INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES

CLASS XXXVIII

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MONOGRAPH

 

 

THE EFFICACY OF POST-COLD WAR U.S. AND RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING REGIME STABILITY AND SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

 

 

BY

 

 

 

COMMANDER ENRIQUE F. MIRANDA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

            WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 1999

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SUMMARY

 

 

            The relationship between the U.S. and Russian arms transfers to Latin America following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War and the arms transfers effects on the maintenance of regime stability and security was examined.  This study uses the focused comparison approach to examine two U.S. cases and two Russian arms transfer cases to Latin American nations. 

           

            The U.S. cases are: Panama and Honduras. The Russian cases are:  Nicaragua and Cuba.  The U.S. and Russian cases were chosen due to the intuitive similarities in the goals of the supplier nation’s involvement in the recipient nation’s ideological status in the region during the Cold War, the amount of arms transfer information available for each nation, and to limit the scope of this research paper.

 

            This research reveals that in the post Cold War environment, U.S. and Russian arms transfers to Latin America have limited impact on the maintenance of regime stability against internal threats.  The role of arms transfers has changed since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent absence of a significant external threat to the security of Latin America.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

            The maintenance of regime stability against Communism in Latin America has been a stated concern of the United States since President Truman proclaimed his Four Points in 1949 and has continued to guide security concerns in the hemisphere throughout the post World War II period.  During the Cold War, the U.S. and much of Latin America had vital interests in maintaining the balance of power against the threat of Soviet influence and expansion within the Latin American continent.  The vital interests of the U.S. included but were not limited to securing strategic accesses in the continent, maintaining influence and cooperation, fostering ideological institutions, and establishing security within the continent.  A major factor in achieving the goals of both the U.S. and Soviet Union were arms transfers in support of government regimes throughout Latin America.

 

            The stability of regimes is still of great importance to the U.S., but for different reasons.  The post Cold War focus of maintaining regime stability is for the achievement of economic development, fostering of democratic institutions, and the establishment of security within the continent.  Arms transfers remain a strong factor for achieving these goals.  This paper examines four specific cases and shows that the efficacy of arms transfers to Latin America in the post Cold War era, 1990 to 1998, for the purpose of maintaining regime stability is highly dependent on the type of threat against the stability of the regime of the recipient nation.  In general, it appears that instability caused by internal threats within a country is not significantly alleviated by arms transfers.  Arms transfers to support regime stability appear to more effectively alleviate instability caused by external threats.

 

            This study is limited to the post Cold War period.  The period in this study is defined as the years 1990 to present.  The year 1990, in general, corresponds to the year of the fall of the Soviet Union.  Intuitively, arms transfers by both the U.S. and russia during the Cold War years were aimed at expanding, containing, countering, and fostering ideological goals of both democracy and communism, respectively.  The period 1990 to 1998 is represented in this study.

 

            In a review of the existing literature of arms transfer there appears several cases where arms transfers and the maintenance of regime stability are correlated. (Kaplan, p. 3)  However, the broad nature and extent of  this correlation is unclear.  For practical purposes, this paper will focus on four cases to reveal in a broad scope the efficacy of U.S. and Russian arms transfers in the post Cold War period (1990-1998) for the maintenance of regime stability, subsequent economic developments, and the overall impact to the Latin American security system.

 

 

Overview of Arms Transfers to Latin America

 

            Today, the United States dominates the arms export market with nearly half of the world’s total.  U.S. sales increased 28% from nearly $12.2 billion in 1994 to nearly $16 billion in 1997.  However, over the entire decade of the 1990’s, U.S. sales has taken a slow 3% decrease annually and 2% decline over the five years.  (WMEAT, p.19)  U.S. arms exports by region of the world from 1990-1997 are shown (in millions of current U.S. dollars) in Table 1.

 

Table 1*

U.S. Arms Exports by Region 1990-1997

 

Middle East                  $18,415           43%

                                      Western Europe               8,885           21

                                      East Asia                          8,130           19

                                      Oceania                            1,140             3

                                      North America                    490             1

                                      Africa                      370             1

                                      Central/South America      370                1

                                      All others                          4,975           11        

 

*Estimates compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990-1997, Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1997).

 

            Russian arms exports reached its highest levels in 1995 with $3.3 billion and showed little sign of revival from the extreme lows of $1.5 million in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In the diminished post-Soviet market, Russia ranked third in world arms exports throughout much of the 1990’s behind the U.S. and Great Britain, with 10% of the world market and 81% of the Eastern European market.  (WMEAT, p. 22)  Table 2 shows Russian arms exports (in millions of current dollars) from 1990-1997.

 

Table 2*

Russian Arms Exports by Region 1990-1997

 

                                     East Asia            $2,235            28%

                                     Middle East                       1,715            22

                                     Eastern Europe                  1,315            16

                                     Africa                                   795            10

                                     South Asia                            740              9

                                     Central Asia                         445              6

                                     Western Europe                   385              5

                                     Central/South America         50                 1

                                     All others                              240              3

 

*Estimates compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990-1997 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1997).

 

            The above data shows that Russia’s arms exports are widespread among regions.  Future arms transfers are likely to increase following the rise of agreements in East Asia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.  (WMEAT, p. 23)

            Arms exports to Latin America have experienced an overall decrease in the post Cold War era.  There is also a sharp decrease in overall military expenditures within Latin American nations.  This amount is an all time high for Latin America.  Much of the overall rise of Latin American military expenditures can be attributed to Brazil’s $3.5 billion increase along with Colombia’s $665 million, Chile’s $336 million, and Peru’s $121 million expenditures during the later half of the 1990’s.  Argentina and Venezuela appear to have experienced sizable decreases in military expenditures with $328 million and $158 million, respectively in the later half of the 1990’s.  Brazil’s 1995 expenditure of  $11 billion ranked 12th in the world.  Table 3 shows the cumulative amount of arms transfers to Central and South America from specific supplier nations (in millions of current dollars).  In general, there has been a significant decline in arms transfers to Latin America. (WMEAT, p. 5)

 

Table 3*

Cumulative Arms Transfers from Supplier to Recipient Nations 1990-1997

Suppliers

Recipient                  T     U     B      R     F     G     C     O     M     E     W     A     Z

Central America

Barbados                    0     0      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Belize                           0     0      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Costa Rica                  5     5      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Cuba                       100     0      0   100     0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Dom Rep                   30   20      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

El Salvador            100 100      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Guatemala                 10     0      0      0      0      0     0      0      5       0      0      0      5

Haiti                             0     0      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Honduras                 40   40      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Jamaica                     10   10      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Nicaragua                   5     0      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

Panama                     5      5      0      0      0      0     0      0      0       0      0      0      0

North America

Canada                   710  400       0      0   290     0     0      0      0       0      20    0      0

Mexico                  155   90       0      0       0     0     0     20     0       0      10    0      5

U.S.                     3,575   X  1200      0   130  310  100  950  340     5      50 190  250

South America

Argentina                 75   50       0      0       0     0     0      0      5       0        0     0      0

Bolivia                       15   10       0      0       0     0     0      0      0       0        0     0      0

Brazil                      430   80     80      0     60  160    0     30     0       0        0     0      0

Chile                       525   20       0      0       0     0     0   180 250       0        0     0      5

Colombia               155   80       0      0       0     0     0       5   20       0        0     0    40

Ecuador                370   20       0      0       0      0     0      0    50    50         0   10    80

Guyana                     0     0       0      0       0      0     0      0      0       0        0     0     0

Paraguay                  25     0       0      0       0      0     0      0      0     10        0   10     5

Peru                        375   20       0      0       0      0     0     20   30   220        0   20     5

Suriname                     0     0       0      0       0      0     0      0      0       0        0     0     0

Uruguay                                  10   10       0      0       0      0     0      0      0       0        0     0     0

Venezuela              250   80       0      0     60      0     0     40   20       0        0    10    0

 

Note:  T= total  U=U.S.  B=U.K.  R=Russia  F=France  G=Germany  C=China  O=Other NATO  M=Mid East  E=Other East Europe  W=Other West Europe  A=Other East Asia  Z= Others

*Estimates compiled from: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990-1997 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1997).

 

The Concept of Regime Stability

 

            The literature of arms transfers and its political significance cites two important cases were arms transfers played a direct role in specifically maintaining a regime’s stability and consequently prevented the regime’s collapse.  These cases are U.S. arms transfers to Jordan and South Korea.

 

            From 1957-1973 the U.S. provided aid to Jordan.  During this period Jordan experienced significant external conflicts and internal strife.  The arms supplied to King Hussein’s military regime by the U.S. satisfied the internal demands of the military factions within Jordan.  The military wanted arms in order to maintain their identity and self-respect as the defenders of the nation against both foreign and domestic enemies.  The military maintained its support for the monarchy and their loyalty to the king.  The regime stability was maintained by U.S. arms transfers to Jordan.  (Kaplan, p.189,203)

 

            The U.S. has long maintained support to the Republic of Korea. This support included vast amounts of military equipment and troop presence.  This relationship has allowed the South Korean regimes to survive a war (1950-1953) and an uneasy truce with North Korea.  South Korea has experienced unprecedented prosperity following the end of World War II.  (Kaplan, p. 203)

 

            What is “regime stability?”  After World War II, the bi-polar environment influenced the direction of U.S. policy towards developing nations and the necessity for military support for their regimes.  The focus of U.S. aid was to aid developing nations toward sustained economic growth and the implementation of the institutions of democracy.  The definition of regime stability can be found in goals the 1984 Kissinger Commission on Central and South America:

-         The absence or elimination of the climate of violence and strife.

-         The development of Democratic institutions and processes.

-         The development of free and strong economies.

-         The development of diversified production for both external and internal markets.

-         Sharp improvements in the social conditions of the citizenry.

-         Substantially improved distribution of income. (Commission, p. 240)

There are many more checklists of regime stability that are found in several empirical studies of regime stability.  Other significant factors included in assessing a regime’s stability are all those elements that have a direct impact on the endurance of a federal political structure and the ability of a nation to eliminate the presence of national disintegration.  (Lemco, p. 24-25)  These factors also include:

-         The stability of the nation’s chief executive.

-         An orderly succession of political power.

-         Orderly collective protests.

-         A Free press.

-         Non-corrupt government.

-         An established and legitimate legal system.

-         Respect for the order of law.  (Lemco, p. 24)

In general, regime stability is the ability of a legitimate government to maintain law and order for the purpose of fostering a climate of economic and social progress with authority and confidence even in the face of internal and /or external threats to the government.

 

 

Hypotheses

 

            Research was based on the examination of the following hypotheses:

1)                  In the post Cold War period (1990-1998), generally, threats to regime stability have not been external in nature and consequently U.S. and Russian arms transfers have not significantly contributed to the recipient nation’s regime stability.

2)                  The amount of arms transfers to a recipient nation has not significantly affected the regime’s stability in view of the recipient nation’s internal or external threat.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the late 1980’s saw the largest amounts of arms transfers to Latin America from the U.S. and Russia.  Following the Jordanian and South Korean experience, the U.S. believed massive amounts of military aid could successfully the survival of regime stability against both external and internal threats.  Likewise, the Soviet Union continued to support revolutionary movements in South and Central America and that massive amounts of military assistance to these movements could result in successful revolution in U.S.-backed nations.

 

            In the Post Cold War period, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, arms transfers declined world-wide from 1990-1998 from both the U.S. and Russia.  The roles of arms transfers appears to have changed and does not appear to play as significant a factor on countering the threats to regime stability in the present geo-political environment.

 

            It is important to note in this study the U.S. external policy towards the majority of developing nations during the Cold War was open support and toleration of dictatorships against communist-backed revolution of insurgency movements.  In the post Cold War, particularly in Latin America, democracy has thrived and freely elected governments are now the clear majority.

 

The Focused Comparison Approach

 

            This study is not intended to be a statistical analysis of U.S. and Russian arms transfers to Central and South  America.  The focused comparison approached is employed.  This method examines a set number of cases and asks a set of general questions in each case.  The questions asked represent either independent or dependent variables.  (George, p.10)

 

            The focused comparison approach examines four cases (two U.S. arms transfer cases and two Russian arms transfer cases) over the period 1990-1998.  The unit of analysis is the supplier-recipient pair.  The U.S. cases are Panama and Honduras and the Russian cases are Nicaragua and Cuba.  These cases were selected because the arms transfers were mainly from a single source, the amount of arms transfer information available, to limit the scope of this research paper, and the significance of these countries during the Cold War period in Latin America. 

 

Dependent Variable

 

            The dependent variables are internal threat, external threat, and regime stability.  These are categorized as either high or low.  These categorizations are general and replace numerical values that can be assigned each variable in a more statistically based analysis such as that conducted by Stephen Andriole in his work, Revolution and Political Instability in 1984 and by David Sanders in his study, Patterns of  Political Instability in 1981.  The perceptions are based primarily from the view of the supplier.  The following shows how the level of the dependent variable is determined in each case:

Variable                       Level

Internal Threat              High:    Increasing number of insurgents.

                                                Increasing number of political assassinations.

                                                Occurrence or likelihood of coup attempts.

                                                Increasing number of political and military factionalism.

                                                Majority of military forces required to counter insurgents

                                                and/or repress political opposition.

                                    Low:    Few or decreasing number of organized insurgents.

                                                Decreasing number or fewer active political oppositions.

                                                Absence of  political violence or fewer political

                                                assassinations.

                                                Loyal military forces to the government.

                                                Military forces not involved in major anti-insurgent or

                                                political repression operations.

External Threat High:    Attacks or likelihood of attacks by foreign military forces.

                                                Potential of armed conflict with extra-territorial forces.

                                    Low:    No hostilities with foreign nations.

                                                No potential for armed hostilities with foreign military

                                                forces.

Regime Stability            High:    Transition of government power by constitutional means or

                                                by the use of  established orderly political mechanisms.

                                                Government forces are able to maintain political,

                                                economic,  and social order.

                                                Government leadership maintains established treaties with

                                                the arms supplier nations.

                                                No likelihood that the leadership and the regime will fall.

                                    Low:    There is significant potential and likelihood that the

                                                government will fall due to internal and/or external threats.

                                                Government forces are unable to maintain political,

                                                Economic, and social order.

                                                No individual or organization is firmly in charge of

                                                leadership.

                                                The government is unable to effectively control internal

                                                or external forces that threaten the nation's legitimacy and

                                                order.

            By determining in each case the level of internal threat, external threat, and the resulting regime stability, the method of focused comparison assures that data from the various cases are comparable.  (Turnbull)

 

Independent Variable

 

            The independent variable is the total U.S. dollar value of U.S. and rusian arms transfers to the recipient nation.  There is a wide variety of data available on the quantity of U.S. and Russian arms transfers.  The most comprehensive data covers annual transfers in current U.S. dollars values. (Fiscal Series)  the U.S. amounts for a specific year vary somewhat from source to source due to current dollar value conversions, liberal estimates of equipment costs, and the specific arms programs involved.  There are also varying inconsistencies with the dollar values for Russian arms transfers.  Much is based on estimates.

 

            For the purposes of this paper it is more important to emphasize the general quantitative patterns in the amounts of arms transferred.  Establishing the trend of arms transfer values within the post Cold War period in each case is the major objective of the independent variable.  The specific dollar values for each case in each year from 1990-1998 is of less importance.

 

Testing the Hypotheses

 

            The hypotheses is tested by using a matrix that represents the examination and findings of each case.  The levels of internal threat, external threat, and the resulting regime stability is determined by matching historical events within the recipient nation to the trend in the amount of arms transferred.  The columns of the matrix contain (from left to right): case and period, internal threat, external threat, regime stability, and the trend of arms transferred.  The hypotheses is proven if the amounts and trend of arms transferred correspond to an increase or decrease in regime stability after examining each case.  The following is a sample matrix:

 

                        Internal External            Regime Trend of

Case                Threat              Threat              Stability            Transfers

Nation A             High                 High                 Low              Increasing

 

Nation B             High                 Low                 Low              Increasing

 

The matrix shows the levels of internal threat and external threat and its relationship to the trend of arms transfers for each case. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PART A

 

POST COLD WAR U.S. AND RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO LATIN AMERICA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER I

 

 

U.S. Arms Transfer Cases

 

            The U.S. cases are: Panama (1990-1998) and Honduras (1990-1998).  These cases were chosen because of the similar foundations and relationship characteristics between the supplier and the recipient nation.  These cases also were chosen because they appear to represent the broad scope and extent of U.S. arms transfers to Latin America allowing for greater generalization in describing the region as a whole.  The extent of arms transfers spans much of the history of these nations since their independence and subsequent regime formations.

 

Panama

 

            By the fall of 1989, the Noriega regime was barely holding onto power.  An unsuccessful attempt by the Panamanian defense forces (PDF) to conduct a coup in October 1989 produced bloody reprisals.  On December 20, 1989 President Bush ordered U.S. forces into Panama to protect U.S. lives and property and to honor treaty obligations to defend and operate the canal, and to assist the Panamanian people in restoring democracy.   Following the operation,  the Noriega regime fell and free elections were restored to Panama and confirmed the leadership of President Endara.  (Background Notes Panama, p. 4)

 

Arms Transfers

 

            Throughout the post-Noriega period, Panama experienced a significant reduction in U.S. arms transfers.  Table 4 shows the amounts of U.S. arms transfers by year.

 

Table 4*

U.S.-Panama Arms Transfers (in current U.S. dollars)

Year        Amount

1990                              6

1991                              0

1992                              0

1993                              0

1994                              0

1995                              0

1996                              1

*Compiled from: World Military expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990-1997 (Washington, D.C.: USACDA, 1997).

 

            The majority of military aid was received throughout the 1970's and 1980's.

 

 

 

 

 

Internal Threat

 

            Following the ouster of Noriega the Panamanians moved quickly to restore and rebuild their democratic civilian constitutional government.  Panama continues to strengthen its representative democracy and judicial system.  The multi-party political system has made strides to improve the nation's economic condition.  But there is potential for increased internal opposition, insurgency, and wide-spread political unrest that undermines the stability of the elected regime of President Balladares.

 

            A significant effort by the Balladares regime continues with the fight against drug trafficking and illegal narcotics.  The country’s proximity to major cocaine producing nations and Panama’s role as a commercial and financial hub make it a country especially important in this aspect of national and regional security.  Although money laundering remains a problem, new banking laws of 1998 should help combat this crime.  Panama has worked closely with U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. (Background Notes Panama, p. 5) The internal threat is evaluated as high.

 

External Threat

 

            The U.S. continues its obligations and commitment in maintaining the Panama Treaty obligations by providing national security to external threats.  Panama has no direct external threat.  There has been armed conflict in the Darien region between government police forces and Colombian insurgents primarily over narco-trafficking operations.

 

            The Panamanian government has converted the former PDF into a civilian “public force.”  This force is subordinate to civilian officials and is composed of five independent units:  the Panamanian National Police,  the National Maritime Service (Coast Guard), the National Air Service,  and the Institutional Protective Service (VIP Security).  A 1994 constitutional amendment abolished the military permanently. (Culturegram Panama) There is increasing potential that the growing police force will assume greater power if  civil unrest continues.  The external threat is characterized as low.

 

Regime Stability

 

            Constitutional processes are in place and in effect.  Free and democratic elections have been conducted and verified by outside observers throughout the decade.  The people of Panama back the legitimacy of the elected regime of President Balladares.

 

            Overall regime stability is low.  The economy is based primarily on a well developed services sector that accounts for 72% of GDP.  A major challenge to the Balladares administration is the turning to productive use the 70,000 acres of U.S. military land and property which will be turned over to the Panamanians by the end of 1999.  As the U.S. military presence departs Panama the country must face the realization that an estimated $170-350 million per year in revenue earned from the U.S. bases will be lost and must be replaced. (Background Notes Panama, p.6)

 

Case Assessment

 

            The U.S. cooperates with the Panamanian government to promote economic, political, and social development through U.S. and international agencies.  The cultural ties between the two countries remain strong. (Culturegram Panama)

 

            The country’s  regime stability is low though democratic processes are in place.  President Endara’s regime struggled to rebuild the nation, but social unrest, poverty, and corruption have hindered progress.  Free elections prevailed in 1994 and President Balladares succeeded leadership of the country in accordance with a free election.  President Balladares has been credited with fighting corruption, stabilizing the economy, and attracting foreign investment. (Background Notes Panama, p.6)

 

            The decrease in arms transfers to the regimes of the 1990’s does not appear to have been a key factor in the maintenance of the countries subsequent regimes. (Culturegram Panama)  The military has been abolished as a separate and powerful institution but could rise again.  All police forces and defense institutions have been subordinated to the civil authorities.  This is a significant cultural and political change in view of the history of the military in Panama.  Arms transfers and military expenditures have reached minimal levels compared to the levels of the 1970's’and 1980's’.  Panama faces a small external threat.  The most significant problems or more precisely, the most significant threats that face the Balladares regime are the numerous internal difficulties of the nation.  These difficulties are the establishment of economic development, the elimination of corruption, defeating drug trafficking and illegal narcotics, and implementing social reforms.  These factors contribute to low regime stability.