INTERAMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES
CLASS XXXIX
Research
Paper
Effects of the Existence of a Superpower on the
Politics, Economics, Cultural, and Military Inter American Integration
Author: Colonel Edward O. Collins
Guyana Defense
Force
FORT LESLEY J.
McNAIR
WASHINGTON, D.C.
May
2000
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
When we consider the effects of the Superpower's presence on the cultural, political, economic, and military integration within the Inter American System, we are immediately confronted with several questions. Not listed in any particular order of priority, the first question that must be addressed, is what is the current state of integration? But this term means different things at different times, often leading to semantic confusion. It therefore, needs to be defined from the outset. "Integration" in this monograph, does not mean to establish an organization such as NATO. Rather, it means adapting to the 'core' as against forming an alliance. For, in the western hemisphere, there are a few countries with similar equipment and doctrine that form part of a core group while the others remain on the periphery. The Superpower is in the core group while its Southern neighbors fall on the periphery. Thus, the current state of integration is determined by the degree to which the Region's militaries have adopted established military professional standards of the core group.
In the same vein, "Western
Hemisphere" is defined as Canada, the United States, and Mexico, along with the
32 countries in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. Western Hemisphere is also synonymous with
such terms as “the Americas,” “the Continent,” and “the Inter-American
System.” They are used interchangeably
throughout the monograph. Similarly, the Superpower in focus is really the
United States and are used interchangeably as well. The historical and cultural
differences among these 19 Latin American states and 14 non-Spanish-speaking
Caribbean countries are noted but nonetheless, certain similarities make it
possible to discuss the region as a whole.
This raises the second question of whether the diversity
in culture, the varying stages of economic development, the fundamentally
different political structures, and the difference in size and limitations of
the militaries, really allow for regional integration? Actually, the power asymmetry among member states
raises doubts and validates the definition. Here, Simon Bolivar's argument
becomes very relevant, although his remarks were directed only at the Latin
American part of the hemisphere.
Bolivar argued against the idea of a "single nation… despite their
common origin, language, customs and religion." America is separated, he
noted, by "climatic differences, geographic diversity, conflicting
interests, and dissimilar characteristic."1 In fact, these differences are so
"dramatic", according to Scheina, that they far outweigh their
similarities.2
A difference that needs highlighting, is the situation
with Cuba and Haiti. Given the
definition, both countries fit the description of western hemisphere states yet do not necessarily
qualify as states integrated within the region. Cuba falls into the category of a rogue state while Haiti is
unquestionably categorized as a failed state.
Fidel Castro still sees no reason to change his communist policies and
will continue to limp along, blaming the United States for his lack of success
while relying on remittances from Miami and the black market to feed and clothe
the Cuban population.
Haiti too, the region's
failed state, will continue to rely on remittances, drug money, and foreign
assistance to remain marginally viable as a state. It will take a drastic change in the philosophy of governance in
both states, if there is to be any hope for integration with regional
associations, let alone military integration.
Political change is not likely to occur before Castro leaves power, and
a change of regime in Cuba does not appear imminent. Meanwhile the United States continues to isolate Cuba
economically and diplomatically, forcing the issue and encouraging change
through such measures as the controversial Helms-Burton Act of 1996. It
is well known that the region's fading rogue state, continues to be
opposed to the democratic values and free-market practices that now
characterize the Region. Similarly, it is common knowledge that Haiti still has
a far way, before it can be considered a democracy. Discussion in this monograph therefore, ignores these two
states.
In any case, the scope of this monograph allows for a detailed
discussion, only on the military aspect of integration. But due to the
interdependent nature of political, economic, cultural, and military
expressions of power, it is necessary to make two assumptions in support of
this focus. One stems from the widely
accepted view that political and economic reforms in the region are well
underway, and therefore would not be discussed separately in this
monograph. Reference to them is only
for illustrative purpose when discussing the central theme. The other assumption is based on the
overwhelming evidence drawn from the literature, supporting the argument that
the United States' McDonalds, Hollywood, CNN and so on, have had a crippling
effect on cultural integration in the region.
As well, there would be no further elaboration on cultural integration
in the remainder of the monograph.
The monograph posits the view that while the United States' commercial institutions have negatively affected the cultural integration in the Region, and its attitude has forced the countries to opt for military integration at the sub-regional level, its very presence as a champion of democracy has a positive effect on political and economic integration. In testing this view, the research will show that U.S.' integration efforts have always been influenced by its global strategic considerations and domestic concerns but nonetheless, in pursuing those interests, it contributed in a significant way towards military reform.
The final question that we are confronted with, is who is the superpower? This is a question that naturally arises; and becomes crucial to the discussion. It forms the central theme of the monograph since any assessment of integration is dependent on knowledge of the most important player in the region, the United States, and what makes it tick. The intent of this monograph, therefore, is to examine the United States' expressions of power within a global context, and to identify certain traits in its global strategic policy that might be present in its security policy for the region; in order to observe the developments and trends that have occurred during the period 1970-1999. The link between strategic policy and pursuit of national interests, explains the relationship between the Superpower and its southern neighbors. This is key to understanding the state of regional integration.
CHAPTER II: CAN THE U.S. HONOR ITS GLOBAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND MEET ITS REGIONAL INTERESTS?
One of the most
dramatic world events in the 20th century bipolar World, was
undoubtedly the shocking defeat by one pole over the other. Implicit in this defeat is the triumph of
democracy over communism. It meant that
the free market open economy is after all, a better economic model than the
closed economy. Additionally, when the
United States’ strategy of containment successfully saw the collapse of the
Soviet Union, it meant also that the "West" was militarily superior
to the "East."
The consequence for
this victory is a global responsibility, but little in its own history has
prepared the single Superpower for this awesome task. One should recall that the nation was conceived in the revolt
against power politics, followed by a century of safety and continental
expansion. However ironic it may be, recall
also that that the US evolution to world power was determined, in part, by a
war it fought against a member of the Inter American System, Mexico.3
Nevertheless, it evolved into a global power and throughout the years, strove to maintain its status quo. Perhaps it would not be unreasonable to conclude that, from a global perspective, the maintenance of its status quo has always been central to the Superpower’s strategic policy. It is no different today, only this time it has found itself in the unique position of being the only standing superpower. And herein, lies the paradox, as the situation defies theory. Some scholars of power politics actually looked forward to a similar situation of fragmentation in the western hemisphere, as occurred in the Eastern bloc during the 1980s.
According to these theorists, no alliance should survive victory. It was expected that no sooner the one pole was defeated than the other alliance should have collapsed, with its members defecting to aggregate their power against the standing superpower. They have cited the Hapsburg Empire during the reign of both Charles V and Phillip II; France under Louis XIV and Napoleon I, Germany of Wilhelm and Adolf; Russia ruled by Stalin and Khrushchev. All of them suffered at one time or another the same fate of being the object of mistrust and the target of their one-time allies ganging up against them. Even the nineteenth century European coalition that scored victory against Napoleon in 1815 had fragmented seven years later - by 1822.4
But the reverse seems true in this
situation. In the North, the alliance
has not collapsed and is showing no signs of so doing. Rather, it is expanding - Poland Hungary, et
al. To the South, there has been, what
can best be described as a "wave of economic and political openness"
traveling from the North. In the
process, the states in the Region seem to be emerging together into some kind
of peaceable commonwealth of responsible democracies, joined by economic
considerations and democratic principles.5 At the same time, the world's only
superpower (the United States) maintains balance and manages security in the
world's vital regions. It grapples with
two other economic giants, Japan and the European Union (EU) while keeping a
wary eye on the largest remnant of the Soviet Union. It has not ruled out the possibility of China rising to challenge
the global position of the United States."6
These various activities
emphasize the role of the United States in shaping not only the World but the
Region as well; yet it remains unchallenged after its victory of the Cold
war. Not only that, the US has since
developed into the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power -
economic, military, cultural, ideological, and technological - with the reach
and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world.7
These activities surely contradict the "Victory gives no rights”
position of Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mariano Varela in responding
to the question about his nation’s demands following the War of the Triple
Alliance. 8 Given its global responsibility,
perhaps the greatest fear for the only Superpower, according to many analysts,
is another great power conflict or a change to the global status quo. More so, if that change would mean a
restless Japan, or an obstreperous European Union, or a China that is at once
strong and revisionist, the United States will most likely, want to extend the
status quo, or at least to govern the change.9
If logic follows its natural
course, then other tasks such as regional integration become subsidiary ones. John Hillen amply explains that the
Superpower’s decision about what region is to have priority over the other are
usually influenced by many factors but national interests, would have a greater
significance than either altruistic motives or crusading impulses.10
For the Americas, the U.S. national interests are still centered on
security, defense reforms, economic, and core values. They are all interdependent, so the U.S. pursues the other
interests in order to create the conditions necessary for the accomplishment of
its security interest. For example,
hemispheric cooperation is enhanced through increased economic integration.
The Americas have, nonetheless, presented many opportunities and
challenges for the United States, especially after the Cold War. On the one hand there is opportunity in the
trend toward increasing democratization, regional stability, economic growth,
and integration. On the other hand
security is challenged by chronic corruption, insurgencies, human rights
violations, deeply-rooted organized crime and, as a consequence, economic
migration. At best, this situation is
probably a manifestation of Rosenau's view of world politics today. The central
characteristics of world politics today, he argued, are the “persistent tensions
between tendencies toward integration and those that foster fragmentation.”11
From the Latin American perspective, the intentions of the U.S.
government regarding integration in the hemisphere are often unclear and
sometimes suspect. This view is based
on a history of U.S. inconsistent relations with the region, from "benign
neglect" to unilateral military intervention.12
Is There a Real or Perceived Threat to the Status
Quo?
While the theorists of power politics seem baffled by the current international system of one superpower, historians provide examples in an attempt to explain the paradox. Most of them have put the US in the same historical image of Rome in its imperial heyday. Nobody balanced against Rome, they noted, because it was practically identical with the international system itself. It comprised lands that stretched from the British Isles to North Africa, from the Levant to Lusitania. It defeated rivals like Carthage and Macedonia and only had to deal with rebellious tribes such as the Gauls and Germans. It did not have to deal with other empires or any other states. Thus there were no balancers against Rome. " Does this apply to the United States today?
Several analysts believe it does, yet some commentators actually feel that there are worthy competitors capable of containing the US, if not singly, then in combination.13 It is like something akin to Kishore Muhabani's “West against the Rest.” In fact Huntington strongly believes that already attempts are being made by nations to keep the US in check. The Primakov doctrine named after the then Russian Prime Minister,Yevgeni Primakov, for example, articulated the concept of Russia, China, and India being the strategic triangle to act as the counter balance to the United States. Reportedly, this doctrine is widely supported among Russian politicians. When Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin huddled in Moscow they came up with a strategic partnership against those who would "push the world toward a unipolar order.
Not long after, it was the Chinese
president and French President Jacques Chirac's turn to make the anti-hegemonic
noises, invoking a new world order with other "power centers besides the
United States."14 Other examples of
cooperation can be found in the Arab World. The most glaring one that should
have alarmed the American leadership, is the recent move to improve the Iran -
Saudia Arabia relationship; and the relationship between Iraq and Iran. Only a
few years ago, this was considered as an unthinkable event. The other which should
have caused embarrassment to the American leadership, was The Organization of
Islamic Conference hosted by Iran. Notably, it was held at the same time the
United States sponsored a meeting on Middle Eastern economic development in
Qatar. The Iran's gathering was highly
successful while the Qatar's turned out to be a "disaster."15
What is more, is that at all
of these gatherings of cooperation, the United States was deliberately left
out. Even when the Heads of the German,
French and Russian governments met in Moscow both the United States and its
closest ally, the United Kingdom were not invited. The picture becomes clearer, if the French Foreign Minister,
Hubert Vedrine's statement is to be taken as a reason for the formation of the
European Union (EU). Reportedly, the
Minister has said that Europe must come together on its own and create a
counterweight to stop the United States from dominating a multipolar world.16 The European (EU) stands tall with
two nuclear powers and an economy larger than America's. Even without the
Soviet empire, Russia still stretches across 11 time zones and retains a mighty
nuclear arsenal.
Rhetoric aside, do these gatherings constitute a real or a perceived threat to US? Do they warrant a response? Some analysts such as Huntington, feel that the Chinese connection, at least, had its desired effect on the Superpower. Joseff and others, dismissed the move as "an anachronism, a pale copy of a mainstay of statecraft in centuries past" They take comfort in the fact that China nor no single state can amass enough power to rival the United States for decades.17
So contemporary United States is
like Imperial Rome in some ways but unlike Rome, the United States does not
conquer. It may be in the "nature and behavior of this peculiar American
beast" according to Joseff, to call the shots and try to bend the rules
but it does not go to war for land and glory. Indeed it was a long time since
the US has not grabbed land. Actually,
these views derive from one set of perceptions of the US. But there is another set of perceptions from
a diametrically opposed viewpoint. For example, the Islamic conspiracy
theorists refer to the dark satanic United States" and can see only
deliberate purpose and focused aim in every aspect of what it does; or indeed
does not do. In Iran, during the
July1999 student unrest the media presented the Great Satan simultaneously as
an evil, all-powerful mastermind; and an inept, muscle-bound moron. Others see
a unilateral United States which has made military power its tool of choice;
still others talk of an American with a network of allies around the world,
ensuring strategic stability in the key areas of Asia Europe and the Middle
East.18
Perceptions
by definition are subjective but this does not mean that they should not be
based on an accurate understanding of the facts. More importantly they should be based on the party’s interests,
values and own perceptions. In this
regard, it should be noted that while the
United States may irk and domineer friends and foes alike, it relies on
its various expressions of power, unlike
Rome, to achieve its national objectives.
Examining the U.S. expressions of power might be useful in correcting misperceptions, especially in the
relationship between Latin American
countries on the one hand and the United States on the other. As Scheina noted,
the US continues to see its southern neighbors as one “Latin American” region
while those in the South continuously fail to grasp the difference between
theirs and the United States' political structure of government.
The
next chapter explores two of these expressions of power - political and
military - and how the United States uses them in advancing its strategic
policy to protect national interests. This approach is influenced by the US
"Strategy of Engagement" in which it emphasizes that the United
States "must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of
national power to influence the actions of other states."19
For this approach to be relevant two premises must be accepted.
One is that integration into the mainstream depends on political freedom and
sound economic principles. The other is that, the exercise of Superpower's
military expression of power to achieve its national objectives, depend on the
spread of democracy. It should be noted
however, that in the context of Superpower politics, these are more instruments
than they are expressions of power; but nonetheless are referred to as
expressions in the discussion.
.
CHAPTER III: USING ITS POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF POWER
TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO
Understanding the Structure of U.S. Government: Is
it Necessary?
Even the most reticent student of the
IADC will know that familiarity with the structure of U.S. government is
essential to an understanding of how its political expression of power might
affect regional integration. So why leaders continuously fail to meet this
requirement, as Robert Scheina noted, is the question that naturally arises
here. Under the circumstances, two
possible reasons are advanced. The first and obvious explanation flows from
the traditional nature of the United States itself. The country is not and never has been a simple one-dimensional
power, even when its foreign and security policy was characterized by the high
degree of societal mobilization of the two world wars and the Cold war. Of note are, American federalism, the
constitutional system of checks and balances, the absence of a cabinet
government in the usual sense and an exceptionally vibrant, diverse and powerful
society. All of this was never going to
make the US an easy place to figure out.
Still, many have observed that the US institutions and their workings
remain essentially the same, throughout the years. They are no more and no less federal; polycentric and sometimes
eccentric than in the past. The checks
and balances of America's durable constitution are still there, along with
occasional gridlock. America's political life, not unlike that of other
democracies, is punctuated from time to time by severe, sometimes bizarre
scandals. Monicagate may have been
weird but the so was Iran-Contra.
Another and perhaps more relevant cause for this failure is because the United States has necessarily become more unpredictable as a result of the loss of focus occasioned by the end of the Cold War. When practically every facet of international life could, and usually was, connected to the US-Soviet power play, it was comparatively simple to determine attitudes on a broad range of Inter American issues. There no longer exist such a shared and overarching view of the US place and purpose in the world. This lapse of U.S. attention probably explains why the leaders of Latin America and Caribbean states are unclear about U.S. intentions towards the region. It certainly provides reasons for Rosenau to hold the "integration versus fragmentation" view of world politics today. 20
At any rate, the US is one of a kind with no countervailing force to
balance it, so the lapse is not crucial.
But, the same cannot be said for regional leaders' attention to their
northern neighbor's political expression of power; as the rest of the world
cannot and does not ignore the United States.
The U.S. in turn, according to Michael Mandelbaum, is basically
attempting to focus on what it sees as its own affairs with no malign
intention. He amply captures this in
colorful caricature when he commented: "If you are the 800-pound gorilla,
you are bound to be concentrating on your bananas and everyone else is
concentrating on you."21 This banana analogy is no doubt revealing of
how difficult it is for the Superpower to carry on with its business without
interfering in what others consider as their own. In fact, the U.S. and the European Union nearly engaged in a
major war because of that tropical fruit. It had to take the
intervention of bona fide multilateral institution, the World Trade
Organization (WTO), to sort out the banana issue.
Every effort should therefore be made towards familiarizing oneself with the structure of U.S. government, especially if one has to assess its effect on Inter American integration. This is however, not an easy task when it is noted that the functioning of U.S. government institutions is a complex activity. The problem is aggravated by a particular US constitutional provision that is biased towards domestic legislation taking precedence over international commitments and US legislation being applied extraterritorially. While the Executive branch might be inclined to act with relative restraint in this regard, the same cannot be said for the US Legislative Branch. The 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the Helms-Burton Act relating to Cuba are not only classic examples, but also stand out because of the enormity of their pretensions. The U.S.-Cuba relationship on counter-drugs efforts bears testimony to what some view as double-standards, but the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs argued that it "does not mean we are formalizing our relations with the Cuban Government."21a
Along with this constitutional trait, comes a political mindset that favors unilateralism. This mindset, it should be noted, is obviously not unique to the US, yet it becomes more arrogant when endorsed by the world's only superpower. The mindset has to do with the US capability to orient multilateral decision-making, notably in the United Nations. But what has been noted, is even if the endorsement of US or NATO action by UN Security Council is still valued, as it was at the end of Kosovo campaign, there is clearly no serious intention for involving the Security Council in any systematic manner. For the US, the complexities of diplomacy and particularly, multilateral diplomacy are seen as inevitable but secondary at best, needlessly burdensome and constraining at worst.
Formulating U.S. Foreign Policy in Pursuit of its
Interests: Effects on the Region
No other government
activity can illustrate the complex nature of
the United States' political expression of power than the process
of formulating its foreign policy. For one thing, it brings out the tension
created due to separation of powers, especially between the Executive and the
Legislature; and in the process, reveals the internal dynamics particularly the
influence of public opinion, that affect decision-making.. For another, it serves as a reminder that,
like every other nation, the United States has goals for its foreign
policy. And as the current Secretary of
State, Madeline Albright admitted that these goals have not changed in more
than 200 years. They are, Albright
wrote, "to ensure the continued security, prosperity, and freedom of our
(American) people."22
(parenthesis mine)
US Senatator John
McCain, however, cautioned American policy makers against the temptation to
inject the US into every foreign policy issue that arises because of the US,
values and far-reaching interests. The
US has limited resources, he reminded them, and at any rate, not all of the US
perceived interests are of equal importance.
It is clearly neither possible nor desirable for the US to simply dive
into every foreign problem and devote whatever efforts are necessary to reach a
solution. The US needs a focused
strategy, he agued, that allows it to sort through the day-to-day problems that
arise and ensure that resources are applied where they would have the greatest
impact over the long term. Such a
strategy is as important to crafting foreign policy as are the fundamental
American values on which it must rest. 23
Thus, the extent to
which integration within the Inter American system benefited from the US policy
is directly related to the convergence of interests, if at all. This probably explains why American politics
have hinged for the most part on domestic issues, after the end of the Cold war
where the policy was to stem Communist expansion,. Since then, foreign and national security issues have been, at
best, an occasional activity; resulting in the failure to develop any coherent
foreign policy.24 Many have attributed this lack of attention
to the tension between the Congress and the Executive. Others, have however noted that this has
always been the case and is not really a phenomenon following the Cold
War. About two decades ago for
instance, the relationship between these two Branches was described as one in
"fundamental or even institutional crisis."25
The facts are however pointing towards an unsure U.S. commitment. President Clinton’s visits to Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, and South America , twice in two years (1997
and 1998), bears testimony to the Executive’s interest in the region. Congressional decisions such as the
non-expansion of NAFTA to Chile and rejection of the fast-track authority ,
raise doubts about the U.S. sincerity for true partnership.25a
So today with the
Global responsibility and its several parts each interacting with the other on
a daily basis, plus the desire for regional cooperation, public support is
essential for any new policy. A key
step in drawing in the public is to engage the Congress, as it is vital that
this institution be involved in deciding on questions of strategy-direction,
commitment, and allocation of resources.26 The Executive cannot sustain any long-term
policies without Congressional support. Yet the leaders in the region are
frequently frustrated and dislike the intrusion of domestic political interests
into foreign policies. They
particularly object to the inevitable delays caused by the government trying to
work through the differences. The
leaders from parliamentary system of government sometimes do not recognize how
the U.S separation of powers produce a distinctive process of governance. In
fact, Richard Neustadt emphasized that the powers are not separated, but in
fact shared and therefore must usually be worked out politically.27
It took the
incident involving President Clinton with the Fast Track Authority to remind
Regional leaders of the limitations to the American President's authority on
multilateral agreements. Although the incident is in relation to foreign trade,
it nonetheless bears some relevance to the integration process. In 1974, Congress had established the
so-called "fast-track" procedures in order to allow it to vote on the
president's multifaceted trade agreements in an up-or-down decision; moreover
various formal and informal procedures complemented this grant of negotiating
authority, so Congress could influence the Executive without reassuming full
responsibility for the results.
Congress felt that by keeping the Executive in the forefront of negotiations,
it could maintain some protection from interests seeking special
treatment. The Executive made good use
of this extension of negotiating authority.
It completed the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTAA), The North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Uruguay Round of GATT.
Interestingly,
after winning the Congressional passage of
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, the Administration focused on two other
free trade areas. One was the free
Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 and the other was the Asia-Pacific economies
(APEC free trade). In the latter case,
it set a deadline of 2010 for the
developed countries and 2020 for all.
The results are well known to this Region. Here, the Executive became complacent with the authority and
apparently took the relationship with the Congress for granted. Fast-track authority had expired and when
the Executive attempted to win support for reviving this negotiating authority
in 1997, he could only marshal about 40 out of approximately 20 members of his
own party in the House.
This incident offers
a salutary lesson. Protectionist
interests prevailed. Many Democratic members rely heavily on the financial and
organizational support from the AFL-CIO trade union confederation for
re-election. Since this organization
opposed the renewal of the fast-track authority, these members were not willing
to take on the union. The Executive was
never to recover the ground he had lost so it is now left up to the new
Executive to re-establish that partnership with Congress.
However frustrated
Latin American and Caribbean leaders may feel about this system, one point that
forcefully comes out here is that it served the purpose of Americans. And it will always attract foreign
criticisms not only from members of the Inter American regionbut outsiders as
well. For example, some critics noted
with disappointment that the President and the Congress each had the powers to
prevent actions by the other. Splitting
of sovereignty into many parts in actual fact was having no sovereign.28
James Bryce, an Englishman who displayed sympathy and even enthusiasm
for the American Commonwealth, was still moved to observe politely that the
designers of the constitution had "underrated the inconveniences which
would arise from the disjunction of the two chief organs of government."29
Writing in the 1830s, the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville thought that
the limitations on America's effective conduct of foreign policy resulted from
the nature of democracy. That is,
"foreign politics demand scarcely any of these qualities which are
peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of
almost all those in which it is deficient"30
Even American
commentators have recognized the tension that the constitution has created over
foreign policy. One Constitution Scholar,
Edwin Corwin summarized shelves and shelves of writings on the topic concluding
that the constitution is an "invitation to struggle for the privilege of
directing American foreign policy"31 One former Congressman, Lee Hamilton has
noted that Congress and the Executive have a foreign policy partnership with a
"creative tension." In his
view, the two branches must work out a shared, effective responsibility to
formulate the policy, but nonetheless, Congress should defer to the President
on implementation.32
But the most
crucial point to an understanding of the impact of US policy on regional
integration, is when Lee Hamilton noted that this "decentralized
process" has a bias towards unilateralism in foreign policy. This approach, he argued, makes it harder to
manage alliances, institutions and long-term policies across regions, and
topics in a highly interconnected and complex world.33
When one considers the enormous influence of American interest groups
other than the AFL-CIO, one is bound to see the need for an understanding of
U.S. institutions if any credible assessment of Inter American integration is
to be made.
Madeline Albright
provides some insights into the workings of this institution when she pointed
out that "foreign policy is not dialogue but deeds", and admitted
that much of the energy at State Department is spent encouraging foreign
governments to act for what the United States perceives to be the common
good. Instructively, this includes,
dissuading regional rivals from provocative acts, promoting economic reform,
blocking destabilizing transfers of arms and technologies, urging the release
of political prisoners, and advocating the development of democratic practices
and institutions. All of this is done,
she wrote, to prevent conflicts, build prosperity, and strengthen the forces of
freedom.34 In order to succeed, the US must convince
foreign governments that the ‘common good’ is good for them as well and the
agenda of the United States is aboveboard.
Yet the approach differs from country to country and situation to
situation. Sometimes it is better to
use the carrot of engagement while at other times the stick of sanctions is the
preferred option.35
Regarding the
influence of domestic interests on American foreign policy, it is very
instructive to note that generally, the U.S. public opinion, tend to be in sync
with the rest of the world. Most people argue for a shift in emphasis to
domestic issues, now that the greatest danger to Global security (the Soviet
Union threat) is neutralized. Preoccupied
with domestic issues, foreign policy seems less pressing thus, they seem to
care very little about which other power falls or which one rises, once it does
not affect their quality of life. And
that is all that matters with regard to American foreign policy.36
With respect to regional
integration, the views are categorized as left, right and center. The left argue against what the theorists
term the ‘imperial overstretch’ as this will eventually lead to national
decline. In their view, foreign
expenditures in general but particularly on anything military (cooperation or
integration, it does not matter) create a severe drain on resources that are
much needed for national development.37
Those of the right cannot see the need for foreign military activity as
democracy and free market economies have triumphed over their opposites. This situation is aptly summed up by one
political analyst as " the right not wanting to inflict the world on the
United States and the left not wanting to inflict the U.S. on the world. Down the center the prevailing view is
that the United States has a Global responsibility that may from time to time
demand foreign intervention but nonetheless it should not actively take on this
leadership role until it consolidates its economy.38 Still, there are some who have
even gone further by advocating cuts in defense expenditures, to which most governments
- the United States included, responded
with rapid down-sizing of their armed forces. This means that the United States
ability to maintain a global presence through the foreign base infrastructure
would be affected. As well, the cuts in
U.S. defense budgets have reduced its ability to support integration programs
such as military aid, and military-to-military cooperation programs, became
severely reduced.39
.
CHAPTER IV: USING ITS MILITARY EXPRESSION OF POWER TO MAINTAIN THE
STATUS QUO
Global Strategic Policy in Support of Global
Responsibility
Absent a threat to its national interests, the US strategic policy is constrained by a persistent desire among Americans to remain the premier Global power while also becoming increasingly reluctant to bear the cost of being a global policeman.40 Maintaining the status quo, however, implies keeping everybody else from uniting against it. How can the US achieve both when its foreign relations is apparently guided by the belief that those who coerce or subjugate others are likely to inspire hostile alliances? There are no simple answers but policy analyst and historians recall two great powers that were one time or another in the same position as contemporary United States. Imperial Britain and Germany under Bismarck, offer interesting historical examples of how to maintain the status quo. That is, to render hostile coalitions either impossible or unnecessary; or alternatively, to preempt or prevent them.
Recalling these two paradigms may help one understand why the United States retains its status quo and seems least bothered by the Russian-Chinese-Israel antics. At the same time, it provides a framework for analyzing the US role in global security; and puts into context, the sticky issue of Inter American integration. Adopting the strategy of either Imperial Britain or Germany under Bismarck is likely to enhance the Superpower's implementation of its grand strategy to "…leverage its influence and capabilities…as leader of an ad hoc coalition…"41
The strategy of Imperial Britain was to stay engaged without getting entangled. It avoided the European quarrels as much as possible and only when it was absolutely necessary did Britain intervene. On those occassions, it was always against the tyrant of the day and with an overwhelming force. It fought with and against France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Prussia-Germany. The British maxim of the day made popular by Henry VII was, "whom I support, will prevail."42 In this way, Britain was able to reduce the other powers' incentives for ganging up, or to break up the gang when it formed nonetheless. Britain recognized that by providing no incentives for ganging up was preemptive and this was even more economical than breaking up coalitions.
Notably, it was Britain that engineered all of the continental coalitions against the Habsburgs and the Hitlers during the great European struggles for supremacy. They were all ad hoc coalitions formed around specific objectives. It then withdrew from the European system after victory, thereby removing itself as a target. The name of the game was balance, not conquest - at least not in Europe.43 The no-conquest rule also reduced future costs by leaving no permanent enmities on the books. This allowed Britain to create alliance options in the next round and, therefore, was always able to mastermind those superior coalitions that brought down the Continental tyrants. Britain invested in the Royal Navy and became master of the seas thus, multiplying its options while reducing costs. Like America's decisive battles at Midway, Britain's decisive battles were won at sea - against the Spanish Armada and at Trafalgar - and at far smaller cost than Napoleon's victory at Borodino. This strategy secured Britain's exalted status as the only global power for about two centuries.
The US Regional, not necessarily its global strategy, is more like that of Britain's. Masterminding the coalition forces against Saddam Hussein and NATO's intervention against the Serbs in the recent Balkan's conflict are two such examples. Like Britain, the US minimizes itself as a target by staying offshore as an over-the-horizon presence in the Western Pacific and Mediterranean. The presence of its ground forces deployed in Japan, South Korea and Western Europe are widely accepted as legitimate deployment. Add to Britain's superior navy, the United States' unmatched air force and the greatest deterrent of all - nuclear weapons. And one could figure out why the US still remains unchallenged as the only superpower
Germany's grand strategy, after its unification in 1871, was the opposite extreme, and perhaps one more akin to contemporary America. That is, not intermittent intervention but permanent entanglement. United Germany was the mightiest actor on the stage - as is the case with present day United States, globally. Bismarck's fear of coalition reached nightmarish proportions. He reacted by seeking to cement better relations with all contenders that were likely to establish a coalition among themselves. The Iron Chancellor believed that as long as all these relationships converge in Berlin like spokes in a hub, Germany would be the manager, not the victim, of European diplomacy.
Being almost in the center of four powers, Germany realized that even though it could hold off any challenger, it could not dominate all of them at once. Germany therefore, had to manage Europe's fragile equilibrium from the center. It thus, created "a universal political situation in which all the powers except France need us and, by dint of their mutual relations, are kept as much as is possible from forming coalitions against us."44
The United States is a bit like Britain and a lot like Bismarck's Germany, but with far more clout than either, and on a global scale. Its interests and its presence span the globe, and therefore is always in harms way. In fact, there are some, like Senator John McCain, who actually feel that the United States is quite often the deliberate target of other countries' policies - be it market protection, weapons proliferation, destabilizing regional activities or targeting exports to U.Smarkets.45 In this scenario, the US cannot even rely on the other great powers to stalemate each other. For instance, how would the European Union balance China?
Many are therefore, of the view that President Clinton’s 'imperative engagement.' In fact, the US National Military Strategy is centered on “Shaping, Responding, and Preparing Now.” But some advocates of the strategy actually feel that if the US is "successful in shaping the environment, there will be no need for a military response because it would have forestalled or deter any threats that might arise."46
When compared, it seems as though the Bismarck's, not Britain's grand strategy has a closer resemblance to the United States' current grand strategy.47 Even if Russia, China et al. coalesced, the US could still deter them as long as it could inflict unacceptable damage on each and all. So, ganging up does not threaten the US core security. Indeed, because they can deter all comers, nuclear weapons are an isolationist dream, but unlike yesterday's Britain, the isolationist option is not a viable one for the United States. Unlike the United States, Britain was not really part of the European great-power system. In order to maintain the status quo therefore, the US foreign policy must take into account the security imperatives peculiar to each region.
Regional Integration as part of U.S. Global
Strategic Policy
Regional integration within the Inter American system must be seen from a global perspective, if one is to be objective in assessing its current state of affairs. Globally, the US strategy is a model of Bismarck's. Using Joseff's model of Bismarck's "hub and spoke" analogy, the US capital, Washington can be seen as the hub and the spokes as Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and to a lesser extent, its Southern neighbors (Latin America and the Caribbean). No matter how antagonistic they may each feel towards the United States, their association with the "hub" is by far more important to them than their ties to one another. Take the Pacific states for example. The United States has fought wars against Japan, North Korea-China, and North Vietnam-Soviet Union, yet the US has better relations with Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea than these states have with one another.
Lesser states like Thailand and even Vietnam would rather huddle under the US umbrella than be exposed to the larger Pacific powers. Despite their "strategic partnership," China and Russia look to the US as an implicit ally against each other. Moreover, they have been quite content to let the US carry the burden of constraining North Korea's nuclear ambitions, even though each had played its own game with that country. All Asia count on the US security guarantee to keep Japan from converting its economic power into military expression.
In the Middle East, the US inserted its spoke decades ago when it curtailed the imperial careers of Britain and France during the 1956 Suez War. Apart from Iraq, everybody now looks to the US to help sort out their ancient quarrels. The same can be said for the Latin American and Caribbean states. Meanwhile, the US dispenses side payments in the form of economic and military aid to its various clients and tacit guarantees of everybody's security against everybody else. When the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan made peace with Israel in 1993 and1994, the signings took place in the White House Rose Garden.
With respect to Western Europe, this region has been linked to the US hub since 1945. Britain, Germany, Italy and even France need the United States as a security backer of last resort. Moreover, as balancer against a resurgent Russia and against each other as well. For Europeans, it is quite reassuring to have in the game, an extra-continental player that is bigger than each and all. At any rate, despite the "Strategic Concept" drafted by NATO, Europe is a long way from providing its own security. It has not been very good at producing public goods like security. Even the 65-paragraph document has some flaws. For one thing, it is too long and the quality of its contents is aptly captured by Heisbourg who observed that it is "a thoroughly indigestible "Strategic Concept" which only insomniacs and students of international relations would read in its entirety."48 One can therefore understand why, after three long years of European humiliation at the hands of the Serbs, it had to be the US cruise missiles that brought Mr. Karadzic and then Mr. Milosevic to their senses.
Europeans are well aware that the world would be a much more dangerous place without the structuring framework provided by global American alliance commitment, be they multilateral or bilateral, and the military means to sustain them.49 But as was demonstrated by Kososvo intervention, they also understand that the US participation in the international security architecture is no longer a given as was the case during the Cold War. It is now, as a result of America's own perceptions and choices. Thus preserving a modicum of order in a disorderly world implies a reviewing some of the agreements.
Latin America and The Caribbean
While the Europeans collectively seem clear about the importance they attach to sustained US engagement in global affairs, the perception expresses itself differently in Latin America and the Caribbean. These states have until now given every sign of recognizing that the US is the Region's great stabilizer, playing the role of a virtual mediator between states with actual or perceived border problems. However, efforts at military integration dating back to the early twentieth-century, have been plagued by suspicion. This is largely due to the frequent U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean and in Central America. And when one considers the amount of territory lost to the US by its closest Southern neighbor, Mexico between 1835-1848, the feelings would be quite understandable. In fact, Scheina estimates the "amount of territory that has been conquered through military operations" to an area equivalent to continental USA west of the Mississippi river.50
So, there can be no question as to
the existence of the spoke that links Latin America and the Caribbean to the
Washington hub. For any credible
inter-American military integration therefore, the U.S. ought to be cognizant
of its Southern neighbors' lingering suspicion about its true motives. Despite the good intentions expressed in the
1930s "Good-Neighbor" policy and the Rio Pact of 1947, this point
cannot be overemphasized as US attention to Latin America has historically
ebbed and flowed. Donald Schultz could
not be more accurate when he noted that, unless there was a crisis, the US tend
to take the region for granted.51
Historically, this hub and spoke relationship fluctuated between good and strained, and has, always been a source of great concern for regional leaders. In any case, some scholars of regional integration always doubted the Superpower's 'good intention.' They argued that since the time of the Munroe doctrine promoted in 1823, the United States relations with the Region was never one of security cooperation. Rather, its primary focus was on excluding external powers from the hemisphere and used diplomacy and flexing of its military muscles to accomplish this. Evidence of this intent was especially pronounced during the Cold War when there were the occasional U.S. military, economic and at times diplomatic interventions, particularly in the Caribbean basin. Such actions were necessary, according to the U.S. to curb Soviet and Cuban influence in the Region. That the states continue to harbor suspicion is therefore, not without basis.
Attempts at integration after the war were again met with suspicion even when those initiatives clearly sought to allay fears of U.S. unilateral intervention . A case in point, is the U.S. proposal for a standing peace-keeping force in the OAS. Promoted during the ‘apogee’ days of the Inter American System (IAMS), the idea of such a force was also meant to act as a potential deterrence to intra-hemispheric conflict; as well as a rationale for military assistance program that should have been more palatable to Congress than "aid to dictators"52 But sides rejected the idea. The very notion of having a NATO type organization established in the region is unpalatable for most states in the South. They believed that such a Force would have been an instrument of the U.S. policy and in any case, giving legal status to the OAS, is likely to ‘militarized’ it on the NATO pattern. At any rate, the proposal did not attract the required support from the U.S. Department of Defense. The main reason was the fear of having multilateral control over significant U.S. military resources.53 A lack of confidence was clearly evident on both sides.
Since then, Regional Leaders still regarded U.S. approach to regional cooperation as skewed towards its own objectives with little or no interest in the goals of other member states. Past policies, for instance, tended to generalize the entire region, without taking into consideration that the countries differ psychosocially, politically, militarily and economically. Some states are more politically matured than others. The English speaking Caribbean countries are culturally different from their Latin American sister-states. Not being fully conversant with U.S. political expression of power, the leaders constantly complained about these policies that tend to unilaterally impose the views of the U.S. on regional issues without consultation.
The Superpower’s Integration efforts: How Successful?
The post-Cold war trends however offer some grounds for hope as the United States recent actions suggest a positive move towards cooperation. One such initiative is the new biannual Defense Ministerial meetings that begun in 1995, by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry. Like the earlier Conferences, these meetings have created an important channel for dialogue. Notably, it was as a result of the Williamsburg Defense Ministerial that a Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies was established, albeit by the United States. Located in Washington D.C., the purpose of the center is to develop civilian specialists in defense and military matters. To do this, it provides graduate-level programs in defense planning and management, executive leadership, civil -military relations, and inter-agency cooperation.
Each country in the region is offered up to five seats spread over four month-long seminars presented each year. Additionally, a senior seminar is presented once annually in the hopes of attracting attendees at the policy level. Funding for students' attendance at the center is done through Extended international Military Training (E-IMET) allocation for U.S. school. This is only possible because the center was established under the Department of Defense and affiliated to the National Defense University as against the Inter American Defense College (IADC). Funding for students attending the IADC has to be met by each participating country. Many accepted the financial advantage and were appreciative of the effort in establishing the center but nonetheless questioned why the initiative could not have been carried out by the IADC. They saw this as yet another attempt by the United States to "unilaterally achieve multilateral ends through unilateral means."54 The United States held fast to its position that there was a pressing need to enhance the democratization process in the Hemisphere. So a cadre of qualified civilian defense bureaucrats had to be created and this, in their view, dictated a unilateral approach. Thus, the Center was established in the most convenient location at the time, given the need for expediency. Initially, there was a favorable response from countries in the region. For the March 1998 seminar, a total of 34 fellows representing 10 countries attended.
Another plus for the US, is its demand for reform of civil-military relations. This has been partially achieved in most Latin American and Caribbean countries. With the US insistence, democratization has emphasized the subordination of the military to civil rule. As a result there were some significant defense reforms. One of them is structural and saw the creation and in some cases, reorganization of ministries for the formulation of national defense policies and the control and management of the nation's armed forces.
Of the democratic states, Brazil was the last to transition into a ministry of defense established by President Cardoza in January 1999. He also appointed a civilian as the Minister. Not all democratic states have however made this bold move in naming civilian ministers. The Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela are yet to replace the Military officers serving in their Ministries of Defense with civilian. Many are still in the process of overcoming the structural weaknesses attendant with a fledgling organization.
It is expected that these new defense ministries will have to be given the time to gain experience before they can expand their authority beyond the narrow focus usually given them at them when established. Several of the new civilian defense Ministers are really Secretaries of State for defense. This means that they have limited authority in shaping military expenditure and investment. Most of them have very few senior civilian officials and the military and civilian staffs are seldom integrated. Thus, the United States' pressure on the military to subordinate authority to the civilian government may succeed in form but not function. There would have to be a markedly increase in civilian expertise and guidance. The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in conjunction with similar programs offered by Latin American Defense colleges and national universities are part of a growing effort to remedy this shortcoming.
Meanwhile, the absence of civilian expertise on security issues remains a major problem. To date, there has not been any defense policy that has been issued from a Defense ministry or from the presidency. Argentina provides a powerful example to illustrate this point. After 5 years of consecutive reductions in the defense budget, the Menem administration was yet to provide a defense policy on which the Ministry of Defense could have based a credible reorganization to match what amounted to an 8o percent defense budget cut. Colombia too, is very illustrative. The situation in that country is worse. It is fighting a war on at least three fronts with no defense policy from either the ministry of defense or the civilian government. Perhaps one can blame past experience for this negligence. Authoritarian regimes in Chile, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay wrote defense policies later used to justify "dirty wars" and other depredations on the civilian population. Such an experience is therefore bound to provide a disincentive for either the military institutions or the civilian governments.55
Civilians no doubt will fear a repeat of the misuse of this kind of policy; and the military fears a repeat of the justice imposed after the fact for doing what it considered the ruling elites' dirty work. The military, in general has accepted civilian control but nonetheless, is still trying to reconcile its traditional role in society with emerging democratic liberalism. Their self-perception is ingrained through education and culture thus, is slowly adapting to national reforms and changes in global security affairs. The problem stems from attempts to redefine the armed forces mission in the absence of military threat after the Cold War. For some, external defense, border control and protection of a nation's national resources will always remain important.56
The other defense reform resulting from democratization of the military, focused on the subordination of the armed forces - including the police - to the legislative branch of government. It has been noted that while the Region's Legislature universally approves defense budgets, there are relatively few of them that actually have an effective oversight role. To be effective, it will require a defense committee and staff, hearings, investigations, and open debate on security issues. Like the Executive, the legislature lacks adequate military expertise, the custom of exercising oversight and sufficient funding. This is however, changing with the emergence of academic and policy research capabilities focused on security studies and defense management. In fact, the whole trend in civil-military relations has been slowly changing, as the militaries grow more comfortable with the concept of not retaining responsibility for guiding civilian governments.
There is a general agreement
that the armed forces must be reorganized and modernized to fulfill its
role. As defense budgets get slashed
year after year - annual defense expenditures
for most countries are one percent or less than the GDP - it becomes
increasingly difficult to restructure the armed forces and replace obsolete
equipment. The process is a slow one indeed.
As resources decline, equipment deteriorates, morale sags, and talented
officers leave the profession. For some
countries, second jobs become the norm.
For others, Honduras for example, the military is part of the
entrepreneurial class with its own business interests. Some of their investments are funded by the
retirement system. These ventures
provide an independent source of revenue and cultivate political and commercial
support for the institution. In
Ecuador, the military is not only in control of the Amazonian region bordering
Peru but also controls the oil discovered there since the 1970s. Retired military officers now own large
landholdings in the area. The
exploitation of this key natural resource, while benefiting these officers, has
been used to enrich the military as an institution.57
It is the first time since the dawn of the Inter-American Military system that the militaries in the region find themselves in such a predicament. In the past, the quid pro quo for hemispheric defense cooperation has been a steady flow of U.S. arms and equipment to the Latin American nations. The quality of relationship of the North-South military cooperation follows a direct correlation to the amounts of grant and cash Foreign Military Sales (FMS) that flowed to Latin America. Some officials in the United States have actually criticized the U.S. government for supplying the Latin American militaries and thereby facilitating their abuses during the Cold War. This argument, however, ignores the fact that before the Second World War these very militaries depended on European suppliers for their equipment and other military hardware. It was therefore not difficult for them to reestablish that contact in the seventies when the U.S. aid supplies dwindled. Not only suppliers from Europe such as France, Italy, Great Britain and the Soviet Union but also Israel, South Africa and even Taiwan and China took up the slack. The implications for the Superpower's exclusion policy are obvious indeed.58
New Roles for the Region: Are Peacekeeping and
Counter drugs Operations Accepted?
It is useful information to note that for the 'Containment of communism' defense strategy, the U.S. actually allowed the regional militaries the scope in determining "their own versions of just what constituted containment"5959 But, containment of the non-traditional threats has become even mor