COLEGIO INTERAMERICANO DE DEFENSA

DEPARTAMENTO DE ESTUDIOS

CURSO XXXIX

 

 

 

 

 

 

TRABAJO DE INVESTIGACION ACADEMICA

 

GROUND ATTACK: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF AIR POWER

AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE SOVERIGNTY AND SECURITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

 

POR

 

TCNEL.  ROBERT “MIKE” HOGAN

LA FUERZA AEREA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA

 

 

WASHINGTON, D.C., MAYO DE 2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ABBREVIATIONS

 

AEF                    Air Expeditionary Forces

AFOSP               Air Force Office of Security Police

ATGM                Antitank Guided Missile

AWACS             Airborne Warning and Control System Aircraft

BBC                   British Broadcasting System

COJIC                Joint Intelligence Center

CONUS             Continental United States

CNN                                                                                                                              Cable News Network

CSC                   Central Security Control

ELN                    National Liberation Army

FARC                 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FMLN                Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front

FOG-M              Fiber-optic guided missiles

GPS                    Global Positioning System

HMMWV           High-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

IADB                  Inter-American Defense Board

IR                       Infrared

JSTARS              Joint Surveillance and Targeting System aircraft

LAWs                 Light Antitank Weapons

LCC                   Land component commander

MANPADS        Man-portable air defense system

MRC                                                                                                                              Major regional conflict

NGB                   National Guard Bureau

NVA                   North Vietnamese Army

OAS                   Organization of American States

OCONUS          Outside Continental United States

OSI                     Office of Special Investigations

PGM                   Precision-guided munitions

POL                    Petroleum, oil, and lubricants

RPG                    Rocket-propelled grenade

SAM                   Surface-to-air missile

         SAS                    Special Air Service

SEALS               Sea/Air/Land personnel

SIGINT              Signal Intelligence

SOF                    Special operations forces

SRT                    Security Response Team

TAI                     Total aircraft inventory

TASS                  Tactical Automated Surveillance System

TIAR                  Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

UAVs                 Unmanned aerial vehicles

VC                      Viet Cong

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Prologue

COLOMBIA, 2004

Three months ago, Major Juan Valdez of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, received orders from Manuel Marulanda, FARC’s leader, to lead an attack against Tres Esquinas Air Base.  Specifically, his orders were to destroy the base’s Joint Intelligence Center (COJIC), Kfir C-7 fighter aircraft, the AC-47 gunship and UH-1N troop helicopters used to insert anti-drug brigades into FARC controlled territory.  The Colombian military had been moving assets to Tres Esquinas Air Base for an offensive against the FARC and narco-traffickers.

 

The FARC was aware of the increasing danger of the Colombian armed forces.  They received more weapons, training and money from the Pentagon than any other Latin American government.  In 1999, the United States government supplied the Colombian government with over $883 million in aide to help fight the war against drugs.  Also, the American President Clinton submitted a supplemental bill to the Congress for an additional $1 billion over the next three years.  For the past several years the Unites States armed forces trained and equipped the Colombian military.  The “gringos” trained three Anti-Narcotic Army Battalions; provided 18 UH-1N helicopters equipped with night vision goggles; built a COJIC at Tres Esquinas Military Air Base; and significantly enhanced Tres Esquinas Air Base by extending the runway, building additional aircraft parking aprons to handle more aircraft and constructed additional dormitories for the brigades.  The COJIC structure was nearly operational.  The structure would be the central nervous system for Colombian government’s war on drugs.  It would house computer and software to gather and analyze intelligence data to combat the growing, cultivating and processing of the coca leaf.

 

FARC knew the government had an ulterior motive for accepting U.S. aid.  The funds would be used to destroy the FARC.  Manuel Marulanda had declared the aircraft and Joint Intelligence Center at Tres Esquinas, as the Americans would say, a “clear and present danger” to their very existence.  For over thirty-five years the FARC, based on Marxist ideology, had been defending the peasants and fighting against the elite to bring about a socialist state. The FARC originated in 1964, when a group of peasants who had already undertaken the armed struggle but who could not be convinced to surrender their weapons, were simply silenced in an operation planned by the Pentagon.  The armed struggle didn't originate in the 1960s, but in 1948 with the assassination of the popular leader Jorge Eliezer Gaitán.  The peasants, who were in the region of Marquetalia after defending themselves against an attack by more than 18,000 troops, organized themselves into mobile guerrilla units and committed themselves to a formidable undertaking- which even now continues to be a formidable undertaking, but which every day seems closer to seize power.  Since the demise of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, financial, economic and equipment aid had dried up.  What made matters worse, aid from Fidel Castro also stopped.  The ruling council decided the only way to finance the revolution was to work with the drug cartels by protecting coca crops, processing plants and transportation of cocaine out of the country.  In 1999, Colombian coca production tripled to 500 metric tons that gave the FARC the funds necessary to continue their quest to bring down the government.  Therefore, it was essential to strike a decisive blow against Tres Esquinas to eliminate the threat to the FARC and drug cartels.

 

The plan was an audacious, but simple.  The main objective was to set the Colombian government’s efforts to eradicate drug traffickers and the FARC back years.  The key to success was stealth and surprise.  The operation would take place on a dark, rainy, moonless night.  It was a two-pronged attack.  The first would be against the stationary aircraft on the flightline and the second against the COJIC.  Maj Valdez and his brave freedom fighters would divide into four groups.  Two groups would infiltrate the base, one to provide overwatch security and the other to place demolition charges on the aircraft.  The remaining groups would remain two miles outside the base on the other side of the Orteguaza River.  One group, a mortar team, would destroy the COJIC while the other would provide security for the mortar team.  Timing was crucial.  At 0130 hours, six FARC soldiers would enter the flightline surreptitiously and with the aid of night vision goggles, avoid the guards, and place demolition charges on all the aircraft and exit the area.  The explosives would detonate at 0230 hours.  At 0300 hours the second two-person group would fire mortars at the COJIC, destroying the building and killing the officers whom had responded to the facility due to the attack on the flightline.  After 15 minutes of the mortar barrage, the mortar/security team would withdrawal.

 

Major Valdez recruited 12 veteran patriotic fighters to attack Tres Esquinas Air Base.  He estimated he could suffer two killed in action and 3 wounded in action and still complete his mission.  Manuel Marulanda told Valdez to provide a list of supplies for the operation.  Maj Valdez requested the state-of-art equipment—night vision goggles, thermal imagers, laser range finders, global positioning system equipment, mortars, mortar ballistic computers, demolition chargers with timers, rocket propelled grenade launchers, M240 machineguns and M4 rifles.  Working with the drug cartels, the FARC ruling council provided all the equipment Maj Valdez requested.  The drug cartels obtained the equipment from illegal worldwide gunrunners and corrupt military officials in countries who received military equipment from the United States.  He and his men became experts with the equipment.  Valdez received satellite images, photographs and blueprints of the base that enabled him to construct a full-size replica of Tres Esquinas.  Further, using the GPS and laser range finder, Maj Valdez was able use pinpoint accuracy to determine the exact location of the COJIC and provide 8 digit grid coordinates for the mortar team.  His squad rehearsed the attack over and over again.  For the last 30 days two three man teams watched the base 24 hours a day.  This provided invaluable intelligence information.  All the static posts were located as well as the location of the response forces.  Maj Valdez knew the young airmen guarding the base received adequate training but were poorly equipped, treated badly, and suffered from low morale.  Once posted on the base boundary the soldiers had no means of communication to sound the alarm, had no observation devices, no wet weather gear to keep them dry, and no bug repellent to keep away the swarms of mosquitoes.  Often after a 12-hour shift the guards had additional duties, working 16 hours a day.  This meant the airmen were constantly tired and frequently dosed on post.  More often than not, once posted, the guards worked their shift with no post relief or visits from their supervisors.  The boundary guards, after a few hours of post, became bored and lethargic.  The terrain would also benefit in the attack because it was hilly with dense vegetation both on and off base.  All these factors would help the freedom fighters enter the base undetected.  Access to the flightline would not be too difficult because it was large and sparsely guarded.  Like the boundary guards, the flightline security guards were also poorly equipped…no night vision equipment and the communication equipment usually didn’t work.  Further, lighting on the aircraft parking ramp was poor.  Like the boundary guards, the security guards were inattentive after several hours on post.

 

The night for the attack was perfect-dark, moonless with a light rain.  The rain helped mask Maj Valdez and his squad’s movements.  Using night vision goggles, thermal imagers, whisper mikes to communicate, and the GPS for guide, they arrived at their objective rallying point.  Then the teams separated.  The mortar team and security team reached their objective without any problems.  As the security team provided overwatch, the mortar team set up the tubes and used a mortar ballistic computer to lay in the exact grid coordinates that would destroy the COJIC.  Maj Valdez and his group using state-of-art equipment bypassed the boundary guards undetected.  At 0130 hours, with a two-person security team providing overwatch, the team entered the aircraft mass parking apron from an area not easily detectable, and within 15 minutes, placed explosives on all the aircraft.  At 0230 hours, with his team was safely off base and heading back to the objective rallying point, Maj Valdez heard the muffled explosions from aircraft detonating at Tres Esquinas.  Then at 0300 hours, he heard additional explosions that came from the direction of the air base, probably mortar rounds impacting on the Joint Intelligence Center.  After the mortar and security team rejoined the rest of the group, the platoon made its way safely back to their base camp.

 

The following day, Colombian broadcasting networks, both radio and television, carried reports on the Tres Esquinas Air Base attack.  Ten helicopters, 6 Kfir C-7 jets, and one AC-47 gunship were destroyed. The Joint Intelligence Center was heavily damaged.  Government sources hypothesized the FARC was responsible for the attack.  Their mission a success, Maj Valdez and his comrades received a hero’s welcome from Manuel Marulanda and the FARC ruling council.  By destroying the aircraft and drug intelligence center, the “clear and present danger” to the FARC and drug cartels was reduced by 80%.  Erased was the Colombian military capability to insert forces into FARC controlled territory or interdict drug traffickers supply routes.

Chapter 1

 

Introduction

 

The purpose of this investigative work is to examine a vulnerability to air power, one of the critical components of military power, and its impact on the nation state and Western Hemisphere security.  Air power has an Achilles’ Heel which is the increased potential threat to air bases by ground forces in the 21st century.  Increasingly, the world community has turned to military power, as a component of power (the other parts of power being political, economic, and social/psychological), to force rogue states to submit to international norms because other tools of persuasion, such as political pressure and economic sanctions didn’t work.  Since World War II, air power has played an increasingly important role as a military tool in fighting wars.  In 1989 and in the decade of the 1990s, it played a vital part in military confrontations with Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and most recently, Kosovo.  Global news agencies, such as CNN and BBC, have broadcasted the destructive nature of air power to the entire world.  Television coverage brought into all households the value of aircraft, whether they carried smart bombs or ordinary ones.  Air power is vital to a nation’s defense and Inter-American security.  In the author’s opinion, the recent successes of air power will lead adversaries in the Western Hemisphere to attack aircraft while on the ground rather than wait to be the recipient of punishing blows from above.

 

Scope of Investigative Work

The scope of this investigative work paper will be covered in the following chapters:

1.      Chapter 2 describes the basic rights of states to provide for their own defense.  Also discussed is the foundation of Inter-American security—the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance  (TIAR).

2.      In Chapter 3, a historical analysis of ground attacks against air bases from WWII to 1992 is presented, the four objectives to air base attacks are discussed and aggressor tactics are examined.  Finally, an analysis of North American and Latin American air assets is provided.

3.      Attacks against two bases in the Americas are analyzed in Chapter 4.  This chapter examines the vulnerability of airframes to attack by terrorist groups in Puerto Rico and El Salvador.

4.   Chapter 5 examines the air base threat in the 21st Century.  The following threats are examined: types and size of threat, new weapon technologies aggressors may use, the “target rich” environment bases have to offer, and probable enemy tactics.

5.   Chapter 6 provides recommendations that can strengthen air base defense measures to protect air assets.

6.   Chapter 7 concludes with the recommendation that the best defense is a robust, multifaceted approach to air base defense.  This is the only approach that can minimize the Achilles’ Heel of air power.

 

            The author hopes this investigative paper will prod the OAS, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and North American and Latin American countries to initiate studies to examine if adequate security measures are in place to protect airframes.  Waiting to conduct this study after an attack will be too little, too late.

 

Chapter 2

 

State Security and the Western Hemispheric Security

 

Every state has the inherent right to protect and defend its sovereignty.  An excellent illustration of this inherent right is spelled out in the preamble of the U.S. Constitution: …to provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity…The goal of every state’s national security strategy is to protect fundamental and long-lasting needs; protect the lives and safety of its citizens; maintain sovereignty with its values, institutions and territory intact and promote the prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people.  The military of every nation plays a key role in safeguarding their sovereignty from potential adversaries--whether from within the state, from other nations, terrorist groups, drug trafficking or criminal organizations—who attempt to disrupt critical infrastructures, impede government operations and use weapons of mass destruction against civilians.  The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly.  In order to assure sovereignty, states enter into alliances with other states for mutual defense, to promote similar systems of government, advance the welfare of its citizens and to become economically more prosperous.

 

Western Hemisphere security is one of the oldest security agreements in the world.  Simon Bolivar, visionary, liberator, hero, and one of the great men of the 19th century dedicated his life to the struggle of Latin American independence.  His vision was of a Pan-American Union that embraced the principles of peace preservation, mutual defense, and respect for sovereignty and non-intervention.  As early as 1826, Simon Bolivar invited representatives from many Western Hemisphere nations to attend a conference, called the Congress of Panama, which initiated his quest for Inter-American security.  There were many subsequent conferences that ultimately lead to the two core instruments for Inter-American defense and cooperation, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States. 

 

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

The TIAR was signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on September 2, 1947.  Basically, this treaty is a mutual defense pact among most of the nations in the Western Hemisphere.  The key military application is found in Article 3:

ARTICLE 3

   1.  The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist n meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

   2 On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance of the principle of continental security.  The organ of consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

   3.  The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American state.  When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provision of Article 6 shall be applied

4.  Measures of self-defense provided for under this article may be taken until the Security Council of the Unites Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. [1]

 

Organization of American States

More than fifty years ago-on April 30, 1948, 21 countries of the hemisphere met in Bogotá, Colombia, to adopt the Charter of the Organization of American States which affirmed their commitment to common goals and respect for each nation’s sovereignty. Since then, the OAS has expanded to include the nations of the Caribbean, as well as Canada.  The Charter is the instrument in which the American States strive to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote solidarity to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, and their territorial integrity and their independence.  The key OAS articles pertinent to this paper are found in Chapter 1 Article 1 & 2 and Chapter 6 Articles 27 & 28.

 

Article 1, Paragraph c

To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression.

 

Article 2, paragraph f

An act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all the other American States.

 

Article 27

Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American State.

 

Article 28

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by a extracontinental conflict, or by a conflict by two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of other principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.[2]

 

 

 

 

Potential Hot Spots for Conflict in the Western Hemisphere

Even with the signing of the OAS Charter the TIAR, there remains a strong potential for military conflict in the Americas.  Military confrontations could occur due to territorial disputes between states, to combat guerrillas, narco-traffickers and international crime organizations.  Latin America has a long history of territorial conflicts.  Ecuador and Peru fought several territorial wars, the latest in 1995.  Venezuela and Surinam have territorial claims over portions of Guyana.  During the past several centuries there have been political tensions between Argentina and Chile and Argentina and Brazil.  In Central America territorial disputes exist between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and Honduras and El Salvador.  There are active guerrilla groups in the Americas attempting to overthrow democratic governments, the most serious in Colombia.  The FARC and the ELN control portions of Colombia.  Both insurgent groups stepped up attacks against security forces, police and civilians in 1998 and 1999.  The FARC and ELN continue to fund their insurgencies by protecting narcotic traffickers, conduct kidnap-for-ransom operations, and extorting money from oil and mining companies operating in the Colombian countryside.  Other guerrilla groups in the Americas which pose a threat to inter-continental security are the Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru; the Zapatistas in Mexico; and in Chile the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. 

 

United States aid to Latin American countries to combat the growing and exporting of illegal drugs mandates a strong military capable of waging war against narco-traffickers.  The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy consists of five major goals to reduce drug abuse and its consequences.  Germane to this paper is Goal 5: Break foreign and domestic drug sources of supply.  “The U.S. supply-reduction strategy seeks to: (1) eliminate illegal drug control cultivation and production; (2) destroy drug-trafficking organizations; (3) interdict drug shipments; (4) encourage international cooperation; (5) safeguard democracy and human rights.”[3]  The U.S. allocated over $2.2 billion dollars in 1999 and 2000 to achieve Goal 5.  U.S. aide to Latin America to fight the drug war mandates countries in the Western Hemisphere maintain a strong military.  This aid will increase the likelihood of military conflict against guerrilla groups and narco traffickers.  For example, in 1999 Colombia received over $883 million in aid from the U.S. to fight the war on drugs.  Also, the U.S trained one Anti-Narcotic Army battalion; provided 18 UH-IN helicopters equipped with night vision goggles, and built a Joint Intelligence Center as the central nervous system against the narcotic war.  In 2000 and 2001 Colombia is projected to receive an additional $1.6 billion in aid.

 

From the preceding paragraphs it is apparent a strong military is required to maintain a state’s sovereignty and hemispheric security to meet the challenges of the 21st century.  Air power plays a vital role with its ability to wage war from the air and airlift men and material “to the fight”.  These factors will increasingly make aircraft more susceptible to attack.  An excellent illustration is military aid to Colombia.  The best avenue for the FARC and narco-traffickers to counter the threat is to destroy airframes.  This would nullify Colombia’s ability to attack or airlift troops to FARC controlled areas where much of the cocaine is grown and processed.  The variety of threats to air bases is discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

 

History and Threat of Ground Attacks

 

It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy’s aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air[4]

 

            The basic methods for ground attack against air bases haven’t changed since World War II.  Army Italian General Douet’s “metaphor was directed at fellow airmen, pointing out the great offensive potential of airpower—a radical notion in 1921--and the exceptional vulnerability of aircraft on the ground.  Flying machines, even modern ones, by their very nature are thin-skinned, relatively soft targets.  Speed, maneuverability, and stealth enable these unarmored vehicles to survive and be decisive in combat.  In contrast, the aircraft parked on the ramp has none of these characteristics and—compared with most ground targets—is triflingly easy to destroy”.[5]  As reflected in Table 3.1, from 1942-1992 armies and guerrilla groups have attacked air bases at least 645 times destroying or damaging over 2000 aircraft.  Ground attacks have included airborne, airmobile, infantry, armor, special forces, terrorists and guerrilla groups.

 

Table 3.1 Ground Attacks on Airfields

 

 

     Conflict

 

Number of Incidents

 

Aircraft Destroyed/Damaged

World War II

130

367/NA

Korea

3

0

Vietnam

493

393/1,185

Falklands

1

11

El Salvador

2

15/18

Grenada

2

0

Afghanistan

3

9

Panama

4

1

1991 Gulf War

3

36

Philippines

1

2/1

Terrorism

3

9/3

TOTAL

645

843/1,207

N/A= data not available

 

            States, guerrillas and terrorists have a variety of objectives for attacking air bases.  These objectives can be grouped into four broad categories.  The number of attacks follows each objective in parenthesis.

 

 

Capture airfield (41)

Deny defender use of the airfield (47)

Harass defender (173)

Destroy aircraft (384)

 

Objectives of Ground Attacks

            As depicted in Figure 3.1, the main objective in 60% of ground attacks against air bases was to destroy aircraft.  The second reason (27%) was to harass the defender.  In only 6% of the attacks was the objective to capture an airfield.  Most of these attempts occurred in World War II but more recently, this was also the objective in Afghanistan, Grenada and Panama.


Objective 1: Capture an Airfield

            Ground forces sought to capture airfields 41 times.  In 16 cases, airborne forces attacked airfields to use them as airheads for the insertion of additional troops.  In 23 cases, airfields were attacked so that the aggressor’s air force could use their facilities.  In two cases, both from the 1991 Gulf War, the airfields were attacked to destroy collocated ground forces.  Therefore, the two main goals to capture airfields are to 1). seize it as an airhead to secure airfield facilities for the air landing of troops, heavy equipment and supplies and 2). Capture the airfield for offensive air operations.  In the Americas, American forces in 1983 during Operation Urgent Fury captured Salinas and Pearls airports in Grenada for use by follow-on forces.  In 1989, during Operation Just Cause, U.S. Rangers captured Rio Hato and Tocumen airfields in Panama.

 

Objective II: Deny Enemy Use of Airfields

            In 47 cases, the attacker sought to counter the defender’s airpower by capturing or shutting down operations at air bases.  All 47 attacks in the study occurred during World War II and the Korean War.

 

 

Objective III: Harass Defenders

            Enemy forces seeking to achieve Objectives I, II, and IV certainly have harassed defenders and disrupted base operations.  The purpose of this separate category is to identify those attacks whose primary objective was harassment.  The primary purpose of these standoff attacks is to delay and disrupt air sorties.  Damage or destruction to aircraft is a bonus to harassment attacks.  An example of this type of attack occurred in Just Cause, the 1989 intervention in Panama.  About the time the U.S. operations began, unknown gunmen fired small arms at a hangar at Albrook Air Station, Panama.  The attackers may have hoped to get lucky and cause damage to an aircraft, but their force was small and the attack brief.  These circumstances, combined with the fact that the attackers fired from outside the airfield fence, suggest that this incident belongs in the harassment category.[6]

 

Objective IV: Destroy Aircraft and Equipment

            Sixty percent of the attacks sought to destroy aircraft and equipment.  The 2,000-plus aircraft destroyed or damaged in ground attacks since 1940 is based on accounts almost entirely on attacks in this category; although aircraft and equipment were almost certainly destroyed in attacks pursuing the other objectives.

 

            The first recorded attempt to destroy parked aircraft with ground forces was in October 1940, when British Special Forces destroyed an Italian bomber in North Africa.  Over the next two years, these small teams, operating hundreds of miles behind enemy lines, destroyed at least 350 Axis aircraft. 

 

            There are only two documented attacks on operating airfields during the Korean War.[7] The Viet Nam War is responsible for 316 of these attacks in this category (82 percent of the total).  Those attacks destroyed 393 U.S. and allied aircraft and damaged another 1,185.  The most common attack techniques was for a small team to fire 10 or fewer mortar, rocket or recoilless rifle rounds at an air base, then flee.  Conversely, only 21 sapper attacks were made against our bases in Viet Nam and Thailand.  An additional eight attacks combined sapper and standoff techniques.[8]  Sapper, as used in this paper, is to describe enemy infantry who penetrated base defenses to place explosive charges.

 

            In the Western Hemisphere Puerto Rican nationalists, the Macheteros, attacked Muñiz National Air Station in 1981 and again in 1990 destroying a total of 12 aircraft.  In 1982 the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas attacked Illopango AFB, El Salvador and another air base in 1990 destroying or damaging 23 aircraft.  The attacks in Puerto Rico and El Salvador will be discussed in Chapter 4.

 

            In 1982, during the Falklands War, the British Special Air Service (SAS) raided an Argentine airstrip.  The SAS mission was to destroy light aircraft on Pebble Island to prevent Argentina from using these aircraft against British ground forces during the upcoming amphibious assault in San Carlos Bay, 30 miles to the southeast.  Before sunrise a 45-man detachment was inserted onto Pebble Island by helicopter, the soldiers tactically made its six-kilometer march to the airstrip and attacked.  Firing small arms and 66-mm rockets at the aircraft while the HMS Glamorgan providing suppressive fire, the force went onto the airstrip and planted explosive charges on the aircraft.  Ten light attack aircraft and one transport were destroyed.  A ton of ammunition and a radar station were also destroyed, and naval gunfire badly cratered the airstrip.  The airstrip was taken out of action throughout the remainder of the conflict.[9]  In 1989, during Operation Just Cause, a 54-man detachment of U.S. Navy SEALs (sea/air/land personnel) destroyed Manuel Noriega’s Learjet at Paitilla airport in Panama.[10]  Also in 1989, unknown attackers firebombed a U.S. Department of State aircraft in Monteria, Colombia.  The aircraft supported Colombian government anti-drug operations.

 

            Knowing how bases have been attacked in the past is key to determining what type of defense security measures may be implemented to thwart future attacks.  It is important to understand insertion and attack modes

 

Attack Tactics: Insertion Mode

            Air base attackers have used several modes of transportation for insertion.  Virtually all attacks (83 percent) used foot travel at some point; in a majority of the attacks, the operation was entirely unmotorized.  All 493 attacks from the Viet Nam war were carried out by forces unaided by motorized vehicles.  Viet Cong (VC) and North Viet Nam Army (NVA) regular forces often used bicycles and boats to transport personnel and equipment; they probably used them for air base attack preparations also.  Figure 3.2 depicts insertion methods minus Viet Nam data so we can get a picture of other techniques.


            Foot travel was the most common technique in other conflicts also, closely followed by vehicle-and-foot insertion.  Many of the vehicle-and-foot causes come from SAS operations in North Africa.  The numbers suggest that, even by the simple expedient of strapping the gear to their backs and walking, attackers in the past managed to move enough people and equipment cross-country to conduct attacks on air bases.  Bases close to oceans or rivers may be vulnerable to attackers slipping in on small boats.  This method of attack was used against Muñiz Air National Guard Base in Puerto Rico.  However, the most common insertion method will probably remain people walking to the vicinity of the target air base.

 


Attack Tactics: Mode of Attack

            Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of attack tactics for the 645 attacks identified in this chapter.  Of particular interest is the apparent evolution of air base attacker tactics since World War II.  In that war, many attacks were intended to secure the base for one reason or another; they required that the attacker put troops onto to base, usually in large numbers (typically regimental strength).  However, looking at the attacks intended to destroy aircraft and disrupt operations without overrunning the base – we find small teams of attackers penetrating the perimeter and using either explosive charges or short-range direct-fire weapons to achieve their ends.  In contrast VC and NVA attackers rarely used penetrating tactics, relying on small units firing standoff weapons for a full 96 percent of their attacks.


            Recent attacks have used both techniques, although all have involved small attacking forces.  Kurdish and Filipino insurgents used penetrating tactics; insurgents in El Salvador and the SAS attack against the Argentine air base used both penetrating and standoff techniques.

 


            It is likely that both tactics will continue to be used in the future.  Where perimeter defenses are weak, sappers will probably continue to penetrate; extremely unsophisticated foes may find this their only effective avenue of attack.  Terrorists and other forces striking bases during peacetime may also be able to exploit penetrating attacks.  More problematic is the possibility that newer techniques, weapons and precision munitions may give small standoff attacks a consistent lethality, which they lacked in the past.

 

            Post World War II attacks against air bases have been focused on only two objectives: destroy aircraft or harass defenders.  Although the possibility of large-unit attacks on airfields should not be discounted completely, it is more a prospect for adversaries of the United States than for the United States.  The threat facing bases in the Western Hemisphere will likely resemble those presented by SAS operations in North Africa or the VC/NVA in Viet Nam.

 

            A basic premise to this investigative work that there is an increased ground threat to air bases in the 21st century.  This threat impacts directly on Inter-American security in regards to hemispheric defense treaties, state sovereignty, and the ability for states to quell insurgency within its borders.  In addressing the evolving threat, we will break it into two categories: the threat to Latin American, Canadian and Mexican airframes and the threat to U.S.A.F. aircraft.  This distinction is made due to the size and sophistication of U.S. aircraft and its worldwide mission. 

 

 

 

Threat to Air Force Assets and Bases in the Western Hemisphere (Excluding U.S.)

            Analysis of Table 3.2 reveals a vast majority of countries have a limited number of air assets and air force bases.  Due to the limited number these high value assets, aircraft replacement or obtaining parts for a significant number damaged aircraft could take years.  For most countries funding isn’t available for aircraft replacement.  Additionally, aircraft aren’t built in most countries in the Western Hemisphere but procured from abroad.  For many aircraft, manufacturing assembly lines have been shut down and start-up costs to procure additional would be very costly.  Therefore, it is imperative states have adequate security measures inplace to protect these vulnerable aircraft on the ground.

 

Table 3.2 Western Hemisphere Main Air Force Bases, Fixed Wing & Rotary Aircraft

 

 

 

Country

 

Number of Primary Air Force Bases

 

 

Number Combat Aircraft

 

 

Number of

Other Aircraft

 

Total Aircraft

(Includes Rotor)

Canada

13

122

385

505

Mexico

8

109

193

302

United States

87

*2,833