COLEGIO INTERAMERICANO DE DEFENSA

Fuerte Lesley J. McNair

Washington D.C.

 

 

 

TRABAJO DE INVESTIGACION ACADEMICA

 

 THE PEACE ACCORDS AND THE

TRANSITION OF EL SALVADOR’S ARMED FORCES.

 

 

 

POR

 

Tcnel DAN C. MEYER

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA

 

 

WASHINGTON, DC., MAYO DE 2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

            The Chapultepec Peace Accords, which brought an end to the 12-year civil war in El Salvador, represent one of the most significant negotiated settlements in recent history.  In addition to ending the armed conflict, the Accords also resulted in substantial reforms to the Armed Forces and provided the basis for creating a new civil-military relationship in that country.

 

            The Peace Accord process reflected the recognition on the part of both the Government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) that a military resolution to the conflict was not feasible and a negotiated, political settlement was inevitable.  The conflict and related negotiation process came at time when the Armed Forces had exercised almost 50 years of direct involvement in politics and had only recently transferred political control of the country back into the hands of a civilian government.  It was evident from the beginning of the negotiation process that in order to resolve the root causes of the conflict the political influence and autonomy of the Armed Forces would have to be reduced.  As a result, a major portion of the Peace Accords addressed the reduction and restructuring of the Armed Forces and mandated an independent review of the officer corps in the form of an Ad Hoc Commission.

                       

In response to the question of which side emerged from the negotiation process a winner it can only be said that there was no single victor.  Just as neither side could claim a complete military victory on the battlefield, neither could the Government or the FMLN claim that they achieved all that their goals at the bargaining table.   Both sides made concessions, obtained part of their demands, and moved from their initial positions in order to reach an agreement.  The negotiations focused on not only putting an end to the conflict, but also addressed access to and the exercise of power.

 

 The Peace Accords and related civil-military reforms put into motion three simultaneous transitions: from war to peace, militarization to demilitarization, and from authoritarianism to democracy.  These three transitions were not isolated events and there was much overlap in the various fields.

 

            The negotiated settlement in El Salvador offers a unique opportunity to review not only the process employed to resolve the armed conflict, but also the impact of the Peace Accords on the Armed Forces and civil-military relations in El Salvador.  While this paper will briefly review the peace negotiation process, it will focus on the latter issues.

 

            This study is divided into the following sections:

 

            Section I, Historical Antecedents: 1932 – 1979, reviews Armed Forces direct involvement in politics during this period and outlines the work of a series of military governments.  What is important about this period is the almost 50 years of direct military involvement in politics.

 

Section II, The War Years: 1979-1992, discusses the formal transfer of political control from the military back to civilian hands while the Armed Forces retained a great deal of political autonomy.  It is suggested that the political power of the Armed Forces may actually have expanded during this period in response to the demands of the ongoing civil war.  Alfred Stepan’s concept of 11 military prerogatives is introduced and used to judge the degree of military autonomy possessed by a 1980’s Armed Forces institution.

 

            Section III, Negotiating Peace: The Peace Accord Process, reviews the peace negotiation process and highlights the results of the various meetings and negotiating sessions leading to the Chapultepec Peace Accords.  The role of the United Nations was key to this process and became impetus for continued negotiation and eventual agreement to end the conflict.

 

            Section IV, Requirements of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, outlines the 13 requirements for the Armed Forces established by the Peace Accords.  These requirements, which can be summed up as reduction, restructure and officer corps purge, resulted not only in changes to the Armed Forces, but also to civil-military relations in El Salvador.

 

            Section V, Armed Forces Implementation of Peace Accord Requirements, discusses how the Armed Forces reacted to and implemented the 13 changes required by the Peace Accords.  This section is divided into two time periods, 1992-1995 and 1995-1999 and includes charts comparing the 1983 Constitution with the 1992 reforms.  Additionally, Alfred Stepan’s concept of 11 military prerogatives is again applied in order to demonstrate how the Armed Forces, as an institution, transitioned to greater civilian control as a result of the Peace Accords and related Constitutional changes.

 

            Section VI, Impact of Reforms on Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations suggests that the reform initiated as a result of the Peace Accords had a positive affect on Armed Forces Professionalism and, as a result, the likelihood of direct involvement in politics is reduced.  This section also points out the need for increased understanding and involvement on the part of the government and civil society with regards to National Security and defense related issues.

 

            Section VII, Conclusion, briefly reviews the impact of the Peace Accords on the Armed Forces and points out that the process did not result in increased friction between the Armed Forces and the Government of El Salvador.  Additionally, it is suggested that the negotiation process that was successful in this case cannot be applied in its entirety to other conflicts in the Hemisphere.  To do so would be ignoring country and situational specific factors that could result in improper concessions in an attempt to end a conflict.

 

 

 

 

 

 

           

 

 

I.                  HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS: 1932 – 1979

 

            Between 1932 and 1979, El Salvador was ruled by what has been referred to as a “civil-military alliance between an agro-exporting (coffee) oligarchy and a Praetorian Guard.  Presidents were generals (or colonels) and the country’s economic survival in the global economy…depended precariously on a single agricultural commodity: coffee.”[1]  The military governments distrusted civilian politicians and considered it a constitutional duty to take power and correct corruption.  The Armed Forces, as an institution, was convinced that it was the sole entity capable of governing and directing the country.

 

Direct control of Salvadoran society by the Armed Forces began on 2 December 1931 when the army ousted reformist President Arturo Araujo, who had served only 11 months in office. Araujo’s Minister of Defense, General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez assumed control as provisional president.  While this was not exceptional by Latin American standards of the time, what is exceptional is that it marks the beginning of almost 50 years of uninterrupted political denomination by the Salvadoran Armed Forces. The proximate cause of the coup was discontent on the part of junior officers who had not been paid or received funds for food and unit administration for almost nine months.  However, as Williams suggests, what was much more important was the decision of the military to settle into the government for the long term. [2]  (See Table 1 for a list of the heads of state between 1931 and 1979)

 

            In January 1980, in response to the chaotic social and political climate in the country, the Armed Forces entered into an alliance with the Christian Democratic Party and organized a civil-military junta.  This coalition was the first step in transferring the executive branch of government back to civilian control.  In 1982 a Constituent Assembly was elected and produced a series of constitutional amendments.  This assembly eventually transferred power to Alvaro Magana, who served as interim president until 1984 when presidential elections were held.

 

            After almost 50 years of direct involvement in politics, the Armed Forces transferred control back to the hands of civilians.  While the Armed Forces, as an institution, was no longer directly involved politics, it was not devoid of political power.  In fact, its political power may have increased in response to the demand of a civil war.


 

II.  1980 - 1992  - The War Years

 

            Ironically, during the 1980’s process of transferring formal political control of the nation back to a civilian administration, the Armed Forces maintained a sizeable amount of political power and institutional autonomy.  While one would expect that the transfer of power to civilian rule would result in a marked reduction in the amount of political power wielded by the Armed Forces, this was not the case. Thus the 1980’s transfer of power was not complete and while the Armed Forces did retreat from formal political involvement, it did not give up its ability to control events that affected institutional interest.  According to Williams, this was possible due to four conditions:  (1) the context of the civil war, (2) a series of political pacts between the Armed Forces and civilian political powers, (3) internal factionalism within the officer corps, and (4) U.S. military assistance.  Additionally, the Armed Forces became less dependent on the oligarchy and increasingly depended on its own set of priorities aimed at protecting institutional interests.[3]

 

The military expanded its functions during the war years and the officer corps maintained its view that the Armed Forces was the only institution capable of saving the nation and ensuring public order.  Some officers believed that they were the guardians of the nations’ permanent interests against internal and external threats.  This line of thinking, not specific to El Salvador, was best expressed in an article entitled “El Ser Militar” (published in El Soldado magazine of January-February 1984):

 

The carnal, concrete, living expression of the Fatherland in sovereignty is the armed forces, whose mission is the defense of unity, of integrity and of honor, as well as everything essential and permanent in the country: The Supreme interests of the Nation.[4]

 

            Despite the fact that the Armed Forces had allowed limited political opening during the 1980’s, they maintained the right and ability to intervene when they perceived that the institution was being threatened.  The control that the Armed Forces exercised during this period was a considerable obstacle to further advances in civil-military relations and civil control of the Armed Forces.  As Stepan has suggested, prolonged military rule can leave important legacies that present powerful obstacles to democratic consolidation.[5]

 

            The amount of power maintained by the Armed Forces manifested itself in the wide array of prerogatives retained by the institution during the 1980’s. The concept of military prerogatives, as defined by Alfred Stepan, refers to those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.  When the military is classified as having a “low” prerogative it is because effective control over this prerogative is exercised by officials, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the democratic regime.[6]

 

Many of these prerogatives were safeguarded by the 1983 Constitution, which charged the military with responsibility for ensuring national defense and internal order as well as defending the democratic system of government.  Table 2 shows the status of Alfred Stepan’s 11 military prerogatives in the period after the 1983 Constitution.

 

III.  Negotiating Peace: The Peace Accord Process[7]

 

            On 7 August 1987 in Esquipulas, Guatemala, the Presidents of the five Central American nations signed the “Procedure for the Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America.”  Some refer to this agreement, which requested all Governments concerned to terminate support for insurrection and to prevent the use of their territory for the destabilization of other countries, as a start down the long road to peace in El Salvador.

 

            Specific talks about peace in El Salvador began in March 1989 when newly elected president Alfredo Cristiani called for discussions with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).  In May, the FMLN met with members of the United Nations asking for increased UN participation in seeking a negotiated solution to the war. 

 

            In August 1989 in Tela, Honduras, the Presidents of the Central American nations met to discuss the peace process in Nicaragua.  In addition to addressing the situation in Nicaragua, the Tela Declaration called for the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN to engage in a constructive dialogue and to end the conflict by political means.

 

            In addition to internal efforts to end the conflict, there was pressure applied from other governments in the hemisphere.  As Juhn points out  “International pressure on both sides – the government and the FMLN – to negotiate a cease-fire was immense from the start, and increased every day.”  In addition to the United States, countries such as Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua urged El Salvador to negotiate a cease-fire.[8]  What follows is a summation of the various negotiating sessions.

 

15 September 1989, Mexico City, Mexico.

The Mexican Accords defined the conceptual framework of the negotiations and established procedural rules for the negotiations.  Both the Government of El Salvador (GOES) and the FMLN agreed that the object of the negotiations was to end the armed conflict as quickly as possible, assist with the democratization of the country, and reunify the Salvadoran people.  Observers included the United Nations, Organization of the American States, and the Catholic Church.

 

 

 

 

16 – 18 OCTOBER 1989, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA.

This meeting involved members of the GOES and the FMLN, as well as representatives from the Catholic Church, United Nations, and Organization of American States.  The San Jose Accords established the necessity to achieve agreements that would permit a cease to the military confrontation, to work in a manner respectful of the rights of the civilian population, and to create a timeline for the cessation of hostilities.

 

            The GOES presented a document titled “The Proposition of the Government of the Republic to Attain Peace, Consolidate Democracy, and Reunify Salvador’s Society.”  This document drew heavily on the Esquipulas II and Tela peace accords.  This document proposed an immediate end to hostilities, and included a promise that the GOES would protect the members of the FMLN and would integrate the FMLN into the political system of the country.  The GOES offered, in this document, to assist with the formation of an FMLN political party, equal to other political parties that existed in El Salvador.

 

            The GOES demanded an immediate cease-fire and the unconditional surrender of the FMLN, which the GOES considered to be incapable of a military victory.  This meeting in San Jose also established 20 and 21 November 1989 as the dates for the next meeting, which was to be held in Caracas, Venezuela.  The FMLN, surmising that the GOES was not serious about negotiating a settlement, launched a military offensive, beginning on the 11th of November, which brought the war to the capital.  While no meeting took place in November, the offensive did serve to bring both sides back to the negotiating table.

 

4 APRIL 1990, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Despite the fact that initially, the FMLN had threatened to make this session little more than a “protocol meeting,” it turned out to be much more.  The Geneva Accords committed both sides to a rapid and uninterrupted negotiation to end the armed conflict in El Salvador.  It also bound the GOES and FMLN to work with the United Nations, and established ground rules for the involvement of other interested governments and political groups.[9]

 

Subsequent to a GOES request for the United Nations to intervene and facilitate with negotiations and an acceptance of UN intervention on the part of the FMLN, the UN agreed to work with the peace process.  The UN pointed to United Nations Security Council Resolution 637, Esquipulas II, and the San Isidro Coronado agreement were cited as terms of reference for UN involvement. The UN received from both the GOES and FMLN an assurance to work in good faith to search for a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

            The Declaration of Geneva formalized the objectives of negotiations as:

·        Ending the armed conflict as quickly as possible

·        Assisting with the democratization of the country

·        Guaranteeing absolute respect for human rights

·        Unifying the Salvadoran people

 

As de Soto and del Castillo explain:

The ultimate goal of the peace negotiations became the establishment of the necessary guarantees and conditions for reintegrating the members of the FMLN, within a framework of full legality into the civil, institutional, and political life of the country.  The FMLN viewed their reinsertion into society through three different channels that included participation in political activities, in the new National Civil Police, and in agricultural production.[10]

 

16 – 21 MAY 1990, CARACAS, VENEZUELA

Under the guidance of UN representative Alvaro de Soto, the Caracas Accords established a General Agenda and a calendar for completing the negotiation process.  Additionally, these accords restated the objectives of the peace negotiations as established in the Declaration of Geneva.

 

            The GOES presented four points for discussion during this meeting: the electoral system, human rights, the judicial system, and the restructuring and evaluation of the Armed Forces.  With regards to discussions on the Armed Forces, the GOES was careful to establish that the existence of the Armed Forces as an institution was not in question.  With regards to this, the GOES stated that “the restructuring and institutional evolution of the Armed Forces are important questions to be discussed in the dialogue process, but the existence itself of the Armed Forces is under no circumstances a point of discussion.[11]    

 

            On 14 June 1990, the UN stated that the talks held in Caracas would continue in Oaxtepec, Mexico in order to have additional discussion concerning the restructuring of the Armed Forces. This was the first time the two sides addressed the idea of a “purge” of the Armed Forces and both sides were unwilling to compromise on issues concerning the Armed Forces.  While the FMLN demanded an Armed Forces reduction, the GOES ruled out any reduction in force without an agreement from the FMLN to end the war.  The issue of the Armed Forces emerged as key to the entire negotiation process. Despite much discussion and presentation of opposing views on the Armed Forces theme, no agreement or signed accords resulted from this meeting.

 

20 - 26 JULY 1990, SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

These talks produced the first substantial agreement in the negotiation process with relation to the respect and guarantee of human rights.  The San Jose Accords were fundamental to the creation and deployment of the United Nation Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).  As a result of the San Jose Accords, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 693 and on 6 September 1991 authorized the opening of an ONUSAL office in San Salvador.  Initially, the ONUSAL office mission was to begin its duties at the end of the conflict, however both the GOES and the FMLN independently requested that the ONUSAL mission be set up before the cease-fire was in place.

 

 The ONUSAL mission, from the beginning, was to have a multi-disciplinary approach and would focus on human rights.  ONUSAL represented the first time the United Nations had been asked to help resolve an internal conflict in the Western Hemisphere and was also the first UN mission to include Human Rights and Police divisions in conjunction with traditional peacekeeping functions.[12] 

 

            After the signing of the San Jose Accords, the GOES and FMLN met two more times in San Jose (August and September 1990) but were unable to come to any agreement concerning the Armed Forces.  Negotiations were stalemated over the issue of Armed Forces impunity and purging.  Discussions became confrontational as the FMLN continued with their demand that the Armed Forces be completely dismantled, while the GOES refused to discuss the issue without a cease-fire commitment from the FMLN. 

 

With negotiations seemingly at an impasse, the UN assumed a more active role in the negotiation process.  In an attempt to break the negotiation impasse, UN representative Alvaro de Soto proposed the idea of a foreign, independent investigation team to address the issue of Armed Forces impunity.  This proposal would eventually become the basis for the UN Truth Commission.  Alvaro de Soto’s proposals and determination to keep the negotiations moving was a key factor in the process and ultimately resulted in the UN writing most of the Peace Accords.  As Montgomery points out, “Alvaro de Soto presided over the negotiating table while Pedro Nikken wrote almost all the accords.”[13]

 

4 – 27 APRIL 1991, MEXICO

This three-week negotiating session resulted in a several agreements concerning human rights, the electoral process, the judicial system, and the Armed Forces.  These accords, in addition to creating the Truth Commission, called for the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly to ratify a series of constitutional reforms in the areas listed above. The reforms were presented to the legislative assembly on 30 April 1991 and amendments to the Constitution were ratified by the legislative body in the following months.

 

The Mexico Accords also included a unilateral declaration by the FMLN stating its opposition to Article 211 of the El Salvador Constitution where the Armed Forces were described as a “permanent institution in service to the nation.”[14]  The FMLN maintained that this statement was incompatible with their position on the matter.  

 

            With regards to the Armed Forces, these accords outlined a new focus for the institution that limited its involvement in internal security and intelligence operations.  As historian Knut Walter points out, the accords signed in the city of Mexico began to define a new role for the Armed Forces, mentioning specifically its subordination to civil authority and disengaging from public security and state intelligence.   Additionally, the Armed Forces were to have a new focus on professional development consistent with human rights and democratic values.[15]

 

            A series of talks held between May and September centered on the persistent problem of Armed Forces reform and cease-fire.  As UN negotiator Alvaro de Soto explained, it was “difficult for the government to agree to reforms to the armed forces … except within the framework of a cease-fire; at the same time, it is difficult to imagine the FMLN accepting a cease-fire unless there are reforms to the armed forces.”[16]      

           

25 September 1991, New York I

This agreement between the GOES and the FMLN moved the two sides closer to an end of hostilities and resulted in several concessions.  The FMLN dropped an earlier demand that it be incorporated into the Armed Forces in exchange for a promise of involvement with the new National Civilian Police.  Additionally, the FMLN no longer expressed an objection to the “permanent character” of the Armed Forces as defined in the constitution.

 

The New York Accords also created the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), established the Ad Hoc Commission to conduct a purge of the Armed Forces and addressed Armed Forces reductions, doctrine changes, and education system reviews.  Other issues addressed in this accords included:

-         Dissolution of the National Guard and Treasury Police

-         Dissolution of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI)

-         Creation of the State Intelligence Organization (OIE)

-         Dissolution of the Immediate Reaction Battalions (BIRI)

-         Suspension of forced recruiting

 

The years of negotiations and various accords all played a role in ending the war and providing an impetus for change in El Salvador.  As Montgomery points out, the negotiations between the GOES and the FMLN were trying to change a whole society and not just bring an end to an 11 year-old civil war.[17]

 

THE CHAPULTEPEC PEACE ACCORDS.

On 31 December 1991, in the last 30 minutes of Javier Perez de Cuellar’s tenure as UN Secretary General, an agreement was reached on the remaining key issues.  This cleared the way for the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords that would put an end to the conflict. Both sides agreed that the final negotiations would take place between 2 – 13 January in New York and that the final accords would be signed on 16 January 1992, in Chapultepec Castle, Mexico City.  Both the GOES and the FMLN agreed to order their troops to stand down on 31 January, and begin a cease-fire on 1 February 1992. 

 

The Chapultepec Accords, in addition to putting an end to the 12-year civil war, had a profound effect on Salvadoran society.  As Walter points out, the Document also summed up the aspirations of various generations of Salvadorans, both military and civilians, who longed for a democratic society.  Additionally, Walter states, the accords served to put an end to years of confrontation between the ruling regime, backed up by the Armed Forces and the Salvadoran Marxist left.[18]

 

The Chapultepec Accords focused on four broad themes: 1) The role of the Armed Forces; 2) the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions; 3) economic and social matters; 4) the end of the FMLN military structure and the reentry of its members into the Salvadoran society and political system.

 

While these accords did address social issues, economic matters, and the strengthening of democratic institutions, the document deals principally with the restructuring of the Armed Forces.  More than half of the document is dedicated to establishing requirements for changes in the Armed Forces.  Major topics addressed include the following:

-         Armed Forces Doctrine

-         Armed Forces Education System

-         A purge of the officer corps by the Ad Hoc Commission

-         A reduction in the organization, personnel, and equipment

-         Military budget

-         Public Security Forces

-         Transfer of Intelligence Service responsibilities

-         Dissolution of the Immediate Reaction Battalions (BIRI)

-         Subordination to civil authority

 

With regards to the importance of the Chapultepec Accords, GOES negotiator David Escobar Galindo points out that the agreement…”does not distribute political power, it distributes sacrifices.  It was a way of putting actors in the role each belonged in.  It fundamentally changed the power structure by reshaping the armed forces.  They used to be the heart of power.  No decision was ever made without them.  No more.”[19]

 

 

IV.           REQUIREMENTS OF THE CHAPULTEPEC PEACE ACCORDS

 

 

            The political agreements arrived at during the peace negotiation process between the FMLN and the GOES were detailed in the Peace Accords.  Chapter One of the Chapultepec Accords mandated the following 13 changes, based on the constitutional reform agreed to in April 1991, for the Armed Forces:

 

DOCTRINAL CHANGES FOR THE ARMED FORCES

The Chapultepec Accords established the following doctrinal changes, based on the constitutional reform agreed to in April 1991, for the Armed Forces:

a.       The mission of the Armed Forces is to defend the sovereignty of the state and maintain the integrity of state territory.

b.      The Armed Forces is a permanent institution in service to the nation.  It will act in an obedient, professional, apolitical, and non-deliberative manner. The Armed Forces, as an institution, is subordinate to constitutional authority.

c.       The Armed Forces will respect the political order as determined by the people and will support political and social change as a result of democratic principals established in the constitution.

d.      The Armed Forces have an instrumental, non-decision-making role in the political arena.  As such, only the President of the Republic and the basic organs of government may use the Armed Forces to implement the provisions adopted within their respective constitutional areas of responsibility.

e.       Armed Forces doctrine is based on a clear distinction between the concepts of security and defense.  Defense, which is the guarantee of sovereignty and the protection of territorial integrity against an external military threat, is the responsibility of the Armed Forces.  Security, a much broader concept that includes economic, social, and political factors, is the responsibility of other sectors of the state and society.  Security is based on the unrestricted respect for the individual and the social rights of individuals.[20]

f.        The maintenance of internal peace, order, and public security is outside of the normal mission parameters of the Armed Forces.  Any Armed Forces participation in internal security missions will be on an exceptional basis, when normal means have been exhausted.  The use of the Armed Forces in such a mission will be in accordance with the Constitutional reforms of April 1991.[21]

 

ARMED FORCES EDUCATION SYSTEM CHANGES

            Changes in the Armed Forces education system dictated by the Peace Accords were designed to put emphasis on the “preeminence of human dignity and democratic values, respect for human rights, and the subordination of the Armed Forces to constitutional authority.”[22]  The legal framework for the Armed Forces educational system was based on articles 212 and 213 of the constitutional reforms agreed to in April 1991.

 

            Among other requirements, the accords directed that the Armed Forces education system be reformed to provide instruction not only in military material, but also humanities and science courses.  The goal of these changes was to provide a curriculum that would prepare cadets as citizens in a democratic society.  The accords also called for an increase in the number of Armed Forces personnel studying in civilian universities in the country.  A board of academic advisors was created at the military academy to supervise the school curriculum, faculty, and admissions procedures. This advisory board is headed by the director of the military academy and composed of three civilians and three military officers. The accords stipulated that the President of the Republic would appoint the members of the advisory board, as well as the academy director.

 

REVIEW AND PURGE OF THE OFFICER CORPS

            The requirement which perhaps had the greatest impact on the Armed Forces as an institution was the establishment of an “Ad Hoc Commission” to review and evaluate the officer corps.  The evaluation would be based on the following three areas;

a.       Personal conduct and compliance with the law, with particular emphasis on respect for human rights.  In addition to personal conduct, an officer’s conduct in command will be reviewed.

b.      Professional competence.

c.       The ability to adjust to changes in society, to participate in a democratic society, to guarantee the protection of human rights, and to reunify the Salvador society.

 

The existence of serious deficiencies in any one of the above areas could

be sufficient grounds for the “Ad Hoc Commission” to recommend change of duty or discharge.

 

The “Ad Hoc Commission” was composed of three civilians and two Military officers.  The three civilians were selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations based on their impartiality and irreproachable support of democratic principles.  The President of the Republic, using the same criteria, selected the military officers.   The military officers were to participate in the commission’s deliberations and recommendations, but not the investigations.  The decision of the Commission was to ideally be based on a unanimous decision by the three civilian members of the group.  If this were not possible, it would be based on a majority vote (the military members were not allowed a vote). 

 

REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES

            In addition to a purge of the officer corps, the Peace Accords called for a general reduction in the size and organization of the Armed Forces. The Accords stated that the Armed Forces, in view of the changes in doctrine and mission, should make adjustments in the organization, unit structure, and personnel strength of the force.

 

            The Accords called for the organization of the Armed Forces to be adjusted to meet the requirements of a peacetime army and the types of units, institutional structure, equipment, and number of personnel to be reviewed and adjusted.  The Accords also mandated the disbanding of units created or strengthened as a result of the war.  As a result of the new mission and organization of the Armed Forces, the Accords directed a reduction in the number of personnel.  Additionally, there should be a review and adjustment of the different categories of the personnel (combat troops, service support, support specialties, etc).  The officer corps should also be reduced appropriately, to meet the requirements of the change in force structure and mission.

 

            In addition to personnel review and reduction, the Peace Accords called for the Armed Forces to review its material and equipment requirements in light of its new constitutional mission.   Additionally, military installations and budgets were required to be adjusted to meet the new mission and doctrine established by the Peace Accords and Constitutional Changes.

 

            While the Accords mandated changes, in general terms, the document did not provide details of the changes or how such changes would be carried out.  These details were outlined in a separate document which the Government of El Salvador provided to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

 

AN END OF ARMED FORCES IMPUNITY

            The April 1991 Accords signed in Mexico created the Truth Commission and the Chapultepec Peace Accords called for the commission to investigate and put an end to all forms of Armed Forces impunity.  The Peace Accords charged the commission with focusing on cases involving human rights.  The goal of Truth Commission was to put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of Armed Forces officers, especially involving cases where respect for human rights was jeopardized.

 

 

 

 

 

 

PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES

            The Peace Accords stated that, in accordance with the new Armed Forces doctrine and constitutional changes, the responsibility for internal security and law enforcement is the responsibility of the National Civilian Police (PNC).   The Accords stated that the PNC is to be a new organization, with new doctrine, structure, and personnel.  Additionally, this section of the Accords established the requirement to disband the National Guard and Treasury Police (Policia de Hacienda).    

 

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

            The Peace Accords abolished the National Intelligence Directorate (DNI) and directed that state intelligence services be entrusted to a new organization, the State Intelligence Organization (OIE).  OIE would be subordinate to civilian control and under the direct authority of the President of the Republic.  The activities of OIE are restricted to those required for compiling and analyzing information in the general interest of the state.  The means of collection will be within the limits of legal order and are based on a strict respect for human rights.

 

IMMEDIATE REACTION INFANTRY BATTALIONS

            In view of the fact that the Immediate Reaction Battalions (BIRI) were created during the conflict, the Accords called for a review of their existence after the conflict has ended.  These units would not be needed in times of peace and the Armed Forces must disband the units and redeploy or discharge the personnel assigned to these units.

 

SUBORDINATION TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITY

            The Accords specifically states that the President of the Republic, exercising the authority granted him by the Constitution, may appoint civilians to head up the Ministry of Defense.  While no legislation existed that prohibited civilians from serving as Minister of Defense, in practice since 1932 all Ministers of Defense had been Armed Forces officers.

 

PARAMILITARY BODIES

            This section of the Accords addressed the issue of civil defense units and mandated changes to the military reserve system.  The existing system of territorial service was ordered disbanded and the Armed Forces was charged with creating a new reserve system.  The members of this new system may only undertake missions in accordance with the Constitution and will not perform any function related to public security or monitoring of the population.  Additionally, this article established the requirement to regulate private security services and ensure compliance with the law and respect for human rights.

 

 

 

 

SUSPENSION OF FORCED RECRUITMENT

            The Accords called for a suspension of any form of forced recruitment and directed the Armed Forces to develop a new law that governs military service and reserve service.  This section of the Accords is specific in that it dictated that military service will be compulsory, universal, and shall be imposed fairly and without discrimination.  It also established the requirement for all Salvadorans to present themselves at the proper time to a registration center.

 

PREVENTIVE AND PROMOTIONAL MEASURES

            This section of the Accords called for the establishment of measures designed to promote respect for the rules governing the Armed Forces.  Such measures include supervision of the Armed Forces by the Legislative Assembly, a Presidential appointed Inspector General, and the creation of an Armed Forces Court of Honor.  This Court of Honor would try acts, which although not necessarily punishable, are contrary to military honor.  This section also called for wide dissemination of Armed Forces doctrine in order that the entire Salvadoran society is familiar with the doctrine.

 

REDEPLOYMENT AND DISCHARGE OF AFFECTED PERSONNEL

            This final section of the 13 requirements directly affecting the Armed Forces described disposition options for troops belonging to units that were to be disbanded.  It authorized redeployment to other units if compatible with the overall end strength limits for the Armed Forces.  This section also established a severance pay of one year’s wages.

           


 

V.              ARMED FORCES IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE ACCORDS REQUIREMENTS

 

 

            For the purposes of this study, the Armed Forces reforms and implementation of the Peace Accords requirements can be divided into two periods.  The first period, 1992-1995, dealt primarily with implementing the changes mandated by the Peace Accords and related constitutional reforms.  This period, characterized by restructuring, reduction, and purge of the officer corps, was initially met with resistance and less than full support for the reforms on the part of the Armed Forces.  A modernization and professionalization process, Plan ARCE 2000, marked the second period, 1995 -1999.   The Armed Forces continued the modernization and professionalization process started with Plan ARCE 2000 by implementing Plan ARCE 2005.  While the first period dealt with preservation of the institution and doctrinal changes, the second focused on consolidating these changes, strengthening the institution and professionalization of the force.

           

FIRST PERIOD OF REFORM 1992-1995

 

DOCTRINAL CHANGES

            The signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords was followed several days later by the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly ratifying several constitutional reforms relative to the Armed Forces.  These constitutional reforms served to formalize the systemic changes for the Armed Forces as agreed to during the peace process.  The reforms primarily address Armed Forces doctrine and the separation of defense and security missions.  These constitutional reforms served as the basis for the change in Armed Forces doctrine and clearly defined the function of the Armed Forces as defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

 

            Prior to the 1992 constitutional reform, the Armed Forces was a “super institution” assigned various responsibilities with regards to state and internal security.  The Armed Forces enjoyed a wide range of powers and a great deal of institutional autonomy.  The 1992 constitutional reforms changed this by limiting and defining the roles and functions of the Armed Forces.  Table 3 compares the 1983 constitution with the 1992 reforms and highlights reforms affecting the Armed Forces.  

 

In addition to the Constitutional reforms of 1992, the Government of El Salvador enacted a series of internal laws and regulations that implemented changes in the institution’s organization and functions.  The three most important of these laws were 1) Military and Reserve Service Law of the Armed Forces; 2) Organic Law of the Armed Forces; 3) Military Career Law.

 

The Military and Reserve Service Law established obligatory military service, created the Directorate of Recruiting and Reserve within the Armed Forces, and outlined the obligations and rights of citizens with regards to military service. 

 

The Organic Law of the Armed Forces established the organization of the Armed Forces and outlined the responsibilities and structure for the Ministry of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the various branches of the Armed Forces.  Additionally, the Organic Law outlined administrative service units, institutional support units, and the Military Doctrine and Education Command. 

 

The Military Career Law defined doctrine and established a model with regards to military administration.   The law established systems for officer evaluation, promotion, and dismissal.  Additionally, the Organic Law discusses military retirements and the assimilation of officers with special skills into the Armed Forces.

 

ARMED FORCES EDUCATION CHANGES

            In order to implement changes in the military education system, the Armed Forces, by means of the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, created the Military Education and Doctrine Command (Comando de Doctrina y Educación Militar-CODEM).  CODEM, established as an institutional support unit, was charged with organizing, planning, coordinating, and executing all military training requirements.  CODEM was to ensure appropriate doctrine was formulated and taught at all levels of military schooling from the military academy through the Command and General Staff Course.  Additionally, a civilian council was formed to oversee the academy curriculum.

 

            In an attempt to increase the number of individuals with defense and national security expertise, in 1993 the Armed Forces created a Strategic Studies College (Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos – CAEE), which studied national level defense topics.  Graduates of this course, the majority of whom are civilians, form a pool of personnel trained to serve as advisors on defense and national security issues.  Given the lack of civilian expertise in the defense and national security arena, the CAEE filled a void.

 

            While critics claimed that these changes were not sufficient to significantly impact the education of the officer corps, as there was no provision for civilian oversight of subsequent military education, the fact that a civilian council had input to the curriculum at the military academy was an important step.

 

            In summary, Salvadoran educator Rivas Platero explained, the educational council and resultant changes focused on improving the quality of the instruction and the organization of educational material, employing better-qualified instructors, implementing a broader curriculum, and integrating the military education system with the national system.[23]

           

REVIEW AND PURGE OF THE OFFICER CORPS

            The Ad Hoc commission was installed on 16 May 1992 and began work on 19 May.  The commission was to conduct its evaluation of the officer corps within 90 days of establishment and make recommendations in the form of a confidential document to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President of the Republic.  The commission was authorized to use information from any source it considered reliable.  While the commission was required to interview an officer before recommending administration action against him, there was no provision for independent review or process of appeal.

 

Given the complexity of the task, to evaluate approximately 2,300 officers in 90 days, the commission decided to focus on the top ten percent of the officer corps including all general officers, colonels and lieutenant colonels.  Additionally, the commission interviewed several lower ranking officers who were accused of specific actions or abuses.  Because of the enormity of the task, the commission asked for and received an extension until 23 September 1992.  In accordance with the adjusted timetable, the President and the Armed Forces would make the required administrative decisions by 23 October and to implementing these decisions by 23 November 1992.

 

            On 23 September, the Ad Hoc commission presented its recommendations in a confidential report to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and President Cristiani. The report made recommendations concerning 103 officers, including one officer who left active service during the commission’s evaluation.  26 officers were to be transferred to other functions and 76, including the Minister and Vice-Minister of Defense, were to be discharged.  The report made recommendations for most general officers and many colonels.[24]

 

            As was expected, the Armed Forces High Command resisted taking action on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc commission.  In late October President Cristiani, citing concerns over FMLN demobilization, announced that he was postponing taking any action on the recommendations.

 

            Immediate UN mediation efforts resulted in an agreement whereby the Ad Hoc commission’s recommendations would be incorporated into the routine November and December 1992 “Armed Forces General Orders” announcing promotions and retirements.  As a result of these year-end “General Orders”, President Cristiani reported that the Armed Forces had taken the following actions to comply with the recommendations of the commission:

 

1)      25 officers had been transferred

2)      23 officers had been discharged

3)      38 officers had been placed on administrative leave pending retirement

4)      7 officers had been appointed as Military Attachés abroad

5)      1 officer had been permitted, for personal reasons, to remain on active service until March 1993

6)      8 officers remained on active duty with a decision on their fate delayed until the end of President Cristiani’s term in office

 

The UN accepted as satisfactory the actions taken with regards to 87 of the 102

officers, but maintained that appointing seven officers as Military Attachés and delaying action on another eight did not comply with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc commission.  The resultant impasse threatened to disrupt implementation of the accords.

 

            The impasse was broken in March of 1993 when the United Nations published and released the Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador.  This report cited the involvement of some 40 Armed Forces officers in human rights abuses during the conflict.  As Walter and Williams explained, “the fallout from this report, combined with pressure by the United Nations and the Clinton administration, prompted Cristiani to inform the Secretary General (in late March 1993) of his decision to remove the remaining officers by the end of June 1993.”[25]

 

                In a letter dated 7 July 1993, the UN Secretary General reported to the President of the Security Council that President Cristiani had, after a delay of several months, complied with the requirements of the Ad Hoc commission regarding the review and evaluation of the officer corps.  Stating “I am therefore in a position to confirm that the Government of El Salvador has now taken the steps that it promised to comply with the Ad Hoc Commission’s recommendations,” UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali certified Armed Forces compliance.[26]  The Ad Hoc and Truth Commission Reports marked the first time in the history of the El Salvador Armed Forces that the officer corps had been subject to an external review.

 

REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES

            In accordance with the New York agreement of 25 September 1991 and the Chapultepec Peace Accords, the Government of El Salvador submitted a plan for the reduction of the Armed Forces.  This plan adjusted the size of the Armed Forces to a quantity “which it judged appropriate to its new doctrine and functions, as established in the amendments to the Constitution that were agreed upon in April 1991.”[27]  This plan called for a 50.2 percent reduction of the Armed Forces, including the demobilization of the five rapid Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions (BIRI).  The Armed Forces planned to begin this reduction on 1 February 1992 and to complete the reduction by January 1994.  In December 1992, the Armed Forces High Command decided to accelerate the reduction and complete the process ahead of schedule.  As a result, the 15 infantry battalions, which were to be disbanded throughout 1993, were all demobilized in January 1993.  The overall reduction of the Armed Forces was completed by the April 1993.

            From a wartime high of 63,175 personnel in 1991, the Armed Forces reduced its strength to 37,800 in 1992, 32,500 in 1993; and 31,400 in 1994.  Reductions continued until 1996 when total strength leveled at approximately 20,000.  As former Minister of Defense Humberto Corado Figueroa points out, the Armed Forces reduction resulted in the demobilization of “three public security organizations, five Immediate Reaction Infantry Battalions, 22 Infantry battalions, the National Directorate of Intelligence, the Territorial Service (Border Guard), and various paramilitary units.”[28] 

 

Table 4 shows the buildup and reduction of Armed Forces strength during the period 1979 throughout 1998.  As shown in the table, the Armed Forces completed the reduction process with a total strength slightly higher that which it had at the beginning of the conflict.

 

END TO ARMED FORCES IMPUNITY

            The April 1991 Mexico Accords included an agreement to establish a Truth Commission to investigate acts of violence that occurred since 1980 and to create public confidence in the positive changes that the peace process was promoting.  The Chapultepec Accords furthered this line of thinking and recognized the need  “to clarify and put an end to any indication of impunity on the part of officers of the armed forces, particularly in cases where respect for human rights is jeopardized.”[29] The Chapultepec Accords formally linked the Truth Commission’s work with the clarification and ending of Armed Forces’ impunity.

 

            The commission’s work, “The Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador,” was made public on 15 March 1993 and contained a set of recommendations that were to be implemented by both the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN. 

 

The Report named some 40 El Salvador Armed Forces officers who were personally implicated in carrying out or covering-up serious acts of violence, or who did not fulfill their professional obligation to initiate or cooperate in the investigation or punishment of such acts.  For those officers who were still serving in the Armed Forces, the Commission recommended that they be dismissed from their posts and discharged from the Armed Forces.  For those no longer on active duty, the Truth Commission Report recommended that they be barred from public office for ten years.[30] 

 

As mentioned earlier, the Truth Commission Report also influenced President Cristiani to fully comply with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commission.  Implementation of the Ad Hoc Commissions recommendations had stalled when Cristiani attempted to delay the dismissal of eight senior officers until the end of his presidential term.

The Ad Hoc and Truth Commission’s reports were significant in that they represented the beginning of an end to Armed Forces’ impunity.  As Williams and Walker point out this “marked the first time in Latin American history that a military had been submitted to an external review of its officer corps…and represented an important step forward in enhancing civilian control of the military.”[31] For the Armed Forces, the requirement to comply with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions was the most traumatic result of the Peace Accords.

 

In addition to complying with the Ad Hoc and Truth Commission Reports, the Armed Forces amended military justice codes to ensure that offenses whose victims were civilians could not be deemed purely military offenses and that civilians would not be subject to military jurisdiction.

 

ARMED FORCES REMOVAL FROM PUBLIC SECURITY MISSION

            Both the Chapultepec Peace Accords and the associated Constitutional changes mandated that the Armed Forces was no longer to be involved in internal peace and public security.  Paragraph 17, article 168 of the Constitution addresses this issue and charges the President with the responsibility to “command, organize, and maintain the National Civil Police to preserve peace, tranquility, order, and public security, in both urban and rural areas.” Additionally it states that the “National Civil Police and the Armed Forces shall be independent and shall be placed under the authority of different ministries.”[32]

 

            The separation of internal security and national defense missions represented a new approach to these missions and generated much discussion concerning this issue.  Articles such as “Armed Forces, Redefinition of Security and Democracy in Latin America” and “The New Concept of Democratic Security in Light of the Changes in the International System” expanded on this topic and made clear the differences between the concept of security and defense.[33]

 

            For the Armed Forces, this separation of internal security and national defense missions meant the immediate dismantling of the National Guard and the Treasury Police, and a gradual phasing out of the National Police and its replacement with the National Civil Police. 

 

            While there were some initial problems with dismantling the National Guard and Treasury Police – the Armed Forces renamed them and incorporated them intact into the army – the units were eventually closed, with many of their members transitioning into the newly formed Special Brigade for Military Security.

 

            The National Civil Police, as described in the Chapter II of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, was a “new force with a new organization, new officers, new education and training mechanisms and a new doctrine.”  Additionally, the Accords states that the “National Civil Police shall be the only armed police body with national jurisdiction.”[34]  In recruiting personnel to form the new police body, a balance was maintained between candidates from the FMLN and the former National Police, with each having a 20 percent representation.  The remaining 60 percent were made up of non-affiliated civilians.

 

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REFORM

            As a result of the Peace Accords and related Constitutional changes the Armed Forces intelligence apparatus, the National Intelligence Department (DNI), was abolished on 15 June 1992 and a new agency, the State Intelligence Organization (OIE), was established. 

 

            Control of OIE was entrusted to a civilian director and the organization was placed under the direct authority of the President of the Republic who was given the authority to “command, organize, and maintain the State Intelligence Agency.”[35]  Additionally, the Legislative Assembly was charged with the responsibility of supervising OIE using oversight mechanisms established in the Constitution. 

 

           

IMMEDIATE ACTION INFANTRY BATTALIONS ABOLISHED

            Given that the Rapid Reaction Infantry Battalions (BIRI) were created and deployed during the conflict, it was agreed that the Armed Forces would abolish these units and reassign or discharge the personnel assigned to these units.  The first two BIRI’s were dismantled by November 1992, the third unit stood down in December 1992, and the remaining two battalions were demobilized by February of 1993.

 

SUBORDINATION TO CIVIL AUTHORITY

            While the Chapultepec Peace Accords stated specifically that the President may appoint a civilian to head the Ministry of Defense, there was no existing law that required a military officer be Minister of Defense.  In practice, however, since 1932 all Ministers of Defense have been military officers. 

 

This changed in 1997 when President Calderon Sol appointed retired general Jaime Guzman Morales as Minister of Defense.  Although the President later replaced Guzman with an active duty general, this was the President’s decision and was not the result of pressure from the Armed Forces to appoint an active duty officer to head the Ministry of Defense. 

 

The issue of military subordination to civil authority cannot be determined, however, merely by the institutional identity of the Minister of Defense.  As U.S. Army War College professor Judith Gentleman explains “…the question was not so much that of the identity of the minister as his subordination to elected civilian authority within the democratic framework.”[36]  The President, in this case, exercised his constitutional authority to select a Minister of Defense who was an active duty officer. 

 

The transition to civil control of the military is a complicated process that includes much more than merely limiting the military’s realm of action.  As Alfred Stepan points out achieving more effective civilian control encompasses a multiplicity of tasks in which civil society, political society, and the state all have a role to play.[37]

 

ABOLISH PARAMILITARY / RESTRUCTURE RESERVE SYSTEM

The Peace Accords called for the Armed Forces to abolish territorial service and civil defense patrols and to establish a new reserve system.  As a result, the Armed Forces disbanded and disarmed the civil defense patrols in June 1992.  The territorial service was to be replaced by a new reserve system in May of 1992, however the Military and Reserve Service Law of the Armed Forces was not approved until 30 July 1992.  The new reserve system establishes the categories of active and passive reservists.  Active reservists were those former members of the Armed Forces who had not yet reached 30 years of age and were within seven years of leaving active service.  Passive reservist included those not in the active category and all others capable of military service in case of necessity.

 

SUSPENSION OF FORCED RECRUITMENT

            Chapter 1, Article 11 of the Peace Accords called for a suspension of “any form of forcible recruitment” and the enactment of a “new law governing military service and reserve service.”  The Military and Reserve Service Law of the Armed Forces, enacted in July 1992 established universal and compulsory military service system and created Directorate for Recruiting and Reserve to manage this system.

 

            As part of the new system, the Directorate for Recruiting and Reserve opened Recruiting and Reserve Centers in each of the 14 departments of the country in 1993.  The law requires all men, during the month of their 18th birthday, to register with the recruiting center in their department and receive a number.  This number would serve as a draft number in the case a draft is held.  Since the enactment of the Military and Reserve Service Law in 1992, there have been a sufficient number of volunteers for military service and there has been no draft.

 

PREVENTIVE AND PROMOTIONAL MEASURES

            Both the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN recognized the need to adopt measures to ensure respect for and compliance with rules and laws governing the Armed Forces.  Specific measures included supervision of the Armed Forces by the Legislative Assembly, effective functioning of the Armed Forces Inspector General, and the creation of an Armed Forces Honor Court.

 

            Articles 72, 73, and 74 of the 1994 Organic Law of the Armed Forces established the Office of the Inspector General as an important advisory and consultant body.  The responsibilities of the Office of the Inspector General lie in four broad areas:

1)      Oversight of Armed Forces laws and regulations to ensure compliance with national laws.

2)      Supervise the execution of orders from the High Command with respect to human rights.

3)      Review the administration of Armed Forces budgets and properties and serve as a link to government audit agencies.

4)      Monitor and evaluate the doctrine, education, and training of the Armed Forces.[38]

 

With regards to an Armed Forces Honor Court, Article 17 of the Military

Career Law established an Honor Tribunal as a permanent entity.  The mission of the tribunal was to analyze and evaluate acts that, although not punishable by law, are contrary to military honor, moral, and discipline.

 

REDEPLOYMENT AND DISCHARGE OF AFFECTED PERSONNEL

This issue was largely and administrative one and concerned the compensation of personnel discharged from the Armed Forces as a result of the institutional and organizational changes.  The redeployment and discharge process was carried out with few problems.  In May of 1994 the UN Secretary General reported that compensation had been paid to 6,000 of the 18,000 demobilized members of the Armed Forces and that an agreement had been reached to continue payments and establish a mechanism for the investigation of complaints.[39]

 

            The Peace Accords provided for a restructuring of the Armed Forces, a change to their relationship with civilian authorities, and a limited, apolitical role for the Armed Forces.  As a result of the Peace Accords, Williams and Walker point out, “the military no longer had a role in public security; the military academy was subject to civilian oversight; and, for the first time, officers had to subject themselves to an external evaluation conducted by civilians.”[40]

 

            An October 1993 UN Secretary General report stated the following with regards to Armed Forces reforms and compliance with the Peace Accords:

Structural reforms of the armed forces have already been carried out in compliance with the peace agreements and following constitutional amendments, whose basic purpose has been to ensure their subordination to civilian power within the rule of law.  Such reforms include mainly the removal of police functions from the military sphere of competence; the purification of the armed forces based on an evaluation of its members by an ad hoc commission; the establishment of new doctrinal principals and a new education system; its reduction by approximately half the original size; the abolishment of the National Intelligence Department and its substitution by a new State Intelligence Agency under civilian control; the disbandment of rapid deployment infantry battalions that had been established as a consequence of the armed conflict; and the proscription of paramilitary forces or groups, including the disbandment of the civil defense and suppression of the territorial service, which has been replaced by a new system of reserves.[41]

 

            It is interesting to note that even a former FMLN commander and political leader, Schafik Handal, was impressed with the efforts of the Armed Forces with regards to compliance with Peace Accords requirements.  Handal, in a 1998 interview, commented that he viewed the Armed Forces as the institution that had made the most progress in complying with the requirements of the Peace Accords.

 

            Applying Alfred Stepan’s model of military prerogatives to the post Peace Accords Armed Forces indicates a shift from the largely autonomous Armed Forces institution that existed in the 1980’s to an Armed Forces effectively under effective civilian control and subservient to proper political authority.  See Table 5.

 

SECOND PERIOD OF REFORM 1995 – 1999

            During the first period of reform, the Armed Forces focused on complying with Peace Accord requirements and on the preservation of the institution.  With the existence of the Armed Forces assured by Article 211 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces turned its attention to developing a modernization plan for the 1995-2000 time frame.  This plan, known as “Plan ARCE 2000” outlined the Armed Forces’ procedure for strengthening and consolidating institutional reforms.  Plan ARCE 2000 included three phases: study and design, 1995; experimentation, 1996-1997; and execution, 1998-2000.[42]

 

            The objectives of Plan ARCE 2000 were as follows:

1)      Draft, approve, and enact laws and military regulations to ensure that the Armed Forces continue to operate within Constitutional limits.

2)      Establish a system to allow some Armed Forces units a degree of economic self-sufficiency.

3)      Strengthen civil-military Relations. 

4)      Improve the organization and integrate the various functions of the Armed Forces.

5)      Modernize the Armed Forces education system.

6)      Implement obligatory military service and the new reserve system.

 

Plan ARCE 2000 was important for several reasons.  First, the plan resulted from an Armed Forces initiative and was not formulated in response to a demand from an external agency.  Second, the Armed Forces was one of the few governmental institutions to recognize the need for modernization and to clearly define modernization objectives.  Third, the Armed Forces recognized the need to present Plan ARCE 2000 to the public and to “sell” the idea in order to generate support for the plan. The Ministry of Defense planners recognized that the success of the plan depended on the institution’s ability to explain problems, to justify objectives, and to win the support of the various sectors of Salvadoran society.  Fourth, the High Command recognized the need for a cohesive effort from the entire Armed Forces and worked to have all members of the force identify with the modernization plan. 

 

            Plan ARCE 2000 represented a vision of the future and an effort on the part of the Armed Forces to secure its place in a changing Salvadoran society.  This vision included the following:

1)      A properly structured Armed Forces, with appropriate doctrine.

2)      An orientation toward democratic values and subordinate to civil authority.

3)      Officers and Non-Commissioned officers trained not only in the required military skills but also in secondary and university level civilian education.

4)      The capacity to confront a wide array of threats.

5)      A size appropriate to the needs of the country, with the ability to adjust to changes in the national and international situation.

6)      The ability to conduct joint and combined operations with the Armed Forces of other nations.

7)      Properly equipped to carry out its mission, with an emphasis on quality not quantity. 

8)      Identified with the general interests of Salvadoran society, without losing the traditional military characteristics of valor, obedience, and subordination.

 

Plan ARCE 2000 was generally successful and, as a result, the Armed Forces continued the modernization and professionalization process with Plan ARCE 2005.  This plan continues to work on areas, such as the military education system and civil-military relations, which the Armed Forces High Command believes require constant attention and adjustment in order to respond to changing requirements.  Additionally, ARCE 2005 addresses military assistance to the Government of El Salvador in cases of natural disaster and gives attention to the use of technology to augment human resources.

 

 

VI.           IMPACT OF REFORMS ON MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

 

 

             The Peace Accords not only ended a 12-year civil war and forced the Armed Forces to undertake a series of institutional changes, but also resulted in the Armed Forces becoming a more professional institution.  This increase in professionalism, according to several experts on civil-military relations, decreased the likelihood that the Armed Forces would again become directly involved in politics. 

 

            As Edwin Lieuwen explained, a genuine military expertise called for the digestion of a tremendous body of knowledge and years of training and experience…gaining the proficiency necessary to qualify as a professional officer was a full time job and left no room for dabbling in politics.  Professionalism, according to Lieuwen, meant that the officer corps turned its energies to the exercise of its military function and resulted in the armed forces becoming servants of rather than masters of the state.[43] 

 

Samuel Huntington also believed that as military professionalism increased the threat of direct involvement in politics decreased.  In his classic work on civil-military relations, The Soldier and the State, Huntington explained:

 

No longer was it possible to master military skills and remain competent in other fields.  Most particularly, it became impossible to be an expert in the management of violence for external defense and at the same time to be skilled in either politics or statecraft or the use of force for the maintenance of internal order.[44]

 

            However, ensuring that soldiers and statesmen remain in their appropriate roles involves not just effort on the part of the Armed Forces, but also the work of the government and society.  In an ideal situation, Gideon Rose of the Council on Foreign Relations explained, each of the three groups must recognize and accept its responsibilities.   The government would represent and serve society, while the armed forces would help devise and implement government policy in the areas of security and national defense. 

 

            The Armed Forces, according to Rose, has three important responsibilities.  First, they must subordinate themselves to responsible civil control.  Second, they must agree to limit their activities to areas that the government decides are appropriate.  And third, they must execute their military duties in a serious and professional manner.

 

            Civilian government officials also have three important responsibilities. First they must give the armed forces a clear mission and achievable tasks.  Second, they must develop sufficient expertise in areas of national security and defense in order that they can provide effective oversight and responsible control.  And third, they must support and respect military professionalism by granting the armed forces a degree of autonomy in those areas of expertise that are clearly military.

 

            Finally, civil society must educate itself enough to understand what the legitimate tasks of the armed forces are and be willing to provide the resources necessary to accomplish those tasks.[45]

 

            In the case of the El Salvador, the Armed Forces have come a long way since the days of direct involvement in politics and control of the government.  The institution now is largely apolitical, is fulfilling those responsibilities outlined above, and will likely continue in a role subordinate to responsible civilian control.  There remains, however, some work to be done on the part of civil government and society.  While the following concept put forth by a pair of authors refers to civil-military relations in general, the idea is applicable to the situation in El Salvador:

 

The head of government, working through a civilian-led and authoritative ministry of defense, must have the capacity to determine budgets, force levels, defense strategies and priorities, weapons acquisitions, and military curricula and doctrines; and the national legislature must at least have the capacity to review these decisions and monitor their implementation.  Capacity is a crucial concept.  It involves not just statutory authority but the knowledge, understanding, and experience to make these decisions effectively, in a way that will earn credibility, respect and acceptance (if not always enthusiastic agreement) from the armed forces…. [This means placing] great emphasis on training civilian defense officials and strategists and on building up a larger fund of national-security knowledge in civilian universities, think tanks, the mass media, and other organizations of civil society.[46]

 

            It is important to point out that in addition to fulfilling their individual responsibilities, the three sectors – armed forces, government, and civil society – will have to work together to develop a common vision of the future for the Armed Forces.  This vision, and a concept of the proper size, composition, and mission for the Armed Forces, should be the result of an open dialogue and debate involving the three sectors.

           


 

 

VII.  CONCLUSION

 

            In addition to ending a 12-year civil war that claimed some 75,000 lives, the Peace Accords and related Constitutional changes significantly altered civil-military relations in El Salvador. The agreement provided for a restructuring of the Armed Forces and their relationship to civilian authorities and set out a new, limited role for the military.  As a result of the Accords, armed forces doctrine no longer included a public security mission; internal security forces were disbanded and replaced by a new National Civil Police under civilian control; and civilians played a greater role in the military education system.  Additionally, the officer corps was subjected to an external review and held accountable for its actions; and there was a significant reduction in armed forces impunity.  A review of Stepan’s model of military prerogatives indicates a shift from largely autonomous institution in the 1980’s to a force under civilian control in the 1990’s. 

 

            While Alfred Stepan has suggested that reducing military prerogatives after prolonged military rule can result in conflict between the military and the civilian government, this was not case in El Salvador.  In El Salvador, Williams and Walker point out:

 

the initiative for reforms related to the military did not originate with the civilian government; rather, the reforms were a product of a process of negotiation whose objective was to bring to an end the armed conflict.  Consequently, implementation of these reforms generated conflict, not between the military and the civilian government of Alfredo Cristiani, but between domestic opposition forces [the FMLN] and international actors on one hand, and the armed forces and the civilian government on the other hand.[47]

 

During the first period of reform, 1992-1995, there was initial resistance on the part of the Armed Forces because they believed implementing the Peace Accord requirements and complying with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions represented a threat to the Armed Forces as an institution.  Those reforms that were perceived as challenges to the military’s core interests elicited the fiercest opposition. 

 

However, once the Armed Forces, as an institution, was assured of its permanent role in service to the nation, it took on the mission of modernization and professionalization with a fervor.  Both Plan ARCE 2000 and ARCE 2005 represent significant undertakings that were the product of the Armed Forces developing a vision of the future and not the result of externally mandated changes. 

In reviewing the Peace Accord process and its impact on the El Salvador Armed Forces, several important aspects stand out:

 

1)      It is easier to start a conflict than to bring about a negotiated settlement. 

2)      Ending the conflict is a necessary, but not sufficient, step toward creating the structures necessary to sustain peace and reconcile society.

3)      The El Salvador Armed Forces underwent a period of substantial change with regards to structure, mission, and doctrine as a result of the Peace Accords and related Constitutional changes.  Armed Forces reforms centered on three broad areas: reduction, restructure, and officer corps purge. The Armed Forces that emerged from the implementation of the Peace Accords was quantitatively and qualitatively different from the force that fought a 12-year civil war.

4)      Personal and institutional vengeance is too costly to permit in the fragile, post-conflict environment.  Taking care of ex-combatants and reintegrating them into society serves to stabilize society.

5)       The Peace Accords and related Constitutional changes had a significant impact on civil-military relations and served to further the concept of civilian control of the military.

6)      In order to provide responsible civilian control, it is important that both the government and civil society increase their knowledge of national security and defense matters. 

7)      International organizations, specifically the United Nations, played a key role in the peace negotiation process and in monitoring compliance with the accords as well as the initial phase of reforms.  International participation can and will influence the attitude of domestic actors.

8)      International organizations can best assist when they facilitate rather than dominate the process or attempt to impose a solution.

9)      The scope of military reforms are greater when the institution is not threatened and the impetus for change comes from within the armed forces.

10)  The increased level of professionalism and emphasis on the armed forces as an important, but non-deliberative, state institution will likely keep the armed forces disengaged from active politics.

11)  It would be wrong to suggest that this exact method of negotiation, concessions, and reforms could be applied entirely to other conflicts in the Hemisphere.  To do so would be a simplistic interpretation that ignores country and situational specific factors and could result in improper concessions in an attempt to end a conflict.

 

The Peace Accord process in El Salvador represents a remarkable achievement, not only for the its bringing an end to a 12-year civil war, but also for the lasting impact it had on civil military relations.   The threat is no longer a military coup, but rather political ineptness.  With the role and influence of the Armed Forces significantly altered, the burden now rests with the civilian government and society to responsibly control the armed forces and develop the expertise required to effectively take the lead in National Security issues and maintaining a proper relationship with the Armed Forces.

TABLE 1.  HEADS OF STATE IN EL SALVADOR 1931-1979[48]

 

 

PERIOD                                 PRESIDENT

1932-1934

Gral Maximilano Hernandez Martinez

1934-1935

Gral Andres Ignacio Menedez

1935-1944

Gral Maximilano Hernandez Martinez

1945-1945

Gral Osmin Aguirre y Salinas

1945-1948

Gral Salvador Castaneda Castro

1948-1950

Revolutionary Government Council

1950-1956

TCnl Oscar Osorio

1956-1960

Cnel Jose Maria Lemus

1960-1961

Revolutionary Government Council

1961-1962

Civil-Military Directorate

1962-1962

Dr. Rodolfo F. Cordon

1962-1967

Cnel Julio A. Rivera

1967-1972

Gral Fidel Sanchez Hernandez

1972-1977

Cnel Arturo Armando Molina

1977-1979

Gral Carlos Humberto Romero

 

 

TABLE 2: MILITARY PREROGATIVES BASED ON 1983 CONSTITUTION

 

 

PREROGATIVE

           LOW

         MODERATE

          HIGH

1.  Constitutionally sanctioned role of the military in the political system.

 

 

The Constitution gave primary responsibility for internal order and protection of the democratic process to the Armed Forces.

2.  Military relationship to the Chief Executive.

 

The President of the Republic was the Armed Forces Commander in Chief, but had and exercised little authority.

 

3.  Coordination of the Defense Sector.

 

 

Minister of Defense was an active duty officer selected by the Armed Forces.  Ministry staff composed of military personnel.

4.  Active duty military participation in the cabinet.

 

 

Active duty officers served in ministry level positions.  Armed Forces officers served as directors of national level institutions.

5.  Role of the legislature.

 

 

Little oversight of military budget and operations.  No tradition of legislative hearings on defense matters.

6.  Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees.

 

 

Few civilians with Defense or Security experience.  Active duty officers filled all key defense/security sector staff roles

7.  Role in intelligence.

 

 

All intelligence organizations were controlled by the Armed Forces.  No independent civilian review of intelligence operations.

8.  Role in Police / Law Enforcement.

 

 

Police and Law Enforcement operations were under direct control of the Armed Forces.  Vice-Minister of Public Security was an active duty officer.

9.  Role in Military Promotions.

 

 

Promotion decisions made in Armed Forces channels.  The “tanda” system and military promotions were independent of executive oversight.

10.  Role in State Enterprises.

 

 

Armed Forces officers were directors of numerous national level enterprises (ports, utilities, telephone, social security, etc.)

11.  Role in the legal system.

 

 

Armed Forces personnel were subject to military courts, not the civilian judicial system.  Domain where military can be tried in civil court was very narrow.

Table 2.  Selected military prerogatives of the Salvadoran Armed Forces retained after the 1983 Constitution.[49]  Based on Alfred Stepan’s model of military prerogatives.

 

TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF 1983 – 1992 CONSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ARMED FORCES MISSIONS.

 

1983 CONSTITUTION                     1992 CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

ARTICLE 211

 

The Armed Forces exist to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the State, maintain peace, tranquility and public security, and to comply with the Constitution and applicable laws.  Be especially vigilant with maintaining a republic form of government, a representative democratic regime and not violate the norm of established transfer of power for Presidents, and to guarantee the right to vote and the respect of human rights.

 

The Armed Forces will collaborate with the Executive Office on programs of national development, especially in emergency situations.

ARTICLE 212

 

The Armed Forces has its mission the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State.  The President of the Republic, in exceptional cases, may employ the Armed Forces to maintain internal peace in accordance with this Constitution.

 

The Armed Forces, when directed by the Executive Branch, will collaborate on projects that benefit the public and assist the population in cases of natural disaster.

 

 

 

ARTICLE 212

 

The Armed Forces is a permanent institution, fundamental for national security, essentially apolitical, non-deliberative and obedient.

ARTICLE 211

 

The Armed Forces is a permanent institution in the service of the nation.  It is obedient, professional, apolitical and non-deliberative.

 

 

ARTICLE 213

 

The organization and development of Armed Forces activities will be subject to special laws and regulations.

ARTICLE 213

 

Law defines the Armed Forces’ structure, its legal management, doctrine, composition, and functions.   The President of the Republic approves regulations and special dispositions associated with this law.

 

 

ARTICLE 213

 

The number of personnel in the Armed Forces will be established by the executive section of the Defense and Public Security Branch in accordance with the necessities of the services.

ARTICLE 168

 

19.  It is the responsibility of the President of the Republic to annually establish reasonable personnel strength for the Armed Forces and National Civilian Police.

 

 

ARTICLE 157

 

The President of the Republic is the Commanding General of the Armed Forces.

ARTICLE  213

 

The Armed Forces, as an institution, forms part of the Executive Branch and is subordinate to the authority of the President of the Republic in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

 

 

ARTICLE 168

 

It is the responsibility of the President to organize and support the Armed Forces in order to maintain the sovereignty, order, tranquility and security of the Republic, and call to service the necessary force to fulfill this responsibility.

ARTICLE 168

 

Among the responsibilities of the President of the Republic:

 

11.     To organize, manage, and maintain the Armed Forces; approve promotions, assignments, and responsibilities of Armed Forces officers; and the dismissal of Armed Forces officers in accordance with the law.

 

12.     To prepare the Armed Forces for the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State.  In exceptional cases, when all normal means to maintain internal peace, tranquility, and public security have been exhausted, the President may deploy the Armed Forces for this mission.  This deployment will be for a limited time and will allow for methods strictly limited to the establishment of public order.  This deployment will stop as soon as public order has been restored. The President will keep the Legislative Assembly informed of his actions and the Legislative Assembly can mandate a stop to such a deployment.

 

17.     Organize, support, and maintain the National Civilian Police in order to guard the peace, order, and public security in both urban and rural areas of the country.  The National Civilian Police will respect human rights and be obedient to civil authorities.

 

18.     Organize, manage, and support the State Intelligence Organization.

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 4:  TOTAL ARMED FORCES STRENGTH 1979-1998

 

Source:  La Modernizacion de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador hacia

el Siglo XXI. [The Modernization of the Armed Forces of El Salvador in the 21st Century].  (1996). Colegio de Altos Estudios Estrategicos, San Salvador, El Salvador.

 

 

TABLE 5: ARMED FORCES MILITARY PREROGATIVES BASED ON THE 1992 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS / PEACE ACCORDS

 

PREROGATIVE

           LOW

         MODERATE

          HIGH

1.  Constitutionally sanctioned role of the military in the political system.

Virtually no direct political participation by the Armed Forces.  Article 211 of the Constitution dictates that the Armed Forces are apolitical.

 

 

2.  Military relationship to the Chief Executive.

Articles 157 and 213 of the Constitution establish the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 

 

 

3.  Coordination of the Defense Sector.

 

While a retired general officer recently served as Minister of Defense (MOD), there are few civilians in key defense positions. 

 

4.  Active duty military participation in the cabinet.

The only active duty officer in a ministry level position is the MOD. (Selected by and appointed by President.)

 

 

5.  Role of the legislature.

 

Major defense policy issues and the Armed Forces budget are reviewed and approved by the Legislative Assembly.

 

6.  Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees.

 

Few senior civil servants with sufficient defense experience to assist the executive branch in designing and implementing a national security policy. 

 

7.  Role in intelligence.

 

Executive branch controls the State Intelligence Organization (OIE) and appoints its civilian director.  The military retains an intelligence staff section.

 

8.  Role in Police / Law Enforcement.

The Ministry of Public Security directs the National Civilian Police.  Article 159 of the Constitution mandates that different ministries control National Defense and Public Security.

 

 

9.  Role in Military Promotions.

 

Articles 10 and 15 of the Military Career Law and Article 168 of the Constitution define the role of the President in the promotion process.  A promotion board makes recommendations to the President, who has final approval over senior officer promotions.

 

10.  Role in State Enterprises.

Civilians control key public and private enterprises.

 

 

11.  Role in the legal system.

The Armed Forces have almost no legal jurisdiction outside of defined military offenses.  Article 216 limits military jurisdiction to those cases that are exclusively military in nature.

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

 

Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos. (1996).  Cuaderno de Trabajo No. 01-96: La Modernizacion de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador Hacia el Siglo XXI. [Workbook No. 01-96: The Modernization of the El Salvador Armed Forces for the 21st Century]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos.

 

Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos. (1995).  Los Acuerdos de Paz en El Salvador.  [The Peace Accords in El Salvador].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos.

 

El Salvador Armed Forces Joint Staff. (1999).  Plan ARCE 2000 Fact Sheet.  [Brochure]. San Salvador, El Salvador.

 

Gobierno de El Salvador. (1983).   Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador.  San Salvador, El Salvador: Editorial Juridica Salvadorena.

 

Gobierno de El Salvador. (1992).  Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador.  San Salvador, El Salvador: Editorial Jurídica Salvadorena.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional. (1993).  Ley del Servicio Militar y Reserva de la Fuerza Armada.   [Law of Military Service and Armed Forces Reserve]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Nacional.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional. (1994).  Doctrina Militar y Relaciones Ejército/Sociedad. [Military Doctrine and Army/Society Relations]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Talleres Graficos UCA.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional. (1994).  Relaciones Civiles-Militares en el Nuevo Marco Internacional..  [Civil Military Relations in the New International Framework].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Impresora El Estudiante.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional.  (1994).  Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada.  [Organic Law of the Armed Forces].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Nacional.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional.  (1995).  Ley de la Carrera Militar. [Military Career Law]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Nacional.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional. (1998).  La Nación Salvadorena: Su Defensa, Seguridad y Desarrollo. [The Salvadoran Nation: Its Defense, Security, and Development].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Nacional.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional. (1999).  Reglamento de la Ley de la Carrera Militar. [Military Career Law Regulation].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Nacional.

 

Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional. (undated).   Modernización Plan ARCE 2000.  [Modernization Plan ARCE 2000] San Salvador, El Salvador: Impresos Chambita.

 

United Nations. (1992).  Acuerdos de El Salvador:  En el Camino de la Paz.  [The El Salvador Accords: On the Road to Peace].  San Salvador, El Salvador: United Nations Department of Public Information.

 

United Nations. (1995). The United Nations and El Salvador: 1990-1995.  New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information.

 

 

BOOKS, ARTICLES, UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS

 

Bonilla Martinez, J. (1994)  El Aporte de la Fuerza Armada para Consolidar el Sistema Democrático en El Salvador.  [The Support of the Armed Forces in Consolidating the Democratic System in El Salvador].  [Masters Thesis, University of Central America].  San Salvador, El Salvador.

 

de Soto, A. and del Castillo, G. (1993).  An Integrated International Approach to Human Security.  [Unpublished Manuscript].  San Salvador, El Salvador. 

 

Danopoulos, C. (1988) Military Dictatorships in Retreat: Problems and Perspectives. In Danopoulos, (Ed). The Decline of Military Regimes.  Boulder: Westview Press.

 

Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (Eds).  (1996).  Civil-Military Relations and Democracy.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

Gantiva, D. and Palacios, M. (1997).  The Peace Processes of Colombia and El Salvador: A Comparative Study.  [Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School]. Monterey, CA.

 

Giralt Barraza, S.  (1998).  On the Road to Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in El Salvador.  [Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School].  Montery, CA.

 

Goodman, L. Mendelson, E. and Rial, J (Eds.). (1990).  The Military and Democracy.  Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

 

Juhn, T.  (1998).  Negotiating Peace in El Salvador.  New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.

 

Loveman, B. (1994, Summer).  “Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978 – 1993.”  Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 36,  no. 2, pp. 105 – 189.

 

Marcella, G. (1990, Spring). “The Latin American Military, Low Intensity Conflict, and Democracy.”  Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 32, no. 2, pp. 45 – 82.

 

Martinez Mejia, A. (1995).  La Reconversión de la Fuerza Armada en el Período 1992 – 2000.  [The Reconversion of the Armed Forces in the period 1992 – 2000].   San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Alto Estudios Estratégicos.

 

Molina Montoya, S. (1992).  The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984 – 1992). [US Army War College Strategic Research Project]. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

 

Montgomery, T. (1995, Winter).  Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 37, 4, pp. 139 – 172.

 

Murcia Pinto, J.  (1997).  El Rol de la Fuerza Armada en la Elaboración de la Política de Seguridad y Desarrollo Nacional.  [The Role of the Armed Forces in Forming the Policy of Security and National Development].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos.

 

Ramos, B.  (1996).  El Nuevo Rol de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador de Cara al Siglo XXI.  [The New Role of the El Salvador Armed Forces in the 21st Centrury]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Alto Estudios Estratégicos.

 

Ruhl, J. (1996, Spring). Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras.  Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 38,  no.1, pp. 33 – 66.

 

Schulz, D. (Ed).  (1998).  The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century.  Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute.

 

Stahler-Sholk, R.  (1994, Winter).  El Salvador’s Negotiated Transition:  From Low-Intensity Conflict to Low-Intensity Democracy.  Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 36, no. 4, pp. 1 – 59.

 

Stepan, A. (1988).   Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press.

 

Suazo C., G.  (1994).  La Reconversión de la Fuerza Armada en El Salvador. [The Reconversion of the El Salvador Armed Forces].  San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Altos Estudios Estratégicos.

 

Walter, K. (1997).   Las Fuerzas Armadas y el Acuerdo de Paz.  [The Armed Forces and the Peace Accords]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Ricaldone.

 

Walter, K. and Williams, P.  (1993).  The Military and Democratization in El Salvador.  Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 35, no. 1,  pp. 39 – 88.

 

Williams, P., and Walter, K.,  (1997).   Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s Transition to Democracty. Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press.

 

 

INTERVIEWS

 

Rose, Gideon.  October 1999 author interview with Gideon Rose, Deputy Director of National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.  New York, NY.

 

 


[1] Juhn, T. (1998).  Negotiating Peace in El Salvador.  New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., pg. 1.

[2] Williams, P. and Walter, K. (1997).  Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s Transition to Democracy.   Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 13-23.

[3] Williams and Walker. (1997).  Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s Transition to Democracy, pp. 114-116.

[4] As cited in Perelli, C. (1990). “The Military’s Perception of Threat in the Southern Cone of South America.”  In Goodman, L., Mendelson, J., and Rial, J. (eds.) The Military and Democracy.  (pp. 93-105)

  Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

[5] Ibid, xi-xii.

[6] Stepan, A.  (1983).   Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.   Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pg. 93.

[7] For detailed information on the various meetings and accords leading to the January 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords see the Government of El Salvador report: Los Acuerdos de Paz en El Salvador. (1995). [The Peace Accords in El Salvador].  San Salvador, El Salvador; The United Nations publication: Acuerdos de El Salvador: En el Camino de la Paz.  (1992).  [El Salvador Peace Accords: The Road to Peace]. San Salvador, El Salvador: United Nations Department of Public Information; The United Nations and El Salvador 1990-1995.  (1995).  New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information; and Montgomery, T.  (1995).  “Getting to Peace in El Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and ONUSAL.”   Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 4. pp. 139-172.

[8]  Juhn, T.  (1998), pg. 45.

[9] Juhn, T. (1998), pg. 58.

[10] de Soto, A. and  del Castillo, G.  (1993).   An Integrated International Approach to Human Security. Unpublished manuscript. San Salvador, El Salvador.

[11] These ideas concerning discussion of the Armed Forces were outlined in unpublished notes Documento 13, (1990), San Salvador, El Salvador, that provided the Government of El Salvador’s rationale behind the major points for discussion.  

[12] Molina, S.  (1996).   The Peace Process in El Salvador (1984-1992).  U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Report, Carlisle Barracks Pennsylvania.

[13] See Montgomery, T.  (1995).

[14] See Section VI of the Acuerdos de Mexico in the United Nations publication: Acuerdos de El Salvador: En el Camino de la Paz.  (1992).  [El Salvador Peace Accords: The Road to Peace]. San Salvador, El Salvador: United Nations Department of Public Information and Article 211 of the El Salvador Constitution.

[15] Walter, K. (1997).   Las Fuerzas Armadas y el Acuerdo de Paz.  [The Armed Forces and the Peace Accords]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Imprenta Ricaldone.

[16] de Soto, A.  Proceso.  Mexico, 12, 26 June 1991, pg. 6.

[17] Montgomery, T.  (1995). pg 146.

[18] Walter, K. (1997).  pg. 28.

[19] David Escobar Galindo quoted in Juhn, T. (1998).  pg. 129.

[20] For a detailed discussion on the different functions of security and national defense, see Aguilera Peralta, G.  (1994). “Fuerzas Armadas, Redefinicion de Seguridad y Democracia en America Latina,”  [Armed Forces, Redefinition of Security and Democracy in Latin America] in  Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional,   Relaciones Civiles-Militares en El Nuevo Marco Internacional.   [Civil Military Relations in the New International Framework].   El Salvador: Impresora El Estudiante: pp.79 – 104. 

[21] Article 212 of the El Salvador Constitution permits the President to deploy the Armed Forces, on an exceptional basis, for the maintenance of internal peace.  Section 12 of Article 168 limits the duration of such a deployment to the minimum necessary to reestablish order.  Additionally, it requires the President to inform the Legislative Assembly of the circumstances of such a deployment.

[22]  See Chapter 1, Section 2, “Sistema Educativo de la Fuerza Armada” [Armed Forces Education System]

 of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in United Nations publication: Acuerdos de El Salvador: En el Camino de la Paz.  (1992).  [El Salvador Peace Accords: The Road to Peace]. San Salvador, El Salvador: United Nations Department of Public Information.

 

[23] Rivas Platero, D. (1996). “Planamiento del Sistema Educativo de la Fuerza Armada y su Intergracion al Sistema Educativo Nacional.”  [Planning the Armed Forces Education System and its Integration in the National Education System].  Cuaderno de Trabajo No. 01-96 La Modernización de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador Hacia el Siglo XXI.  [Workbook No. 01-96, The Modernization of the El Salvador Armed Forces for the 21st Century]. San Salvador, El Salvador: Colegio de Altos Estudios Estrategicos.

 

[24] See United Nations document S/25078 dated 9 January 1993.  This document is the 7 January 1993 letter, from the Secretary-General to the President of the United Nations Security Council concerning implementation of the provisions of the peace agreements relating to the purification of the Armed Forces. United Nations.  (1995).  The United Nations and El Salvador: 1990-1995.  New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information.

[25] Walter, K. and Williams, P.  (1993)  “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador.”  Journal of Inter- American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, no. 1, 1993: pp. 66-67.

[26] For additional information on UN role in ensuring compliance with the Ad Hoc Commission’s requirements, see the following UN documents.  S/25516, 2 April 1993, a letter dated 2 April 1993 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the purification of the Armed Forces.  S/26052, 8 July 1993, a 7 July 1993 letter from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council concerning the purification of the Armed Forces.

[27] See part C, “Reduction of the Armed Forces of El Salvador (FAES)” in UN document S/25812, 21 May 1993, the Report of the Secretary-General on all aspects of ONUSAL’s operations.

[28] Corado Figueroa, H. (1994). “Los Procesos de Desmovilización de las Fuerzas Armadas” [The Armed Forces Demobilization Process] in Aguilar Urbina, F. (ed.).  (1994).  Demobilization, Demilitarization and Democratization in Central America. San Jose, Costa Rica: Fundacion Arias: 147.

[29] See section IV of UN document, A/46/553-S/231308, dated 9 October 1991, a letter dated 8 October 1991from El Salvador transmitting the text of the Mexico Agreement and annexes signed on 27 April 1991 by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN.  Also refer to Chapter One of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in UN document A/46/864-S/23501, dated 30 January 1992, which transmits the entire text of the Peace Agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN, signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

[30] For the full text of the recommendations, see Section V, Recommendations of UN document S/25500, dated 1 April 1993 a letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the report presented on 15 March 1993 by the Commission on the Truth. “The Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador”,

[31] Walter, K.and Williams, P. (1993). “The Military and Democratization in El Salvador.”  Journal of Inter- American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 35, no. 1: pg.163.

[32] See Constitutional reforms as outlined in UN document A/46/553-S/23130, dated 9 October 1991, a letter dated 8 October 1991 from El Salvador transmitting the text of the Mexico Agreement and annexes signed by the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN.

[33] For a detailed discussion of the concepts of security and national defense, see Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, “Fuerzas Armadas, Redefinicion de Seguridad y Democracia en America Latina,” and Gral. Carlos E. Celis Noguera, “El Nuevo Concepto de la Seguridad Democratica a la luz de los Cambios del Sistema Internacional,” [The New Concept of Democratic Security in view of the Changes in the International System] in Relaciones Civiles-Militares en El Nuevo Marco Internacional. [Civil-Military Relations in the new International Framework]. (1994).  El Salvador: Impresora El Estudiante: pp. 79 – 113. 

[34] For additional information on the establishment of the National Civil Police, see Chapter II of UN document A/46/864-S/23501, dated 30 January 1992, which transmits the entire text of the Peace Agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN, signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City on 16 January 1992.

[35] See the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, Article 168, paragraph 18.

[36] Gentleman, J. (1998).  “Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy Process,” in Schulz, D. (Ed.),  The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century,  Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute: pg. 128.

[37] Stepan, A. (1998).  pp.128-145.

[38] For a complete discussion of Inspector General duties and responsibilities, see Bonilla Martinez, J.  (1994).  El Aporte de la Fuerza Armada para Consolidar el Sistema Democratico en El Salvador.  [Armed Forces Support in Consolidating the Democratic System in El Salvador]  Unpublished masters thesis, San Salvador, El Salvador:  pp. 70-71.

[39] See Chapter II D, of UN document S/1994/561, dated 11 May 1994, the Report of the Secretary-General on ONUSAL’s activities from 21 November 1993 to 30 April 1994.

[40] Williams, P. and Walter, K.  (1997).  Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s Transition to Democracy.   Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: pp.183.

[41]  See paragraph II.A, Reforms in the Armed Forces, in the Annex to the UN document S/26581, dated 14 October 1993, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Truth.

 

[42] Information on Plan ARCE 2000 was taken from an El Salvador Armed Forces Joint Staff Fact Sheet, dated 22 October 1999 and La Modernizacion de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador Hacia el Siglo XXI, (1996). [The Modernization of the Armed Forces in the 21st Century].  San Salvador, El Salvador, Colegio de Altos Estudios Estrategicos, pp.13-16.

[43] Lieuwen, E.  (1961).  Arms and Politics in Latin America.  New York, Frederic A. Praeger Press, pp.151-153.

[44]  Huntington, S.  (1957).  The Soldier and The State.  Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pg.32.

[45] Rose, G., Interview by author, October 1999, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY.

[46] Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (Eds.).  (1996). “Introduction”.  Civil-Military Relations and Democracy Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, pg.xxviii.

[47] Williams, P. and Walter, K.  (1997).  Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador’s Transition to Democracy pg.153.

[48] Armstrong, R. and  Shenk, J.  (1980).  “El Salvador – Why a Revolution?” NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, no. 4, pg. 46.

[49]   Giralt-Barraza. (1998).  pg. 24.