INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES

CLASS XL

 

 

 

 

 

MONOGRAPH

 

MODERN PEACEKEEPING IN THE INTER-AMERICAN CONTEXT

 

 

 

 

BY:

 

CDR KEVIN P. NEWMEYER

UNITED STATES NAVY

 

FORT LESLEY J. McNAIR

 WASHINGTON, D.C.

  APRIL 2001

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MONOGRAPH PRESENTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE AS A REQUISITE FOR OBTAINING THE DIPLOMA OF COMPLETION FOR THE SENIOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE COURSE

CLASS XL

 

 

 

 

 

 

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND REVIEWED THIS RESEARCH PAPER AND FOUND ITS CONTENT AND LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE AND WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE’S methodology.    

 

 

 

_______________________

    COL M. K. DiPrimo

                                                                                    Student’s Advisor

 

 

 

 

 

NOTE

 

            The views and opinions expressed in this work are exclusive of the author and do not represent those of the United States Government, the United States Department of Defense and/or their associate elements and the Inter-American Defense College.

 

 

AUTHORIZATION

 

            I, hereby, do authorize the Inter-American Defense College to publish this work, as an article for selected reading or as inclusion in the College Review.

 

 Introduction

                Peacekeeping in the Inter-American System must conform with the standards of the United Nations and international systems while reflecting the unique aspects of the hemispheric structures already in place and functioning.  This paper will examine the existing norms and body of law covering peacekeeping and the current practices of the governments in the Americas.  From this legal base it will then examine the recent history of peacekeeping operations (PKO) in the hemisphere and finally provide recommendations for improvements for future missions.

                Modern peacekeeping in the United Nations system originated with actions in the Suez Canal Crisis and Cyprus.  Traditionally, peacekeeping operations involved the separation of the warring factions by international observers.  The important characteristics of these operations were the willing agreement of the warring factions, normally nation states, a clearly defined border or cease-fire line, and the lightly armed, neutral observers fundamentally serving as an interpositional force to separate the combatants while political negations continued to resolve the conflict.  In summary this type of peacekeeping involved the consent of all the parties (normally nation states), a neutral observer force, and clearly delineated lines of demarcation.   Over the past ten years following the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping has increased and changed significantly.  A recent UN report on peace operations defines peacekeeping as “a 50 year old enterprise” that has evolved from a traditional military model of ceasefire observation/force separator to a much more complex model of military and civilian elements working to build peace in the aftermath of civil wars.[1]

                Post Cold War peacekeeping is much more likely to involve international intervention in what were previously considered internal matters of sovereign states.  Whereas previous peacekeeping efforts involved the matters of sovereign, independent states in a Westphalian system, modern peacekeeping often involves intervention to address humanitarian interests in civil wars.  These interventions may be in failed states such as Somalia, after the negotiation process in a civil war such as El Salvador and Guatemala, or the actions of a regional organization at the behest of the UN or another political organ as in the case of Haiti or the Balkans.  This new style peacekeeping is also significantly more dynamic than cease-fire monitoring such as Cyprus.  It now often includes the significant use of coercive military force such as in the Balkans and West Africa.  Modern missions often include significant aspects of nation building as in Cambodia and East Timor. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants has been a feature of at least fifteen peacekeeping operations in the past ten years.[2]

                In examining peacekeeping, it is necessary to discuss the legal basis on which it is built and justified.  Peacekeeping derives its legitimacy much more from practice and custom than from treaty law.  This is especially true of modern, intrastate intervention by outside forces.  The Charter of the United Nations is fundamentally concerned with maintaining world peace in terms of preventing and arresting interstate conflict.  In the post Cold War era, the number of interstate conflicts has diminished significantly but the number of UN peacekeeping missions has increased geometrically. Off the 25 major armed conflicts in 1997, 24 of them were internal wars.[3]  Of the forty-nine UN peacekeeping missions initiated as of 2000, thirty-six were initiated in the 1990’s.[4] This has led to a new body of customary international law regarding international intervention.  This customary law reflects the repeated practice of nation states and is a traditionally valid form of international law.  Thus through tradition and practice, the nature of the law has changed while the treaties have not. 

                This paper will therefore review the legal basis for international peacekeeping and intervention with a concentration on the Americas.  This review will consider the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS), other treaties in the Inter-American System, and the various declarations of the organs of the Inter-American system specifically related to peacekeeping.  In order to develop recommendations for improving peacekeeping in the Americas, it is necessary to review some of the significant United Nations PKOs in the world as well as the recent evolutions in Haiti, El Salvador and Guatemala conducted under UN auspices as well as the significant regional effort undertaken in response to border conflict between Ecuador and Peru.

                In order to best prepare, it is essential that the Inter-American system evaluates potential areas for crisis within the region and establishes the requisite plans and structures to meet those crises.  A true hemispheric approach offers a legitimate means to prepare now for the next humanitarian and social disaster.  This paper will offer suggestions to improve the prospects for success in the inevitable crises both inside and outside the Americas.

Legal Basis for Peacekeeping

 

Peacekeeping derives its legal basis from a combination of declaratory law and customary practice over a number of years.  Significantly, the treaty law was primarily written in the aftermath of a global war among sovereign nations.  This is in contrast to the recent practice of states in the aftermath of the Cold War where civil wars predominate.  Both sources provide valid international law however.  The principal treaties to be considered include the United Nations and Organization of American States Charters.  These documents form the basis for the interrelations among sovereign states on the world and regional levels.

The United Nations Charter is the foundation for modern day relations of nation states.  It provides for the maintenance of peaceful relations, outlaws the use of force, and recognizes the sovereign equality of states.  How then has this document been adapted to the complexities of the 21st century?

The requirement for peaceful resolution of disputes and the comportment of states toward one another is contained in Article 2 (4) of the Charter:

 

 “All member states shall refrain in international relations

from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or

political independence of any state, or in any other manner

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

 

This article specifically rejoins states from the use, or threat of use, of force against another state.  The Charter further curtails the powers of the United Nations itself with regard to the internal affairs of sovereign states in Article 2 (7):

 

“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize

the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially

within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the

members to submit such matters to settlement under the present

Charter.”[5]

 

This prohibition against intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state reflects the attitude prevalent at the end of the Second World War and the continuation of the system of states originally envisioned with the Treaty of Westphalia. 

                The UN Charter places the authority for action in support of peace with the member states and the Security Council.  Consider Article 34:

 

“The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any

situation which might lead to international friction or give

rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance

of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance

of international peace and security”

 

This article invests the Security Council with the power to investigate any situation which may endanger international peace and security.  This power has been used to send missions to east Timor and other areas in order to investigate what previously had been internal matters.  The potential for large flows of refugees as in the wars in the Balkans and the Great Lakes region of Africa easily affords the “international” threat to security necessary to invoke this investigation.  If the Security Council determines that a threat to the peace exists, Article 39 of the Charter empowers the Council to “decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This allows for a spectrum of responses from the economic and trade blockades and embargoes of Article 41 to the military expressions of power in Article 42:“such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

                The UN Charter also recognizes the use of regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security.  Article 52 (1) states that “nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.”  This potential for the employment of regional actors offers a means for improvement of the peacekeeping mechanisms and perhaps an indication of the future of peacekeeping. 

                Given the nature of the UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American of the States (OAS) of the same era contains strikingly similar language regarding the use of force and the sovereignty of states.  In Article 1, the OAS Charter continues this prohibition on the intervention in the domestic affairs of member states:

 

“(OAS) has no powers other than those expressly conferred

upon it by this Charter, non of whose provisions authorizes it

to intervene in the matters that are within the internal jurisdiction

of the member states.”[6]

 

This theme is continued throughout the OAS Charter.  Article 18 expressly forbids intervention in the internal or external affairs of another state not only by armed forces but also unspecified “other” means.  Article 20 declares that the territory of a member state is “inviolable” and will not be subject to even “temporary occupation.”

                In Articles 27 and 28, the OAS Charter provides for collective self-defense consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter.  However, the language of these articles is specifically focused on external and extra-continental threats to security.  This is reflective of the aftermath of World War II and the beginning stages of the Cold War, which framed the drafting and ratification of the document. 

                Another significant treaty of the Inter-American System is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).  It reaffirms the principles of collective security (Article 3) and the classic notions of territorial sovereignty (Article 5).  It is significant to note that neither the OAS Charter nor the Rio Treaty has been renegotiated in the aftermath of the Cold War.

 

               


Modern Peacekeeping[7]

 

                Modern peacekeeping is a multi-dimensional, complex operation.  It is no longer simply the insertion of military observers between two forces willing to be separated.  Peacekeeping requires the mixture of politics, diplomacy, law, social action and economic development.  This is all carried out under intense media scrutiny in a globalized information network without traditional lines of command and control.

                What organizations are involved in modern peacekeeping?  The United Nations (UN) remains the predominate player in the peacekeeping arena.  It serves not only as the sanctioning force but the legitimizing factor in situations requiring the use of force.  As discussed earlier in the legal foundations for peacekeeping, the UN has the sole authority to sanction the use of force by member (and non-member) states outside of actions taken under Article 51 (right of self defense) of the UN Charter.  The dilemma however is that the UN does not have an army at its disposal.  It therefore must use coalitions and regional organizations to execute its mandates. [8] Another principal actor in the peacekeeping process is the individual nation state.  The nation state remains a prime actor in the post-Cold War era and the state retains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.   There has also been an explosion in the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with a role in all stages of peacekeeping operations.  Finally, the role of the Red Cross movement, development agencies and police forces must be considered.

 

The United Nations System

 

                The United Nations organization is essential to understanding Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).  The three principal organs are the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretariat.  Each plays a unique and vital role in the execution of a peacekeeping operation.

                The Security Council is the highest decision making body within the international and UN systems.  The Security Council determines the details of the PKO mission’s mandate.  This includes the character, size, extent, and purpose of the mission.  Its authority arising from Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, the Security Council determines the direction of the organization; it requests support from the member nations, and provides executive level oversight of operations.  In some analysts’ view, the Security Council is the only legitimate forum for sanctioning the use of force.

                The council however suffers from structural limitations.  Composed of the representatives of fifteen member nations, five permanent members (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China) each with the power to veto any action in the Council, and ten members representing the rest of the world, the Security Council cannot take any action until it is “seized of an issue.”  Article 34 of the Charter authorizes the Council to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction … is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”  Article 35 authorizes any member state to bring any potential Article 34 issues to the Security Council for consideration.  However, the key element remains the ability to attract the attention of the members of the Council to an issue.  Unless the fifteen members agree to address an issue it will die.  This is particularly true with issues that directly involve the interests of one of the Great Powers.  Recent examples of the ability of the Council to effectively ignore issues of international importance are Russia’s actions in Chechnya, China’s actions with respect to Tibet, and the United States’ embargo of Cuba.

                The General Assembly offers an open forum for each state, regardless of size or power, to present issues on the international stage.  Essentially a large debating forum, the power of the Assembly rests on its ability to reflect or generate sufficient world opinion to force action.  Article 11 of the Charter allows the General Assembly to “discuss and make recommendations on issues concerning international peace and security.”  It also has the specific power under this article to “call the attention of the Security Council” to issues that are “likely to endanger international peace and security.”  This type of action has occurred with respect to the issues involving Israel and the Palestinians.  However, Article 12 of the Charter severely limits the role of the General Assemble in matters of which the Council is already aware.  It is hard to imagine an issue in a globalized, networked society of the 21st century that would escape the notice of the Council.  Additionally, Article 18 of the Charter requires that votes on important issues, such as the maintenance of peace and security require a two-thirds majority.

                The General Assembly nonetheless controls two organizations in the United Nations system that are key players in the world of peacekeeping.  The UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHR) are positions created by and responsible to the General Assembly.  Both of these organizations retain exceptional legitimacy internationally and a damning report by either agency will serve to rally international public opinion and lead to calls for international action and intervention.

                The third side of the United Nations triangle is the Secretariat.  The Secretariat, under the Secretary General, exercises day to day control over peacekeeping operations.  The Secretariat contains the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  Each of these organizations is essential to modern peacekeeping operations. 

                The Department of Political Affairs is charged with direction of the overall effort in a peace operation.  Since the ultimate objective of the UN System is to achieve stable governments free to pursue peaceful interests on the world stage, DPA supervises the nation building aspects of peace operations.  This includes the establishment of rule of law organizations such as courts, development of political institutions of the country, conduct of free and fair elections, and the execution of normal state functions such as social services and security.

                The Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides supervision and support to the military and civilian police elements of a peacekeeping operation.  DPKO performs several functions of a headquarters staff but it is a relatively small organization compared to the typical General Staff of a modern military force.  It has only recently begun to maintain an around the clock operations center to support its numerous field operations.

                The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs supports the Secretary General with respect to caring for the victims of international strife.  Its primary role is as a liaison for the numerous non-governmental organizations and specialized UN agencies that respond to crisis situations.

                As modern peacekeeping normally involves situations where the normal apparatus of national governments has failed, OHCA must oversee the many and varied efforts underway to meet the basic needs of the civilian population.  Some of the most significant organizations involved are:

World Health Organization (WHO) - The objective of WHO is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.  Health, as defined in the WHO Constitution, is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.[9] 

 

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) - UNICEF is mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential.[10]

 

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) - UNDP is the United Nations' principal provider of development advice, advocacy and grant support.  In addition to coordinating international humanitarian assistance in crisis situations, UNDP provides a bridge between emergency relief and long-term economic development.  In societies wracked by conflict, UNDP supports national and regional reconciliation; greater participation by women in peace-building and democratization; reintegration of refugees and displaced persons; reconstruction of war-torn communities; and demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers into civil society.[11]

 

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) - The Food and Agriculture Organization was founded in October 1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural populations.[12]

 

World Food Program (WFP) - WFP is the food aid arm of the United Nations system.  Food aid is one of the many instruments that can help to promote food security, which is defined as access of all people at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life.  Targeted interventions are needed to help to improve the lives of the poorest people - people who, either permanently or during crisis periods, are unable to produce enough food or do not have the resources to otherwise obtain the food that they and their households require for active and healthy lives.[13] 

 

 

            The UN Secretary General also has at his disposal additional powers with respect to modern peacekeeping.  Under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary General “may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”  This power to personally address an issue to the Council is significant.  As a public but international figure, the Secretary General may play a personal role in a crisis.  This power has been used by various individuals and is not without political risk as evidenced by the failure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali to be recommended for the customary second term as Secretary General after he fell afoul of United States policies.

                Additionally the Secretary General may appoint a Special Representative (SRSG) to investigate an issue or situation.  The SRSG would become the head of mission for any UN operation subsequently executed.  The act of appointing an SRSG in and of itself is a significant political statement and serves to draw attention to an issue at the international level.

                A third tool available to the Secretary General is the publication of a Secretary Report.  The report is a public document that may outline the nature and extent of an international issue.  It will outline the options available, the current status of the parties, and the status of the affected population.  It may serve as part of the peacekeeping mandate if the Security Council subsequently decides to take action.  By virtue of being a public document issued by the Secretary General, it may serve to place significant international pressure on the parties to the dispute, their supporters and the Security Council.

 

Alliances, Regional Organizations and Individual States

 

                Once the United Nations decides to sanction a peace operation, where do the forces come from?  The United Nations doesn’t “go to war” but rather requests regional organizations or coalitions of the willing to execute the coercive components of peace operations.

                Military alliances, such as NATO in the Balkan peacekeeping missions, or ECOMOG in West Africa, serve a key role in executing PKOs.  NATO, as the most integrated and developed alliance, is able to rapidly place forces in position once the political decisions have been made.  The proposed European Defense Identity, an European Community controlled force separate from NATO, may one day attain a similar capability.

            The alternative to a military alliance, a coalition of the willing, generally requires more time to form and deploy.  Such coalitions also suffer from a lack of common training, tactics and procedures, which makes field operations more difficult.  Finally, some coalition partners may not significantly enhance the military power available but are often critical to achieving the political consensus necessary to launch a mission.

                Regional Organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for African Unity, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) play significant roles in several peace operations.  The OSCE remains involved in both the Balkans and the successor states to the Former Soviet Union.  As political organizations, they provide forums for member states to focus on an issue at a more regional and even local level.

                Ultimately, the individual states remain the fundamental players in peacekeeping operations.  Individual states provide both the forces and the economic resources required to undertake PKOs.  The United States, as the world’s dominate military, economic and political power, retains the ability for both unilateral action and inaction in matters of peace and security.  By failing to support an issue, it can keep the UN from acting.  The effects of United States Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 issued after the deaths of seventeen US Army Rangers in a firefight in Somalia delayed UN action in response to genocide in Rwanda.[14]  Other permanent members of the Security Council have also delayed international action for political reasons.  Clear examples of this include the Peoples Republic of China’s actions with respect to the limitation of the extension of the Haiti PKO mandate to four months vice the recommended six months in 1996 and delays to the dispatching of observers to Guatemala in 1996-97 despite the signing of a peace treaty.[15]  More recently it stopped the extension of the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) mandate in Macedonia.[16] China took these actions to express its displeasure that the governments of Haiti and Guatemala had established relations with Taiwan.  The ability of Russia to block discussion of Chechnya and of China to block issues concerning Tibet are other examples.

                Regional powers such as South Africa or Nigeria can significantly impact the development of peace operations.  These regional powers often share a common heritage, geography and cultural understanding.  This knowledge can be crucial to a successful mission.  Likewise, neighboring states to the conflict are critical.  These states are often directly involved in the conflict as a result of refugee flows, insurgent support, or the transnational effects of the environmental and economic disruption caused by conflict.  Finally, these nations may become staging points for eventual outside interventions.  Ultimately, successful intervention depends on regional support as evidenced by Australia’s leading role in East Timor.

 

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

 

            Non-Governmental Organizations play an increasingly important role in modern peace operations.  These organizations range in size from one or two individuals with a cause to global enterprises focused on specific issues.  Some of the more well known organizations often involved in peace operations are Doctors Without Borders, OXFAM, World Vision, and CARE.  These organizations operate worldwide on funding from a variety of sources.  In many cases, NGOs are active in a conflict long before the UN musters the political will to enter a crisis.

                NGOs may focus on any of a number of issues.  Common areas of interest include humanitarian goals, human rights issues, development and social welfare.  It is important to remember that these organizations follow their own independent agendas in response to their domestic or global interests.  They are not subordinate to the United Nations civilian or military mission, but may place substantial demands on the UN operation.  Security of the NGO workers is often an issue for the military peacekeepers.  It is also important to remember that the NGOs are not required to be neutral and should not be expected to behave as such.

                A special class of NGO is the Red Cross movement.  The Independent Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an internationally recognized body with rights and privileges guaranteed by treaty.  The ICRC is active in conflict resolution worldwide and is characterized by its neutrality.  It is tasked with being impartial and this neutrality affords it access to all sides of a conflict.  Modern peacekeepers must recognize this fact and not expect or demand more from the ICRC than it can legally provide. 

                The second element of the Red Cross movement is the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the associated national Red Cross organizations.  These organizations are active worldwide and are focused on humanitarian concerns.

 

The Professional Disciplines of Peacekeeping

 

                As modern peacekeeping became more complex and deviated from a  purely interpositional observer force, several professional disciplines have become partners in the effort.  Each partner has a series of roles to play that are essential to organizing, approving, executing, sustaining and transitioning a peacekeeping operation from conflict to stable nation state.

                The politicians and diplomats hold the legitimate power within the state.  While political leaders are not always chosen in free and fair elections, they are accorded the right to speak for the nation under customary international law.  Increasingly as peacekeeping moves from interstate to intrastate conflicts, the political leaders are not always government leaders but the heads of sub-state movements or factions such as the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or the FARC in Colombia.  These individuals are not elected under classic terms but by virtue of the fact that they control large organizations capable of acting in the environment, they must be considered as politicians for the purposes of negotiations and conflict resolution.  The reliability of these non-state actors must be carefully considered by the peacekeeper.  A party may give consent to the UN operation merely to gain time to retool it forces and then withdrawal its consent when regrouped and refreshed.[17]  Additionally, the irregular forces under these “leaders” are often less tightly controlled than the conventional armies involved in classic peacekeeping situations.[18]

                Politicians maintain the aims and goals of the government faction that they represent.  Their task is to promote the strategic aims of their faction.  Politicians also ultimately decide the resources and methods to be used to reach the organizations goals.  Politicians determine the policies to be implemented by the other players in the peacekeeping partnership.

                Diplomats, as the appointed representatives of the state, play a key role in the prevention and pre-hostilities phase of a conflict.  They serve to observe and report for their governments.  Diplomats also serve as a conduit for communication to the parties in the conflict from outside nations.  They can serve to facilitate communication between the parties through the use of “good offices.”  Often able to operate behind the scenes, diplomats conduct many of the negotiations necessary to further action.  It is important to remember however, that the diplomat is merely an implementer of the policies devised by the political authority.

 

The Humanitarian Partner

 

                Humanitarian concerns are a prime motivator for modern peace operations.  The initial US led intervention in Somalia was aimed at alleviating the human suffering that was fanned by internal conflict.  In the early stages of an operation much of the humanitarian assistance may involve the direct use of military forces due to their equipment, command and control systems, and organization.

                The objectives of humanitarian assistance are to sustain life and relieve suffering.  This includes in most cases the provisioning of shelter, food, water, sanitation, fuel and health care.  A number of actors in the peacekeeping partnership are involved, namely the UN agencies and NGOs.  As previously stated, the military may play an important role, especially in the early stages of a peacekeeping mission, due to the ability to rapidly deploy with an imbedded infrastructure for execution of basic support operations.  This assistance provides the basic safety net to allow for the longer term development and nation building efforts to take root.

 

The Development Partner

 

                Long term sustainable development is necessary for achieving a true end to peacekeeping operations.  While development efforts may be ongoing before a violent conflict erupts or after it ends, development vary rarely occurs while hostilities are ongoing.  Violence discourages donors.  The United Nations defines these post conflict efforts to rebuild the society as peace building.[19]

                The key players in development include the United Nations, international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Regional organizations such as the OAS and their associated development banks as well as individual donor nations routinely sponsor development efforts.

                NGOs play an increasingly important role in modern development efforts and are key players in yet another facet of peace operations.  These NGOs are at both the national and international level.  They respond to the interests of their donors, whether in modernization of the infrastructure or preservation of natural resources.

                One of the crucial elements of the peace building process is the ability to attract private investment.  Long-term development depends much more heavily on private investment by corporations than on government/NGO investment.  Private investment only occurs in a stable environment where the investor has a reasonable expectation of a profit.  Without stability and a viable legal system to protect property rights, private long-term investment will not occur.

 

Human Rights Partner

                One of the prime generators of ethnic conflict is human rights abuses.  Military peacekeepers play an important role in guaranteeing protection of human rights.  The Security Council considers humanitarian actions to be firmly situated within peacekeeping operations.[20]  However the mandates and directions from the Security Council have not always given peacekeepers the authority to act.  A key recommendation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (hereafter referred to as the  Brahimi report for the panel chairman -- Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria) is that peacekeepers – troops or civilian police – should be explicitly authorized to stop violence against civilians when they encounter it.[21] This is an outgrowth of the UN debacle in Rwanda.  The report goes on to add however that this is a potentially enormous liability for the UN to assume and sufficient troops and resources must therefore be allotted if all potential victims are to truly be protected.  While much of the emphasis is on the work of the peacekeepers, it is important to remember that the peacekeepers have no exit without the effective work of the peace builders.[22] This is to say that unless human rights protections and sustainable development strategies are not established in the area of conflict, peacekeeping missions cannot end.  There is clearly a symbiotic relationship among the partners in a peace operation, and human rights personnel can play a significant role in this peace building process by conducting programs of national reconciliation[23] such as the truth commissions in El Salvador and South Africa.  These efforts allow the facts about atrocities to be publicly aired and the healing process to begin.  Human rights specialists also help strengthen the rule of law, which is necessary in the reconstruction of a failed state.

 

Civilian Police Partner

 

                The civilian police are second only to military forces in the number of international personnel assigned to peacekeeping operations.[24] It is expected that the demand for civilian police will remain high, which only exacerbates the problems faced by police in peacekeeping operations.  Currently there is a significantly longer gap in the mustering and deploying of police units than the corresponding military peacekeeping personnel.  The reasons are obvious, there are not large civilian police regiments standing by for action comparable to the corresponding military units used in peacekeeping operations.  As of August 2000, twenty-five percent of the 8,641 UN authorized police peacekeeping positions were vacant.[25]

                These vacancies are not due to the reluctance of governments to send civilian police.  In fact the use of civilian police normally carries less political overhead than the employment of military forces.[26] The problem arises from the tailoring of police forces to domestic needs, thus there is negligible personnel overhead.  A police officer sent to a peacekeeping mission is a police officer that is not walking a beat in the nation of origin.

                Civilian police also face operational issues when deployed in a peacekeeping role.  Unlike military peacekeepers, which normally deploy in battalion size or larger units, police deploy as ones and twos from many different nations.  Each nation uses distinct legal codes, procedures and operational styles.  The learning curve for police units is therefore much steeper than for a military unit.

                Civilian police serve primarily to monitor and train local police forces.  The creation of a fair and impartial police force is essential to successful peace-building operations and the restoration of the rule of law.  It is extremely important in areas of ethnic conflict and civil war that an impartial police force be established and its impartiality will be under constant review by the indigenous population.  The rule of law cannot exist without an effective police force.  To be truly effective however, civilian police must be paired with the appropriate judicial, penal and human rights specialists to form “rule of law” teams for employment in peace operations.[27]

 

Military Partner in Modern Peacekeeping

 

                Military forces play a significant role in modern peacekeeping operations.  The primary function for these forces is to provide security not only to the other peacekeeping partners but to the civilian population in the area of conflict.  Military forces may also assume a number of secondary functions such as: public order and safety, human rights protection, humanitarian relief, development and democratization.  It is in these secondary roles that charges of mission creep often occur.

                Security consists of providing not only military security but also human security.  The insertion of military troops into a peacekeeping situation is designed to promptly stop violence among the warring parties and to provide for the immediate concerns of the population.  Human security revolves around establishing the conditions necessary for personal development such as respect for human rights, opportunity for development and stable government in a rule of law society. 

                Military operations in war are focused on defeating an enemy through the use of fire and movement.  Conversely in peace operations the military is attempting not to destroy the enemy but rather to stop violence between opposed factions.  The first task for a military force deployed into a peacekeeping environment is to determine who the belligerent factions are.  In present terms, these belligerents may range from organized military forces under the control of a nation state, to rogue forces beholden to war lords, criminal enterprises or merely freelancers with guns.  The military solutions will vary depending on the status of the host nation, the nature of the belligerent factions, and the extent of the war prior to intervention.

                Military security operations include several subordinate tasks.  The first and perhaps most important role for military forces is to separate the warring factions.  This separation of combatants recalls the classic role for military peacekeepers of interpositional observer missions following international conflicts.  It is much more difficult, however, in the civil war interventions frequently seen in modern peacekeeping due to nature of the underlying conflict.  Civil wars are often fought along ethnic or sectarian lines, tend to be more violent than international wars, are often zero sum situations not conducive to trade-offs for peace, often feature multiple antagonists, and the sides often have no place to return to after the conflict terminates.[28]

                The tasks for the military in these situations include the creation of zones of separation for the different factions, developing a series of confidence building measures to improve transparency and lessen mistrust, and developing the necessary measures to reduce conflict and violence.  After the initial stabilization of the situation, operations can be expanded to include disarmament and demobilization of the combatants and the necessary steps to ensure freedom of movement and personal security such as demining.

                Military peacekeeping forces must also provide the required force protection and security for mission essential personnel and equipment.  They must also supply the operational security for the other members of the international community involved in the peacekeeping partnership such as relief workers and NGO personnel.  To do this, however, they must be properly sized and equipped.  Politicians organizing peace missions must bear in mind the military credo that no amount of good intentions can substitute for the ability to project credible military force.[29]  But the force alone will not create the peace, merely the space in which peace may be built.

                International military options vary in size depending on the nature of the mission.  The possibilities range for a few military observers, as in Guatemala in 1997, to the heavy military forces deployed to the Balkans in 1992 and 1999.  These military forces are used because they have the manpower, organization, mobility and self-sufficiency to accomplish the task.  The ability to rapidly deploy with a robust force is essential to successful peacekeeping.[30] These military forces serve to witness, investigate, deny access by belligerents, increase civil security, and deter further hostilities.  It is also important to note the limitations of United Nations peacekeeping forces.  The UN can monitor ceasefire lines and peace accords, and protect citizens from small bands of criminal; but it cannot impose its will on warring parties.  Regional organizations and coalitions led by the world’s leading military powers are needed to conduct peace enforcement operations for the foreseeable future.[31]

                The heavier interpositional forces such as in the Balkans perform the following function.  They exist to use force to compel action.  Their use of force is restrained but must not be hampered by overly restrictive rules of engagement or they will soon be proven to be paper tigers.  These forces will establish bases, fortifications and observer posts necessary to separate and monitor the belligerent forces.  Routine missions include the establishment of checkpoints to control movement in the region and the conduct of routine patrols to observe the actions of the parties involved.  Larger forces also maintain an operational reserve force ready to move quickly to a trouble spot.  Is summary, they perform the typical military functions of an occupation force.

                The employment of heavy forces in a theater depends on the mission and the Security Council mandate.  Common options are: cease-fire line deployments as in classic peacekeeping missions such as the Golan Heights and Sinai; and buffer zone deployments which act as a blocking force to the expansion of conflict such as the United Nations Preventative Deployment (UNPRODEP) to Macedonia from 1995-1997.  Forces may also be deployed to establish a military presence in an area of interest or to maintain safe corridors or transit ways such as in Bosnia Herzegovina. 

                The second category of military force used in modern peacekeeping reflects the traditional role of the unarmed peacekeeper.  The Military Observer often serves a critical role in monitoring ceasefire lines, communicating between the factions of a conflict, incident investigation and local dispute mediation.  Observers are normally only lightly armed for self defense if they are armed at all.  They are designed to observe and report for the international community and not to undertake military action.  As such, military observers are often able to establish close contacts with the communities they monitor.  Such missions have been used worldwide and are often of long duration.  Examples include the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) established in 1948, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established in 1949, and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) since 1991.[32]

                Military forces also play key roles in the de-escalation of violence.  This includes participation in disarmament and demobilization efforts aimed at reducing the means available to conduct violence and improving the quality of life of the combatant and non-combatants alike.  This often involves retraining the host nation’s military to perform to internationally accepted professional standards, the incorporation of former rebel elements into the nation’s security forces (e.g.  El Salvador), and the retraining of former combatants for peaceful enterprises.  As these tension-reducing efforts are successful, military peacekeeping forces may be transitioned as well. 

                If peace-building efforts are successful, military forces may be reduced accordingly.  This normally includes the replacement of heavy forces by lighter ones, reduction in the overall number of military forces deployed, and a transition from occupation type force to observer forces.  This process is currently ongoing in some sections of the Balkans.  The ultimate objective is the removal of all peacekeeping forces and the restoration of normal state practice such as in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Summary of Major Peacekeeping Missions in the Americas

 

                Since the end of the Second World War, eight United Nations sponsored peacekeeping missions and one non-UN mission have been conducted in the Americas.  It is surprising that despite a series of institutional agents for maintaining peace within the hemisphere, the members of the Inter-American System have repeatedly called upon extra-hemispheric actors to resolve these issues.[33] Two events occurred during the Cold War (Dominican Republic 1965-66, Central America 1989-1992).  The Cold War and subsequent United States unilateralism weakened institutions such as the Inter-American Defense Board, the OAS, and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in their ability to conduct peace operations.[34] The notable exception to this process of outside support was the resolution of the Peru-Ecuador Border war in 1995.  Interestingly, half of the United Nations missions occurred in one country, Haiti.  Review of all of these major peacekeeping evolutions is essential to understanding potential means for improving the capability of the Inter-American system to respond to future peacekeeping requirements.

 

 

Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)[35]

 

This mission was established as a follow up to the largely unilateral U.S.  invasion of the Dominican Republic in May of 1965 following a series of coups and counter-coups by various Dominican factions.  The United States used the OAS to sanction the initial intervention.  The UN mission was established to observe the situation (post invasion) and to report on breaches of the cease-fire between the two de facto authorities in the Dominican Republic.  Once an agreement was reached to form a new government, DOMREP was withdrawn.  This mission only consisted of two military observers and served from May 1965-October 1966 and can be characterized as a classic military observer mission. 

Expenditures: $275,831.

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)[36]

 

                This mission was established to verify compliance by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with their efforts to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region and to deny use of their territory for attacks on other States.  The mission also played a significant role in the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (Contras) and monitored the Nicaraguan cease fire and force separations.  It was a complex mission involving both traditional functions of cease-fire monitoring but also the more complex mission of demobilization of irregular forces.

 

LOCATION: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua

HEADQUARTERS: Tegucigalpa, Honduras

DURATION: November 1989 - January 1992

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 260 military observers, infantry battalion of approximately 800 all ranks, and crews and support personnel for an air wing and naval unit; the mission also included international and locally recruited civilian staff

FATALITIES: None

EXPENDITURES: $88,573,157

 

 

United Nations Observer Mission in EL Salvador (ONUSAL)[37]

 

                This mission was established to verify the implementation of all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional aimed at ending a decade-long civil war.  The agreements involved a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues.  After the armed conflict had been formally brought to an end in December 1992, ONUSAL verified elections that were carried out successfully in March and April 1994.  After ONUSAL competed its mandate on 30 April 1995, a small group of United Nations civilian personnel -- known as the United Nations Mission in El Salvador (MINUSAL) -- remained in El Salvador to provide good offices to the parties, to verify implementation of the outstanding points of the agreements and to provide a continuing flow of accurate and reliable information.  This was a truly modern, complex peace operation.  It was forced to deal with demobilization issues, hidden arms caches, and complex development tasks.  At its peak strength in February 1992, ONUSAL's Military Division comprised 368 military observers.  Although never realized, the authorized strength of the Police Division was 631.  As the peace process progressed, the strength of both divisions was gradually reduced.  On 30 November 1994, the strength of the military component stood at 3 military observers, with the Police Division comprising 31.  Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and Venezuela provided ONUSAL military observers.  In addition, Argentina and Spain contributed medical officers.  Police observers came from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Sweden

LOCATION: El Salvador

HEADQUARTERS: San Salvador

DURATION: July 1991 - April 1995

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 380 military observers; 8 medical officers; and 631 police observers; there was also a provision for some 140 civilian international staff and 180 local staff

FATALITIES: 5 (3 police observers and 2 local civilian staff)

EXPENDITURES: $107,003,650

 

 

United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGA)[38]

 

The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala - the peacekeeping mission within the larger civilian and humanitarian MINUGUA mission was established by the Security Council in resolution 1094(1997) on 20 January 1997 for a three-month period to verify agreement on the definitive ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), which was signed at Oslo on 4 December 1996.  Verification functions under the Oslo agreement included observation of a formal cessation of hostilities, the separation of forces, and the demobilization of URNG combatants in assembly points specifically prepared for this purpose.  The mission contained a total of 188 uniformed personnel, comprised of 145 military observers and 43 civilian police contributed by 18 countries (maximum strength authorization: 155 military personnel).  The contributing countries included
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.  In addition, 13 medical personnel from Austria, Germany and Singapore served in the mission. 

 

Expenditures: $4,570,800

 

 

United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)[39]

 

This was the first of a series of United Nations missions established in Haiti during the 1990s.  Its objective was to implement the Governors Island Accord of  3 July 1993 which called for the restoration of civilian rule.  Following the United States led intervention by the Multination Force in Haiti, UNMIH’s mandate was revised to enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities in connection with: sustaining a secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key installations; and the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force.  UNMIH was also to assist the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections to be called by those authorities.  Democratic legislative elections were held in summer 1995, despite some logistical difficulties.  The Presidential elections were held successfully on 17 December 1995 and the transfer of power to the new President took place on 7 February 1996.  Upon the receipt of the request of the President of Haiti, UNMIH's mandate was extended for the final period until the end of June 1996.  At its peak in June 1995, UNMIH deployed over 6,000 military personnel and some 850 civilian police.    Nations contributing military personnel included Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and United States.  Civilian police were provided by nineteen countries: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Guinea Bissau, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federations, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Togo.  UNMIH also made a significant contribution to restoring basic services and infrastructure in the country, which suffered from years of dictatorial neglect and international economic sanctions imposed on the illegal regime.

                Costs: $315,794,700.

 

 

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)[40]

 

The second UN mission in Haiti was tasked to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the police and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of the effort to establish and train an effective national police force.  In establishing UNSMIH, the Security Council also supported the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.   This continued the trend of complex peace operations in the 1990s.

 

The size of this mission varied as indicated in the table below.

 

On 10 July 1997

1,525 military and civilian police personnel, including 225 civilian police and 1,300 military personnel.  Of the 1,300 military personnel, 800 were voluntarily funded (Canada supplied an additional batallion) Mission personnel also included some 103 international and 148 local civilian staff and some 14 United Nations Volunteers

Authorized by
resolution 1086 (1996)

300 civilian police and 500 troops
(The military component also included an additional 800 troops provided on the basis of voluntary funding, for a total of 1,300 military personnel.)

Authorized by
resolution 1063 (1996)

300 civilian police and 600 troops
(The military component also included an additional 700 troops provided on the basis of voluntary funding, for a total of 1,300 military personnel.)

 

Costs: $71,196,000 (est)

 

 

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)[41]

 

                The third mission in Haiti continued the transition away from military forces toward civilian police forces and the focus of the effort was more on reconstruction and support of democratic institutions of the country.  UNTMIH was established on the basis of a July 1997 report by the Secretary General to the Security Council.  In the report, the Secretary General stated that Haiti had taken significant strides forward.  Nevertheless, the country continued to face daunting political and economic challenges.  The basic consensus among Haitians for the reforms required to strengthen democratic institutions, generate economic growth and create jobs had yet to be built.  Progress had also been made with regard to the establishment and training of the new police force.  However, progress was slow, and the Secretary General shared the view of Haiti's political leaders that, without steady and long-term support from the international community, the force might not be able to cope with serious incidents, risking deterioration in the security situation. Authorized strength for the mission was 250 civilian police and 50 military personnel.  The United States and Canada provided additional military personnel on the basis of voluntary funding.  Pakistan also provided military personnel.  Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, and United States provided civilian police.

 

Expenditures: $20,600,000.

 

 

 

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)[42]

 

The last peacekeeping mission in Haiti was known as the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).  Unlike the three previous missions, MIPONUH had no military component.  Its mandate was to continue the work of the United Nations to support the Haitian National Police and to contribute to its professionalization.  The United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) completed its mandate on 15 March 2000.  Its main task was to assist the Government of Haiti in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police.  MIPONUH, which succeeded the previous United Nations Missions in Haiti in December 1997, placed special emphasis on assistance at the supervisory level and on training specialized police units.  Other tasks included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in their day-to-day duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the Haitian National Police funded by the United Nations Development Program and bilateral donors.  MIPONUH's special police unit was tasked with providing assistance to MIPONUH personnel and protecting its property.  MIPONUH was succeeded by the new International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) on 16 March 2000.  The General Assembly, in resolution A/54/193 of 17 December 1999, approved the establishment of MICAH.  Its mandate is to consolidate the results achieved by MIPONUH and its predecessor missions of the United Nations in Haiti as well as by the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), which was a joint undertaking of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) to promote respect for human rights in Haiti.  The new mission is tasked with further promoting human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary, and with coordinating and facilitating the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.  Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, United States contributed civilian police personnel to this mission.

Expenditures: $20,400,000.

 

 

Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP)[43]

 

                This mission differs from the others in that it was not a United Nations operation but rather a multinational effort fully within the Americas.  The purpose was to establish the conditions for disengagement of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces deployed into the Upper Cenepa Valley region over a border dispute.  The MOMEP force was quickly drawn together by the four Guarantor Nations of the 1942 Rio Protocol that delineated the border between Ecuador and Peru.  These nations are Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States.  The force was under the command of a Brazilian general, with a colonel commanding each national contingent.  The Concept of operations was limited to an observer mission only.  The forces deployed were light and not capable of combat.  MOMEP was able to achieve the establishment of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the disputed region.  Over a series of stages, forces were withdrawn and conditions established that allowed for the eventual negotiation of a treaty to settle the boundary dispute.  This was a classic interpositional peacekeeping operation but it was unique in the Americas in the modern era due to its non-reliance on outside organizations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

 

                Peace operations will remain an essential element of national security policy and international security policy for the nations of the Americas.  The recent UN-sponsored missions in El Salvador and Guatemala successfully demonstrated the capacity of the international system to resolve internal conflict, promote peace, and make strides toward the restoration of civil liberties and democracy.  Many nations of the Americas consider peace operations an essential role for their armed forces.  These middle powers such as Canada, Brazil and Argentina play a significant role in peace operations around the globe.  The United States, while not placing a priority on organizing forces specifically for peacekeeping – considering it an included capability of combat forces at present, will continue to be a dominant partner in peace operations due to its status in the UN Security Council and its military, economic and political power.  Numerous other continental states contribute to peace operations.  (Appendix A).  Some states have even pledged forces to be available to the United Nations for peace operations on short notice.  (Appendix B)

                Additionally, the recent Military Observer Mission Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP) represents a non-UN or OAS operation.  This peace operation involved the forces of four nations (US, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile), the Guarantor Nations of the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro.[44]  The Guarantors were able to act quickly in February 1995 to facilitate a rapid cessation of hostilities. They established the conditions for serious negotiation necessary to achieve a diplomatic solution for a complex and long standing problem.  This type of regional effort to resolve conflict and promote a peaceful resolution of disputes provides a sterling example of international cooperation.  These regional and sub-regional efforts allow for more timely action than United Nations missions and involve states that are truly interested stakeholders in conflict resolution.  Timely resolution of such conflicts serves to limit not only the pain and suffering of the people of the combatant countries, but lessens the second order effects of refugee migration, economic disruptions and the potential for spill-over conflicts.  While this type of international conflict is significantly more rare in recent history, MOMEP offers an excellent case study for interpositional peacekeeping by regional actors in interstate conflict.

                At present, the majority of border disputes of the type precipitating the Ecuador Peru conflict are matters for peaceful negotiations.  There are, however, other situations in the Americas which may lead to peace operations in the near future (less than ten years).  These include both failed state interventions and invitational conflict resolution in areas of civil war.

                Haiti remains a concern.  The site of several previous peacekeeping missions by the UN and the OAS, the country remains unstable.  The recent re-election of President Aristide has been viewed with suspicion.  The country continues to suffer from economic stagnation and rampant corruption.  Haiti remains a source of economic migrants.  Concerns over a large outflow of migrants have led to unilateral US military action in the past and were a prime motivation for the initial interventions in Haiti in the early 1990s.  The various UN missions in Haiti achieved very limited results.  The objectives achieved include the restoration of democracy and the removal of the coup leaders in 1994.  The international forces were successful in stopping violence and the gross abuse of human rights.  Follow-on missions aimed at establishing viable domestic security forces and rule of law have been less successful.  These missions UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH September 1993-June 1996), UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH July 1996- July 1997); and the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH August to November 1997) involved military forces and aimed at establishing the transition to civilian rule.  The final peacekeeping operation, United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH December 1997-March 2000) was entirely civilian and focused on improving the professionalism of the Haitian National Police.  It was succeeded by the joint UN and OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) aimed at promoting human rights.  While nominal democratic rule exists, a lack of economic development and political liberty will likely lead to increased social unrest and potentially increased migration.  Excessive migration could be potentially destabilizing to the Dominican Republic.

                A second potential state failure in the Americas is Cuba.  While the country remains relatively stable under the dictatorship of Fidel Castro, it, like Haiti, suffers from economic stagnation.  The lingering effects of the U.S. economic blockade and the weakness of the world sugar market severely limit the Cuban economy.  Despite the risks, numerous Cubans attempt migration to the United States. Direct military intervention the affairs of another state tends to be for one of three purposes:

1.        Humanitarian - to provide the basic necessities of life

2.        Nation building - to restore or create the institutions necessary to conduct a rule of law state.

3.        Compellence/Peace-making - to tilt the balance of power in an internal conflict.[45]

All three of these scenarios can be envisioned in a post-Castro Cuba.  A situation of great internal strife caused either by economic collapse or civil war could lead to a mass migration scenario resulting in a public demand for action in the Cuban –American community (and possibly other affected Caribbean island nations).

                This intervention would most likely involve forces from the United States with a desire by the United States for a multinational effort under the OAS or UN.  The primary objective for intervention would be to restore internal stability and thus end the immediate need for emigration.

                Colombia is also a possible candidate for a failed state intervention scenario.  The continued multifaceted civil war funded by narco-trafficking threatens the stability of the Bogota government as well as the security of neighboring states.  While the U.S. backed Plan Colombia aims to strengthen the democratic institutions necessary for a functioning state, the narcotics-funded guerrilla movements (FARC and ELN) as well as the right-wing paramilitary forces remain powerful forces working against stability.  If the civil war widens or continues to spill over into neighboring countries, regional leaders may exert pressure for intervention in order to prevent the spread of the conflict.

                Given the amount of direct assistance being provided to Colombia, a failed state scenario seems remote.  A more likely scenario is an invitational peacekeeping mission following a negotiated settlement among the parties.  The current political leadership of Colombia is clearly interested in settling the civil war.  The establishment of “safe havens” demonstrates this intent.  It is important to note that recent history in Sierra Leone and elsewhere indicates that when factions in a conflict have an independent source of income from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones, or other high value commodities that cannot be cutoff, there is little incentive to remain loyal to the accord and peace is unsustainable.[46]  At best, the operation could be modeled on the successful missions in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and Nicaragua (ONUCA).  These were, however, time consuming agreements to reach, implement, and complete.

                For such an invitational peace mission to be successful, it would require significant involvement by the leading hemispheric powers.  Recent UN missions in Africa have been characterized by failure due to the employment of inadequately trained troops with inferior equipment.[47] While the United States would clearly be involved, the other nations of the Inter-American System would also be required to play significant roles.  A unilateral United States action would most certainly be rejected not only by the factions in Colombia, but by a significant portion of the members of the OAS and the American populace as well.

                Numerous possibilities exist for the employment of peacekeeping forces from the Americas in other regions of the world.  Despite political rhetoric to the contrary, the United States will remain significantly involved in peacekeeping operations in Southeastern Europe for the foreseeable future.  Canada is a world leader in peacekeeping operations and has elevated peacekeeping to a primary role for its armed forces.  Other nations in the hemisphere also consider peacekeeping a significant mission for their forces.  The Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army recently stated “(sic) Argentine Republic, member of the United Nations, decided to adopt a more active role in the global scene and to that end has increased her participation in the Multinational Peace Corps as a legitimate valid medium for actively contributing to world peace.”[48] The following nations of the Inter-American System have signed Memorandums of Understanding with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide specified forces on short notice to participate in peace operations: Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile.[49]  Canada, Ecuador, Guatemala, and the United States have publicly indicated a willingness to support such arrangements.[50] It is easy to foresee military forces from these nations being deployed to trouble spots around the world.  Prime possibilities for further peace operations in the next five to ten years include Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and South Asia.

The Presidents of the Americas called for “increased cooperation with United Nations peacekeeping operations” in their Plan of Action following the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago Chile in 1998.[51] As the hemisphere’s forces will clearly be involved in future peace operations, it would be beneficial if they were better prepared for cooperative action.[52]  At the high end of cooperation would be a joint and combined Inter-American force designated and trained for collective action.  This force could be prepared for peacekeeping operations as well as multilateral efforts to interdict unauthorized migrant flows or to respond to the emergencies caused by natural disasters.[53] Realistically, given the present state of military cooperation at the Inter-American level, such a concept is extremely remote.

More reasonable steps exist that could be taken by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) to improve the performance of the Inter-American system’s military forces for peace operations.  The following recommendations apply:

1.        Encourage the use of available training programs by member nations and their forces.  Training programs are available from the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

2.        Conduct table top and seminar wargames for staff members of the IADB similar to the Pearson Centre Exercise TORO AZUL conducted for the Inter-American Defense College Class XL.

3.        Maintain Peacekeeping in the curriculum of the Inter-American Defense College to continue exposing future leaders of the Inter-American System to the concepts and issues in complex peacekeeping operations.

4.        Maintain a peacekeeping database for member nations.  This database should include at least the following information:

a.       Names and contact information for military and civilian police personnel with experience in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

b.       A peacekeeping lessons learned depository for access by member nations.

5.  Establish formal ties between the IADB and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to improve information flow and regional training programs.

 

Appendix A

Recent UN Peacekeeping Participation by OAS Member States

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

(Military observers, civilian police, troops) as of 28 February 2001

Country

Observer

Police

Troops

Total

Argentina

14

 

 

14

Bolivia

13

28

5

46

Brazil

8

12

 

20

Canada

 

23

 

23

Chile

 

2

 

2

Colombia

42

60

 

102

Dominican Republic

37

49

213

299

El Salvador

43

117

73

233

Honduras

15

 

779

794

Paraguay

60

391

872

1323

Peru

2

 

 

2

United States

43

227

327

597

Uruguay

42

827

1

870

Venezuela

 

34

 

34

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Military observers, civilian police, troops) as of 31 December 2000

Country

Observer

Police

Troops

Total

Argentina

10

21

491

522

Bolivia

9

 

 

9

Brazil

13

11

71

95

Canada

31

112

425

568

Chile

9

6

32

47

Colombia

 

1

 

1

Dominican Republic

 

15

 

15

El Salvador

2

1

 

3

Honduras

12

 

 

12

Peru

5

 

23

28

United States

36

849

 

885

Uruguay

61

 

1

62

Venezuela

3

 

 

3

 

 

 
(Military observers, civilian police, troops)as of 30 September 2000

Country

Observer

Police

Troops

Total

Argentina

10

64

490

564

Bolivia

11

 

 

11

Brazil

15

18

71

104

Canada

27

116

189

332

Chile

8

6

34

48

Colombia

 

3

 

3

Dominican Republic

 

15

 

15

El Salvador

2

3

 

5

Honduras

12

 

 

12

Peru

5

 

23

28

United States of America

36

865

 

901

Uruguay

61

 

 

61

Venezuela

4

 

 

4

 

 

 

 

Appendix B

OAS Members Pledging Forces for UN Peacekeeping Operations on Short Notice

 

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM

88 UN Member States have now stated their political willingness to support the Standby Arrangements System.  The following OAS Member States participate:

 

Argentina

Ecuador

Brazil

Guatemala

Canada

Chile

U.S.A

Uruguay

 

OAS MEMBER STATES THAT HAVE PROVIDED LIST OF CAPABILITIES

66 UN Member States have provided list of capabilities. This list of capabilities covers some or all of the following information:

-What kind of resources they in principle are willing to make available for peacekeeping operations upon request

-Number or quantities of personnel or equipment included in their contribution

-Response time

-Any restrictions concerning their contribution

-The following table shows OAS members states providing information

Bolivia

Paraguay

Brazil

Uruguay

Canada

U.S.A

Chile

 

 

 

 

 

MEMBER STATES THAT HAVE PROVIDED PLANNING DATA SHEET WHICH IS MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS.

This includes, among other things, a list of Major Equipment, Organization, Level of self-sufficiency and movement data.

44 UN Member States have submitted Planning Data Sheet.

 

The following table shows OAS Members providing detailed information. 

Argentina

Guatemala

Bolivia

Paraguay

Canada

Uruguay

Chile

 

 

 

 

 

The following OAS members have signed formal memorandum of understanding with the United Nations specifying thier willingness and commitment to support UN Peacekeeping Operations on a Standby Basis.

 

COUNTRY

DATE

Bolivia

22 May 1997

Uruguay

30 September 1997

Argentina

18 November 1997

Paraguay

23 September 1999

Chile

11 November 1999

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Debix, Francios; Re-envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology; University of Minneapolis, MN, 1999.

 

Durch, Wiliam J. (editor), UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990’s, St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1996

 

Farkas, Evelyn N. “A Mission that Keeps Our Forces Strong” The Washington Post, January 14, 2001.

 

Haass, Richard N., Intervention, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 1994

 

International Peace Academy, Program brochure, New York, NY. 2000.

 

Jett, Dennis C., Why Peacekeeping Fails, St. Martin’s Press, New York, NT, 1999.

 

MacKenzie, Lewis, “A Crucial Job, But Not One for a Superpower” The Washington Post, January 14, 2001.

 

Morrison, Alex (editor), The Changing Face of Peacekeeping, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Ontario, Canada. 1993.

 

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, “Pro Pace Paratus: Military Operations in Modern Peacekeeping” Course CX-30, Inter-American Defense College, February 2001.

 

Perry, William and Max Priomorac, “The Inter-American Security Agenda”  Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Volume I, 1994.

 

Organization of American States, Official Documents of the Summit of the Americas Process from Miami to Santiago, Volume I,  Office of Summit Follow-up, General Secretariat, OAS, Washington, DC, 1998.

Organization of American States, Official Documents of the Summit of the Americas Process Volume II, Office of Summit Follow-up, General Secretariat, OAS, Washington, DC, 2000.

 

Quinn, Dennis J (Editor), Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1994.

 

Summers, Colonel Harry G. Jr., The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America’s Future, Touchstone, New York, NY, 1995.

 

Thakur, Ramesh and Carlyle A. Thayer (editors), A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping the 1990’s, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1995.

 

United Nations General Assembly and Security Council A/55/305—S/2000/809 “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” Lakhdar Brahimi, Chairman.  New York, NY August 2000.

 

Veneroni, Horacio L., Fuerza Militar Interamericana, Distribuidora Maipo, Buenos Aries, Argentina, 1966.

 

Weidner, Colonel Glenn R. “Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley: A Regional Response to Crisis” published in Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict, Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes, eds. University of Miami Press, 1999.

 

Internet Resources

 

http://www.brookings.edu/press/REVIEW/fall2000/ohanlon.htm “Doing it Right – The Future of Humanitarian Intervention.” Michael O’Hanlon, author.

http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/Ohanlon/20010108.htm “How to Keep Peace in Africa Without Sending Troops” originally appearing in The New York Times, January 8, 2001. Michael O’Hanlon author.

 

http://www.brook.edu/views/testimony/ohanlon/20000405.htm testimony by Michael O’Hanlon to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 5 April 2000.

 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum27.html “Peace Operations.”  William Lewis, author.

 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/z302.html  “A Presidential Decision Directive Multilateral Peace Operations Workshop Conclusions.”

 

http://www.sgi.com.ar/eapaz/Ingles/mensajemayoi.html “Message from the Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army”

 

http://www.jha.ac/articles/a018.htm “Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping Operations” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Larry Minear, author.

 

http://www.jha.ac/articles/a002.htm “Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid, and Civil Conflict” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. Cedric Thornberry, author.

 

 

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Webpages:

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home_bottom.htm  UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Home Page

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm Operations Page.  Links to current and completed UN Peacekeeping Mission Data

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/regcoop.htm “Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements In a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms” March 1999.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/domrep.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in the Dominican Republic.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuca.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in Central America.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpkoco_mission/onusal.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in El Salvador.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/minugua.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in El Salvador.

 

www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in Haiti.

 

www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmih.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in Haiti.

 

www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in Haiti.

 

www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm Information on UN Peacekeeping in Haiti.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/mousign.htm Information on UN Standby Arrangements.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpki/rapid/signed.htm Information on UN Standby Arrangements.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.htm Data on contributors to UN peacekeeping.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm Current Peacekeeping Operations information.

 

http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/str.htm Information on Standby Arrangements.

 

Other United Nations Webpages

 

http://www.un.org United Nations Homepage

 

http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html United Nations Charter

 

http://www.who.int   World Health Organization homepage

 

http://www.unicef.org  United Nations Children’s Fund homepage

 

http://www.wfp.org/index.htm World Food Program homepage

 

http://www.fao.org UN Food and Agriculture Organization homepage.

 

http://www.undp.org United Nations Development Program homepage

 

 

 

 

 

 


[1] Brahimi, paragraph 12.

[2] Brahimi, paragraph 42.

[3] International Peace Academy, mission statement p. 3.

[4] IPA, p.3.

[5] UN Charter text cited throughout this section found  at http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html (English text)

[6] OAS Charter English text contained in Inter-American System Core Documents , Divison Politica, Colegion Interamericano de Defensa, 2000-2001.

[7] This chapter draws significantly from the course notes used in the Peterson Peacekeeping Centre Course CX-30 Version 1.2 Pro Pace Paratus: Military Operations in Modern Peacekeeping presented at IADC in February 2001.

[8] UN, Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment, 1999.  Located at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/regcoop.htm

[9] http://www.who.int   World Health Organization homepage accessed 2/24/01

[10] http://www.unicef.org  United Nations Children’s Fund homepage accessed 2/24/01

[11] http://www.undp.org United Nations Development Program homepage accessed 2/24/01

[12] http://www.fao.org UN Food and Agriculture Organization homepage accessed 2/24/01

[13] http://www.wfp.org/index.htm World Food Program homepage accessed 2/24/01

[14] Minnear, page 4

[15] Minnear, page 4

[16] Washington Post, 19 Mar 2001, page A7.

[17] Brahimi, paragraph 48.

[18] IBID.

[19] Brahimi, paragraph 13.

[20] Minear, page 1.

[21] Brahimi, paragraph 62.

[22] Brahimi, paragraph 88.

[23] Brahimi, paragraph 41.

[24] Brahimi, paragraph 118.

[25] Brahimi, paragraph 119.

[26] Brahimi, paragraph 120.

[27] Brahimi, paragraph 126 (e).

[28] Haas, pages 82-85.

[29] Brahimi, paragraph 3.

[30] Brahimi, paragraph 4.

[31] O’Hanlon testimony.

[32] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm Current Peacekeeping Operations information. Accessed 6 April, 2001

 

[33] Weidner, page 1.

[34] IBID.

[35] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/domrep.htm accessed 01/09/01.

[36] http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuca.htm accessed 1/09/01.

[37] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpkoco_mission/onusal.htm accessed 1/09/01.

[38] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/minugua.htm accessed 03/27/01.

[39] www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm accessed 1/9/01.

[40] www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmih.htm accessed 1/9/01.

[41] www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm accessed 01/09/01.

[42] www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm accessed 01/09/01.

[43] The discussion of MOMEP draws heavily on the article by Colonel Glenn R.  Weidner  “Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley” provided as class notes to Class XL of IADC.  Published originally in Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador Peru Conflict, Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes eds.  University of Miami Press 1999.

 

[44] Weidner.

[45] Haas, page 132.

[46] Brahimi, paragraph 22.

[47] MacKenzie

[48] Message from the Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army, http://www.sgi.com.ar/epaz/Ingles/mensajemayoi.html accessed 2/2/2001

[49] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/mousign.htm accessed 2/2/2001

[50] http://www.un.org/Depts/dpki/rapid/signed.htm accessed 2/2/2001

[51]  OAS, Official Documents of the Summit of the Americas Process Volume II 1998-2000, p.  262. 

[52] Perry and Primorac, p.  117.

[53] IBID, p.  122.