INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES

CLASS XL

 

 

 

 

 

MONOGRAPH

 

U.S. ROLE IN HEMISPHERIC SECURITY:  A U.S. MARINES’ PERSPECTIVE

 

 

 

 

BY:

 

LTCOL CJ CAMARENA

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

 

FORT LESLEY J. McNAIR

 WASHINGTON, D.C.

  MAY 2001

 

 

 

 

 

MONOGRAPH PRESENTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE AS A REQUISITE FOR OBTAINING THE DIPLOMA OF COMPLETION FOR THE SUPERIOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE COURSE

CLASS XL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND REVIEWED THIS RESEARCH PAPER AND FOUND ITS CONTENT AND LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE AND WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE’S METHOLOGY.   

 

 

 

_______________________

    Dr Pablo Genta

                                                                                Student’s Advisor

 

 

 

 

 

NOTE

 

 

 

 

 

            The views and opinions expressed in this work are exclusive of the author and do not represent those of the United States Government, the United States Department of Defense and/or their associate elements and the Inter-American Defense College.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AUTHORIZATION

 

 

            I, hereby, do authorize the Inter-American Defense College to publish this work, as an article for selected reading or as inclusion in the College Review.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

___________________

LTCOL CJ Camarena

USMC

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

PREFACE

 

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

DEFINING HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

What is security?

What is collective security?

What cooperative security?

Is the difference important?

A US view on security.

A Canadian view on security

What is human security?

An OAS view on security.

Are there any agreements on threats to security?

Summary

CHAPTER 2

DISCUSSION OF US SECURITY STRATEGY

Introduction

Background

The original statement

Further development in the 19th Century

20th Century and US policy

The Monroe Doctrine in the 20th Century

Effect

The President’s National Security Strategy

US National Interests

USSOUTHCOM’s Theater Strategy

Summary

 

CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF THE OAS AND SECURITY

Role of the OAS

Collective Security in the OAS

Institutional mechanisms in the Inter-American System related to hemispheric security

The Charter of the OAS

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)

Creation of the Committee of Hemispheric Security

The Defense Ministerial Summits

Summary

CHAPTER 4

FACTORS THAT EFFECT HEMISHERIC SECURITY

Is there a requirement for regional approach to hemispheric security?

Is the Inter-American Defense Board, an obstacle?

Distrust of US policy and its intentions for the region.

Security and Sovereignty.

New democracies and other sources of instability

Disagreements by member states on problems and risks to security.

Summary

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

THE US ROLE IN WESTERN HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

First and foremost, the US must be the regional leader

Help the OAS gain required credibility to be the principal instrument of Hemispheric Security

Help strengthen Sub-regional Security Alliances and organizations

One final thought

 

ANNEX 1

TABLE SUMMARIZING THE POSITIONS EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBER STATES
AT THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY
HELD ON APRIL 20 AND 21, 1999

 

 

ANNEX 2

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND ITS SUB-ORGANIZATIONS AND ENTITIES

 

 

THE WORLD WIDE WEB

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PREFACE

 

In October 2000 the Defense Ministers of the Western Hemisphere met in Manaus, Brazil.  The purpose of the summit was to comply with the task agreed upon by the Heads of State and Government of the Hemisphere issued by the 1998 Santiago Summit of the Americas to initiate a process of review “to culminate in a Special Conference on Security within the framework of the OAS, to be held at the latest, at the beginning of the next decade.”   It further directed “regional dialogue with a view to revitalizing and strengthening the institutions of the Inter-American system, taking into account the new political, economic, social, and strategic-military factors in the Hemisphere and in its sub regions.” 

As a student at the Inter-American Defense College, I was very interested in the summit.  I became more interested when I was named as a president to chair a symposium on the summit.  The next observation I made I could not believe or understand.  I found only minimal superficial media coverage of the event.  CNN did not cover the event nor did any other high visibility media outlet.  The summit was only covered by local news.  I was further disappointed when I discovered that the US Secretary of Defense did not attend.  High priority issues took him to the Middle East.  My overwhelming question became:  Is Western Hemispheric Security on the bottom rung of the US totem pole?  Or is it that the Western Hemisphere is so secure that little emphasis needs to be placed on its defense. 

The end of cold war brought many changes to security requirements in the world.  Communism was soundly defeated and replaced by democracy and a free market system, where most countries have benefited economically.  NATO was shaken up pretty well but it responded with “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” in 1991.  NATO recognized a new strategic environment and went to work to make the Alliance credible and relevant.  The Western Hemisphere likewise has responded but has not come to an agreement on its requirements for a security instrument.

 …BUT NOT ALL IS BAD NEWS

As mentioned above, the traditional threats posed by the Cold War – the ‘Communist threat’ itself have passed.  The days of authoritarian and repressive regimes, diminishing the capacity for maintaining internal stability, which based their own raison d’être significantly on their ability to repress the Communist challenge, have passed.  The possibility of armed conflict between States in the region – has not only substantially passed but has done so without leaving behind the legacy of a nuclear arms race or nuclear proliferation.  This crucial achievement is due in large part to the success of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco creating a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Latin America.  By an equally large part, the region has remained reasonably secure by shear good fortune and luck.  Luck seems to prevail in the hemisphere.  Or maybe it isn’t luck at all and you agree with the assessment of Samuel P. Huntington, nations of the Americas are fortunate in the inherent compatibility of their civilizations and their future potential to integrate.[1] 

My paper will focus on the Role of the US in Western Hemispheric Security.  Although the subject is very vast, I have not tried to narrow the scope as this is a general research project and I am not tasked to provide any recommendations but only conclusions of my investigative study.  I go into this research project with some preconceived notions and very little practical experience in the Western Hemisphere.  When I was assigned this topic, my first thoughts toward the topics were that the role of the US is very simple:  The role of the US in Western Hemispheric Security can be summed up in one obvious statement, The US Role is to maintain stability in the Region.  The US won the Cold War and is the lone Super Power, which controls the planet in security terms.  If this statement seems too arrogant I will rephrase it:  The US is the Lone Super Power that exerts primary influence on the planet in security terms.  

The scope of my investigative work is as follows:

Chapter 1 is an introduction which tries to define the term “security” as seen by the US, some of the member states of the OAS, and then collectively by the OAS.  No consensus has been reached as to an institutional definition.

Chapter 2 is a discussion of US security strategy.  It covers the historical precedence of the Monroe Doctrine and the cause and effect of this US policy.  It further discusses US strategy from the President to the CINC that is responsible with carrying out the policy.

Chapter 3 is a discussion of the OAS’ role in hemispheric security.  It further discusses some of the institutional instruments that the OAS uses to carry out its mandate.

Chapter 4 discusses some of the factors that affect Hemispheric Security.  It tries to describe some of the challenges that the region has if it is to establish a regional security architecture.  It also discusses the positions on security, of several member states of the OAS.

Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions that I have gleaned out of this investigative work.

Although I have spent almost 28 years in the Armed Forces of the United States, most of my oversees time has been in the Far East and the Mediterranean Sea.  Most Americans are not aware of the Organization of American States much less the Inter-American System.  I must confess that I had very little knowledge of the institutional tools that the OAS has at its disposal.  

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

DEFINING HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

 

Although there are different concepts of security among the member states of the OAS and no consensus on a definition or what institutions might be required to meet today’s non-traditional threats, there is general agreement on the need for a review of the subject.   All member states of the OAS have been tasked by the Santiago Summit of the Americas to initiate a process of review “to culminate in a Special Conference on Security within the framework of the OAS, to be held at the latest, at the beginning of the next decade.”  I will try to define the concept as viewed by the US.  I will also try to define the concept as viewed by member states and collectively by the OAS.

WHAT IS STATE SECURITY?

Security in its most basic term means freedom from danger or risk, or a general state of safety.  State security means a protection of a state’s territorial integrity, political independence, citizen’s safety, and protection of its sovereignty.          

WHAT IS COLLECTIVE SECURITY?

It is helpful to define what is meant by “collective security.” The term commonly refers to the joint effort among nations to address and overcome perceived threats to national security. Definitionally, therefore, a common perception of what constitutes a “threat to national security” is a prerequisite for the creation of a collective security regime. National interests will be discussed later in this paper.

WHAT IS COOPERATIVE SECURITY?

The concept of ‘Cooperative Security’ has been developed since the beginning of the nineties when the United States, Canada, and some Latin American countries such as Chile, Argentina and Colombia, have organized forums within the ‘Inter-American System’ which has its head at the OAS. ‘Cooperative Security’ is based on the principle of the “defense of the democratic systems of government” adopted by the OAS in Santiago, Chile, in 1991.

IS THE DIFFERENCE IMPORTANT?

The primary difference that I see between collective security and cooperative security is that Collective Security implies that there is an element of obligation associated with this type of security.  It is in the charter as a mandate.  It has some type of legal basis.  The OAS Charter like the NATO Charter state “an act of aggression against one State is an act of aggression against all other States.”  Cooperative security is more of a “pick and choose” concept where member states support their own concept of security.  This type of arrangement, basis its legality on international law and not necessarily on a written treaty or mandate.   This can be important but for the purposes of this paper, I will call the difference unimportant.

A U.S. VIEW ON SECURITY

The overreaching US security objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean are to ensure the area remains stable, democratic, and friendly to commerce and trade, and to maintain a regional military presence.[2]

The United States firmly believes that hemispheric security is based on four indispensable pillars – democracy, prosperity, good neighborly relations, and peace. Each pillar is essential for the region to deal effectively with internal and external threats to regional peace and security. The passage of OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080 in 1991 was a watershed in institutionalizing democratic governance in the hemisphere and acting jointly when such was threatened. Resolution 1080 symbolized not just our common commitment to democracy, but an important transition in a new era of peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere.

In Santiago and in Miami at the Summits of the Americas, our Presidents and leaders envisioned a hemisphere in which our democracies are consolidated, our economies are integrated, and our security is indivisibly enhanced through dialogue, mutual confidence, and transparency. Today, in pursuit of that mandate we are called to “Promote regional dialogue with a view to revitalizing and strengthening the institutions of the Inter-American system . . ..” An essential part of this work for the OAS and its member states will be a common expression of principles on hemispheric security based on existing Inter-American institutions and processes.

Our commitment to democracy must be reinforced by a security architecture that reflects our common values and principles – commitment to democracy, freedom, justice, and the protection of human rights. It requires that our nations have the appropriate means to support the hemisphere against transnational threats in ways that reinforce those common values. We must recognize the interconnectedness of policing, military requirements, and democratic security. These are all part of our region’s ongoing need to define security in the context of today’s security environment.

The current inter-American security system was designed for responding to threats from outside the hemisphere. However, there are certain security threats from within the region that can only be effectively addressed through multilateral cooperation. Non-traditional, transnational security threats, such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, natural disasters, environmental disasters, transnational criminal enterprises, and illegal immigration require multilateral responses by governments.

These modern threats are also crosscutting problems that require multi-faceted responses by different national organizations depending on the nature and severity of the threat. Effective communication among national governments will be necessary to respond appropriately and increase capability for joint and combined actions. In many cases the region’s response may require actions by both civilian and military elements, as directed by governments. Joint training, professionalization of security forces and a certain level of interoperability among similar government agencies will be necessary for effective multilateral cooperation.

A CANADIAN VIEW

For Canada, human security means freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or their lives.

A wide range of old and new threats can be considered challenges to human security, ranging from epidemic diseases to natural disasters, environmental change to economic upheavals. Through its foreign policy, Canada has chosen to focus its human security agenda on promoting safety for people from threats of violence. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has chosen this focus because it believes this is where the concept of human security has the greatest value-added – as a complement to existing international agendas already focused on promoting national security, human rights, and human development.

WHAT IS HUMAN SECURITY?

Human security places a focus on the security of people. They believe that this constitutes a major and necessary shift in international relations and world affairs, which have long placed predominant emphasis on the security of the state. By broadening the focus to include the security of people, human security encompasses a spectrum of approaches to the problem of violent conflict, from preventive initiatives and people-centered conflict resolution and peace building activities to – in extreme cases, where other efforts have failed – intervention to protect populations at great risk.

The main factors to human security are outlined below.

Protection of civilians, concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict.

 Peace support operations, concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these missions.

Conflict prevention, with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence.

Governance and accountability, concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights.

Public safety, concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organized crime.[3]

AN OAS VIEW

In Article 2 of the Charter of the Organization of American States the member states proclaim that one of the essential purposes of the Organization is “to strengthen the peace and security of the continent.”

Since 1991, the General Assembly has adopted a series of resolutions on cooperation for hemispheric security, covering its various aspects. In resolution AG/RES. 1123 of that year, the General Assembly established the framework for cooperation in the Hemisphere, in stating that “the … international situation would seem to dictate the adoption of measures to ensure hemispheric security, strengthen democratic processes in all of the member states and devote maximum resources in those countries to economic and social development” and that “such measures call for mechanisms for mutual consultation and an exchange of regional information to promote a climate of institutional international stability, progress, and confidence …”

The OAS has recognized that “peace is not merely the absence of war but also includes interdependence and cooperation in promoting economic and social development. Moreover, disarmament, arms control and limitation, human rights, the strengthening of democratic institutions, environmental protection, and improvement of the quality of life for all are indispensable elements for the establishment of democratic, peaceful, and more secure societies.”

In this framework, the OAS has emphasized regional contributions to global security and the need for enhanced dialogue on cooperation in peace, confidence, and security issues among the nations of the Hemisphere, and has recommended that a consultation process be initiated at the earliest possible date as a step towards the limitation and control of conventional weapons.

The General Assembly has considered the Treaty of Tlatelolco to be a cooperation security measure, as it represents one of the most momentous contributions to international law and to the ceaseless efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and guarantee international peace and security. This Treaty has become the model for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, such as the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), which, when they enter into force, will cover more than half the countries of the world and all of the Southern Hemisphere.

Thus, through resolution AG/RES. 1500 (XXVII-O/97), “Mutual Confidence in the Americas,” the General Assembly instructed the Permanent Council to consider the desirability of approving a legal framework on the issue of advance notification of major arms acquisitions covered by the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. As a consequence, in 1999, the General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions.[4]

Agreement on Threats to Security

A common threat perception has not yet entirely emerged among the nations of the Western hemisphere. As in the past, differences exist between the security threats perceived by the United States and those perceived by the majority of Latin American nations. Until differences on the issues of Cuba, drug control, and a fear of continued U.S. hegemony are resolved, the Americas will be prevented from realizing a shared perception of national security threats.

In addition, before all the hemispheric governments can develop effective regional strategies for promoting security, they must realize the domestic consensus, which defines the principal threats to their states. The dominant internal problems today were considered to be crime, corruption, illegal immigration, and the influence of international smuggling of narcotics, weapons and people.  Poverty and all its by-products is also a main threat to security. Several traditional security concerns in the region, such as the insurgency in Peru, the possibility of fighting again within Nicaragua, and the spillover influence of conflicts in Mexico (Chiapas) and the violence in Colombia, were still considered threatening to some states. In addition, the phenomena that are posing the greatest threat to both international and hemispheric security are the new dimension of terrorism, the uncontrolled migration to Mexico (mainly from Central America and the Caribbean) and from Mexico (to the United States), and the depletion of the environment and its socio-economic causes and effects.

 Efforts to establish a role for national military institutions and regional security organizations to counter such security challenges, however, proved to be very difficult. Traditionally the Latin American armed forces are nationalistic. They have national defense doctrines based on territorial defense, and their missions are fundamentally internal (territorial integration, counterinsurgency, intelligence, internal police security, etc.). However, with globalization and democratization, civilian governments are looking for a higher degree of participation by their armies in matters of “international security”. 

Running alongside this important change of attitude, though, is a fear of the internationalization of some controversial and potentially destabilizing topics. A shared perception of non-traditional threats to national security is emerging in the Americas, and this trend must be examined along with the issues, which still obstruct the emergence of a common American security agenda. The collective security goals, which could potentially comprise this agenda, should be examined, as well as the foundation for a collective strategy to advance these goals.

Armed forces must reorient themselves to adjust to the changing threat environment, and policymakers must carefully understand this process as well as the overall desirability of enhanced collective security efforts in the hemisphere. Although it will be a long process, leaders of the Americas can potentially advance common security goals on a multilateral basis, once they become unified by shared perceptions of security threats and surmount remaining obstacles to increased cooperation. Although a multitude of other issues also demand attention, promotion of economic development that benefits all sectors of society should be the cornerstone of American leaders’ vision for future cooperative relations.

SUMMARY

Member states of the OAS differ greatly on a definition of security.  There is no shared concept of security, owing not so much to the inappropriate, outdated definition given in the Rio Treaty, but to differing and sometimes opposing views of the security concerns of each state.  For this reason, it is difficult to set any sort of priorities, since all of these security concerns are legitimate (from the most traditional, to the "new threats," to weather phenomena and natural disasters). Clearly, we risk failing to meet the requirements of the member states when we try to shape an all-inclusive concept.   Collective security comes under more fire.  All member states want security at the lowest cost possible due to the ever-increasing pressure of expensive militaries, but few are willing to give up any sovereignty.  Canada speaks of human security, which is by far the widest definition of security.  The concept seems very viable, however, member states will pay a high cost in sovereignty terms if this concept was ever implemented in the Americas. 


 

CHAPTER 2

DISCUSSION OF US SECURITY STRATEGY

 

US security policy is and has always been based on US National interests.  To fully understand security policy a historical view must be looked at.  Security policy of the Western Hemisphere began with the Monroe Doctrine. 

 

INTRODUCTION   

Monroe Doctrine is a statement of United States policy on the activities and rights of European powers in the western hemisphere. President James Monroe made it in his seventh annual address to the Congress of the United States on December 2, 1823; it eventually became one of the foundations of U.S. policy in Latin America. Because it was not supported by congressional legislation or affirmed in international law, Monroe’s statement initially remained only a declaration of policy; its increasing use and popularity elevated it to a principle, specifically termed the Monroe Doctrine after the mid-1840s.[5]

 

BACKGROUND  

The Monroe Doctrine was developed because the United States and Britain were concerned over the possibility of European colonial expansion in the Americas. Britain feared that Spain would attempt to reclaim its former colonies, which had recently gained independence. This would have caused Britain’s trade with these new nations to decline. The United States wanted to ensure that no European nations would attempt further colonialization in the western hemisphere. The British foreign minister George Canning suggested a joint venture with the United States to preserve the interests of both nations. However, John Quincy Adams, the secretary of state, convinced President Monroe that the United States should develop its own policy, which would safeguard U.S. interests independent of Britain. Why, Adams asked, should the United States appear “as a cockboat in the wake of a British man-of-war?”

 

THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT

In his two most notable pronouncements, Monroe asserted that European powers could no longer colonize the American continents and that they should not interfere with the newly independent Spanish American republics. He specifically warned Europeans against attempting to impose monarchy on independent American nations but added that the United States would not interfere in existing European colonies or in Europe itself. The last point reaffirmed George Washington’s Farewell Address in 1796, in which he urged the United States to avoid entangling alliances; however, the Monroe Doctrine did not represent an isolationist policy.

By thus separating Europe from America, Monroe emphasized the existence of distinct American, and specifically U.S., interests. He rejected the European political system of monarchy, believing that no American nation would adopt it and that its presence anywhere in the western hemisphere endangered the peace and safety of the young United States. He also implied that the United States alone should complete the remaining settlement of North America.

Despite the boldness of his assertions, Monroe provided no means to ensure the enforcement of his ideas. The United States alone would not have been able to uphold this policy, but Monroe knew that Britain, with its powerful navy, also opposed European intervention in Spain’s struggle to restore its colonies.

 

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY

As far as the United States was concerned, the Monroe Doctrine meant little until the 1840s, when presidents John Tyler and then James Polk used it to justify U.S. expansion. In 1845 Polk invoked the doctrine against British threats in California and Oregon, as Tyler had done in 1842 against French and British efforts to prevent the U.S. annexation of Texas. In 1848 Polk warned that European involvement in the Yucatán could cause the United States to take control of the region. Despite Polk’s use of the doctrine and its increasing popularity in the 1850s, the American Civil War greatly reduced its effectiveness during the 1860s; hence, Spain’s reacquisition of the Dominican Republic (1861) and France’s intervention in Mexico (1862-1867) went largely unopposed.

During the 1870s and 1880s the Monroe Doctrine took on new meaning. The United States began to interpret it both as prohibiting the transfer of American territory from one European power to another, and as granting the United States exclusive control over any canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through Central America. The latter claim was recognized by Britain in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901. The United States continued to expand the meaning of the doctrine when President Grover Cleveland successfully pressured Britain in 1895 to submit its boundary dispute with Venezuela to arbitration.

20th Century and U.S. Policy

On occasion, during the second half of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century, the U.S. government itself actively intervened in Latin American affairs. Based on the theory that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the Western Hemisphere, possessed a “manifest right” to regulate the destinies of the turbulent southern republics, U.S. policy during this period aroused considerable antagonism in South and Central America. Various opprobrious epithets, including “dollar diplomacy” and “big-stick policy,” were applied to that phase of U.S. diplomacy. In 1933, after President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced that the United States wished to be a “good neighbor” of the other American countries, the U.S. policy of friendship and cooperation became known as the “good-neighbor policy.” In both world wars most South American nations cooperated fully with the United States. During World War II military as well as economic cooperation developed.

In 1960 six South American nations and Mexico signed a treaty setting up a Latin American Free Trade Area. In the following year President John F. Kennedy introduced a new approach to U.S. economic aid for Latin America. His Alliance for Progress program was aimed at encouraging economic and social reforms in the American republics. In April 1967, member nations of the alliance met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to measure progress and reaffirm their commitment to the alliance. The most significant item agreed on was the establishment of a Latin American Common Market, which would supersede the Latin American Free Trade agreement. By 1971, ten years after the establishment of the alliance, disappointment arose over problems resulting from unanticipated population growth, increased unemployment, and continued inequitable distribution of income and land. In the early 1980s these problems were complicated for most South American nations by a general, international economic recession; a mounting burden of foreign debt continued to sap the economic vitality of the region for the remainder of the 1980s. Several internal economic measures characterized South America during the next decade. The privatization of major nationalized industries proceeded rapidly in Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, resulting in a rise in unemployment. Another key problem was the rapid rise of external debt during the 1980s. Many countries were forced to spend up to 30 percent of their net income to pay the interest of their foreign debt. Some, such as Peru, refused to pay, or demanded rescheduling of payments. Others, such as Brazil, were able to pay off their debt by “swapping” natural resources. Another problem that resulted from poor economic management and the international recession of the 1980s was the rampant inflation that has plagued several countries. The solution included harsh fiscal austerity measures imposed by international donor agencies such as the World Bank. Although they eased the inflationary crisis, these measures also generated unemployment and a higher cost of living, resulting in increased numbers of poor people.


The 1990s brought new and more positive trends. Democratically elected governments replaced military, dictatorial regimes, although there is still concern over human rights violations. With external debt crisis behind them, some countries’ privatization programs have helped to improve industrial efficiency and other countries have initiated major infrastructure expansions in their underdeveloped interiors. One persistent problem that may increase in significance in the future is the protest of marginalized poor, often Native American, citizens who deny that they have benefited from the nation state, and who have no faith in the so-called democracy of political parties. Urban-based neighborhood groups are also emerging as a new force on the political scene. Continued urban growth still produces megalopolises problems, most notably air pollution, water shortages, and infrastructure decline. [6]

 

THE MONROE DOCTRINE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt claimed, in what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary, that the United States could intervene in any Latin American nation guilty of internal or external misconduct. Roosevelt’s statement was precipitated by Germany, Britain, and Italy, which were trying to force Venezuela to repay debts to those countries. Roosevelt involved the United States in settling the matter. The corollary was part of President Roosevelt’s address to Congress that year. Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine set a precedent and therefore justified subsequent U.S. intervention in Caribbean states during the administrations of Presidents William Taft and Woodrow Wilson. By the 1920s Latin American countries were protesting U.S. involvement.

In the 1920s and the 1930s, the United States reduced the doctrine’s scope by favoring action in concert with the other American republics. The Platt Amendment, which was part of the U.S. treaty with Cuba in 1903 and which provided for U.S. involvement in the rule of Cuba, was revoked in 1934. This emphasis on acting with other nations, or Pan-Americanism, continued during and after World War II with the Act of Chapultepec (1945) and the Rio Pact (1947), which declared that an attack on one American nation was an attack on all. The formation of the Organization of American States in 1948 was designed to achieve the aims of the Monroe Doctrine through Pan-Americanism. Subsequently, however, fear of Communism in Latin America prompted the United States to return to unilateral actions against Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1961), and the Dominican Republic (1965), without consulting its Latin American allies.

The administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) openly espoused the Monroe Doctrine once again as it resisted Communism in the Americas. This reaffirmed the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine to prevent European expansion in the Americas. Despite this position, Reagan supported Britain’s claim to the Falkland Islands off the coast of Argentina in 1982.

 

EFFECT

As a component of foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine has had considerable effect and has had strong support in the United States, in part because it has promoted U.S. interests. The doctrine has served other American nations, too, particularly because it asserts their right to independence. Because the doctrine as originally formulated made no clear distinction between the interests of the United States and those of its neighbors, however, the United States has used it to justify intervention in the internal affairs of other American nations. Given growing U.S. anxiety about the unstable politics of Latin American countries, intervention has been especially prevalent and controversial in the 20th century.[7]

THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

To meet the challenges and opportunities presented by this security environment, the Clinton Administration has developed a National Security Strategy concomitant with U.S. global interests. (The Bush Administration had not published its National Security Strategy at the time of this research project.) The United States will remain engaged abroad while supporting efforts to enlarge the community of secure, free-market, and democratic nations and to create new partners in peace and prosperity. While the United States will retain the capability to act unilaterally when necessary, this strategy emphasizes coalition operations to secure basic U.S. national goals, protect and promote U.S. interests, and create preferred international conditions. Indeed, the nature of the challenges the nation faces demands cooperative, multinational approaches that distribute the burden of responsibility among like-minded states. [8]

US NATIONAL INTERESTS

US interests shape US policy and strategy.  It is important, therefore, to look at US interests.  They are discussed in three broad areas:  Vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian interest.

 U.S. vital national interests include:

· Protecting the sovereignty, territory, and population of the United States.

· Preventing the emergence of hostile regional coalitions or hegemons.

· Ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources.

· Deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression against U.S. allies and friends.

· Ensuring freedom of the seas, airways, and space, as well as the security of vital lines of communication.

In other cases, the interests at stake may be important but not vital—that is, they do not affect the nation’s survival but do significantly affect the national well being and the character of the world in which Americans live. In these cases, military forces should be used only if they advance U.S. interests, are likely to accomplish their objectives, and other means are inadequate to accomplish U.S. goals. Such uses of the military should be both selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the U.S. interests involved.

When the interests at stake are primarily humanitarian in nature, the U.S. military is generally not the best means of addressing a crisis. In some situations, however, initial use of the military’s unique capabilities may be both necessary and appropriate when a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond or when the need for immediate relief is urgent and only the U.S. military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster. In such cases, if the United States decides to commit military forces to assist in the situation, the military mission should be clearly defined, the risk to American troops should be minimal, and substantial U.S. military involvement should be confined to the initial period of providing relief until broader international assistance efforts get under way.[9]

US SOUTHERN COMMAND

The role of the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is to support the objectives of US policy in its assigned area of responsibility (AOR)—Central America, South America, and contiguous waters—and assist friendly nations. It does this through a Theater Strategy.

USSOUTHCOM’S Theater Strategy

The Southern Command’s theater strategy, derived directly from the President’s National Security Strategy, is based on promoting regional security and stability among supporting democracies. USSOUTHCOM supports U.S. interests in four principal ways:

Building regional cooperative security by promoting activities that develop cooperative security arrangements and confidence building measures between neighbors that can contribute to reduce inter-state and regional tensions.

Developing military roles and missions for the 21st century by assisting Latin American and Caribbean armed forces in their development of appropriate force structures and doctrines that demonstrate support for human rights and subordination to civilian authority. One of the means USSOUTHCOM supports democracy in the region is by encouraging the militaries to consider roles appropriate to their national requirements, roles that are supportive of civilian authority and respectful of human rights and the rule of law.

Supporting the national counter drug strategy by providing military support to the counter drug efforts and programs of U.S. agencies and committed allies. The command actively supports the National Drug Control Strategy, USSOUTHCOM provides, at the request of participating nations (through their respective U.S. ambassadors), training and operational support, equipment, technological advice and maintenance support to the nations’ counter drug organizations and to participating U.S. law enforcement agencies. The U.S. military is not the lead agency in counter drug effort in the region, nor is it authorized to participate directly in participating nation counter drug operations. USSOUTHCOM assists its interagency partners, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice, and U.S. Customs Service. USSOUTHCOM receives about one percent of the total federal counter drug budget to support the counter drug efforts of other U.S. agencies and committed participating nations.

Restructuring USSOUTHCOM for the future by positioning and restructuring USSOUTHCOM to ensure continued support of U.S. national security interests throughout the area of responsibility well into the 21st century. [10]

SUMMARY

As stated previously, collective security is a term commonly referred to as the joint effort among nations to address and overcome perceived threats to national security.   As described above, The US defines its national security interest in international terms.  This is far different than any other nation in the Americas.   It is no small wonder why the Americas cannot find a common perception of what constitutes a “threat to national security”.  If it is a prerequisite, to define what a “threat to national security” is, for the creation of a collective security regime, then I believe no consensus will ever be found.

CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF THE OAS AND HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

Role of the OAS

Before we go into the ongoing security debate in the OAS, it might be useful to briefly summarize the role of the OAS since it’s founding in promoting security within the hemisphere. The OAS is the oldest regional international organization in the world, tracing its origins to the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington in 1889-90. This conference created a new organization, renamed the Pan American Union in 1910, which in turn became the OAS after the adoption of a new Charter in 1948. That Charter was a reflection of the times. It was a dangerous world then. We had just come out of a catastrophic World War, during which invasion from outside the hemisphere was a real danger. We were then plunged into a super-power standoff when the prospect of nuclear annihilation was a real possibility. It should therefore be no surprise to find that in the Charter of the OAS, conventional security concerns figure large in the essential purposes set for the Organization. First and foremost the OAS is “To strengthen the peace and security of the continent,” it was also “To prevent possible cause of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the member states,” and finally, it was “To achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the member states.”

The OAS and its predecessors have served as the catalyst for hemispheric cooperation and the broader “inter-American system,” which now includes the Pan American Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture, and many other entities. The OAS has also produced a framework of regional security instruments such as the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and the American Convention on Human Rights, a large number of specialized agreements dealing with commercial matters and private international law, and – most recently – the conventions against corruption, on international trade in firearms, and on transparency in weapons acquisitions.

The OAS was extremely active during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, especially in the area of peacekeeping in Central America and the Caribbean area. It negotiated the end of the 1969 Honduras-El Salvador “soccer war” and stopped a resurgence of fighting on that border in 1976. It sought unsuccessfully to pressure the Somoza regime to cede to a moderate leadership before the Sandinista takeover. In the economic area, the OAS played a large part in the Alliance for Progress; its technical assistance program was substantial throughout the 1970s.

During the 1980s, however, the OAS role became much less prominent as the United States placed its emphasis on bilateral rather than multilateral diplomacy. In part, quite frankly, because of frustration over the lack of support from other OAS governments for U.S. policy objectives in Central America and elsewhere in the hemisphere. The organization was also ignored in the Falklands Islands and Grenada crises.

With the end of the Cold War, the OAS began a dramatic turnaround in the late 1980s. This coincided with the prevalence of democratically elected governments and a growing consensus on open market economic policies. The OAS played an active role in resolving the Nicaragua conflict, notably with strong election observation missions and management of a national reconciliation program. In 1991, the Santiago General Assembly approved Resolution 1080, which requires OAS Foreign Ministers to meet swiftly and act whenever the democratic constitutional order in an OAS country is disrupted.

As a result, the OAS has played a prominent role in political crises in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, and was active behind the scenes during crises in Venezuela, Paraguay, and Ecuador, and most recently in a flurry of Central American border disputes. The Charter has been amended to permit suspension of governments that seize power by force, as well as to create a new Inter-American Council for Integral Development (CIDI) to lead a hemisphere-wide attack on extreme poverty.

As we know, today’s security concerns have broadened to encompass far broader terrain than external military aggression. There is the fight against illegal narcotics. The OAS developed a drug abuse control program (CICAD) – launched in 1987 – that has developed model legislation and fostered cooperation across the broad range of narcotics issues. In 1996, it negotiated the Anti-Drug Strategy for the Hemisphere, which provides the policy context for the multilateral evaluation mechanism recently negotiated and now becoming operational.

In another area – building democracy – The Unit For The Promotion Of Democracy, which the U.S. has strongly supported, has worked to strengthen democratic institutions and continues to organize election observation missions, most recently in Panama and Guatemala, and as we speak, the mission in Peru is playing a pivotal role. In 1997, the Washington Protocol took effect, amending the OAS Charter to permit suspension of a member state whose democratically constituted government is overthrown by force.

Democracy, of course, goes hand-in-hand with the protection of human rights. The OAS’ highly respected Inter-American Commission on Human Rights continues to hear cases involving allegations of human rights abuses and issue recommendations to OAS governments, or refer the cases to the Inter-American Court. The Commission also conducts on-site visits, issues country reports, and focuses attention on thematic areas through the use of Special Reporters, the most recent of which is the Special Reporter on Freedom of Expression.

Another entity has been added to the hemispheric family to combat terrorism. The Inter-American Commission Against Terrorism was established in October 1999 to coordinate member states activities against terrorism, including special training, and to facilitate exchanges of information on the subject.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Consideration of the topic of collective security in the inter-American system began during the 1930s as a consequence of the situation existing at the time, which would lead to World War II. The principles and procedures established in 1936 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, in the instruments adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States (Lima, 1938), at the Second Meeting of Consultation (Havana, 1940), and at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Mexico, 1945) are the direct background to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which regulates collective security within the framework of the Organization of American States.  The Charter of the Organization, for its part, also refers to this topic. Fundamental aspects of the collective security system within the OAS and the proposed amendment to the Rio Treaty are presented below.

It should be noted that since the proposal was made effective in 1975 in the Protocol of Amendment to the Rio Treaty, no systematic effort has been made to review this treaty, or its relationship to other juridical instruments of the Organization of American States or the hemispheric and international setting for it.

This paper provides an initial summary of the principal legal provisions in force in the Organization.

INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM RELATED TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

 The Charter of the Organization of American States

Article 2 of the Charter of the Organization establishes its essential purposes “to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.” In subparagraph (a), it establishes as one of these purposes “to strengthen the peace and security of the continent” and in subparagraph (d), “to provide for common action of [the member states] in the event of aggression.”

Article 3 of the Charter reaffirms principles, among which is, in subparagraph (h), that “an act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all other American States.”

The following two articles in Part One, Chapter IV of the Charter of the Organization deal with the topic of collective security:

Article 28. Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States.

Article 29. If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject.

The Charter of the Organization also establishes the procedure applicable to the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the following terms:

Article 61. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be held in order to consider problems of any urgent nature and of common interest to the American States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation.

Article 62. Any Member State may request that a Meeting of Consultation be called. The request shall be addressed to the Permanent Council of the Organization, which shall decide by an absolute majority whether a meeting should be held.

Article 63. The agenda and regulations of the Meeting of Consultation shall be prepared by the Permanent Council of the Organization and submitted to the Member States for consideration.

Article 64. If, for exceptional reasons, a Minister of Foreign Affairs is unable to attend the meeting, a special delegate shall represent him.

Article 65. In case of an armed attack on the territory of an American State or within the region of security delimited by the treaty in force, the Chairman of the Permanent Council shall without delay call a meeting of the Council to decide on the convocation of the Meeting of Consultation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance with regard to the States Parties to that instrument.

Article 66. An Advisory Defense Committee shall be established to advise the Organ of Consultation on problems of military cooperation that may arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.

Article 67. The Advisory Defense Committee shall be composed of the highest military authorities of the American States participating in the Meeting of Consultation. Under exceptional circumstances the Governments may appoint substitutes. Each State shall be entitled to one vote.

Article 68. The Advisory Defense Committee shall be convoked under the same conditions as the Organ of Consultation, when the latter deals with matters relating to defense against aggression.

Article 69. The Committee shall also meet when the General Assembly or the Meeting of Consultation or the Governments, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, assign to it technical studies or reports on specific subjects.

 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, adopted by the Third Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1947, is based on the concept of continental solidarity in adopting measures of self-defense or other collective measures for common defense and the maintenance of peace and security. In that context, Article 2 of the Rio Treaty calls for the peaceful settlement of controversy and Article 7 provides for action along those lines by the Meeting of Consultation. The Rio Treaty has been applied on 19 occasions, the last of which was in 1982.

The Rio Treaty is the special treaty referred to in Article 29 of the OAS Charter and it defines the measures and procedures governing a collective response when a State party suffers an armed attack (Article 3) or an aggression that is not an armed attack (Article 6). The aforementioned Article 3 contains a specific reference to the “exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

Consistent with it is Article 5, which establishes the obligation to send complete information to the Security Council, in accordance with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, “concerning the activities undertaken” in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of a peaceful settlement of a conflict. Article 10, for its part, reinforces the link with the United Nations system when it establishes that none of the provisions of the Rio Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations. The Rio Treaty also specifies the region in which it is applicable (Article 4) and the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree (Article 8). The Rio Treaty also regulates the way the Organ of Consultation may operate (Articles 11-19) and establishes the obligatory nature of the measures adopted, with the exception of the use of armed force, which requires the express consent of each State (Articles 20 and 21).

The General Assembly of the Organization decided at its regular session in April 1973 to conduct a “critical study, analysis, and evaluation of the philosophy, instruments, structure, and functioning of the inter-American system” [AG/RES. 127 (III-O/73)] and to that end created a Special Committee to Study the Inter-American System and Propose Measures for its Restructuring (CEESI). That process included revising the Rio Treaty and culminated in 1975 with the Protocol of Amendment to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries held that year in San José, Costa Rica. The Protocol of Amendment was ratified by seven of the twenty-two High Contracting Parties and thus has not entered into force.

It is thus clear that there is a dual set of situations in which the Meeting of Consultation may be convened: on the one hand in the framework of the Charter of the Organization of American States and on the other in the framework of the Río Treaty, by States parties to that treaty.

CREATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

The reason for the creation of this committee is unclear to me.  A logical conclusion is that the IADB did not have committee status and getting a consensus on its status was very improbable.  It was created in 1995 through resolution AG/RES. 1353XX-0/95. The Committee has its origins in a 1991 resolution of the General Assembly, AG/RES. 1123 (XXI-O/91), in which that organ entrusted the Permanent Council with setting up a working group to carry out the functions described below.  The Committee on Hemispheric Security is one of the permanent committees of the Permanent Council of the OAS, established pursuant to Article 14 of the Rules of Procedure of the Permanent Council. Its functions are specified in Article 24 of the Rules of Procedure:

“…to study and make recommendations to the Permanent Council on any matters relating to hemispheric security that may be entrusted to it by the Permanent Council and, through it, by the General Assembly, in particular with a view to promoting cooperation in this field.”

That group recommended that a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security be established to continue to consider the agenda for cooperation for security in the region. Based on the foregoing, and through a General Assembly mandate, in 1992, the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security was created, which was subsequently replaced by the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS).

Since that time, the Committee has constituted a forum for representatives of the countries of the Americas to exchange views on a broad range of issues, including confidence- and security-building; the Western Hemisphere as an antipersonnel-land-mine-free zone; the special security concerns of small island states; support for the Mine-Clearing Program in Central America; design of an Education for Peace Program in the Hemisphere; transparency in conventional weapons acquisitions; and consolidation of the regime established in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.[11]

THE DEFENSE MINISTRY SUMMITS

The Defense Ministerial of the Americas process started in 1995, by the United States. The DMA provides a forum for frank discussion of security issues that brings together civilian policy makers and senior military officers. It meets on roughly a biennial basis, and through the course of the process participants have developed a progressive agenda addressing most of the security issues of pressing concern. These include such practice-oriented security issues as terrorism and narcotrafficking, and policy-oriented issues such as civil-military relations, the role of the military in civil society, human rights, and other previously taboo subjects and nontraditional issues.

This process is the only one, which brings together on a regional basis Defense Ministers, and their civilian and military policymakers. Its principal drawback is that because it includes only Defense Ministers, the level of participation on discussion of specific issues is sometimes uneven because the constitutions of the countries of the region provide widely differing mandates for their militaries. Many of the important themes of the DMA process are of considerable interest, but are not under the decision-making authority, of the Ministers gathered at that table.

There are also issues regarding continuity in agenda setting and follow-up, which the Defense Ministerial process should address.  Some countries feel that these summits are merely a great photo opportunity.   A better linkage between the Defense Ministerial and the OAS, through the Committee on Hemispheric Security should be strengthened.

SUMMARY

The role of the OAS is well defined. Implementation of its role will and will continue to be the greatest challenge.  The Western Hemisphere is considered by many as the most peaceful region in the world.  The OAS can take a great deal of credit for this great distinction. 

The OAS has played a critical role in the region.  It played a prominent role in political crisis in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala.  It played a smaller but important role in Venezuela, Paraguay, and Ecuador. 

But its role has been expanding.  To stay relevant its role needs to keep up with the times.  The OAS needs to pay more attention to transnational threats and the cooperative responses that should combat these threats.  The problem we face again is, can we find a consensus to what these threats are, and are all member states willing to sign up for cooperative responses?

CHAPTER 4

FACTORS THAT EFFECT HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

 

REQUIREMENT FOR REGIONAL APPROACH TO HEMISHERIC SECURITY

Measured since 1830 by percent of the gross domestic product spent on the armed forces, percent of the national manpower in military uniform, number of wars, relative levels of armaments, and percent of citizens killed or displaced by war, Latin America is also the world’s least bellicose and least militarized region.[12]  So why would we have a need to establish a Regional Security Force?  Many in the region fear a regional force or any type of international collect security instrument.   Others feel that a military alliance, perhaps modeled similar to NATO would be appropriate for the region.  Visions of an Inter-American Defense Force (IADF) headed by an OAS Security Commission with sub-regional planning elements have been discussed mostly by US Armed Forces Strategic Planners.  Wide acceptance of these concepts has not been seen.

In this broad context, the current tendency is that commercial sub regionalization is also producing sub regional security alliances. In Central America there is a new Central American Alliance of Security, which aims to coordinate and achieve joint actions by the armed forces and security corps to combat new threats. In the Southern Cone, the commercial alliance between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay (MERCOSUR) has led to security cooperation advances. This process began with an agreement between Argentina and Brazil over the control of fissionable material.

The US should not try to force a regional security regime upon nations that reject the structure.  Consensus to build such a regime would be very improbable.

INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD

As stated previously in this paper, the IADB was created in 1942 to plan for the defense of the hemisphere and coordinate resistance to the Axis threat. It serves an advisory (and, as required, planning) role to