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## MONOGRAPH

# Haiti in the Balance: Implications for the UN and OAS



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MONOGRAPH PRESENTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN  
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MAY 2005**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND REVIEWED THIS RESEARCH PAPER AND FOUND ITS CONTENT AND LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE AND WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE'S METHODOLOGY.

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## Chapter 1. Introduction

The United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) are once again involved in an international intervention to restore order and stem the tide of a widening humanitarian crisis in the country of Haiti. Widespread social upheaval, which culminated in the February 2004 resignation of president Jean Bertrand Aristide, and the subsequent deployment of UN peacekeeping forces were accompanied by cries of “Not Again!” from the international community.<sup>1</sup> Less than ten years earlier, the UN had sanctioned--and the OAS supported--a similar major international intervention in Haiti to accomplish almost the identical mandate defining the mission today. After years of hard work and millions of dollars spent, the UN and the OAS find themselves virtually starting over in the hopes of finally putting Haiti on a permanent track to independent governability and economic stability. Given this unfortunate sense of *déjà vu*, obvious questions arise from those member countries of the UN and the OAS that have expended vast quantities of resources in the effort to rehabilitate Haiti. These questions stem from the belief that this time around we *must* get it right in Haiti and from the perspective that we can not afford to repeat the mistakes of the past elsewhere in our hemisphere. Both the UN and the OAS should be considering these important questions: What have we learned from past peacekeeping interventions that will help ensure success in Haiti this time around? What are the broader implications of peace operations lessons learned that can be applied by the UN and the OAS in future conflict scenarios in the western hemisphere?

The UN has been involved in peacekeeping for over 50 years. The UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the UN mission in Timor L’Este (INTERFET/UNTAET) are widely considered successful examples of UN intervention. These two interventions, although not necessarily similar in mandate or scope, provide valuable lessons learned that can be applied to the situation in Haiti today. This paper will compare and contrast the key elements of these past successful missions with the less than successful results of the previous UN/OAS intervention in Haiti from 1994 to 2001. The purpose of this analysis is to develop near and long term recommendations for the current UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as well as strategies that the UN and the OAS could be apply to future conflict scenarios in the western hemisphere.

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<sup>1</sup> Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, "Haiti: This Time We Must Get It Right", [The Wall Street Journal](#), 16 March 2004.

The paper begins with a detailed examination of the background of ONUMOZ in Mozambique and UNTAET in East Timor as well as lessons learned from those two interventions. It then continues with an examination of the 1994 to 2001 intervention of the UN and OAS in Haiti. The lessons learned from the successful interventions are compared with the results of the less than successful Haitian intervention in order to develop a common set of lessons learned which may be applied to MINUSTAH as well as future missions within the hemisphere. Finally, the paper will outline the implications of these lessons learned for both the UN and the OAS.

## **Chapter 2. Types of Peace Operations**

It is important to develop a common understanding of various types of peace operations in order to establish an overall framework for discussion and analysis. Past students or practitioners of peace operations who have not kept up with developments in the field undoubtedly recognize the terms peacekeeping and peace enforcement. However, recent scholarly research as well as practical analysis of peace operations by the UN has led to a significantly broader development of the theme in terms of the nature and types of peace operations. Operations that are widely recognized today are: traditional peacekeeping, transitional operations, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support operations.<sup>2</sup> This paper will focus on transitional operations, peace enforcement, and peace support operations.

Transitional operations, a relatively new term within the study of peace operations, refers to interventions that occur after both a ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached by the belligerents.<sup>3</sup> Peacekeepers are introduced at the invitation of the combatant parties in order to assist in the implementation and maintenance of the cease fire and peace agreements. These operations generally have a significant civil or political component to help facilitate all aspects of a transition to stability and security to include civil administration, civilian policing, democratic institution building, and supervision of electoral processes.<sup>4</sup>

Peace enforcement operations attempt to impose the will of the UN Security Council on belligerent parties in a conflict.<sup>5</sup> These are fairly well recognized operations conducted under Chapter VII of the UN charter which, since the 1990's, have become extremely common. The UN generally

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<sup>2</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, 2004, Cambridge England, p. 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 111-113.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

authorizes the use of force only in certain circumstances where the will of the international community and the legitimacy of the operation support what frequently may be seen as a violation of national sovereignty. These circumstances are generally accepted to be: to restore or maintain international peace and security, enforce sanctions, defend personnel involved in peacekeeping operations, provide physical protection to civilians in conflict zones, protect humanitarian activities, and to intervene in certain internal conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

The Brahimi Report, published by the UN in 2000, provided the basis for defining the concept of peace support operations.<sup>7</sup> The report highlighted a historical lack of credible military force and operational flexibility on the part of UN security forces to respond to violations of a UN mandate while engaged in wider peacekeeping situations. The report focused on widely recognized failures in Rwanda and Bosnia in a constructive attempt to avoid similar mistakes in the future. Based on the report, the concept of peace support operations has evolved to become a commonly accepted norm of UN peace operations. Peace support operations combine robust peace enforcement forces, a strong civilian administration component, humanitarian elements and civilian policing.<sup>8</sup> In an era of increased ethnic, religious and non-state actor violence, peace support operations have become more common than ever before. Peace support operations aim to establish liberal, democratic societies within states as a means of maintaining peace and security. Peace support operations implement a political agreement dictated or endorsed by the international community and enforced by intervention forces.<sup>9</sup>

Peacekeeping is not always a clear-cut, neatly defined proposition. Indeed many UN interventions may have the characteristics of more than one type of peace operation discussed above. Of particular note, Chapter VII peace enforcement tasks may be superimposed on many of the other types of peacekeeping operations. This paper focuses on managing transition operations (accepted ceasefire and political settlement) in the case of ONUMOZ in Mozambique, peace support operations (settlement dictated by the international community in support of East Timorese independence) in the case of INTERFET and UNTAET in East Timor, peace enforcement operations (impose the will of the international community) in the case of UNMIH in Haiti, and peace support operations (political

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<sup>6</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, p. 147.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 17 August 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p-169-170.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.6

and humanitarian intervention dictated by the international community) in the current case of MINUSTAH in Haiti.

### **Chapter 3. Case Study: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)**

#### **3.1. Background of ONUMOZ**

In October of 1992, after more than fourteen years of civil war, the President of Mozambique and the leader of the Resistancia Mozambican Nacional (RENAMO) signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome. The agreement provided for an immediate ceasefire, outlined a political settlement that included the establishment of new political parties and elections, and welcomed the offer of humanitarian assistance to ease the suffering of the starving and displaced Mozambican people wracked by the civil war. The UN was asked to undertake a major role in monitoring the implementation of the GPA. In December of 1992, the Security Council approved the establishment of ONUMOZ.

The civil war in Mozambique was a complicated affair rooted in its struggle for and subsequently suddenly realized independence from Portugal; the contemporary movements in Africa toward overthrow of white minority rule; and the ongoing proxy struggles of the Cold War so prevalent on the African continent at the time. In 1974, following a coup in Portugal, Portuguese authorities agreed to give power to the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) party, the communist leaning insurgent movement supported by China and the USSR which had been fighting Portuguese forces for Mozambican independence since 1962. FRELIMO's announced policy was to create a modernized, disciplined, socialist country.<sup>10</sup> The FRELIMO government nationalized all private property holdings, educational systems, and medical programs within the first five years of independence. In 1980, Mozambique's President Samora Machel announced that Mozambique would align itself with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup> Eastern European and Cuban troops acted as advisors to the Mozambican army and other government institutions.

In the late 1970's, the struggle to overthrow the white minority government in neighboring Rhodesia (later known as Zimbabwe) spilled over into Mozambique. The FRELIMO regime allowed

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<sup>10</sup> Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, Endowment of the United States Institute for Peace, 1994, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

the black insurgent forces of Robert Mugabe to operate inside Mozambique's borders in their struggle to overthrow the Rhodesian government. Rhodesia retaliated by attacking infrastructure targets within Mozambique as well as creating and supporting a Mozambican insurgent movement known as RENAMO. The Mozambican government's economic policies had alienated many rural Mozambicans making it easy for RENAMO to recruit followers. Additionally, RENAMO's anti-socialist position attracted external anti-communist support from South Africa and at least tacit support from the United States.<sup>12</sup>

Throughout the 1980's the Mozambican civil war raged. Although the Mozambican government was better equipped with Soviet style tanks, artillery and aircraft, the RENAMO forces outfought the government troops with superior tactics, command and control, morale, and spirit.<sup>13</sup> However, RENAMO's brutal tactics and attacks against civilian targets earned it the reputation as the "Khmer Rouge of Africa."<sup>14</sup> The Mozambique government, whose economy was a disaster, received material support from the USSR as well as advisors and troops from Cuba, Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe. In the later 1980's however, in the face of its own troubles, the USSR began to cut back on support for Mozambique's government. The RENAMO insurgency made gains but had little outside support other than from South Africa and was not able to make significant progress on a military or diplomatic front. This tendency toward stalemate, the approaching end of the Cold War, and the resolution of conflicts in neighboring African countries opened a path toward negotiation facilitated by the international community, the Catholic Church and a voluntary Catholic charity organization known as the Community of Sant'Egidio. The Community of Sant'Egidio had been providing humanitarian assistance in Mozambique throughout the 1980's and had established a relationship of credibility and trust with both RENAMO and the government.<sup>15</sup>

The first round of peace talks was held in July of 1990 at Sant'Egidio's headquarters in Rome. After ten rounds of talks and several summits, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) was signed at a ceremony on 4 October 1992. Both the Mozambican government and RENAMO were committed to the GPA. However, many practical elements of demobilizing up to 100,000 troops, creating a new

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<sup>12</sup> Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, p. 11-12

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 18.

national armed force, and reestablishing a national civilian administration throughout the country had yet to be worked out. The role of the UN thus became pivotal.<sup>16</sup>

Security Council Resolution 797 of 16 December 1992 established ONUMOZ.

The mandate of ONUMOZ included political, military, electoral and humanitarian components. The Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stressed that ONUMOZ would require a fully integrated approach and close coordination of all four elements of the mandate by the Special Representative (SRSG) and operational units of ONUMOZ in order to achieve success:

“Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country might deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, required prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections.”<sup>17</sup>

The Secretary General appointed Mr. Aldo Ajello of Italy as the SRSG. Prior to the arrival of UN troops, major violations of the ceasefire were occurring. However, the SRSG was successful in gaining agreement between the parties to appoint a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). The CSC would assume responsibility for interpreting the GPA, settle any disputes that might arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of other commissions.<sup>18</sup> The CSC would be chaired by the SRSG himself.

Once ONUMOZ troops arrived, they would monitor and verify the ceasefire; ensure the separation and concentration of the two belligerent parties; monitor the demobilization of approximately 100,000 combatants as well as the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; verify the withdrawal of foreign forces; authorize and provide security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and provide security for the UN and other international activities in support of humanitarian assistance and the peace process.<sup>19</sup> The mandate of ONUMOZ authorized 6,625 troops and military support personnel, 354 military observers and 1,144 civilian police. The civilian police component was not part of the original ONUMOZ deployment but rather was authorized by UN resolution on 23 February 1994. The maximum number of forces achieved was 6,576 peacekeeping

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<sup>16</sup> Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, p. 138.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, Mozambique-ONUMOZ Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/onumozFT.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozFT.htm) p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

troops on 30 November 1993 and 1,087 police observers on 31 October 1994, very close to the mandated authorized strength.<sup>20</sup>

Verification of the ceasefire and the disarmament process was carried out at 49 assembly areas in three military regions. Military observer teams were also deployed to airports, ports and other critical infrastructure areas, as well as to the RENAMO headquarters. ONUMOZ military forces assumed responsibility for security of strategic transportation routes and humanitarian relief convoys. They also worked closely with the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC).<sup>21</sup>

ONUMOZ's electoral division was to monitor legislative and presidential elections which were to be held one year after the signing of the GPA. The period could be extended if circumstances warranted. ONUMOZ was to monitor and verify all stages of the electoral process as well as maintain contact with the Mozambican government, RENAMO and the National Election Commission.<sup>22</sup>

The GPA laid out two goals for humanitarian assistance. The first was to serve as an instrument of reconciliation. The second was to facilitate the return and resettlement of displaced persons in neighboring countries and within Mozambique. UNOHAC was the principal organ for ONUMOZ's humanitarian operations. It was headquartered in the capital and had regional and local offices throughout the country. Non-governmental organizations (NGO's) provided representatives to UNOHAC to help coordinate programs. A primary function of UNOHAC and ONUMOZ was to provide food and relief supplies to the thousands of former combatants gathering in the demobilization and disarmament assembly areas.<sup>23</sup>

### **3.2. Analysis of UN Operations in Mozambique**

The UN mission in Mozambique can be characterized as a managing transition operation as discussed above. There was both a political settlement as well as a lasting ceasefire in effect upon the introduction of UN peacekeepers. The mandate of ONUMOZ was relatively complex and multidimensional. It required a Herculean effort to coordinate the civil, military and humanitarian aspects of the mission. It is widely accepted as being a success. The UN Secretary General, in his

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<sup>20</sup> United Nations, Mozambique-ONUMOZ Facts and Figures,  
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/onummozF.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onummozF.html), 5 January 2005.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations, Mozambique-ONUMOZ Background,  
[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/onumozFT.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onumozFT.htm)

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

final report on the ONUMOZ mission, wrote: “The mandate given to ONUMOZ two years ago by the Security Council in its resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992 has now been successfully accomplished.”<sup>24</sup>

The process of demobilization and disarmament of government and RENAMO troops took about 9 months, which is quite remarkable considering that a total of 91,961 soldiers were disarmed. ONOMOZ collected 189,827 weapons at the forty-nine cantonment sites throughout the country. A small amount was destroyed and others were used to arm the newly formed Mozambican Defense Force.<sup>25</sup> Some delays in the demobilization process occurred due to administrative delays in the arrival of formed UN units. Other delays occurred due to what was considered an overly optimistic timeline for the disarmament and demobilization process.

ONUMOZ played a central role in the formation and training of a new Mozambican defense force of 30,000 troops. An initial cadre of 540 officers of the new army was trained by France, Portugal and the United Kingdom in the neighboring country of Zimbabwe. Following six months of training, these officers then returned to Mozambique and helped train the remainder of the new Mozambican soldiers at three defense force training centers.<sup>26</sup>

UN civilian police (CIVPOL) activities involved deploying 1,086 policemen from 29 different countries to 83 field posts in country. This deployment facilitated wide monitoring of activities of the Mozambican police. There were some complaints of police misconduct and human rights violations were not followed through by government authorities but, all in all, the CIVPOL mission was instrumental throughout the entire pre and post electoral process.<sup>27</sup>

In March of 1993, a draft electoral law was distributed to RENAMO and other political groups. A conference was convened for all parties to discuss and approve the law but RENAMO representatives refused to attend on the grounds that they had not had time to properly review the law and develop a position and input. Direct intervention on the part of the SRSG and the Secretary-General of the UN, as well as several meetings between the head of the FRELIMO government and RENAMO, were required to ensure the participation of all parties in the critical task of moving forward toward the elections. Presidential and legislative elections were held in October of 1994 and certified as free and fair shortly thereafter by the SRSG. The entire electoral process went very

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<sup>24</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, United Nations, 23 December 1994, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Mozambique-ONUMOZ Background, p. 10.

<sup>27</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, p. 5.

smoothly due to the efficient and impartial organization of Mozambican electoral authorities as well as the financial and technical assistance provided by the UN Development Program (UNDP).<sup>28</sup>

The humanitarian assistance program of ONUMOZ provided aid to approximately 6 million internally displaced persons, refugees, and demobilized soldiers over the course of two years.<sup>29</sup> The cost of this program was approximately \$616 million. UNOHAC provided the primary focus and organizational capability for the effort, paying particular attention to the program for reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. The budget for the reintegration support scheme was \$31.9 million. The reintegration program, implemented by the UNDP, included cash payments, vocational training, small scale economic activities, and credit facilities for demobilized soldiers.<sup>30</sup> Approximately 700 primary schools, 250 health facilities, and 2,000 wells were built or rehabilitated by ONUMOZ, other UN programs and NGO's.<sup>31</sup>

### **3.3. ONUMOZ Lessons Learned**

The mandate of ONUMOZ was clear and received consistent support by the Security Council and donor countries. There was excellent political, financial and technical support of the peace process from the members of the UN. A strong commitment to peace and reconciliation was demonstrated by the Mozambican people and their leaders.

The peace process which led to the successful intervention was characterized by four key points: the peace process centered attention on the core of the conflict and its principal causes; the peace process took place in a framework built to order for this particular conflict, taking advantage of a legitimate, trusted NGO such as the Community of Sant'Egidio to further the process; the character of the peace process transformed with events in order to accelerate changes in relations between the parties; the process of dialogue and reconciliation continued well beyond the signing of the initial GPA.<sup>32</sup>

The DDR process was completed before selecting recruits for the new security force. This helped expedite compliance on the part of military personnel who wanted to become part of the new

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<sup>28</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique*, p. 2.

<sup>29</sup> *Mozambique-ONUMOZ Background*, p. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Final Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique*, p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6.

<sup>32</sup> Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, Endowment of the United States Institute for Peace, 1994, p. 144-147.

defense force.<sup>33</sup> Police and paramilitary forces were included in the demobilization process in order to prevent them from having an adverse role *outside* of the process.<sup>34</sup>

In her work "The Secret of Success: Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique and Somalia" author Diane Faires identified four keys to success of the UN transition operation in Mozambique. They were: credible impartiality, coordinated leadership, adequate resources, and seizing opportunities by being fully committed to taking advantage of positive developments.<sup>35</sup>

Credible impartiality requires peacekeepers to be neutral and credible. They must investigate all reported violations of existing agreements and equally enforce the UN mandate amongst all parties. For this to work, the mission of the peacekeepers should be clear and unequivocal to all parties involved in the conflict. Peacekeepers must establish a firm presence and be able to show to all factions that they can keep them safe from attack as well as prevent violence in the presence of persistent belligerence on the part of one party. ONUMOZ treated Mozambican government and RENAMO troops equally throughout the ceasefire and demobilization period. The presence of wide international participation and the leadership of a perceived neutral power such as Italy contributed to a perception of neutrality. The UN mandate was clear and both parties agreed to support it. Once the demobilization and disarmament process began, there were very few instances of violence.<sup>36</sup>

On the subject of coordinated leadership, the United States Ambassador to Mozambique, Dennis C. Jett wrote that "the importance of [Aldo] Ajello's role in the process is difficult to overstate. Unlike some other SRSB's, who are sometimes selected more because of intra-UN bureaucratic politics rather than competence, Ajello was able and willing to use the political muscle at his disposal to push the process forward, to challenge the UN bureaucracy, and to deal squarely with foot-dragging by both Mozambican parties."<sup>37</sup> Ajello met weekly with the ambassadors of major international donors and spoke frequently with the press. Leaders of the Mozambican government and RENAMO also played significant roles by overcoming personal prejudices and acting for the greater good. It was probably easier for them to accept this position in light of the hopelessness of the protracted civil war and the unlikelihood of victory for any side. Finally, the UN staff in

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<sup>33</sup> Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices, p. 10.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11.

<sup>35</sup> Diane Faires, The Secret of Success: Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique and Somalia, <http://www.is.rhodes.edu/Modus/99/3.html>, 4 Feb 2005, p. 2-4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6-7.

<sup>37</sup> Ambassador Dennis C. Jett, Lessons Unlearned-Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere, <http://www.jha.ac/Ref/aar008.htm>, 20 January 2002., p. 5.

Mozambique admitted that the quality of mid-level staffing in ONUMOZ was probably higher than in some other recent PKO's.<sup>38</sup>

Adequate resources were widely available to support the UN mission in Mozambique. Europeans, especially the Nordic countries, generously supported ONUMOZ. Donor coordination was exceptional. The ambassadors of the major donor countries met each week with the SRSG to coordinate and discuss the political and security situation. Donor coordination was helped by the fact that the donor countries as well as numerous NGO's had a long history of working within Mozambique. Rather than reinvent the wheel, ONUMOZ built on this capability and utilized it to the benefit of overall mission success.<sup>39</sup>

The UN must fully commit itself to an operation in order to quickly build up forces and seize opportunities to advance toward accomplishing the mandate. Administrative delays in UN force deployment jeopardized the success of the ONUMOZ mission. One of the administrative delays for UN troops was caused by the lack of a status of forces agreement. Delays in arrival of peacekeeping troops cause a loss of credibility on the part of the UN, a situation which had been addressed in a 1994 book by former UN officers Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart titled "*Renewing the United Nations System*" published by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation of Uppsala, Sweden in 1994. Late arrival of the force could allow tensions to escalate in the absence of forces as well as fail to capitalize on an initial spirit of optimism and good will. The sooner the leadership and the force are on the ground, the greater flexibility the SRSG has to deal with unexpected setbacks or unanticipated opportunities for accelerating certain aspects of the mission. The UN logistics and procurement support structure have often proven to be too slow and not fully accountable. In Mozambique, the UN force did not begin full operations until six months after the mandate was signed. Some outside observers feel that had it not be for the commitment of the Mozambican government and the RENAMO leadership, the entire GPA would have disintegrated and the country returned to civil war due to the lack of a timely UN response to its commitment.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Ambassador Dennis C. Jett, Lessons Unlearned-Or Why Mozambique's Successful Peacekeeping Operation Might Not Be Replicated Elsewhere, p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>40</sup> Diane Faires, p. 14.

## **Chapter 4. Case Study: INTERFET and UNTAET in East Timor (Timor L'Este)**

### **4.1. Background of INTERFET and UNTAET**

Portugal ruled the colony of East Timor for more than four hundred years. Following a coup in Portugal in 1974 and the subsequent decision to withdraw the Portuguese civil administration from East Timor, civil war broke out between factions within the colony struggling for the right to determine the country's future. The conflict, stirred by the sudden potential for independence and self determination, was not unlike what occurred in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique in the same year.

East Timor shares the island of Timor with the Indonesian territory of West Timor. Immediately after Portuguese officials began making plans to withdraw from the colony, pro-independence forces clashed with militias loyal to the country of Indonesia. Using weapons left behind by the Portuguese, a powerful pro-independence militia known as the Frente Revolucionara de Timor Leste Independente (FREITLIN) soon controlled the colony and declared its independence. Shortly thereafter however, a united group of pro-Indonesian parties also proclaimed East Timor's independence and quickly aligned itself with Indonesia. In December of 1975, Indonesian military forces (known as the TNI), launched an invasion to support and defend its pro integration allies in East Timor. The Indonesians quickly overcame the resistance of FREITLIN forces and gained control of the territory. Subsequently, Indonesia annexed East Timor as its 27th province in 1976.<sup>41</sup>

Tensions between FREITLIN and Indonesian forces would continue for the next two decades. The Indonesians attempted to maintain order in the territory with an iron hand. A 1994 report to the UN Economic and Social council stated that between 1975 and 1980, an estimated 100,000 Timorese out of a population of 700,000 were killed by the Indonesian armed forces.<sup>42</sup> The UN condemned the situation in East Timor but the issue did not garner wide public attention until 1996 when two East Timor men, Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose Ramos Horta, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for "their work towards a just and peaceful solution of the conflict in East Timor."<sup>43</sup> From that point,

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<sup>41</sup> United Nations, The United Nations and East Timor: Self Determination Through Popular Consultation, UN Department of Public Information, New York, August 2000, p. 3-4.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

greater pressure in favor of self determination for East Timor was placed on Indonesia by the international community and particularly regional actors, such as Australia. In a surprise move by the newly installed President of Indonesia B.J. Habibie on 27 January 1999, an agreement was reached to allow the East Timorese people to determine through a popular vote whether they wanted to accept independence or enter into an autonomous relationship with Indonesia.

Habibie's decision, hailed as an act of supreme statesmanship by the international community, set the wheels in motion for a UN supervised ballot at the end of August 1999. To facilitate the balloting and subsequent implementation of the popular decision, the UN established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in June of 1999. UNAMET successfully carried out the referendum wherein the East Timorese people overwhelmingly voted by a margin of 78.5% to 21.5% for independence.<sup>44</sup> Immediately following the balloting, violence was instigated by members of pro-Indonesian militias unwilling to accept the results of the popular vote. The Indonesian government did not live up to its commitment to provide security for the transition to independence. As many as 500,000 East Timorese were forcefully displaced and many others were killed. Homes, businesses and government facilities were completely destroyed.<sup>45</sup> Amidst the escalation of indiscriminate violence, UNAMET was forced to withdraw the majority of its force to Australia.

In September of 1999, under intense pressure to halt the violence from the UN and the international community, Indonesia accepted the intervention of a UN sanctioned multinational force acting under a unified command structure led by Australia. The force was known as International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Its mandate was to restore peace and security to East Timor; protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks; and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations. The force was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter to "take all necessary means to fulfill its mandate." The resolution also stated that the multinational force would be replaced as soon as possible by a UN peacekeeping force.<sup>46</sup> On 25 October 1999 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1272 which established a new UN mission known as the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. An excerpt from the UN resolution follows:

"1. Decides to establish, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General, a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which will be

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<sup>44</sup> United Nations, East Timor-UNTAET Background, <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>, UN Department of Public Information, May 2002, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999.

endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice;

2. Decides also that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the following elements:
  - (a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
  - (b) To establish an effective administration;
  - (c) To assist in the development of civil and social services;
  - (d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance;
  - (e) To support capacity-building for self-government;
  - (f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development;
  
3. Decides further that UNTAET's...main components will be:
  - (a) A governance and public administration component, including an international police element with strength of up to 1,640 officers;
  - (b) A humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component;
  - (c) A military component, with strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200 military observers"<sup>47</sup>

The resolution also stipulated that the UNTAET military force would replace INTERFET forces as soon as the security situation would allow. In reality, all but one of INTERFET's battalions would remain in place as the UNTAET force. By the end of February of 2000, INTERFET had completed its turnover of security responsibility to the forces of UNTAET and the security situation throughout the country remained very stable.<sup>48</sup>

Brazilian Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was appointed as the SRSG and Transitional Administrator for East Timor, arrived in country on 16 November 1999. He established the National Consultative Council (NCC), a political body which would oversee all facets of the transition. The NCC consisted of 15 members, eleven East Timorese members and four from UNTAET. Vieira de Mello acted as the head of the NCC. The initial steps take by the NCC included setting up a legal system, reestablishing the judiciary, establishing a national currency, creating border controls, taxation, and creating a national budget.<sup>49</sup>

In December of 1999, UN member nations pledged a total of \$522.45 million for operations in East Timor, of which \$148.98 million was for humanitarian activities and

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<sup>47</sup> United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1272, 25 October 1999.

<sup>48</sup> United Nations, "The United Nations and East Timor: Self Determination Through Popular Consultation", p. 59.

<sup>49</sup> United Nations, "East Timor-UNTAET Background", <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>

\$373.47 million for civil administration, reconstruction and development.<sup>50</sup> Deep poverty and the absence of employment opportunities were causing problems in the security situation as many out of work East Timorese were frustrated with their inability to provide for their families. One UN estimate stated that 80% of the population of East Timor was without any means of support.<sup>51</sup> INTERFET and subsequently UNTAET forces had sufficient strength and the appropriate mandate to control most of the security challenges. In addition, UNTAET launched a series of quick impact projects to put people back to work. Short term humanitarian aid was considered crucial to satisfying the basic needs of East Timor's citizens in order to avoid further frustration.

The humanitarian crisis caused by the violence and destruction of property following the public ballot was the most pressing challenge for UNTAET. UN humanitarian agencies as well as dozens of NGO's cooperated to provide potable water, shelter and food for the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and refugees. The UNTAET military forces were indispensable in providing transportation, security, engineering and construction support to the humanitarian effort.

An initial skeletal governance and public administration component run by UNTAET eventually grew into a nascent East Timorese government. UNTAET began a process of reorganizing itself to resemble more closely the future government of East Timor and to increase the direct participation of the East Timorese. Eight public administration portfolios were created: internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs, social affairs, finance, justice, police and emergency services, and political affairs. The first four were headed by East Timorese and the other four by senior UNTAET officials.<sup>52</sup> A National Council (NC) was installed with 36 representatives from East Timorese society to expand upon and eventually replace the NCC until elections could be held. The transition process was designed to gradually give power back to the East Timorese themselves and to impart a sense of ownership as key stakeholders in the future of their nation.

In August of 2001, the people of East Timor returned to the polls to elect their first Constituent Assembly. Over 90% of eligible voters turned out to elect 88 representatives. The

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<sup>50</sup> Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor", 2 January 2000, p.4.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> United Nations, East Timor-UNTAET Background, <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>

elections were certified as free and fair and the representatives were sworn in by SRSV Vieira de Mello on 15 September.<sup>53</sup> One of the first acts of the Assembly was to establish a Constitutional Committee which would oversee the drafting of a new constitution. During September of 2001, UNTAET oversaw the installation of an all East Timorese Council of Ministers who would assume leadership of the transitional administration. The process of transition toward full independence and East Timorese governance was progressing quickly and smoothly. UNTAET recruited and trained 9,500 East Timorese civil servants and established a civil service presence throughout the country's 13 districts.<sup>54</sup>

UNTAET's CIVPOL contingent served in a dual role of providing police services as well as training the newly recruited East Timor police force. By 30 September of 2001, more than 1,000 East Timor police (out of an anticipated 3,000 required) had been trained and were on patrol throughout the country. A new defense force of 1,500 soldiers (of an eventual goal of 5,000), recruited from the former FREITLIN ranks, was trained primarily to provide security against external threats along the nation's border with West Timor.<sup>55</sup>

An important economic agreement with Australia, known as the Timor Sea Arrangement, was signed on 3 July 2001. The agreement governed petroleum exploration and operations in the Timor Sea which eventually would become a key source of revenue for the East Timorese government and its citizenry. Efforts to rehabilitate the agricultural sector, which most East Timorese depend on for subsistence, were coordinated through NGO's and international donors. Projects to rebuild the country's infrastructure, health and education systems received extensive attention and support from UNTAET and the international community.

East Timor's Constituent Assembly signed into force the country's first Constitution on 22 March 2002 and following presidential elections on 14 April, Xanana Gusmao was appointed president-elect of East Timor. With both these preconditions for a hand-over of power met, the Constituent Assembly transformed itself into the country's parliament on 20 May 2002. On 27 September 2002, the country of Timor-Leste was admitted as the 191st member of the United Nations. A follow on UN mission, known as the United Nations

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<sup>53</sup> Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor for the Period 25 July to 15 October 2001, 18 October 2001.

<sup>54</sup> Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor for the Period 25 July to 15 October 2001, 18 October 2001.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), assumed responsibility for UN operations in East Timor following its independence in May of 2002.

#### **4.2. Analysis of INTERFET and UNTAET**

The case of INTERFET and the subsequent UNTAET is widely recognized as a classic peace support operation that combined robust peace enforcement forces, a strong civilian administration component, humanitarian elements and civilian policing. The Brahimi Report, which formalized the concept of peace support operations, reflects much of what went right in East Timor. At the time, the transitional administration of UNTAET was only the 4th time in the UN's history that it accepted total responsibility for the civil administration and governance of a country.<sup>56</sup> Three key facets to the transition of East Timor to an independent state were: restoration of law and order; democratization; and economic reconstruction.

Restoration of law and order involves reestablishment of a civilian police presence, rebuilding of the judicial system and penal systems, and disarmament and demobilization of former belligerents. Civilian police are frequently subordinated to military forces early in a peace support operation until a basic level of security is reestablished. This occurred in East Timor as the INTERFET military force initially had to subdue the numerous armed pro-Indonesian militias who were carrying out a scorched earth policy following the vote for independence. Once INTERFET turned over to UNTAET, the CIVPOL component progressively assumed a greater presence in all of the districts of the country and then in turn assumed a monitoring role as newly trained East Timorese police forces assumed their duties.

UNTAET had to deal with the practical issues of establishing a basic system of laws and punishments for the country. It was considered important by UNTAET to adopt key facets of internationally accepted human rights law yet also preserve local legal traditions wherever possible. This created a legal framework which East Timor lawmakers could adapt as the country progressed toward full ownership of the legal system.<sup>57</sup>

Disarmament and demobilization helps to prevent a return to violence and promotes the settlement of disputes through peaceful means. In East Timor, the highly credible

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<sup>56</sup> Sue Downie, The United Nations in East Timor: Comparison With Cambodia in Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor's Vote for Independence, edited by Damien Kingsbury, Monash Asia Institute, Victoria Australia, 2000, p.120

<sup>57</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, Cambridge England, 2004, p. 241.

INTERFET forces were able to disarm or force pro-Indonesia armed militia groups out of the country with relative ease. In this respect the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in East Timor was different than in other traditional conflicts in that generally only FREITLIN members were disarmed and subsequently reintegrated into East Timor society.

The process of democratization in a peace support operation involves more than merely staging elections. Rather than being seen as an endpoint, democratic elections in East Timor were seen as part of the wider process of democratization. The establishment of an effective functioning government administration was central to the mandate given to UNTAET. A Civil Service Academy was set up to train civil servants in all aspects of government operations. Government services were gradually handed over from UNTAET to the East Timorese as they demonstrated the capability to accomplish them in a fair and efficient manner.

Economic reconstruction is a major factor in weaning a post conflict government of international support. Rebuilding of the social infrastructure such as health, education, and basic services is generally required prior to subsequent reconstruction of the economic infrastructure. The basic needs of the people must be addressed in order to provide a source of human capital for economic rebirth and expansion. This was particularly true in East Timor where indiscriminate violence had destroyed the majority of houses, access to potable water, schools, medical clinics and food distribution mechanisms. East Timor's economic reconstruction benefits from a high degree of agrarian subsistence farming as well as key agreements with Australia for access to petroleum resources in the Timor Sea.

#### **4.3. INTERFET and UNTAET Lessons Learned**

One of the keys to the initial success of the UN in East Timor was the ability of a strong regional actor such as Australia to quickly respond with a significant, credible force on behalf of the UN. Australian forces arrived in East Timor only four days after the passage of UN resolution 1264 authorizing the INTERFET deployment. INTERFET also benefited from wide regional support, particularly from ASEAN countries, eventually involving 22 nations. An Australian was initially the force commander with a Thai general as his deputy.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, Cambridge England, 2004, p. 241.

With its 10,000 troops, numerous ships, aircraft, and mechanized brigade, INTERFET was a significant force given the size of the country of East Timor (just over 15,000 km<sup>2</sup> or approximately half the size of Haiti) and a population of approximately 800,000. The mandate clearly authorized the use of force and INTERFET's liberal rules of engagement and aggressive posture ensured that activity contrary to the UN mandate would be met with a swift and overwhelming response.<sup>59</sup> The transition from INTERFET to the UNTAET force was described as "flawless" by the SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello.<sup>60</sup> This is frequently not the case with UN transitions which often create gaps in security or power vacuums that can quickly lead to further violence and a loss of credibility on the part of the UN.

In the area of leadership, SRSG Vieira de Mello was widely considered to be a "superstar" of the UN. His charismatic and energetic style plus his over 30 years of UN experience in a variety of difficult missions made him an excellent choice for the position. The SRSG maintained strong relationships with Indonesia, Australia, and member nations of the mission. He served in the position of SRSG and Transitional Administrator until May of 2002. He was subsequently killed in a terror attack in Baghdad, while serving as the SRSG in Iraq. The military component of UN operations in East Timor also benefited from strong leadership with Major General Peter Cosgrove of Australia serving as the INTERFET commander and Lieutenant-General Winai Phattiyakul of Thailand serving as force commander of UNTAET. Both were widely praised by the Secretary General of the UN for their service.

Continuing an evaluation resources committed, the United Nations has appropriated well over \$1.5 billion dollars since the inception of UNTAET in 1999.<sup>61</sup> The World Bank has continued to coordinate the transition support program by contributing about \$35 million per year to the Timorese budget and by monitoring progress in the areas of governance, delivery of basic services and job creation. The International Monetary Fund continues to assist the

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<sup>59</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, Cambridge England, 2004, p. 241..

<sup>60</sup> Sergio Vieira de Mello, remarks before the XVIIIth International Workshop On Political-Military Decision Making in the Atlantic Alliance Kronborg Castle, Copenhagen, Denmark, 24-27 May 2001, [http://www.cedr.org/2001Book/2001\\_chap10.htm](http://www.cedr.org/2001Book/2001_chap10.htm)

<sup>61</sup> United Nations, Multinational Peacekeeping Operations, expenditures (estimated) through 2004.

Government through a close policy dialogue. The IMF also helped to strengthen Timor-Leste's economic institutions and capacity.<sup>62</sup>

Finally, from the aspect of seizing opportunities by being committed, there is no question that the UN undertook one of its most ambitious missions ever in East Timor and to date has been extremely successful. At times, the UN was criticized for moving too slowly in East Timor and not turning over more of the day to day administration to the East Timorese more quickly. However, the entire operation may never have been possible had not the Australians agreed to form a regional "coalition of the willing" (that included many ASEAN members) on behalf of the UN. Once the mandate was approved by the UN, the INTERFET coalition was able to intervene exceptionally quickly to avoid any type of security vacuum or credibility gap. The success in East Timor is largely attributed to a clear, concise mandate, a sound operational plan, and an adequate level of funding over a significant period of years. The reality is that the UN maintains an important presence in East Timor even today and the Secretary-General has recently asked the Security Council to further renew the UN mandate for yet another year until 2006. This type of long term commitment helps to consolidate and further develop gains made and is a resource investment that ensures that the country will not backslide into violence and ungovernability.

## **Chapter 5. UN Operations in Haiti 1994-2001**

### **5.1. Background**

In December of 1990, Jean Bertrand-Aristide was democratically elected as the President of Haiti with 67% of the popular vote. He took office in February of 1991. In September of 1991, he was overthrown by military coup and forced into exile in the United States. Lieutenant General Raul Cédras, head of the Haitian armed forces (FADH), installed himself as the head of the government. The UN, OAS and international community unanimously denounced the coup and demanded that measures be taken immediately to reinstate the legitimate government of President Aristide.

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<sup>62</sup> Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (for the period from 10 November 2004 to 16 February 2005), New York, 18 February 2005.

The OAS immediately agreed upon economic sanctions and isolation of the Cédras regime to force the return of Aristide. A high level group of OAS mediators traveled to Haiti to negotiate with the FAHD leadership but were immediately expelled from the country several days later. Thus began a series of failed diplomatic initiatives over the next three years that would occasionally give some hope to the possibility of a diplomatic solution but in the end would result in a failure to restore Aristide to the Presidency.

The illegitimate government of Haiti failed to follow through with promises it had made in an agreement known as the Governor's Island Accord, signed in 1993 by Cédras and President Aristide in New York. The Governor's Island Accord dictated the "early retirement" of Cédras from the FADH, the installation of a new Prime Minister selected by Aristide, the eventual return of Aristide as President, and a call for national reconciliation. The agreement also welcomed the establishment of a UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) which would assist in the modernization of the Haitian armed forces and the establishment of a new and professional police force. It was widely accepted that the armed forces and the police were significant impediments to democratic progress, greater respect for human rights, and establishment of the rule of law in the country.

In October of 1993, elements of the FADH and supporters of the illegitimate government barred entry of the USS Harlan County, a U.S. Navy ship carrying the vanguard of the UNMIH force. This led to an immediate worsening of the crisis and a reinstatement and strengthening of economic sanctions imposed by the UN and supported by OAS member states. Following the exhaustion of diplomatic means, on 31 July 1994 the Security Council adopted resolution 940. Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the resolution authorized Member States to form a multinational force under unified command of the United States "to use all necessary means" to facilitate the departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate Government authorities.<sup>63</sup> The multinational force was also tasked to create the conditions for full implementation of the UNMIH mission.

A 28 member multinational force led by the U.S. landed unopposed in Haiti on 19 September 1994. The multinational force, sanctioned by the UN and supported by the OAS, had the mission of reestablishing the peace and security necessary for the restoration of

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<sup>63</sup> United Nations, Haiti Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one).

democracy in Haiti and to prepare the way for insertion of the full UNMIH peacekeeping force. The 21,000 strong multinational force quickly established order and on 15 October 1994 President Aristide returned to the country and reassumed his duties as President. The FADH was effectively dissolved and the multinational force established its presence throughout the country. On 31 March 1995, the multinational force relinquished its role to the UNMIH mission led by SRSR Lakhdar Brahimi, and force commander Major General Joseph Kinzer of the United States. UNMIH was authorized a maximum of 6,000 troops and 900 civilian police officers.<sup>64</sup>

The UN Mission in Haiti was given four basic and interrelated objectives by the Security Council. First, it was to maintain a “secure and stable environment.” Second, it was to assist the government in “the professionalization of its armed forces and the creation of a separate police force.” Third, it was to help “the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections.” Finally, it was to “improve the functioning of Haiti’s justice system,” including the training and fielding of a new police force.”<sup>65</sup>

UNMIH provided security throughout Haiti for humanitarian relief agencies and UN personnel and facilities. The CIVPOL mission helped establish an interim Haitian National Police Force consisting of 3,300 hastily trained former members of the FADH as well as began a formal training program for an eventual 5,000 strong police force. Civil affairs activities undertaken by UNMIH included projects providing assistance to Electricité d’Haïti to improve power supply, security to food convoys, the transportation and security of repatriated Haitian refugees, the development of a disaster response training program, assistance to the Haitian Government with animal immunization and nutrition management programs, engineering support for public construction projects and the removal, in collaboration with the municipal authorities, of hundreds of wrecked vehicles littering the streets of Port-au-Prince.<sup>66</sup>

UNMIH and the Provisional Electoral Commission of Haiti began preparing for local and parliamentary elections to be held in June of 1996. The elections were held amid accusations of irregularities. In spite of the OAS’s contention that conditions were

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<sup>64</sup> United Nations, Haiti Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one).

<sup>65</sup> Jacques Fomerand, Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses To The Quest For Nationhood 1986-1996, p. 88.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

substantially favorable throughout the vote, many local opposition parties had serious problems with early rounds of voting and refused to participate in subsequent rounds.<sup>67</sup> This was certainly an ominous sign for the future of Haiti's democratic processes. In December of 1996, Presidential elections were held and Rene Preval, the Lavalas Party candidate supported by President Aristide, was elected President. The handover of power from Aristide to Preval would be the first time that a peaceful, constitutional succession of power had occurred in the country since adoption of the constitution in 1987.

The mandate of UNMIH was set to expire on 29 February 1996. In anticipation of this, the force was drawn down to 4,100 troops and only 300 CIVPOL by the end of January 1996. Recognizing that there were still major problems in Haiti, the Secretary-General, acting at the request of President Preval, recommended to the Security Council that the mandate for UNMIH be extended for another six months to allow for further training of the police forces and to consolidate gains made in governmental programs. The Security Council passed a resolution extending the mandate but the UNMIH force would continue to be gradually drawn down over the course of the next six months. In March of 1996, six months before the mandate would expire, both the SRSG and force commander of UNMIH relinquished their posts to successors.<sup>68</sup> Upon expiration of the UNMIH mandate, the Security Council once again acknowledged the continuing tenuous and difficult situation in Haiti by authorizing a new mission to be known as the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH). The primary role of the UNSMIH was to assist the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police; assist Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable environment; and Coordination of activities by the United Nations system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti. UNSMIH reached a maximum force deployment of 1,297 military and 291 civilian police personnel in November of 1996. After two extensions, the UNSMIH mandate expired in June of 1997.<sup>69</sup>

UNSMIH was followed by yet another UN mission known as the UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), a short lived (4 month) mission to continue to contribute to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). UNTMIH was followed by the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) which continued the mission of

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<sup>67</sup> Jacques Fomerand, Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses To The Quest For Nationhood 1986-1996

<sup>68</sup> United Nations, Haiti Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one).

<sup>69</sup> United Nations, UNSMIH Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unsmihmandate.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmihmandate.html)

professionalization of the HNP until supplanted by the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) in March of 2000. MICAH, the last UN mission in Haiti during the period, was established by General Assembly resolution 54/193 of 17 December 1999, in order to consolidate the results achieved by the Organization of American States (OAS)/United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and previous United Nations missions.

MICAH was tasked with “further promoting human rights and reinforcing the institutional effectiveness of the Haitian police and the judiciary, and with coordinating and facilitating the international community's dialogue with political and social actors in Haiti.”<sup>70</sup> The initial deployment of MICAH's 68 advisors was delayed due to problems of financing, demonstrating that the international community was growing weary of the Haiti mission. Once deployed in the summer of 2000, MICAH personnel were assigned to the Ministry of Justice, HNP, the Prison Authority, the Judges School and the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as to MICAH regional offices, a human rights verification unit and units working with civil society partners. By this time, Haiti was once again involved in a deepening political and electoral crisis due to widespread irregularities and alleged fraud in the parliamentary elections held in June of 2000. Fanmi Lavalas party candidates claimed victory in 18 of 19 Senate races as well as 72 of 83 seats in the House of Deputies. The OAS refused to certify the results of the Senate elections based on their knowledge of clear irregularities. However, it became apparent by this time that the government of President Preval would continue to consolidate power for the Fanmi Lavalas party. Despite calls from the opposition to annul the election results and from the international community to delay installation of an illegitimate Parliament, the Preval government seated the new Parliament on 28 August 2000.<sup>71</sup>

Haiti's main bilateral donors announced the end of "business as usual" after a mission led by OAS Secretary-General César Gaviria in mid-August and several visits by envoys of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the United States of America had failed to stop the seating of the new Parliament. They would not finance the November Presidential elections or any electoral observer missions, they would not recognize the new Parliament, and they would henceforth provide little or no assistance to the Government of Haiti,

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<sup>70</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, 9 November 2000.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

channeling it all through non-governmental organizations.<sup>72</sup> Despite continuing OAS attempts to mediate the growing crisis between the government and the opposition, little progress was made. Violence increased throughout the country and the HNP, rife with corruption and under threat of purges of non-Fanmi Lavalas supporters, did little to stem the violence. In many cases they were the instigators of significant human rights violations including beatings of prisoners and extended detentions in horrible conditions without charges being brought or access to due process, frequently with the consent of Fanmi Lavalas officials.

Hostility towards the international community developed following disparaging statements by the President and Prime Minister Preval in the media of the potential for renewed sanctions being imposed by the international community. The President and Prime Minister called upon Haitians to tighten their belts, likening the situation to 1804 when Haiti won its independence on the battlefield. Intermittent street demonstrations, for the most part non-violent, continued outside embassies and offices of the United Nations and OAS. On 27 July, a grenade was thrown at the Canadian Ambassador's residence and, on 11 August, a Molotov cocktail was tossed at the home of a European Union official. No one was hurt in either incident and damage was considered minimal.<sup>73</sup> It was clear by this point that Haiti was again on a path toward self destruction. The Secretary General of the UN wrote in November of 2000:

“In my previous report, I stressed the fact that Haitian authorities had flouted the views of OAS, the International Organization of la Francophonie, CARICOM, bilateral partners, domestic electoral monitors and other civil society groupings, as well as the United Nations, in particular the concern of members of the Security Council. In refusing to recalculate the erroneous Senate results, some Haitian leaders have violated basic norms of democratic governance and fair play. In recent weeks, as opportunity after opportunity to reach common ground has been missed, there have been suggestions by critics that these leaders are further isolating Haiti, and ensuring it pariah status. This isolation is apt to grow, as a Parliament has been seated whose legitimacy is in doubt, rendering unlikely the early resumption of international assistance.”<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, 9 November 2000.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

Jean Bertrand-Aristide was reelected President of Haiti in December of 2000 amidst a cloud of alleged voting irregularity. He assumed office in February of 2001. He survived a coup attempt in the fall of that same year and violent opposition to his government and the Fanmi Lavalas party continued to grow. Political killings and violent crimes committed by supporters of Aristide as well as the opposition contributed to a complete breakdown of respect for the rule of law. Attempts by the OAS and others in the international community to mediate the crisis failed amid escalating violence and a worsening economic situation. In February of 2004 Aristide, in the face of an armed rebellion and with little support or sympathy from the international community, was forced to resign as President and fled into exile in Africa.

## **5.2. Haiti 1994-2001 Analysis**

This portion of the paper will compare and contrast some of the elements of success of the interventions in Mozambique and East Timor with some of the obvious shortcomings of the Haitian intervention. It is important to reiterate that the operations in all three countries were very different in terms of mandate and scope. Rather than comparing similar types of operations, this paper seeks to compare and contrast *similar elements* of the different operations and emphasize common points of success and failure.

If the measure of success of the UN and OAS in Haiti was a lasting democratic process, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and an improved economic situation, the effort from 1994-2001 had clearly failed. The Secretary-General's declaration of success at the end of ONUMOZ in Mozambique and very favorable outlook as UNTAET transitioned to the continuing UNMISSET in East Timor, stand in stark contrast to his final report in 2001 on the UN mission in Haiti when he admitted that the mandate could not be accomplished by stating "in the light of the conditions in Haiti...a renewal of the mandate of MICAH is not advisable...and it is with regret that I recommend that the Mission be terminated when its mandate draws to an end..."<sup>75</sup> It is interesting to note that this report, in hindsight, is exemplary of a number of warning signs that the international community either failed to heed

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<sup>75</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, 9 November 2000.

or had become so weary that it did not have the political will to act decisively in an attempt to salvage the situation prior to ultimate failure in 2004.

The September 1994 multinational force intervention in Haiti was a peace enforcement operation that subsequently morphed into a peace support operation under the banner of UNMIH and UNSMIH. The multinational force imposed the will of the international community by reinstating President Aristide and establishing security and stability throughout the country. UNMIH and the shorter lived UNSMIH both combined peace enforcement forces, a strong civilian administration component, humanitarian elements and a CIVPOL component characteristic of peace support operations. The subsequent UN missions in Haiti known as MIPONUH and MICAH are difficult to define with respect to the different peace operations as described above and may in fact be an indicator of why they were less than effective in accomplishing their mandates.

The initial multinational force intervention in Haiti, sanctioned by the UN and led by the U.S., was very similar to the INTERFET intervention in East Timor. Both were very timely, with the Australian led contingent arriving in East Timor within four days of a UN mandate and the Haitian intervention coming just hours after an agreement had been reached by former President Jimmy Carter and Lieutenant General Cedras. Each encompassed wide regional support and included overwhelming and credible military force. The multinational force in Haiti had a maximum strength of 21,000 troops from 19 nations.<sup>76</sup> In both cases, the presence of a substantial international military force rapidly contributed to an environment of peace and security with very few casualties suffered by the peacekeepers.

The three key facets of success in Mozambique and East Timor--namely restoration of law and order and the rule of law; democratization; and economic reconstruction--were never completely realized in Haiti. In military parlance, the mission in Haiti could be deemed a tactical and operational success but a strategic failure. That is to say that although short term strides were made in each of these three areas, institutionalization of success never occurred at the national level.

As previously discussed, restoration of the rule of law requires disarmament and demobilization of former belligerents, reestablishment of a civilian police presence, and

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<sup>76</sup> Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, 2004, Cambridge England, p. 161.

rebuilding of the judicial system. Unlike in Mozambique where 91,961 former soldiers were disarmed, the UN demobilized but failed to disarm the former Haitian armed forces' 7,500 soldiers. This fact was recognized as early as 1995 when Claudette Werleigh, then Minister of Foreign Relations of the Government of Haiti, stated: "But the government has always said that disarmament efforts were inadequate and have left a sword of Damocles over our heads...While the military has been dismantled, many individuals are armed and can still use their weapons with impunity."<sup>77</sup> In fact, while disarmament and demobilization were clear priorities for ONUMOZ and UNTAET, the issue never appeared in the mandate of UNMIH or subsequent Haiti missions through 2001. The original mandate of UNMIH included "the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces" but the armed forces effectively dissolved upon the arrival of the multinational force and subsequent mandates did not address the disarmament and demobilization issue.<sup>78</sup>

A principal focus of the UN missions from 1994-2001 was to reestablish the Haitian National Police as a professional and credible police force. However, under pressure to quickly deploy a force, the UN demonstrated a lack of understanding of the complexities of training a new police force. Its training program eliminated certain aspects of practical training as well as the education of a supervisory force. The UN was obviously not committed to a long term process of "accompaniment," where each Haitian police officer could be paired up with a CIVPOL officer.<sup>79</sup> By July of 1996, the UNSMIH mission was only authorized 300 CIVPOL officers, an exceptionally low number to attempt to both train and accompany HNP officers.<sup>80</sup> By mid June of 2000, the MICAH mission had problems scraping together 68 advisors to be assigned to the Ministry of Justice, HNP, the Prison Authority, the Judges School and the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as to MICAH regional offices, a human rights verification unit and units working with civil society partners.<sup>81</sup> In light of the Secretary-General's concerns of lawlessness at the time, this hardly

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<sup>77</sup> Claudette Werleigh, Keynote Speaker at the OAS Democratic Forum, as transcribed in One Year After the Return to Constitutional Government: The Challenges to Democratic Consolidation in Haiti, Democratic Forum Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States, October 1995, Washington D.C.

<sup>78</sup> United Nations, Haiti Background, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one).

<sup>79</sup> International Peace Academy, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Seminar Report, 23-24 January 2002.

<sup>80</sup> United Nations, United Nations Support Mission in Haiti: Facts and Figures, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unsmihfacts.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmihfacts.html).

<sup>81</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, 9 November 2000.

constituted a committed response to the establishment of law and order. By contrast, the ONUMOZ CIVPOL mission deployed 1,086 policemen to 83 field posts which facilitated wide monitoring of the Mozambican police.

UNTAET built a functioning legal system for East Timor that preserved local legal traditions as well as included key facets of internationally accepted human rights law. The UN mission in Haiti never was able to establish an effective justice system. In July of 1997, the Secretary-General described the Haitian justice system as "ineffectual...and in need of a total overhaul."<sup>82</sup> Both the HNP and the local populace, frustrated by the lack of responsiveness within the judicial system, were committing acts of vigilantism on a more frequent basis. France, Canada, and the United States were individually sponsoring initiatives designed to promote judicial reform but their individual efforts were not coordinated and there was not a common basis for their legal systems. This led to conflicting and unintentionally self serving developments within the Haitian justice system. There was no internal disciplinary mechanism for judges and most of those trained during the UN involvement had left the system by 2002 due to low pay and cronyism.<sup>83</sup>

Democratization generally is epitomized by the holding of free and fair elections. This was the case in both Mozambique and East Timor. In Mozambique, elections represented a peaceful step toward national reconciliation following years of civil war. East Timor conducted free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections just months before complete independence and admittance to the UN. In both cases, UN and NGO support for electoral processes led to an educated electorate which turned out in record numbers. In the case of Haiti, elections were never carried out during the UN intervention without some sort of irregularity or verified fraud. The first legislative elections conducted in early 1997 just after the height of the UN intervention were marred by irregularity. In a letter to the Provisional Electoral Council following the first rounds of elections, the Electoral Observer Mission (EOM) of the OAS cited "irregularities and attempts to manipulate the results in some jurisdictions." A subsequent communiqué by the EOM wrote of "numerous irregularities,

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<sup>82</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the UN Support Mission in Haiti, 19 July 1997, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/183/45/IMG/N9718345.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>83</sup> International Peace Academy, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Seminar Report, 23-24 January 2002.

procedural shortcomings and controversies which have tarnished the integrity of the process."<sup>84</sup>

The Haitian legislative elections of 2000 were marred by even more serious fraud and were not certified as free and fair by the OAS. Outraged by the failure of the Haitian government to cooperate in rectifying the fraudulent elections, the international community refused to provide support for the presidential election in December of 2000. The lack of transparency and certification by the OAS and UN cast a pall over the legitimacy of the government of president elect Jean Bertrand-Aristide. In a fascinating discussion of this topic, Robert McGuire et al wrote in Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses to the Quest for Nationhood that "the presence of outside electoral observers at Haiti's 1990 elections—from governments, the UN, the OAS, and numerous NGOs—was of paramount importance in confirming the willingness of the same international community to act vigorously to restore the deposed government [in 1994]."<sup>85</sup> In the end however, Aristide's reluctance to cooperate with the international community on the election issue and the absence of outside observers who would verify his 2000 election probably tainted his legitimacy to the point that no major government was willing to come to his support in 2004 as they had done in 1994.

Despite some short term achievements in governance, self-sustaining democratic institutions never took hold in Haiti during the intervention. This is definitely not surprising given the 200 year history of the country in which authoritarianism, social apartheid, and a complete lack of inclusion of the vast majority of society in the basic functioning of the state were completely accepted. Polarization of political groups, particularly between the pro-Aristide Fanmi Lavalas party formed in 1996 and those opposed to it was a catalyst for violent behavior and retribution in the absence of a functioning security system.

A major split between the Lavalas Political Organization (LPO) and Aristide's newly formed Fanmi Lavalas party in 1997 created gridlock within the government, was a catalyst for widespread fraud in the April 1997 Senate and local elections (which were not certified as free and fair by international observers), and caused the 1998 parliamentary elections not to be held. The Prime Minister at the time, Renae Preval, dismissed a majority of the legislators

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<sup>84</sup>United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the UN Support Mission in Haiti, 19 July 1997, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/183/45/IMG/N9718345.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>85</sup>Robert Maguire (team leader), Edwige Balutansky, Jacques Fomerand, Larry Minear, William G. O'Neill, Thomas G. Weiss, and Sarah Zaidi, Haiti Held Hostage: International Responses To The Quest For Nationhood 1986-1996, p. 87.

and ruled by decree until the widely fraudulent elections of 2000. The UN was simply not able to sustain the momentum of nascent democratic development once the UNMIH force was replaced by UNSMIH and the security force was reduced from over 6,000 troops to 1,297 and the police forces were reduced by almost 60% from 1,297 to 291 less than two years after the intervention had begun.<sup>86</sup> By contrast in East Timor, the INTERFET and subsequent UNTAET security forces were maintained at significantly robust levels (about 10,000 personnel) throughout the majority of the intervention which created a very stable security situation. Democratic and economic development simply can not take place in the absence of security.

Haiti was one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world prior to the 1991 military coup. The irresponsible economic policies of the military regime from 1991-1994 as well as a harsh UN sanctioned economic embargo created a precipitous decline in the already fragile economy. Thus, Jean Bertrand Aristide and the UN inherited an economic disaster from the outset of the 1994 intervention. From 1996-2001, the government of Prime Minister Preval attempted to liberalize trade and tariffs, control government expenditures and increase tax revenues, downsize the civil service, and privatize some state businesses. However, these efforts were not successful. The country realized negative GDP growth in both 2001 and 2002. Economic stability was adversely affected by high budget deficits, the collapse of informal banking cooperatives, low investment, and reduced international capital flows. International lenders such as the Inter American Development Bank and the World Bank suspended lending as the country was unable to make payments on its loans.<sup>87</sup>

Sustainable economic development did not materialize in Haiti during the UN intervention despite the investment of billions of dollars by the international community. In January of 2002 the Institute for Peace Analysis wrote in its report on Haiti: “Infrastructure, where it exists, is in shambles and the environment devastated. The economy is dependent on direct foreign aid, remittances from the large Haitian Diaspora, and money from drug trafficking.”<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>86</sup>United Nations, United Nations Support Mission in Haiti: Facts and Figures, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unsmihfacts.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmihfacts.html) and United Nations and Haiti Background--UNMIH, [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html#one).

<sup>87</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Haiti, August 2004, page 8.

<sup>88</sup> International Peace Academy, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Seminar Report, 23-24 January 2002.

In his two terms in office and as leader of the Fanmi Lavalas party, President Aristide had significant differences of opinion over economic theory and practice with the international economic community. Aristide favored a socialist approach as opposed to privatization and competitive practices. Private investment and direct foreign investment thus suffered as investors shied away from the country. Many of the textile manufacturing jobs in Haiti were shifted to places like China, Honduras and other countries with cheap labor. Poor governance in Haiti combined with an unstable security and political situation undermined economic development efforts. In contrast, the UN and the new government in Timor L'Este worked closely with both the World Bank and the IMF to develop sound economic policy, build economic institutions, create jobs, and negotiate a natural resource agreement with Australia. The difference in the two cases is evident in that Timor L'Este has created a relatively promising economic outlook after about five years of effort—roughly half the time it took for Haiti to go virtually nowhere economically at significant cost to the international community.

### **5.3. Comparison of Case Study Lessons Learned**

At this point, the key lessons learned from the 1994-2001 intervention in Haiti will be compared to those of Mozambique and East Timor through the use of the same theoretical framework of examining credible impartiality, coordinated leadership, adequate resources, and seizing opportunities by being fully committed to progress.

The UN intervention in Haiti in 1994 began very much like that in East Timor. A strong, credible force ably led by a regional actor quickly deployed throughout the country to establish a robust security presence. The U.S. led force in Haiti had roughly 20,000 troops, ships, aircraft and mechanized vehicles very much like the Australian led force in Timor L'Este. The results of the rapid deployment of a well trained and credible force was nearly identical in both cases, with almost no significant incidents of violence or recalcitrance in the face of a force with a clear mandate and the means to enforce it. The other important aspect of utilizing a well prepared and cohesive regional force for the initial stabilization mission is that it gives the UN adequate time to organize, train and equip its own security and police forces for subsequent assumption of the mission. This was not the case in Mozambique where delays in deployment of the UN security forces caused both a credibility gap and a power

vacuum that nearly jeopardized the success of the UN mission. One of the weaknesses of any UN deployment is the ad hoc nature of designating, training, and deploying forces which results in a generally slow force generation tempo.

One of the principle problems of the Haiti mission was that the UN did not maintain a credible, impartial force in country long enough to ensure the sustainment of a stable security situation. Less than two years after the initial intervention, the security forces were drastically reduced as the mission transitioned from UNMIH to UNSMIH. This was most unfortunate considering the fact that within months after this occurred, the security situation began to unravel without apparent undue concern on the part of the international community, in spite of the worrying evidence mentioned consistently in the Secretary General's own reports. Sadly, the force continued to shrink with subsequent reinventions of the mission until it was hardly recognizable as a credible UN operation.

On the subject of coordinated leadership, there is no question that the international community initially tried very hard to help Haiti in all aspects of its development. The problem was that with so many actors and initiatives involved, it was very difficult to maintain a coherent policy approach in the absence of strong central leadership. A string of SRSG's, among them Lakhdar Brahimi from September 1994 to March 1996, attempted to balance the competing concerns and desires of the international community with the sometimes obstinate Haitian political leadership that often had a completely different approach to the country's problems. None of the SRSG's in Haiti achieved the effectiveness or command of the situation like Sergio Vieira de Mello in East Timor or Aldo Ajello in Mozambique. Donor coordination was poor in Haiti resulting in a very low productive output given the billions invested by the international community. This was partially caused by a lack of understanding on the part of the UN from the very beginning of the operation on what its role would be in Haiti. In contrast to the central and well understood role played in Mozambique and East Timor, "it was not always clear [in Haiti], however, if the role of the international community was to take charge of the peacebuilding process or advise on and facilitate Haitian initiatives."<sup>89</sup>

Another major leadership aspect in Haiti was the fact that "the performance of Haitian political actors—including President Aristide—in meeting international actors halfway in the

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<sup>89</sup> International Peace Academy, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Seminar Report, 23-24 January 2002, p.3.

joint endeavor of peacebuilding fell short of expectations.”<sup>90</sup> This was in stark contrast to the example of both the Mozambican government and RENAMO political leadership who often put aside major differences in an effort to keep the peace process on track. The international community often bypassed, rather than insisted on the replacement of, corrupt or recalcitrant Haitian public or political officials. In many cases, if a Haitian official was known to be inappropriately benefiting from international resources or was blocking a project in the hopes of some personal gain, the UN would tap an NGO to administer funds or shepherd a project in lieu of the Haitian official as opposed to demanding honesty and accountability from the government and its representatives. In the end, this pattern of the UN accepting a lack of government institutional performance, especially from President Aristide's office, may have been a factor in why many in the international community did not do more to save his government in February 2004. Aristide and the Fanmi Lavalas party had not done enough to demonstrate their commitment to the future of Haiti for the international community to gamble on a major operation to prop up his regime.

On the subject of adequate resources, it seems obvious that the UN did not maintain a sufficient level of security forces in Haiti for the long haul and this led to the failure of the mission. During the INTERFET and UNTAET intervention in Timor L'Este, there was approximately one UN peacekeeper for every 80 East Timor citizens. At the height of the US led intervention in 1995, when there were almost 21,000 peacekeepers in Haiti, there was one peacekeeper for every 380 Haitian citizens. Just over a year later in July 1996 under the auspices of the UN, the number shrank to one peacekeeper for every 5,000 Haitians and continued to decline with each subsequent reinvention of the mission. By July of 1997 there was an incredibly low number of one peacekeeper for every 26,666 Haitians. In a country of 8,000,000 people there were roughly 3,000 policemen. The city of New York, with a similar size population, has approximately 40,000 policemen plus hundreds more state and federal officers.<sup>91</sup> It is almost inconceivable that the UN believed that the security situation in a country with absolutely no tradition of respect for the rule of law had reached some sort of self sustaining level that security resources could be cut so drastically so quickly. Resources

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<sup>90</sup> International Peace Academy, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, p. 2.

<sup>91</sup> Ambassador Paul Josephe, Haitian Ambassador to the United States, address before Inter American Defense College, fall 2004. INTERFET and UNTAET had a force of approximately 10,000 troops and policemen for the East Timor population of 800,000. In July 1996, the UNSMIH mission in Haiti was authorized 1,297 troops and 297 international police officers. UNTMIH in 1997 had 250 policemen and 50 military observers.

may seem low in the case of Mozambique but in reality the population density is so low and the will to maintain the peace process on the part of all antagonists enabled the UN to succeed with a relatively low number of peacekeepers given the size and population of the country.

Figure 1 below provides a comparison of resources allocated to each of the three UN missions.

	ONUMOZ (Mozambique)	UNTAET (East Timor)	UNSMIH (Haiti)
Population	12,300,000	800,000	8,000,000
Land Area	784,090 <sup>2</sup>	15,000km <sup>2</sup>	27,560 km <sup>2</sup>
Peacekeepers	6,576	9,150	1,297
CIVPOL	1,087	1,640	297

Figure 1.

The monetary contributions of the international community to the Haitian mission were substantial. The IMF, World Bank, UN and donor countries poured billions of dollars in both grants and loans into Haiti throughout the 1990's. The funds were intended to rebuild infrastructure, alleviate poverty, redevelop the commercial manufacturing sector, and build government institutions. One interesting aspect of international monetary assistance to Haiti during the time period was the fact that much of the money came with conditions imposed by the international community in a carrot and stick approach to ensure that the Haitian government was a good steward of the money. However, the Haitian government became so adept at negotiating away the conditions of loans that the aid process became paralyzed by the negotiations themselves. One participant at the 2002 International Peace Academy's review of the Haiti effort stated that negotiations on foreign assistance with the President and parliament of Haiti were having an adverse effect in that "we are negotiating instead of doing development, and in the process, we are propping up the government."<sup>92</sup>

The UN intervention in Haiti, especially after 1996, was troubled by a lack of political and personal "buy-in" by Haitian political leaders, a waning sense of commitment on the part of the UN, and the inability of the OAS to greatly influence the situation. The political

<sup>92</sup>International Peace Academy, Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Seminar Report, 23-24 January 2002.

process in Haiti was sidetracked as early as 1997 after Aristide split from the OPL and formed his Fanmi Lavalas party. The subsequent series of electoral and political crises that consumed virtually all the government's political capital was well beyond the capability of the shrinking UN presence to deal with. The UN and the OAS were constantly struggling to patch up the political process such that there were never any opportunities to seize on initiatives. Without legitimate, democratically elected leaders with which to deal with, the UN and OAS effort was being carried out in a house of cards that was becoming less stable year by year. Faced with such crises in Timor L'Este, the UN stepped in and took complete control of the country. In Mozambique, the SRSB and the Secretary General became personally involved in negotiations with government and RENAMO leadership to keep the peace process on track. In Haiti, the UN abdicated its leadership role to the OAS which had already failed once to resolve the crisis in Haiti after the 1991 military coup.<sup>93</sup>

To its credit, the OAS maintained a presence in Haiti and a sense of commitment to resolving the country's crises throughout the 1990's and even after the UN withdrew in 2001. The OAS conducted a number of diplomatic missions following disputed elections in 2000 which included attempts to delay the seating of the illegitimately elected parliament. The Haitian government paid little attention to these efforts and subsequently conducted Presidential and Senatorial elections. The second Presidency of Aristide began amidst a cloud of impropriety as the opposition had boycotted the election which brought him to power with only an estimated 5% voter turnout.<sup>94</sup>

Shortly thereafter in April of 2001, OAS mediated negotiations attempted to find a resolution. The OAS passed Resolution 806 in January of 2002 which called for the Haitian government to address the political stalemate, growing violence, and deterioration in respect for human rights. It also authorized OAS establishment of a Special Mission in Haiti.<sup>95</sup> Amidst a continuing deterioration in the security situation in Haiti, the OAS passed a subsequent resolution in September of 2002 which called for a resolution of the crisis by conducting a new round of free and fair elections in 2003. This resolution again proved little effective and in March of 2003 the OAS sent another high level delegation to present President Aristide with specific demands for improving the security and political climate. This

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<sup>93</sup> Dr. Belt, address before the Inter-American Defense College, 31 March 2005.

<sup>94</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Background Note: Haiti, August 2004, page 5.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

act was met by attempts by Aristide to circumvent the OAS resolutions by holding elections outside of the OAS framework. By the end of 2003, armed groups were in open revolt against Aristide and he was more willing to accept assistance of the OAS and others in the international community if it meant helping him remain in power. Further assistance from the OAS did not materialize and the acting Secretary General of the OAS, Luigi Einaudi, claims that "one has to accept the fact that the fall of Aristide is attributed to the weakness of the Inter American system because Aristide and the opposition were seeking help from the OAS but the OAS could not provide it. The opposition discussed the introduction of 100 armed individuals from the OAS at around a cost of \$100,000 but this was contrary to the OAS charter and it did not have the support of the U.S. The proposal did not receive economic support from members to act on it."<sup>96</sup> The Haitian failure reflects the weakness of the OAS as an arbiter of conflict as well as the lack of commitment of the UN at that particular time to commit itself to resolving the growing crisis.

## **Chapter 6. Compilation of Case Study Lessons Learned**

The following lessons learned were derived from analysis of the three peacekeeping missions:

**6.1. Commitment to Peace.** All parties involved in a UN intervention must demonstrate a strong commitment to peace. Those that do not cooperate fully, especially local political actors, must be personally subjected to pressure by the SRSG, the Secretary General or other highly placed leadership of the international community. The UN must have the capacity to pressure any local actor or person of influence to compromise, comply, cooperate or resign.

**6.2. Clear and Realistic Mandates.** Mandates must be clear and concise with realistic expectations. Mandates must be matched by appropriate means to accomplish them. A mandate must be crafted such that it will receive the highest cooperation and support from within the UN system as well as member states and international institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.

**6.3. Adequate Resources to Accomplish Mandate.** The UN and member states must commit adequate resources in the form of committed leadership, military forces, CIVPOL forces, civilian technical experts from all fields of national power, monetary assistance, and highly qualified UN administrators to accomplish the mandate. A timely and robust peacekeeping response is required to assure credibility and eliminate the possibility of power vacuums.

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<sup>96</sup> Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, Acting Secretary General of the OAS, address before IADC, 4 January 2005.

**6.4. Realistic Timetables.** The UN must commit itself to a realistic timetable to accomplish the mandate. It must be willing to invest for the long haul in certain circumstances. In longer operations, the UN must be particularly mindful during transitions in leadership and assigned forces to ensure continuity of effort and elimination of security gaps.

**6.5. Utility of Regional Actors in Support of the UN.** A strong regional actor with participation of other regional countries is sometimes the best entity to lead an interim response when timeliness and a robust force are required to stabilize a situation until a proper UN force can intervene. The UN has increasingly turned to regional organizations acting under Chapter VIII of the UN charter to provide longer term responses to regional crises.

**6.6. Credible Impartiality.** Credible impartiality requires peacekeepers to be neutral and credible. They must investigate all reported violations of existing agreements and equally enforce the UN mandate amongst all parties. Peacekeepers must establish a firm presence and be able to show all factions that they can keep them safe from attack as well as prevent violence in the presence of persistent belligerence on the part of one party.

**6.7. Security and the Rule of Law.** Security is the key to economic and political development. Security includes establishment of the rule of law to include professional police forces, a functioning judiciary, and a humane penitentiary system.

**6.8. Importance of SRSG.** A dynamic, widely respected, hard working SRSG can greatly increase the chances of success. The SRSG must work tirelessly to coordinate the efforts of all donor countries and international institutions to ensure that they support the spirit and intent of the UN mandate. He must also keep donors informed of progress as well as setbacks so that they may adjust their expectations and level of effort accordingly.

**6.9. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).** Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are complex but absolutely necessary processes to establish a lasting, secure environment.

**6.10. Importance of Elections and Electoral Participation.** Free and fair elections are an extremely important milestone in the democratization process. However, they should be viewed as only one indicator of progress. Full participation of a clear majority of political parties and registered voters are required for elected leaders to have legitimacy.

**6.11. Development of Democratic Institutions.** The development of self sustaining democratic institutions that support the democratic process is more important than merely conducting elections. If a country has not developed its own institutions that are capable of maintaining security, governing with a balance of power amongst the executive, judiciary and legislative branches, administering free and fair elections, and providing a basic level of other government services to the people, it is not ready for the UN to depart.

**6.12. Economic Assistance Must Be Balanced.** International economic recovery assistance should include a balance of loans and grants. Loans engender responsibility of the receiving

country to develop economic viability to repay the debt but involve a level of political negotiation. Grants allow economic institutions or member states to directly target projects without extensive negotiations or intervention of local political actors. Economic assistance should include some support for quick impact projects and employment opportunities that put unemployed persons back to work.

#### **6.13. OAS as a Regional Partner of the UN or as an Independent Actor in Interventions.**

The OAS is the only one of 12 recognized regional organizations that did not actively participate in or sponsor peacekeeping interventions in the 1990's.<sup>97</sup> The lack of some type of military or CIVPOL peacekeeping or monitoring option within the OAS charter affects its ability to effectively partner with the UN under Chapter VIII operations or to act independently in situations that fall below the radar of the UN.

**6.14. UN Ability to Administer a Failed State.** In the case of failed states, the UN has demonstrated the capacity to successfully form an interim governmental authority and then subsequently transfer that authority to a newly formed national government.

## **Chapter 7. Case Study: Applying Lessons Learned to MINUSTAH**

### **7.1. MINUSTAH Background**

Despite last minute negotiations on the part of the U.S., the OAS, CARICOM and other international actors to resolve the crisis between President Aristide and the Haitian opposition, Aristide was forced to resign and flee into exile on 29 February 2004. An interim government was immediately formed with the chief of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre, assuming the role of President. The President appointed Gerard Latortue, a little known Haitian expatriate living in Florida, as Prime Minister. The UN Security Council immediately passed a resolution authorizing an Interim Multinational Force, led by the U.S., to intervene in Haiti for no longer than three months. Troops from the U.S., Canada, France and Chile began arriving in Haiti on 1 March to maintain the peace and provide immediate humanitarian support. Many of the Haitian people, including the opposition, welcomed the intervention with open arms.

On the 30<sup>th</sup> of April, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1542 which authorized the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to replace the Interim Multinational Force beginning on 1 June of 2004. The Resolution authorized 6,700 troops and 1,622 international police for an initial mandate of six months under Chapter VII

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<sup>97</sup>Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, Polity Press, 2004, Cambridge England, p. 215-216.

of the UN charter. The tasks of MINUSTAH are: to support the political and constitutional processes of Haiti; establish a secure and stable environment; encourage democratic governability and institutional development; assist the interim government in organizing free and fair elections at the local, parliamentary and presidential level as soon as possible; strengthen the rule of law; and provide support to human rights groups and institutions throughout the country. The mission also has the responsibility to reform the Haitian National Police and assist them in carrying out a program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of all illegally armed groups. MINUSTAH will also assist the government in extending its authority to all areas of the country as well as encouraging a process of national dialogue and reconciliation.

The role of the OAS in support of MINUSTAH has been primarily to support preparations for local, parliamentary and presidential elections expected to take place in the fall of 2005. It is also involved in modernizing the electoral system, strengthening institutions related to the electoral process, and promoting dialogue and consensus among the various political parties in the country.

## **7.2. Analysis of MINUSTAH Based on Identified Lessons Learned**

**7.2.1. Commitment to the Peace Process.** Haitian opposition groups that forced President Aristide into exile initially welcomed the arrival of multi-national forces and accepted the authority of the interim government.<sup>98</sup> However, this good will quickly evaporated with the onset of natural disasters caused by a series of tropical storms in September of 2004. The inability of the interim government and MINUSTAH forces to provide a timely disaster response, especially in the most affected city of Gonaives where nearly 2,000 perished, was critical to reigniting tensions within opposition groups, many of which remain illegally armed.

Several key leaders of the opposition to Aristide are widely suspected of instigating violence and human rights violations against Aristide's remaining supporters as well as attacking UN aid convoys. These four or five notorious gang leaders--many of them ex-

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<sup>98</sup>Colum Lynch, [The Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A56781-2004Apr30&notFound=true), May 1, 2004; Page A15 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A56781-2004Apr30&notFound=true>

Haitian army members--have expressed no magnanimous aspirations for their country other than to control and exploit their small pieces of it. One of these men, Buteur Metayer, even went so far as to proclaim himself president of Haiti's central Artibonite district.<sup>99</sup> Neither the interim government nor the UN seem to hold sway with any of these individuals and to date have yet to bring them into a concerted negotiation process.

The U.S. government has put the blame for much of the political violence on supporters of Aristide's Lavalas Party. The U.S. has urged the former president to call on his followers to surrender their weapons and stop killing civilians. Aristide has done nothing to stop the violence. Haiti's interim government doesn't seem to know what to do about Aristide. In November of 2004 Haiti's Prime Minister Latortue indicated that he had called for an arrest warrant of Aristide on corruption charges but then announced in January of 2005 the possibility of a special mission to South Africa to negotiate with the exiled former president.<sup>100</sup>

Prime Minister Latortue has succeeded in gaining international support but has alienated himself from the lower and middle class people of Haiti. He has also condoned the practice of rounding up former Aristide supporters and holding them in Haitian jails, usually without charges. He has done little to forge a political climate needed to conduct successful elections in the fall of 2005. The President, Boniface Alexandre, is rarely heard from and it is clear that power rests with the Prime Minister.

The UN, OAS and other international actors must bring pressure to bear on all the principle protagonists, especially Aristide, in Haiti's current political and security stalemate in order to convince them to act in a manner for the good of the country rather than personal gain. The UN intends to hold an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council in Haiti from 13 to 16 April of 2005. This is rarely done and will hopefully bring a renewed focus on the looming crisis facing Haiti.

**7.2.2. Clear and Realistic Mandates.** The mandate for MINUSTAH is exceptionally broad. The majority of the action items outlined in the mandate (paragraph 7.1) have not seen significant progress to date. Of particular note, MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police


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<sup>99</sup> The Associated Press, "Major Figures in the Haiti Uprising", 25 February 2004.

<sup>100</sup> Reuters, "Haiti PM orders arrest warrant against Aristide" 13 Nov 2004, <http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=6803586> and Joseph Guyler Delva, Reuters, "Haiti's PM seeks Aristide's help to end violence", 21 January 2005.

have not yet begun *the most critical task* of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups. The mandate contained in UN Resolution 1542 states that MINUSTAH shall "assist the Transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups....as well as weapons control and public security measures." Although the interim government published a presidential decree establishing the national commission for DDR in February of 2005, the Commission has yet to define the national institutional framework for the implementation of the process. Armed groups roam Haiti's slums with impunity. There is the distinct possibility that the mandate is not realistic given the level of resources that have been provided. As the first anniversary of the initial Interim Multinational Force intervention has passed, the UN must reassess the mandate or consider immediately committing more resources (in the form of security forces) to accomplishing it.

**7.2.3. Adequate Resources to Accomplish Mandate.** The international community poured millions of dollars into the country of Haiti from 1994 to 2001 with very little to show for it. Figure 2 below shows the amount of international aid provided. With this in mind, it is somewhat surprising that many countries were willing to commit any resources to the problem a second time around. In fact, there are indications that the international community may not be totally willing to follow through with the required resources to accomplish the mandate, especially given other pressing crises such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.



International donor countries pledged over \$1.2 billion dollars at a donors conference held at the World Bank in July of 2004 (cohosted by the European Commission, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the World Bank) for near term economic assistance in support of funding requirements for Haiti's Interim Cooperative Framework, the country's blueprint for political, social and economic recovery. Unfortunately, nearly 9 months after the conference, international donors have failed to deliver 80% of the pledged donations.<sup>101</sup> Donor fatigue in the case of Haiti is definitely something to be wary of.

Twenty countries have sent peacekeeping troops to Haiti and thirty four have sent civilian police or formed police units. That said, the MINUSTAH mission has yet to reach its full mandate of 6,700 troops and 1,622 international police. MINUSTAH forces have had to focus their efforts on the major population centers and have not established a presence in all areas of the country. Acting OAS Secretary General Luigi Einaudi said recently that "we are going to need a lot more than 7,000 troops because most of the country is still outside of the

<sup>101</sup> The Washington Post, editorial, "Haiti One Year Later", 5 April 2005.

control of the international force."<sup>102</sup> It is clear that the present number of troops is too low to provide the level of presence and security required by the mandate. A possible mandate to resources mismatch exists which is setting the stage for significant erosion of the credibility of the UN mission as well as extreme donor dissatisfaction that could lead to dissolution of support for the Haiti mission. In fact, the Spanish government announced on the 4th of April that they would consider withdrawing their troops from MINUSTAH by the end of the year if humanitarian assistance promised by the international community to accomplish the mandate of MINUSTAH does not arrive as promised.<sup>103</sup> The UN must consider either modifying the mandate or increasing the resources available to accomplish the current mandate.

**7.2.4. Realistic Timetables.** The UN began drawing down USMIH forces in 1996, less than two years after the intervention began. In hindsight, this was clearly a mistake on the part of the international community. Kofi Annan stated as much when he wrote: "The most important lesson is that [this time] there can be no quick exit. Haiti will need our resources and support for a long time. The current crisis in Haiti is at least as much the result of irresponsible behavior by the Haitian political class as of omissions or failures in previous international efforts....A long-term effort--ten years or more--is needed to help rebuild the police and judiciary, as well as basic social services such as health care and education."<sup>104</sup> The sad part is that ten years may not be enough. The current mandate of MINUSTAH runs through June of 2005 and a proposal to extend the mandate will be brought before the UN Security Council in May of 2005.

**7.2.5. Utility of Regional Actors in Support of the UN.** The situation in Haiti has demonstrated both the positive and negative influences of regional actors. The UN made good use of a regional actor in the initial response to the recent Haiti crisis when it authorized the U.S. led Interim Multinational Force to intervene following the departure of Aristide. Brazil subsequently volunteered to lead a mostly regional coalition for the MINUSTAH intervention. Ten Latin American countries have contributed troops or civilian police to the mission giving it a wide regional flavor. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) however, of which Haiti is a member, has refused to recognize the interim government of Haiti and will

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<sup>102</sup> Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, Acting Secretary General of the OAS, address before IADC, 4 January 2005.

<sup>103</sup> Xinhua News Agency, "Spain Says [it] May Reconsider Military Presence in Haiti", 5 April 2005.

<sup>104</sup> Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, "Haiti: This Time We Must Get It Right", The Wall Street Journal, 16 March 2004.

not allow it to actively participate in CARICOM meetings until the country holds elections. Given the fact that CARICOM holds considerable sway in the sub region, no Caribbean nations have provided troops or civilian police to MINUSTAH.<sup>105</sup> This serves as a good example of how a regional actor can make things more difficult for the UN.

**7.2.6. Credible Impartiality.** The commitment of MINUSTAH to credible impartiality has been questioned in the face of the arrest and confinement, without charges, of Fanmi Lavalas members and Aristide supporters. The arrests are carried out by Haitian National Police, however, the forces and the leadership of MINUSTAH are implicated by association and by their inability or unwillingness to pressure government forces to refrain from such tactics. The Secretary-General noted in his latest report of 25 February 2005 that the SRSG, the Force Commander, and the CIVPOL commissioner meet weekly with the Prime Minister at the Conseil Supérieur de la Police Nationale. He also noted however that international human rights groups have continued to report alleged cases of arbitrary arrest, wrongful detention, ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings. In one specific instance, a resident of the Bel-Air slum was apprehended and taken into custody by a joint MINUSTAH/HNP patrol on 13 January 2005. He was found dead at the morgue eight days later.<sup>106</sup>

The SRSG must demand that the Haitian National Police and the interim government act with utmost respect for the law and human rights. Those that commit unauthorized arrests or detentions must be held publicly accountable. Impartiality does not mean neutrality. The SRSG and the force commander must commit themselves to use all authorized means necessary to enforce the mandate equally amongst all parties.

**7.2.7. Security and the Rule of Law.** Seven months after the Security Council authorized the mission, MINUSTAH had only about two thirds of its authorized troop strength in country. The mission was unable to establish a significant presence in any one part of the country. This problem helped to create a power vacuum and a loss of credibility on the part of the UN. The problem was further exacerbated when MINUSTAH's response to the humanitarian crisis following the devastating hurricanes in September of 2004 was initially ineffective.

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<sup>105</sup>Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 25 February 2005, p. 15-16.

<sup>106</sup>Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 25 February 2005, p. 5 and 8.

The MINUSTAH force has been reluctant to use force to enforce its mandate. The force commander, Brazil's General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro, has come under intense pressure but has said: "I command a peacekeeping force, not an occupation force...we are not there to carry out violence, this will not happen for as long as I'm in charge of the force."<sup>107</sup> The fact of the matter is that armed gangs rule the streets of many of Haiti's major cities and humanitarian assistance is unable to reach a majority of the population. There have also been several high profile prison breaks, one in which 480 prisoners escaped from the main Port-au-Prince jail in February of 2005.<sup>108</sup>

Following the deaths of two MINUSTAH peacekeepers in March of 2005, there are signs that MINUSTAH forces may become more aggressive. MINUSTAH forces and Haitian National Police backed by armored vehicles entered the Port-au-Prince slum of Cite-Soleil on the 31<sup>st</sup> of March in order to "restore security in the district."<sup>109</sup> Military force can never be a sole solution to a difficult situation like that of Haiti. However, the MINUSTAH mission was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and thus far the force has not been able to comply with the mandate's requirement to "establish a secure and stable environment" by utilizing non violent means.

In some parts of Haiti, in the absence of Haitian National Police or MINUSTAH security forces, former elements of the Haitian army have taken up arms to provide security. In the town of Petit-Goave, dozens of camouflaged ex-soldiers have taken up quarters in a building marked with a sign that says "General Headquarters of the Haitian Armed Forces." They have unlawfully arrested and detained civilians and maintain detention centers in some localities. These forces participated in the rebellion against Aristide and are now demanding that the Interim Government reestablish the Haitian armed forces.<sup>110</sup>

The UN must reassess the level of troops and CIVPOL required to reestablish full control of the country, in both cities and rural areas. Based upon the successful intervention of 1994, upwards of 21,000 troops and CIVPOL could be necessary to establish security, ensure the protection of human rights and support for the rule of law, and provide support to the humanitarian assistance effort.

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<sup>107</sup> Reuters, Brazil rejects U.S. Call for Haiti Crackdown, 3 December 2004.

<sup>108</sup> Peter Prengaman, Associated Press, "Scores at Large After Haiti Prison Attack", 20 February 2005.

<sup>109</sup> AFP, "UN Troops Descend on Haitian Slum After Three Killed in Gang War", 31 March 2005, [http://www.haiti-news.com/article.php?id\\_article=3508](http://www.haiti-news.com/article.php?id_article=3508).

<sup>110</sup> Kevin Sullivan, The Washington Post, "Ex-Troops Fill Haiti's Security Vacuum", 15 October 2004.

**7.2.8. Importance of the SRSG.** Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés, a political scientist and economist from Chile, is the SRSG in Haiti. He was previously Chile's Permanent Representative to the UN. Haiti is his first assignment as SRSG. His qualifications as both political scientist and economist would seem to make him an ideal SRSG for MINUSTAH given the political and economic crises in Haiti. However, he has come under scrutiny from international media as "a Chilean diplomat with little influence over the country's feuding political forces."<sup>111</sup> That said, it may be the case that the situation in Haiti is so difficult that no one person has the capability to accomplish the Herculean task of bringing together the various political factions in the country. Therefore, the UN and the OAS should make sure that all of their leadership and staff members in Haiti are of the highest quality and are willing to cooperate over the long haul in order to gain a foothold toward progress. The UN should begin looking now for the next SRSG, force commander, and MINUSTAH key staff members in anticipation of a phased change of leadership as the current leadership reaches the 12 to 18 month mark of service. A smooth, planned personnel change is necessary to prevent any loss of momentum or uncertainty within the operation.

**7.2.9. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).** The Interim Haitian government established a National Commission on DDR (NCDDR) in February of 2005. However, the NCDDR has thus far not done much to further the DDR process. This is difficult to understand given the significance of the issue. In March of 2005, the Geneva-based group "Small Arms Survey" stated the following in a report on Haiti:

"Human and national security are undermined by a wide variety of non-state armed groups currently operating throughout the country. There are at least a dozen distinct types of armed groups in possession of varying numbers and calibres of small arms and light weapons: OP's (Popular Organizations), *baz armés*, zenglendos, ex-army (FADH), former paramilitaries (Revolutionary Armed Forces for the Progress of Haiti – FRAPH), the ex-Presidential Guard, prison escapees, organized criminal groups, self defence militia, private security companies, civilians, and politicians."<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> The Washington Post, editorial, "Haiti One Year Later", 5 April 2005.

<sup>112</sup> Robert Muggah, Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper 14, March 2005, p. 16.

The report estimated that civilians and "nonstate" armed groups in Haiti have more than 183,000 weapons, and reported that so far, "virtually every disarmament effort in Haiti has failed."<sup>113</sup> The UN has a fairly robust DDR staff in place in Haiti but to date, the Interim Government has been reticent to take on the task. Again quoting from the Small Arms Survey report: "All parties, as well as many representatives from Haitian civil society, recognize that disarmament is a priority, but the Interim Government and the Haitian National Police (HNP) have thus far dragged their feet in moving the process forward."<sup>114</sup>

The problem may lie in the fact that the process of DDR can be expensive, especially in a "cash for guns" approach. The situation in Haiti is even more complicated in that a large number of the illegally armed groups are former members of the Haitian armed forces that will not turn over their weapons without some sort of guarantee that they will be given a job in the new police or state security service. The UN must pressure the Interim Government to demonstrate unambiguous commitment to DDR, develop an execution plan for implementing the DDR process, identify specific international financing needed to complete the task in a timely manner, and ensure the full support of MINUSTAH in assisting the HNP in executing the technical tasks of DDR.

**7.2.10. Importance of Elections and Electoral Participation.** Members of the UN Security Council, meeting in an extraordinary session in Port-au-Prince in April 2005, have begun to indicate that elections might not be possible in Haiti as planned in November of 2005 due to a lack of security and the absence of a climate of national reconciliation amongst political parties in Haiti. Both the acting U.S. Ambassador and the French Ambassador to the UN indicated that, during talks in Haiti, Haitian politicians had presented few constructive ideas for the future and that they were mainly concerned with what had happened in the past. In addition to reconciliation problems, there are also technical problems. Voter registration has not yet begun and there is a \$20 million shortfall in funding the elections process.<sup>115</sup> At this point, it does not appear that members of the Fanmi Lavalas party are willing to participate in the electoral process due to a continuing loyalty to Aristide and the hope that he will return to Haiti to participate in the electoral process. This throws the whole concept of

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<sup>113</sup> Robert Muggah, Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper 14, March 2005, p. 17-18.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>115</sup> Associated Press, "Haiti Said Not Ready for Nov. Elections", 15 April 2005.

electing a supportable government into question. The UN must find a way to pressure Aristide into stating unequivocally that he has permanently withdrawn from Haitian politics. They must also somehow convince the existing political party leadership in Haiti that the situation is hopeless if all they do is look to the past rather than identifying issues of agreement and moving forward. Finally, the "father" of Haitian democracy (in the manner of Ataturk in Turkey or George Washington of the U.S.) has yet to step forward, but he must be found and thrust to center stage as soon as possible.

**7.2.11. Development of Democratic Institutions.** It is evident that previous interventions in Haiti failed to develop self-sustaining democratic institutions. This is perhaps the most difficult task because although outsiders such as the UN can show the way, the ultimate task rests with the Haitians themselves to be dedicated to something with which they have no experience. All of the UN and OAS systems must remain committed to educate and support Haitian society for perhaps as much as a generation in order to fully establish a functioning democratic society.

**7.2.12. Economic Assistance Must Be Balanced.** The World Bank is in the process of conducting a Fiscal Year 2005 "World Bank Review of Conditionality." Conditionality is the process of lending money to recipient countries on the basis of pre-agreed upon objectives and involves the right of a donor to halt the flow of money if the recipient country does not comply with those objectives. There is currently an ongoing debate within the international financial community on the effectiveness of conditionality. Virtually all aid programs involve some sort of implicit or explicit conditionality. However, reviews of the effectiveness of development assistance over the past decades have demonstrated that reforms are more likely to be sustained when the reform program emerges from a country's own domestic political process and is suited to that country's specific circumstances.<sup>116</sup> A review of aid to Haiti in the 1990's revealed that conditionality created a "culture of negotiation" as opposed to a "culture of development action" within the Haitian government. On the other hand, the Interim Government of Haiti has produced little evidence to date that it is capable of fairly and efficiently obligating international monetary assistance funds toward the Interim Cooperative Framework's development goals. Until the outcome of the World Bank's study

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<sup>116</sup> The World Bank, Operations Policy and Country Services, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Issues Note, January 24, 2005.

on conditionality is known, the international community should continue to provide a balanced aid package that includes conditional and unconditional loans and grants to the Interim Government as well as grants to respected NGO's with a proven track record of efficient support to the people of Haiti.

**7.2.13. OAS as a Regional Partner for the UN.** The OAS has demonstrated its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes in Haiti for over a decade. Unfortunately, its track record when utilizing this approach for resolving the crises that have occurred there since 1991 is not very good. The Charter of the OAS, as well as the Inter-American Democratic Charter adopted by the OAS in September of 2001, rely on diplomacy or suspension of a member state to resolve a breach of democracy in that state. The OAS recognizes the authority of the UN to impose sanctions or conduct an intervention under Chapters VI and VII but it does not subscribe to these measures as an organization. This approach would generally preclude the OAS from being a full partner of the UN for operations under Chapter VIII of the UN charter which allow for the 'existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action...' <sup>117</sup> Haiti is an example of a significant regional problem where the primary regional organization--the OAS--through its experience and cultural awareness, could provide a significant leadership role yet is limited by its Charter to do so. This should call into question the subject of basic reforms on the part of the OAS.

**7.2.14. UN Ability to Administer a Failed State.** A deteriorating situation in Haiti may eventually call for a bold move on the part of the UN. Should upcoming elections in Haiti fail or if the process of national reconciliation is such that a newly elected President does not have the legitimate support of a majority of the electorate, the UN must be prepared to step in and establish a transitional administration as they have done in other failed states. That would likely be the only remaining hope for maintaining international support to avert anarchy, civil war or at the very least a significant humanitarian crisis that would impact the entire region.

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<sup>117</sup> United Nations, United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII, 26 June 1945.

## **Chapter 8. Implications of Case Study Lessons Learned for the UN and the OAS**

**8.1 Implications for the UN.** The situation in Haiti is at a culminating point. The recent extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council in Port-au-Prince comes at a key time. The mandate for MINUSTAH expires in June of 2005. It is in critical need of a reassessment and update, not uncommon in peace support operations. The UN must be prepared to increase the number of security forces--perhaps double them- in order to match resources to the mandate and swiftly improve the security situation in the near term in order to move forward with the DDR, reconciliation and electoral processes. It can then turn its full resources to humanitarian aid and economic development.

The lessons learned highlighted in this paper should certainly be of no surprise to the UN. One of the things that the UN does quite well is document and study its operations. Several significant documents of UN lessons learned have previously been published, among them the Brahimi Report in 2000. The UN would do well to heed the lessons highlighted in that report and apply them to Haiti. The report stated several important changes that must be adopted by the UN: "A doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of DDR programs into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of UN peace operations to fund 'quick impact projects' that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions."<sup>118</sup>

The Brahimi report goes on to say that unless Member States have the political will to support the UN politically, financially and operationally, the UN will not be credible as a force for peace. The political will of Member States is certainly being tried in Haiti. It is not possible to say how long they will need to continue to support this mission but if history is a guide, it will require at least ten years of concerted effort.

**8.2. Implications for the OAS.** The former OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria outlined the successes that the OAS has achieved in conflict resolution in his report, "The

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<sup>118</sup> United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 21 August 2000.

OAS in Transition: 1994-2004". The OAS has had particular success in situations where the parties involved were willing to partner with the OAS in preventing conflicts and in supporting post conflict reconciliation. The report cites contributions to end conflict in the Central American region, resolution of territorial disputes between Peru and Ecuador, Argentina and Chile, as well as other important investigations and peace initiatives. However, the less than successful efforts of the OAS to help resolve disputes that resulted in unanticipated changes of government in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, Haiti in 1991 and 2004, Venezuela in 2002, Bolivia in 2003, and most recently Ecuador in April of 2005, indicates that perhaps the OAS should give consideration to some type of reform or strengthening of its intrastate conflict prevention and post conflict recovery role.

The possibility of interstate conflict in the Western Hemisphere is very low at present. The possibility of intrastate conflict seems to be much more likely. The OAS Charter's emphasis on non-interference in domestic affairs, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and rejection of the use or threat of force to resolve them means that it will rarely be a major factor in resolving the most dangerous and most likely threats to the stability of the hemisphere. Haiti is the best example of this but the situations in Bolivia (2003) and Ecuador (2005) also bear witness to the occasional ineffectiveness on the part of the OAS. The OAS has missed opportunities to play a more proactive role in circumstances that fall beneath the radar of the UN but nevertheless may have benefited from some type of on call assistance in the form of regional civilian police or military observers. The OAS could also play a significant role in long term interventions when the UN begins to withdraw its support while there is still a need for an international presence. A clear example of this was the situation in Haiti in the late 1990's when the UN had too small a presence in the country to be truly effective.

Presently, the OAS does not have the capacity or legal framework to intervene in a monitoring, civilian police or military peacekeeping mode even when asked by a legitimate government to do so. The organization's sole reliance on diplomatic and pacific conflict resolution measures doesn't carry much weight with anti-democratic actors who in many cases have already shown a penchant for disregarding international norms of governance and diplomacy. In order to remain relevant, the OAS should consider reforms that would allow it to respond quickly with police or military intervention forces in conjunction with diplomatic

efforts or, more importantly, after diplomatic efforts have failed to resolve a conflict. There is no doubt that peaceful resolutions of crises are preferred. However, the reality is that these intervention mechanisms are an internationally accepted practice that can prevent crises from worsening or help speed post conflict resolution.

If member states of the OAS are able to support the Chapter VI and Chapter VII mechanisms of the UN Charter, then it seems logical that they could coordinate resources within the hemisphere to provide, at a minimum, formed civilian police or military units to be used as monitoring or peacekeeping forces when invited to do so by a democratically elected government or at the request of the UN under the provisions of Chapter VIII. This is not to suggest that the OAS could or should be able to shoulder the responsibilities of a large scale intervention on the order of MINUSTAH, but rather that it should have the capability to commit a cadre of several hundred police or military members at the request of a member state if it could prevent or mitigate the effects of an inter or intra state conflict within the hemisphere. Many OAS member states are understandably reluctant to sanction military or civilian police intervention in another country's affairs. However, if the organization had a recognized, credible capability to assist in proactively stabilizing situations where democratically elected governments are at risk, this would seem to enhance the goal of promoting democracy and respect for constitutional processes within the hemisphere.

The current situation in Ecuador is a perfect example of what the OAS might have done had it had a capability to proactively intervene in the crisis. On the 20th of April, 2005 Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutierrez was forced from power following open violence in the streets after months of political unrest. At a special session of the OAS on 21 April, the delegation of Ecuador came to the OAS “to demand its solidarity” with the Ecuadorian people and government. Ecuadorian Special Ambassador Blasco Peñaherrera explained that his country had suffered a deterioration of its democratic institutions in recent months and needed OAS support “in the complex task of restoring and consolidating the rule of law in our country,” in accordance with the terms of the Democratic Charter.<sup>119</sup> The OAS agreed to send a high level delegation to consult with the current government. However, the situation may have been averted had the OAS had some type of on call instrument that could have intervened at the request of both the Ecuadorian government and the opposition leaders before

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<sup>119</sup> Organization of American States, press release, [OAS to Send High Level Mission to Ecuador](#), 22 April 2005

the situation deteriorated to the point of lawlessness. Since most of the violence was centered in a small part of Quito, international police monitors may have been very effective in stabilizing the situation and giving both parties, as well as a high level delegation of the OAS, an opportunity to negotiate a diplomatic solution in an atmosphere free of violence.

## **Chapter 9. Conclusion**

The study of history can be a very effective tool in preparing for the future. In Haiti, the future is now for the UN and the OAS. A significant collection of historical lessons learned exists, both from previous Haiti interventions as well as other UN operations, to provide an effective blueprint for ensuring success in Haiti this time around. There is no doubt that both the UN and the OAS have the capability to analyze these lessons and prescribe adequate courses of action for resolving the current crisis in that country. What is not clear is whether the international community is fully committed to providing the resources--security, economic, and political--to assist the Haitian people in getting the job done. It is certainly obvious that one year after the beginning of the current UN mission in Haiti, there are significant problems that threaten the prospect of restoring some semblance of a peaceful, self sustaining democracy in that country. The mission is in need of a reassessment and course correction--not uncommon in peace support operations--that will help maintain the steady pace of progress and motivate donor states to continue their commitment to success.

The OAS has proven that it can be an effective partner with the UN under certain circumstances. However, it has room to improve its ability to take decisive action in order to avert or mitigate the effects of political crises in the hemisphere that are occurring with some regularity. As the principle regional organization, it must maintain its legitimacy by demonstrating success as a proactive partner toward resolving problems. The OAS can achieve this success by continually analyzing and adopting some of the best practices of past successful UN interventions, either in partnership with the UN under Chapter VIII of that organization's charter or upon making the fundamental philosophical and legal shift to allow it to act independently at the request of a member state.

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