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**CONVERGENCES & DIVERGENCES BETWEEN THE US NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE'S INSTRUMENTS OF DEFENSE AND
SECURITY**

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Security.

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I certify that I have reviewed this Research Project and have found it suitable and within the standards and methodologies of the IADC.

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

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ABSTRACT

This research paper investigates the convergences and divergences between the security strategies of the United States, as described in *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, and the Western Hemisphere, as articulated in a variety of regional security-related documents agreed to under the auspices of the Organization of American States. This paper finds that the stated values and strategies of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere are generally congruent, with few real points of divergence.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The United States is a global power with global interests. The affairs of state around the world impact its security. It is led by a President with a broad and expansive worldview, with a stated policy of expanding freedom and democracy around the world. Its wide-ranging diplomacy and security policies keep it active and involved globally. As a proactive society and government, the United States is willing to employ a wide variety of multilateral or, if necessary, unilateral options when developing and implementing its security policies. The states of Latin America, while a diverse group of sovereign bodies difficult to encapsulate, in general reflect a very different global posture.¹ Overall, they are focused within the region and committed to policies of national sovereignty and non-intervention. Generally speaking they are more focused on domestic development and other social issues such as poverty, debt, and societal income disparities. Issues such as Middle East peace, the human rights situation in Darfur, and the delicate balance of peace in China and Taiwan, while important, are not front-burner issues in their routine, day-to-day responsibility to maintain national security.² In short, the security horizons of the United States and Latin America are, naturally, different. One could expect, even absent the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent military operations in the Middle East that US and Latin American security strategies and policies would differ.

In September 2002 the Bush administration released its first US National Security Strategy (NSS). The first NSS written since the 9/11 attacks, it was awaited by security analysts eager to see how US security strategy would change in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US's subsequent attack on and defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the buildup to war in Iraq. And while these events seemingly would have little to do with Latin America, the US NSS, given the weight the US wields in the region, in fact is of great importance to the states of the region, and hence affects US relations within the region. To say that "9/11 changed everything" has become a trite and overused statement, even if it is true. But even in Latin America, the events of 9/11, Operation

¹ Indeed, Robert Keohane goes so far as to question the true existence of a "Latin America." He writes "I do not agree with the statement that Latin America forms a regional subsystem within the global system. Empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis. Certainly, there are historical and perhaps sociocultural characteristics shared by most of the region, but it has been pointed out before that if you were to map communication routes, airline routes, and trade relationships across the globe, without sticking on national or regional labels, you would not be able to pick out a coherent geographic entity to be called Latin America...There is, therefore, little meaning in speaking of Latin America as a political or economic region." Robert O. Keohane, "Between Vision and Reality: Variables in Latin American Foreign Policy," in Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, eds., *Latin America in the New International System* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 207-208.

² Tulchin and Espach make a similar argument, writing that "For their part, the nations of Latin America have been unassertive in projecting any importance in the global system beyond economics. In terms of international power, these nations—with the possible exception of Brazil—are still third- or fourth-tier players in international affairs, and continue to be "ruletakers" and not "rulemakers." Ibid, 2.

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq have had a profound impact, given the effect these events have had on the US, the region's hegemonic superpower.³

One would think that a post-9/11 US NSS could be problematic to states in the region. Given the US's historic predilection toward interventionism in the region, one could plausibly, even without examining the NSS, envision an aggressive and assertive NSS inimical to the region's historic insistence on national sovereignty and resistance to outside influences in domestic affairs. But is that in fact the case? The purpose of this paper, then, will be to examine the US NSS to determine whether it in fact is divergent from or congruent with the security needs and concerns of the region.

The US's security concerns are easily specified and examined, as they are expressly stated in the NSS. But capturing the security concerns for an entire region, that spans the small countries of Central America to Brazil, the state with the fifth largest landmass in the world, would be a daunting task. Therefore, rather than a state-by-state examination, this paper will use resolutions, declarations, statements, and agreements negotiated and agreed to within the Organization of American States (OAS) as proxies to represent the security beliefs and concerns of the region. More specifically, this paper will focus on several key documents. First, the basis behind security in the hemisphere, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) of 1947, then the key security-related documents passed or adopted since 9/11:

- Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism, adopted by the 23rd meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 21 September 2001;
- The Declaration of Quebec City, adopted at the 3rd Summit of the Americas in April 2001;
- The Declaration of Bridgetown: The Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security, adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in June 2002;
- The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, signed in June 2002
- The Special Conference on Security in the Americas, adopted in October 2003;

These OAS documents are of course imperfect proxies for examining the security perspectives and concerns of the region. First, adopted out of consensus among the 34 member states, they are inevitably compromises that ultimately represent no state perfectly. Second, since the US is an active member of the OAS, its security views, and those articulated within its NSS, are reflected at least partially within the OAS documents, meaning that these documents are not pure representations of a Latin American consensus. For the purposes of this paper, an ideal study would

³ Indeed, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic contributed forces to the 37 state multi-national coalition that conducted Operation Iraqi Freedom. See "US Moves to Preserve Coalition," *The Washington Post*, February 25, 2005, p. A1.

compare the US NSS to regional resolutions and declarations devoid of US influence. That academic ideal does not exist in the real world, and thus OAS documents and statements, while imperfect, are the best representation available of regional security concerns and policies. Indeed, given this limitation, the selected documents are well suited for this study. First, they reflect an extended timeline, starting with the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and ending in late 2003. Second, they represent the voices of various bureaucratic interests that speak for states, ranging from Presidents to Ministers of Foreign Affairs to Ministers of Defense to state representatives to the OAS, meaning that no one institutional or bureaucratic block of voices predominate.⁴

This paper proposes to demonstrate a controversial point: that while the security concerns of the United States are sometimes at odds with its hemispheric brethren, in fact that, aside from a few divergent key points, the US NSS is generally congruent with the security concerns of the region. This will be demonstrated by first analyzing the US NSS, followed by the regional security documents listed above. This paper will then compare the salient points of each, highlighting their convergences and divergences, showing that in fact there are many commonalities of interest across the Western Hemisphere. The real points of contention, when they arise, come out of how states in the region seek to maximize their security in an anarchic world order. In other words, US and regional *goals and objectives* are generally congruent; the devil is in the details, or the actual policies taken to ensure that security.

⁴ For the classic analysis of bureaucratic politics, see Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Harper Collins, 1971). Allison analyses how decisions are made, and concludes that the governmental politics model, now frequently known as the bureaucratic model, offers the best framework for understanding government decisionmaking. Under the model, decisions are shown to be the result of negotiations between actors (government agencies) involved in the decision making process, with each agency bringing its own institutional perspective to the bargaining process. Hence, if the OAS statements analyzed span a range of institutions, presumably institutional biases would be filtered out (or at least become apparent).

CHAPTER 2 – NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The NSS released in September 2002 was forged in the attacks and destruction of 9/11. President Bush had been elected in 2000 in large part based on a platform that called for a more measured use of US military force, a greater reluctance to use US forces as “the world’s policeman,” and on the claim that the US would be less arrogant in its international policies. And indeed, reflecting the impact of 9/11 and the post-9/11 perspective of the US leadership, this NSS takes a very different tone from its predecessors. The first and most striking feature of the NSS is its idealistic fervor. Bush sets the stage in his cover letter, writing that “We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom...” The NSS itself continues with this idealist strain, stating that “The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better,”⁵ and the ideals of freedom and liberty are constant throughout the document; indeed, the NSS equates the core of its idealism, the spread of freedom, with US security.

US foreign policy, since it’s founding, has reflected a continual tension between realism, idealism, and, more recently, neoliberal institutionalist thought.⁶ George Washington was a strong believer in a realist perspective toward international affairs, believing that states follow, or should be expected to strictly follow, their own interests; he was a strong and unwavering believer in the notion that, internationally, states did not have friends. They had interests, and international friendship was a function only of mutual interest.⁷ The realist perspective has been prominent throughout US history, from the foreign policy implemented by Henry Kissinger in the 1960s and 1970s, to President George H.W. Bush’s policies of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The starkest example of idealist liberalism in US foreign policy was seen in Woodrow Wilson and his advocacy and founding of the League of Nations after World War I,⁸ and later in the policies of the Carter Administration in the 1970s. Idealists are generally more optimistic about human nature and the ability to reach

⁵ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 1. Hereafter cited as NSS.

⁶ The body of scholarly literature on international relations theory is vast. For the most influential articulation of realist theory, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Alfred Knopf) first issued in 1948 and updated through five editions. For the most influential modification to realism see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1979), which created the body of theory known as neorealism. Liberalism is best advocated in Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795. Largely discredited by the outbreak of World War II, Liberalism has generally evolved into neoliberalism, which argues for the role of international institutions in mitigating the affects of anarchy in international politics. See, among others, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

⁷ See Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 132.

⁸ A theory severely damaged by Wilson’s failure to make the League of Nations work and the outbreak of World War II. E.H. Carr published a withering critique of idealism and liberalism in his classic study *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939* (New York: Harper and Row, 1946).

security through reason and morality.⁹ Neoliberal institutionalist thought, or the belief that international institutions can mitigate the forces of anarchy and provide some form of international order, was prevalent in the Clinton Administrations. The current Bush Administration, and by extension this NSS, have largely fused the realist focus on power relationships, by strengthening the US military and pursuing a robust forward defense policy, with the idealist desire to create a better, more just world.¹⁰

The 2002 NSS reflects a post-9/11 view of the US's role in the world by articulating an aggressive, proactive approach to solving crises and indeed preventing their emergence in the first place. That is the part of the NSS that has attracted the most attention, in large part because of the newly emerging advocacy of preventive warfare. It is to the more proactive aspects of the NSS that we first turn.

2.1 POWER AND PREVENTION IN THE NSS: MUSCULAR ASSERTIVENESS

Clearly reflecting the aftermath of 9/11, the NSS is unapologetic in articulating a strategy of opposing terrorism wherever it appears in the world and in naming terrorism as *the* enemy: “The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”¹¹ To defeat terrorism, the strategy proposes direct and continuous action using all the elements of power, identifying and destroying threats before they reach the US, and by acting preemptively against terrorist threats. Moreover, the NSS explicitly states that sponsors will also be targeted, by “convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.”¹² Even more forthrightly, the NSS states that “We will make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”¹³ In other words, sponsors are also explicitly defined as the enemy—not an adversary, but an enemy, and thus subject to the full range of options available when confronting terrorist organizations themselves.

⁹ Schuyler Foerster and Edward N. Wright, *American Defense Policy*, 6th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 6-7.

¹⁰ Charles Knight makes a similar point when he states that the NSS invokes, citing Alexander Wendt, “the Kantian culture of friendship.” Knight, “Essential Elements Mission in the National Security Strategy of 2002,” Cambridge: Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives *Commentary*, Nov 2002. Adapted from a presentation at the Center for International Relations, Boston University, 9 Oct 2002, 6.

¹¹ NSS, 5.

¹² *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 5.

Similarly, President Bush and the NSS speak unambiguously about the threat posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Shortly before the release of the NSS, President Bush foreshadowed its strategy on WMD, stating

The greatest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention...and we will oppose them with all our power.”¹⁴

A nexus of events—proliferation of WMD to rogue states, the now-lower technological barriers to WMD expertise, and a greater likelihood that WMDs will be used—has made “today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.”¹⁵ To counter this threat requires a new view of deterrence and action, a view articulated in the strategy that has caused great consternation: the well-described but unstated strategy of preventive warfare.

Preventive warfare is distinct from the far better known notion of preemptive warfare. Preemptive warfare, as defined by the US military, is “An attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”¹⁶ It is a widely accepted policy option adopted by states around the globe and generally considered legal under international law. Hugo Grotius, a founder of modern international law, stated that it is “lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill.”¹⁷ Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” While a restrictive reading of this Article 51 requires a state to absorb an attack before defending itself, a more expansive reading focuses on the reasonable notion that no state should be forced to endure an attack it knows is coming. States have long adhered to this more expansive interpretation.¹⁸ In sum, preemption is an accepted notion in international law and in international policy. Central to the notion of preemption is *imminent threat*. Imminent threat can be inferred from a number of actions, such as general military mobilizations, the movement of forces out of garrisons and into attack formations, the movement of vessels into launch zones, the arming of missiles or aircraft, etc. But clearly, imminent means the threat exists, is real, and is about

¹⁴ President George W. Bush, speech given at West Point New York 1 June 2002, quoted in the NSS, 13.

¹⁵ NSS, 13.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 Apr 2001 (as amended through 30 Nov 2004), 424.

¹⁷ The following discussion comes from Christopher S. Owens, “Unlikely Partners: Preemption and the American Way of War,” *Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition*, (Washington DC: NDU Press, 2003), 3-4.

¹⁸ Michael E. O’Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,” Policy Brief #113, *The Brookings Institution*, Dec 2002.

to be employed. The threat of preemption still holds an important place in the NSS. When addressing terrorism, the strategy states that the US will defend itself “by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders...by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.”¹⁹, and the strategy alludes to preemption when addressing the actions of rogue states as well.

The NSS actually doesn't explicitly speak of preventive war. Rather, it speaks of “adapting” the concept of imminent threat because of “The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm” inherent in today's threats.²⁰ The NSS states that

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objective of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means...Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered covertly and used without warning.²¹

The clearest statement of this expansion of the notion of preemption to prevention is not in the NSS itself; rather, it is contained in President Bush's cover letter introducing the NSS. In that letter President Bush writes “And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats *before they are fully formed.*”²² (italics added) Later, the NSS states that “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients *before they are able to threaten* or use weapons of mass destruction...”²³ (italics added) In short, preemptive action required a threat to be imminent. Imminence requires the presence of an actual threat; President Bush writes of action before a threat is fully formed. Hence, though the words “preventive warfare” are not used in the NSS, it is clearly the strategy being articulated. The strategy *at a minimum* expands the definition of preemption and, more likely, *creates* the relatively new concept of preventive warfare.

Is preventive warfare legal under international law? The debate rages, though most observers would conclude that it is not a legally accepted action. Jack Spencer skirts the legality issue, ignoring the difference between imminent threat and Bush's “before fully formed” statement.²⁴ Malcolm Brailey, reflecting what is likely a common theme, argues that any policy of preventive war targeted

¹⁹ NSS, 6.

²⁰ Ibid., 15.

²¹ Ibid., 15.

²² George W. Bush, cover letter to *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 17 Sep 2002.

²³ NSS, 14.

²⁴ Jack Spencer, “The New National Security Strategy: An Effective Blueprint for the War on Terror,” *The Heritage Foundation Web Memo #149*, 25 Sep 2002.

against sovereign states would be illegitimate from both a legal and ethical perspective.²⁵ Jonathan Kirshner focuses less on the legalistic aspect of preventive warfare, but argues that it is a poor policy decision that will make the US weaker and less secure.²⁶ Joseph McMillan, while blurring the difference between preemption and prevention (despite the title of his work), makes a strong case that, given the threat, the US should help forge a new international consensus for the right of anti-terrorist intervention based on a broadening of three existing international legal norms: (1) Work to have terrorists considered to be enemies of mankind, and thus a standing enemy of all states. Just as piracy, genocide, and slavery were existing realities of history that have become morally repugnant to all legitimate states, the same consideration should be extended to terrorism and thus its purveyors. (2) A reinvigoration of the concept of the sovereign *responsibility* of states. Sovereignty, or the right to conduct one's own internal affairs, has become reified in international relations and the foreign policy of much of the world. McMillan argues that sovereign rights are granted after a state exhibits sovereign responsibility...and, given the status of terrorism as a common enemy of mankind, countries that fail to exercise responsibility in preventing terror operations from within their borders, cannot expect the community of nations to honor their sovereign rights. (3) An adaptation of the concept of self-defense to the new realities of modern threats. While McMillan falls short of persuasively arguing the notion of prevention, his work clearly shows that, under certain conditions, a strong case can be advanced for preventive action. If nothing else, his analysis starts down the long and difficult path of establishing a new international norm.²⁷ In short, to go back to the original question: what here is legal? International law has legitimated preemptive warfare, given the existence of the requisite threat and imminence. Preventive warfare, on the other hand is a far less accepted concept in international law. International law regulates the actions of states internationally, particularly with regards to actions they may take against other states; it holds less sway in actions taken by states against non-state actors such as terrorists. Thus, in the aftermath of 9/11, the application of preventive force against a terrorist target would probably be rather uncontroversial, especially if the attacking state could produce strong evidence of a forming threat. Less clear, though, is the legitimacy of preventive attack against a rogue state, since the attack or warfare could

²⁵ Malcolm Brailey, "Pre-Emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Us of Force in Defence of the State," Working Paper No. 55 of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of Singapore, 2003.

²⁶ Jonathan Kirshner, "Why the Bush Doctrine will Hurt US Interests," in *Iraq and Beyond: The New US National Security Strategy*, Occasional Paper #27, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Jan 2003.

²⁷ Joseph McMillan, "Apocalyptic Terrorism: The Case for Preventive Action," *Strategic Forum: Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University*, No. 212, Nov 2004.

surface issues and create second-order effects far beyond merely neutralizing a forming threat, such as spurring regime change.²⁸

This is the core of the offensive, muscular part of the NSS, and, because of its newness, it receives the most attention.²⁹ It addresses the more militaristic aspects of the NSS and reflects the belief that, in some circumstances, such as in the presence of terrorist and/or WMD threats, that the US is prepared to act aggressively, decisively, and, if necessary, unilaterally. However, the vast majority of the NSS is quite different. Indeed several scholars note the many continuities between the Bush NSS and previous post-Cold War NSS's. Maria Fanis argues that the Bush NSS in reality "... encapsulates the consensual view of America's proper role abroad since the end of the Cold War. This post-Cold War national consensus ... is reflected not only in President Bush's recently announced national security policy, but is also evident in the foreign policies of his two predecessors."³⁰ The current NSS articulates an understanding of the importance of cooperation, alliances, development, poverty reduction, public diplomacy, common approaches to transnational threats, and free trade to ensure the continuation of development and the expansion of freedom, all of which enhance US security. In short, as this paper will demonstrate in the next few paragraphs, the US NSS reflects a wide-ranging understanding that cooperation and global development are central components to US security.

2.2 THE US NSS AND THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Since the start of the war in Iraq the US has frequently been accused of unilateralism and an unwillingness to work with allies and other states to further international peace, security, and development, a critique primarily but not exclusively related to the decision to invade Iraq.³¹ Yet the NSS reflects a clear understanding of the importance of allies and cooperative multilateral action to further US security. On the security front, President Bush writes, in the NSS cover letter that "...no

²⁸ Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, "The New National Security Strategy and Preemption," Policy Brief #113, *The Brookings Institution*, Dec 2002, 4-5.

²⁹ See, for instance, Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, "The Bush National Security Strategy," in *US Foreign Policy Agenda*, Dec 2002, found at <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm>

³⁰ Maria Fanis, "Old Elements in the New Security Policy," in *Iraq and Beyond: The New US National Security Strategy*, Occasional Paper #27, Cornell University Peace Studies Program, Jan 2003, 15. See also Robert H. Dorff, "The Current US National Security Strategy and Policy: A Brief Appraisal," in Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, eds., *The Search for Security: A US Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2003), 22.

³¹ Literally thousands of sources exist. See, for instance, the *New York Times* editorial, "Saying No to War," 9 March 2003; Senator Robert Byrd, "We Stand Passively Mute," speech on the floor of the US Senate, 12 February 2003.

nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The US is committed to lasting institutions like the UN, the WTO, the OAS, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances.”³² The overview to the NSS also gives a strong foreshadowing to an explicit commitment to cooperative action, stating that “To achieve these goals (political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity), the United States will:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- *Strengthen alliances* to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- *Work with others* to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- *Develop agendas for cooperative action* with other main centers of global power; and
- Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.³³

In short, three of the NSS’s eight objectives *explicitly* address cooperation, and even a cursory reading of the NSS shows that cooperative action is an important component of the other five methods as well.³⁴ In short, the NSS demonstrates that cooperative action and consultation is viewed as a key component across the scope of US security planning and thus is a central feature of US security, as the following paragraphs will demonstrate.³⁵

2.3 CHAMPION FOR HUMAN DIGNITY

The unapologetic chapter “Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity” refers to the US commitment to the rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech, tolerance, and a number of other characteristics fundamental to the US’s view of human dignity. The administration commits itself to championing these values and speaking out against violations while using US foreign aid programs to promote freedom. Under this view, US dealings with other states will be informed and shaped by how those states treat their citizenry; if a democratic state respects the values listed above, then relations will proceed cordially; but if a state that does not permit its citizens certain basic rights, then that will also significantly shape US relations and interaction with that state. Yet at the same time, this is not to be a unilateral US crusade, as the NSS states a commitment to

³² Bush, cover letter to *The NSS of the USA*, 17 Sep 2002.

³³ NSS, 1-2.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ This paper will not examine the NSS’s final chapter, “Transform America’s National Security Institutions,” since that chapter is inherently inward looking.

enlisting solidarity and cooperation from other democracies in pressing these interests where needed. In short, the US intends to honor human dignity globally, but seeks to do so within a block of like-minded democracies to spur changes within those societies toward a more open, inclusive system of government.

2.4 STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM

The chapter “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and our Friends” is one of the two chapters that has sparked the most controversy, with its insistence on preemptively attacking terrorist threats and holding state sponsors (or states willfully ignorant of terrorist activity in their territory) accountable for actions launched from or taken within their borders. This chapter, in short, states the case for the US’s aggressive and comprehensive campaign to attack and defeat terrorism militarily. But it is more than that. The NSS reflects an understanding that military attacks or defenses are insufficient tools for defeating or defending against terrorist attacks. It reflects that the US will also need to counter terror by disrupting access to financial resources.³⁶ More importantly, the chapter reflects the administration’s understanding that defeating terror is a long-term campaign that is best fought by waging a “war of ideas” against international terrorism, to ideologically defeat the terrorist appeal by removing the sources of discontent that terrorist groups use to attract recruits.³⁷ This war of ideas is to be fought, *working closely with friends and allies*, to make terrorist acts illegitimate...so that terror will, over time, be viewed in the same light as piracy, slavery, or genocide—acts no respectable state nor citizen would support. The NSS also seeks to sustain moderate and modernizing regimes in the Muslim world and diminish the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism *by enlisting the international community*. This will be done through a public diplomacy program to promote learning and understanding that counters the rhetoric promulgated by sponsors of terrorism. The chapter makes explicit the understanding that the campaign against terror is best waged multilaterally. It states “... to defeat terrorism in today’s globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the US will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism.”³⁸ In short, despite the aggressive tone of this chapter, it again reflects a recognition that

³⁶ NSS, 6.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 7.

the war on terror is best waged multilaterally, using a range of tactics that span diplomacy, aid, freedom, and, if necessary raw power.

2.5 WORKING WITH OTHERS TO DEFUSE REGIONAL CONFLICTS

“Working with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” virtually reeks of global engagement and demonstrates the US’s stated interest in working with regional actors to defuse specific regional hotspots or issues of contention around the world. Regarding Latin America in particular, the NSS speaks in broad, general terms, and then hones in on one issue of great importance to the region and to the US. Given its centrality to this paper, it will quote the NSS extensively. Broadly speaking, the NSS states that

In the Western Hemisphere we have formed flexible coalitions with countries that share our priorities, particularly Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Chile, and Colombia. Together we will promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our integration enhances security, prosperity, opportunity, and hope. We will work with regional institutions, such as the Summit of the Americas process, the OAS, and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of the entire hemisphere.

Parts of Latin America confront regional conflict, especially arising from the violence of drug cartels and their accomplices. This conflict and unrestrained narcotics trafficking could imperil the health and security of the US. Therefore we have developed an active strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs, while—as important—we work to reduce the demand for drugs in our own country.

In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups of both the left and right by extending effective sovereignty over the entire national territory and provide basic security to the Colombian people.³⁹

Regarding Latin America, the chapter presents few specifics, reflecting the hemisphere’s overwhelming success in resolving interstate conflict in comparison to the rest of the world. It alludes to security, economic development, and broadened democracy, but spends most of its effort reaffirming the US commitment to fighting drug trafficking and helping Bogotá wage its campaign against narcoterrorists. On a positive front, the NSS is explicit in supporting work with a wide variety of regional multilateral processes and organizations.

³⁹ Ibid., 10.

2.6 PREVENT OUR ENEMIES FROM THREATENING US, OUR ALLIES, AND OUR FRIENDS WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The title of this chapter reflects a multilateralist strain, even as the chapter itself offers a blunt appraisal of the threat posed by WMDs in the hands of rogue states and terrorists and offers a robust military posture and policy for neutralizing that threat. Within that posture is a recognition that this policy is best advanced multilaterally. In detailing how best to stop rogue states and terrorist threats, the NSS states that the US “must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries ...”⁴⁰ Later, in a statement of the importance of strengthened nonproliferation policies, the NSS states that “We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance... We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts...”⁴¹ In the section articulating the preventive warfare option discussed above, this chapter of the NSS states that the US will “coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats...”⁴² How to summarize this discussion of the WMD threat posed by rogue states and terrorist operatives? It clearly takes the position that the US will do what it considers necessary to defend itself and the rest of the world against these threats. But it also demonstrates a commitment to consultations with allies and attempts to build coalitions to confront threats, and even commits US forces to safeguard other states as they confront these same threats. Thus, while not making the US beholden to global opinion, it clearly illustrates that the US will seek the counsel of others and their support as well.

2.7 IGNITE A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH FREE MARKETS AND FREE TRADE

At this point the NSS moves from emphasizing the military instruments of power to the economic instruments. In this chapter, as the title reflects, the document states that the US economic component of the NSS will focus on expanding trade and lowering trade barriers, reaffirming the US commitment to a liberalized global economic regime.⁴³ The language of the NSS leaves no doubt as to the US position on the path to economic success:

⁴⁰ Ibid., 14.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 16.

⁴³ This theme goes back at least to the 1999 *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, 21-24.

The lessons of history are clear: market economies, not command-and-control economies with the heavy hand of government, are the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. Policies that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions are relevant for all economies—industrialized countries, emerging markets, and the developing world.⁴⁴

This is best done, according to the strategy, by economic engagement to encourage pro-growth legal and regulatory policies; tax policies with positive inducements for work and investment; rule of law and intolerance for corruption; and free trade.⁴⁵ This chapter, in the view of the administration, is fully congruent with the President’s vision of global freedom, stating that freedom to buy and sell openly is “real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living.”⁴⁶ The multilateral strains to free trade are obvious, as free trade implicitly implies interactions across borders and either bi- or multilateral trading regimes, such as agreements within the World Trade Organization or free trade agreements such as NAFTA. Latin America figures prominently in the path toward free trade, citing the regional agreement to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas and committing the US toward completing a free trade agreement with Chile (which was completed in 2002 and ratified by the US Senate in 2003) and working toward an agreement with Central America, which is before Congress as of May 2005, though its future is uncertain.⁴⁷

This chapter is important from several perspectives. First, it reaffirms the longstanding US commitment to free trade and the use of both bilateral and multilateral agreements to expand free trade around the world. Secondly, and more importantly, it reflects the US understanding that security is a multifaceted concept that includes but is far more than just physical or military security. It demonstrates a US understanding that economic progress and trade, both at home and around the world, are important to providing for the development crucial to social progress all states seek to provide for their citizens.

2.8 EXPAND THE CIRCLE OF DEVELOPMENT BY OPENING SOCIETIES AND BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEMOCRACY

While the previous chapter argued the merits of free trade, this chapter offers substantial US economic and social assistance for states that commit themselves to development; in other words, if states commit themselves to social, political, and legal policies conducive to development, then the

⁴⁴ NSS, 17.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁴⁷ A Free Trade Agreement with Chile was signed in June 2002 and ratified by the US in July 2003. The Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was signed in May 2004 and joined by the Dominican Republic in August 2004.

US will be forthcoming with development assistance. Arguing that decades of massive assistance has been largely squandered, the NSS offers that “Where governments have implemented real policy changes, we will provide significant new levels of assistance...[with] a specific target: to double the size of the world’s poorest economies within a decade.”⁴⁸ This will be done by increasing core US development assistance by 50 percent via a newly established Millennium Challenge Account; by improving the effectiveness of the World Bank and other international financing institutions; insisting upon quantifiable results to measure and gauge progress; increasing the amount of developmental assistance in the form of grants; supporting the global fund for HIV/AIDS; increasing US funding for education programs; and continued aid to agricultural development.

In one sense this chapter is unilateralist, in that it requires country’s to reform before receiving US aid, but this seems legitimate; like any donor country, the US is within its right to insist that its assistance not be squandered, and no state is obligated to reform or accept US aid. But the document is also explicitly multilateralist and oriented toward cooperative action. For example, the US worked through the UN to ensure that the objectives of aid programs be rationalized, and the NSS offers US leadership to, *working with other developed states*, set ambitious growth goals for less developed states willing to make necessary structural changes. It also commits US leadership to improving operations within the World Bank, and the US has recently moved on that front by nominating a veteran academic and government official with close ties to the White House to run the World Bank. Demonstrating an understanding that widespread poverty contributes to instability and thus detracts from US security, the document states that “A world where ... half the human race lives on less than \$2 a day, is neither just nor stable. Including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of US international policy.”⁴⁹ Additionally, the commitment to UN HIV/AIDS programs and education programs suggests that the US is seeking to tackle the development deficit from a variety of fronts, acknowledging the many components that contribute to development—and thus security. In short, by again demonstrating the realization that global development favors the US security situation, the NSS demonstrates understanding that multiple factors affect US security, and that development fosters stability, trust in government, hope for a better future, all of which will positively influence US security.

⁴⁸ NSS, 21.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

2.9 DEVELOP AGENDAS FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION WITH THE OTHER MAIN CENTERS OF GLOBAL POWER

This section of the NSS is a global call for and evidence of the cooperation by the largest world powers in seeking a stable and secure world order, and the chapter is rife with commitments to multilateral action. This section of the strategy starts with a call for cooperation, stating

America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions—as broad as practicable—of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom ... Effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others’ interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility.⁵⁰

The chapter then goes on to address the commonality of interests and cooperation with world power centers. Reaching out to Europe, the strategy states “There is little of lasting consequence that the US can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”, and lauds the role NATO and the EU have played in expanding freedom, security, and open world trade.⁵¹ It also lauds increasingly cooperative ties with Russia on economic and security grounds, even as it acknowledges the remaining tensions in US-Russian relations, primarily the distrust many Russian elites maintain for the US. The strategy does not abandon its focus on freedom at this point, and chides Moscow’s uneven commitment to free trade and democracy as well as its spotty record in matters of proliferation. The NSS takes a similar tone with China, applauding the degree of change in its economic policies and cooperation in security matters on the Korean peninsula, terrorist threats, and other transnational issues. Yet the NSS challenges Beijing to make similar strides elsewhere in society. “Yet, a quarter century after beginning the process of shedding the worst features of the Communist legacy, China’s leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state,” and also criticizes its military buildup as an “outdated path” that will diminish its pursuit of progress.

This chapter, while multilateral throughout, is of limited application to Latin America since the region isn’t even mentioned, a weakness in the NSS. For while it lauds Australia for invoking the ANZUS treaty and sending forces to combat in Afghanistan, it does not note the similarly supportive Brazilian-led invocation of the Rio Treaty. And while the chapter notes combined US-allied efforts to promote stability and progress in specific regions of the world, it does not speak to the efforts to similarly stabilize and advance progress in the Western Hemisphere. In sum, the chapter again

⁵⁰ Ibid., 25.

⁵¹ Ibid.

demonstrates the US's commitment to wide-ranging multilateralism and a recognition of the varying components of security. But it falls short in applying those same principles in its own region.

2.10 SUMMARY: THE NSS IN REVIEW

How can the NSS be judged? Given that it is both a national security statement and a proclamation of the current administration's worldview, academic and policy analyst comments reflect a wide range of views. Charles Peña of the Cato Institute writes that the document is excessively focused on a global strategy to export democracy based on a false belief that the best way to achieve security is by recreating the US abroad, and is insufficiently devoted to actually providing for the security of the homeland—the mission that he believes is the crux of what an NSS should provide.⁵² Stanley Hoffman, who like this paper notes the idealistic bent of the NSS, is highly critical, calling the NSS a “breathtakingly unrealistic” strategy that presumes US legitimacy as a global arbitrator that authorizes its own use of force globally without constraint. In sum, Hoffman sees the NSS as proclaiming “...the emancipation of a colossus from international constraints (including from the restraints that the US itself enshrined in networks of international and regional organizations after World War II). In context, it amounts to a doctrine of global domination.”⁵³ Scholars at the Brookings Institution hold a more nuanced view and see positive elements to the strategy while also noting its weaknesses. Daalder, Lindsay, and Steinberg see the NSS's overall goals as sound, though they question its reliance on states (such as China and Russia) that do not necessarily share the values of freedom and liberty espoused in the NSS. They also worry that the strategy does not recognize the limits of preemption as a policy tool and relies excessively on ad-hoc coalitions at the expense of established international bodies.⁵⁴ On the other hand, a variety of commentators and scholars praise the strategy. Joshua Muravchik from the American Enterprise Institute sees a more practical, a more realistic, and a more idealistic strategy, one that draws from the

⁵² Charles V. Peña, “Bush's National Security Strategy is a Misnomer,” The Cato Institute *Policy Analysis No. 496*, 30 October 2003, 1 and 20.

⁵³ Stanley Hoffman, “The High and Mighty,” *the American Prospect* vol. 13 No. 24, January 13, 2003. See also J. Bryan Hehir's review, “The New National Security Strategy,” in *America: The National Catholic Weekly* Vol 188 No. 12, April 7, 2003.

⁵⁴ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, “The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation,” The Brookings Institution *Policy Brief #109*, October 2002. The analysis on preemption is greatly expanded in Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,” The Brookings Institution *Policy Brief #113*, December 2002. See <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/archive.htm>

strengths of the realist vision of the world and the idealist visions.⁵⁵ Keir and Robert Lieber of Notre Dame and Georgetown argue that the NSS embodies both continuity and change, and does so constructively. They write

Although the new Bush NSS is a bold and candid proclamation of American objectives, much of the document articulates what has been implicit in American strategy since the US became a great power a century ago. Moreover, what is new is generally reasonable given the nature and magnitude of the threats that have emerged in the post-September 11th international environment.⁵⁶

The eminent Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that the Bush worldview articulated in the NSS is less a radical creation of a new American foreign policy and is rather a reclamation of a number of US foreign policy themes that go back as far as President John Quincy Adams. Gaddis further categorizes the Bush NSS as “the most interesting statement of American national security strategy perhaps since [American diplomat George] Kennan's "[Sources of Soviet Conduct](#)"--his X article in 1947. The [Bush's] basic argument was simply that strategies that had won the Cold War for us--containment and deterrence--were not enough to protect us in this new situation.” Gaddis goes on to endorse the NSS as an articulation of a US grand strategy for the post-9/11 environment.⁵⁷

In sum, a healthy debate over the NSS continues; and in reality, a discussion of whether it is good or bad is irrelevant for our purposes. We can, however, make a number of definitive statements. First, it is a bold and honest statement of what the US intends to do and seeks to create to maintain its security. No national or international actor should consider the US's position as unclear. Second, the NSS clearly states its view of the path to security: the spread of freedom, development, and open markets around the world. Third, the strategy forcefully states that the US will not relinquish its prerogatives to maintain security to any multilateral institution or any other entity. If a threat is detected, it will be dealt with, one way or another, to include via preventive action. Fourth, the NSS clearly sees security as more than just military might and physical security; rather, it sees security as a concept that encompasses development, poverty reduction, freedom, and free markets. Finally, the NSS acknowledges that the ideal conditions for fostering US security is via multilateral action. Gaddis states that

It was also interesting for a reason that has been largely forgotten in the wake of Iraq events, and that was the extent to which it [the NSS] was multilateral in character. There was a surprising amount about multilateralism in this document. It was quite clear--the document made it very clear that, if multilateral action is not possible,

⁵⁵ Joshua Muravchik, “The Bush Manifesto,” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, December 1, 2002, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.14538.filter.all/pub_detail.asp

⁵⁶ Lieber and Lieber, 1.

⁵⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, “Surprise, Security, and the American Experience,” comments before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, New York, May 14, 2004.

the United States will proceed unilaterally. And that is what has gotten most of the attention. But the intent was to try to build an international consensus in support of going after both terrorists and tyrants, and to do this on a multilateral basis.⁵⁸

Lieber and Lieber similarly write

Some have interpreted the new Bush doctrine as one of unabashed unilateralism befitting a Texas Lone Ranger, or as simply the rhetorical velvet glove covering the mailed fist of brute American power. These views are wrong. The Bush NSS is clear about the benefits and necessity of multilateral cooperation ... What is different is that the Bush administration appears to reject the single-minded pursuit of multilateralism for its own sake...⁵⁹

Thus far this paper has articulated the important themes of the NSS, especially as they relate to the concerns of the hemisphere, and it has strongly supported the notion that, contrary to many beliefs, the US seeks to act multilaterally. Having laid out the US view of security, this paper now turns to the hemispheric perspective.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Lieber and Lieber, 4.

CHAPTER 3 – HEMISPHERIC PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY

The Organization of American States (OAS) has been an active international body for over 50 years and has over that time released a large body of statements covering a wide range of activities, to include matters of security. Since September 11, 2001, the tone of its security-related statements has taken on a new direction. Prior to the end of the Cold War, security in the region was concerned in large part with preventing the spread of communism in the region; after the fall of the Berlin Wall issues of security languished somewhat. In the past four years security has regained a prominent place on the hemispheric agenda and has reflected a different tone than in years past. After first examining the foundational document in the region's security posture, this paper will examine the region's most recent security statements.

3.1 THE RIO TREATY

Depending upon one's perspective, the Rio Treaty can be seen as a military pact binding the region together, or, predictably, as an instrument of US regional domination.⁶⁰ The Rio Treaty was seen as groundbreaking and was even used as a model for the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty that established NATO. And a close reading of the Treaty reveals much agreement—and disagreement—with the today's NSS.

Some aspects of the treaty are clearly congruent with the NSS. First and foremost among the agreements is the underlying, unifying theme of the Rio Treaty—that an attack on one American state is an attack on all that requires action by all High Contracting Parties of the agreement. This is noted most clearly in Article 3, which reads

The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the UN.⁶¹

Clearly, the intent of this Article is the notion of collective security, though a close read indicates that the Article only technically requires collective action in the event of an attack by another state.

Written in the immediate aftermath of World War II and in light of the looming Cold War with the

⁶⁰ See Deborah L. Norden, "The Transformation of Argentine Security," in Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold-Biss, eds., *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition*, (Miami: The North-South Center Press, 1996), 245. Norden cites Alain Rouquié's classic study, *The Military and State in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 131.

⁶¹ Article 3, para 1, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947, entered into force December 3, 1948.

Soviet Union, the treaty came into force in an international era in which states held near-total dominion; the notion of international terrorism, distinct from overt state support as seen today, was likely not even considered. And indeed, since the treaty was invoked in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, it appears clear that the rest of the region sees the treaty as encompassing non-state actors as well. This section of the Rio Treaty is clearly congruent with the words of the US NSS, since the NSS strongly supports multilateral cooperation in addressing threats, be they from terrorists or rogue states either supporting terrorism or threatening others with WMDs. But other sections of the Rio Treaty also resonate within the construct, goals, and policy prescriptions of the NSS. The Rio Treaty strongly supports a united Inter-American system, and is also based upon the support of a democratic state construct, the importance of justice, and the protection of human rights and freedoms, with the ultimate goal being peace through cooperative security.⁶² All of this is fully consistent with the NSS's commitment to freedom and multilateral actions to assure security in its many components.

Other aspects of the Rio Treaty diverge from the NSS. A significant divergence relates to what happens *after* a state or the Inter-American states respond to an attack or threat of imminent attack. Article 3, paragraph 4 states that “Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the UN has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” In other words, under the Rio Treaty self-defense is acceptable *only until the Security Council acts*, giving self-defense an inherently limited mandate. While the NSS is not inherently opposed to the referral of threats, either prior to or following them being attacked, the NSS is also forthright in that the US, while preferring multilateral action, is not beholden to the restrictions or failures of action of any other state or international body. Additionally, recall that Article 3 is predicated upon the self-defense actions being taken in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In an earlier discussion, this paper argued that the NSS, at the least, articulates an expanded notion of preemption; and more likely advocates the less accepted principle of preventive war, which is not addressed in the UN Charter nor is a generally accepted international norm. That being the case, it is unlikely that the Rio Treaty would accommodate preventive military action, particularly against a state. The Inter-American system, which follows closely the international norms of the United Nations, is unlikely to support preventive warfare unless recognized by the UN, which has clearly not happened to this point.

⁶² See, in particular the preamble to the Treaty, paras 1, 5, 6, and 7.

In sum, there is much in the Rio Treaty that is congruent with the NSS: a commitment to peace, democracy, human rights, and multilateral action while advancing a notion of collective security. In that respect, the two documents are in very close agreement. The divergence comes primarily in one aspect of how the NSS advocates achieving these goals. The Rio Treaty states that its position on collective security and self-protection in the event of an armed attack (or threat of one) flows from Article 51 of the UN Charter; and until the UN revises its thinking toward preventive warfare, the Rio Treaty (and by extension Latin America in general) is not likely to officially accept preventive warfare.

3.2 RESOLUTION STRENGTHENING HEMISPHERIC COOPERATION TO PREVENT, COMBAT, AND ELIMINATE TERRORISM

This resolution, adopted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (on September 21, 2001), contains little new expansion of the understanding of security in the region, but it is, in large part, congruent with the notions of security as articulated in the NSS. It reaffirms that the peoples and governments of the Americas absolutely reject terrorist acts and activities and recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charters of the OAS and the UN.⁶³ Moreover, the resolution demonstrates that the collective states of the hemisphere understood the wide-ranging impact terrorist attacks have that cross state lines, writing

Recognizing further that terrorist attacks, and the climate of insecurity they generate, have highly damaging effects on international trade, the tourism industry, and investment capital flows, and therefore also represent a threat to the economic and financial stability, progress, and freedom from social unrest in the countries of our hemisphere.⁶⁴

This statement, while undeniably true, reflects a primarily economic understanding of the effects of terrorism. The NSS, on the other hand, articulates a broader impact of terrorism—one that sees terrorism as a threat to both the economic and social bases of a society.

The Resolution's calls to action are generally congruent with the US NSS. Specifically, Resolution 3 acknowledges the actions states can take to deny terrorists support and sanctuary, stating that "[states should] deny terrorist groups the ability to operate within their territories, noting that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these

⁶³ Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 23rd Meeting of Consultation, "Resolution Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism," (RC.23/RES.1/01) September 21, 2001, p. 2.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

acts are equally complicit in these acts.”⁶⁵ This statement is fully congruent with the NSS’s statement that “We [the US] make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”⁶⁶

One aspect of the resolution, while congruent with the NSS, is not as expansive in its understanding of the terrorist threat. Resolution 4 asks all member states to “strengthen cooperation, at the regional and international levels, to pursue, capture, prosecute, and punish and, as appropriate, to expedite the extradition of the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist acts...” The NSS would fully concur with this notion, as it calls on states to cooperate regionally and internationally to counter terrorism. However, the Resolution projects an explicitly law enforcement perspective on terrorism; that is, it reflects a belief in terrorism as criminal acts, to be dealt with through legal systems and law enforcement mechanisms. This is in keeping with the Resolution’s articulation of terrorism as a threat primarily to the economic bases of a state, as well as a general belief in the region (other than in Colombia) that does not view terrorism as serious a threat as it is seen in Washington. The NSS, however, reflecting its more all-encompassing perspective of terrorism as threatening both social and economic foundations of a society, sees terrorism as requiring more than just a law enforcement perspective. It sees the need to counter, preempt, or prevent terrorist action through military action. In that sense, the resolution does not necessarily run counter to the NSS, but it does reflect a different perspective on the threat posed by terrorism, and thus the types of actions needed to prevent it.

In sum, the Resolution, coming in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, focuses on the terrorist aspect of security. Its statements on strengthening hemispheric cooperation against terrorism are not specifically divergent from the US NSS. Its proposed responses, however, reflect a more narrow perspective of the threat posed by terrorism, and thus the methods needed to counter it.

3.3 DECLARATION OF QUEBEC CITY, 3rd SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

This Declaration grew out of a three year planning process that included a wide range of member states, international and financial organizations, and civil society organizations.⁶⁷ As such, the genesis and most of the constructive stages of the Declaration precede 9/11. The Declaration thus should be seen as the culmination of a long and involved course and not a snap reflection of transient

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ NSS, 5.

⁶⁷ Summit of the Americas website, <http://www.summit-americas.org/eng-2002/quebeccity-summit.htm>

or fleeting sentiments. As such, it is not focused on terrorism or even rogue states with WMDs. Rather, the Declaration reflects the requirements states have to take care of common hemispheric issues and challenges that were identified as a result of this three-year process. These included improved access to education, poverty alleviation, strengthening human rights and democracy and economic integration, and the manner in which these aspects contribute to the security of citizens from a broader perspective. And given this, the Declaration of Quebec City and the US NSS reflect very similar perspectives toward the broader aspects of security. Indeed, a comparison of the Quebec City Declaration and the NSS offers the clearest example possible that the stated security strategy of the US is congruent with the security strategies of the Western Hemisphere. The Declaration starts with its action plan, which is to “strengthen representative democracy, promote good governance, and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms...to create greater prosperity and expand economic opportunities while fostering social justice and the realization of human potential.”⁶⁸ Each of these will be examined in turn to illustrate the similarities in the US and regional views.

The Declaration states unequivocally that “the values and practices of democracy are fundamental to the advancement of all our objectives.” Additionally, the document restates the principle that democracy is a prerequisite to participation in hemispheric processes, stating that “rule of law and strict respect for the democratic system...are an essential condition of our presence at this and future Summits. Consequentially, any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order...constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to participation...” To promote good governance, the Declaration states that corruption undermines core democratic values, and advocates increased transparency throughout government. Protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen not just as a good thing to do, but as a commitment based on shared principles and convictions. The Declaration later discusses multidimensional threats, such as drug and firearms trafficking and the threats of organized crime that undermine core democratic values and, certainly, the human rights of the citizenry.

The US NSS is fully congruent with the principles and values expressed in these portions of the Quebec City Declaration. The NSS states that, in pursuit of the US’s goals, it “must defend liberty and justice because these are right and true for all people everywhere.” Later, the NSS states that core belief more explicitly, stating “America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands for human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of

⁶⁸ “Declaration of Quebec City,” Third Summit of the Americas, April 20-22, 2001.

worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.”⁶⁹ The NSS later speaks to the transnational threat posed by illicit drug trafficking, stating that “In Colombia, we recognize the link between terrorist and extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that help finance the operations of such groups. We are working to help Colombia defend its democratic institutions and defeat illegal armed groups...”⁷⁰ Curiously, the NSS is silent on the threats posed by illicit firearms trafficking and organized crime. But that silence does not mean that the NSS does not reflect similar world views; it only reflects that the US NSS could not or did not address all threats; indeed, other US statements have demonstrated full US agreement with these sentiments from the Quebec City Declaration. For example, Ambassador Noriega, speaking toward a related theme, recently stated that

While the hemisphere is making progress in the development of effective democratic institutions and open economies, this progress is threatened by the inability of governments to control crime and demonstrate to all citizens the value of a rule of law. Indeed, the lack of personal security is now recognized in many countries as a primary threat to the stability of the democratically elected government.⁷¹

The Declaration and the NSS are likewise fully congruent in their views toward economics and how it relates to state security, human security, and social justice. The Declaration states that “Democracy and economic and social development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing as fundamental conditions to combat poverty and inequality.” It also states that

Free and open economies, market access, sustained flows of investment, capital formation, financial stability, appropriate public policies, access to technology and human resources development and training are key to reducing poverty and inequalities, raising living standards and promoting sustainable development. We will work with all sectors of civil society and international organizations to ensure that economic activities contribute to the sustainable development of our societies.⁷²

As amply demonstrated in the analysis of the NSS above, this passage on economic activity, its relationship with free trade, the development of human capital, and their cumulative role in lifting people out of poverty is closely mirrored in the NSS. The NSS agrees with the relationship between democracy, and economic and social development, stating that “Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption and it reinforces the habits of liberty.”⁷³

⁶⁹ NSS, 3.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 10.

⁷¹ Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, March 2, 2004.

⁷² Declaration of Quebec City.

⁷³ NSS, 17.

In sum, the Declaration of Quebec City and the US NSS are statements nearly cut from the same cloth. Each recognizes the value and importance of democracy and freedom, and the role free trade and free markets play in reaching those goals and fostering social justice. While the Declaration does not speak to the more traditional aspects of security, such as terrorism and WMDs, it is fully consistent with the NSS's statements about the longer-term aspects of security and the betterment of human lives in the fulfillment of human dignity.

3.4 DECLARATION OF BRIDGETOWN: THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

Adopted by the hemisphere's ministers of foreign affairs in June 2002, this Declaration is a short but important statement by the hemisphere on the nature of security threats in the region. While less than two pages in length, this is the Western Hemisphere's first formal statement articulating what all have recognized for years: that security is a multifaceted state that requires attention to a wide range of threats. The Declaration states "...recognizing that security threats...are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and that the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects." The Declaration goes on to recognize that many of these threats challenge the hemisphere's security, are transnational in character, and may require hemispheric cooperation. Moreover, many of these threats are cross-cutting problems that require multi-faceted responses. The Declaration closes by agreeing that member states should deepen cooperation and coordination in order to address the new multidimensional threats to member states and the region.⁷⁴ The Declaration does not lay out what the threats and challenges are; rather, it serves as an opening statement of the region's new commitment to a broader understanding of the requirements of security. Presumably, future Declarations and other hemispheric statements will articulate these multidimensional threats. The importance of this opening statement cannot yet be ascertained, as it is less than two years old; but it does herald a new direction in the regional perspective on security as being more than just physical security from attack by state or nonstate aggressors.

The Bush NSS, as explained above, clearly recognizes that security encompasses more than just an aggressive, forward-deployed armed force providing physical security. The NSS addresses

⁷⁴ Declaration of Bridgetown: The Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security," (AG/Dec. 27 (XXXII-O/02)), June 4, 2002.

the need to foster new and bolster existing allies, expand freedom around the globe, and improve economic performance and free trade, particularly in the less developed world. But is also encompasses the other themes outlined in the Bridgetown Declaration. On social aspects of security, the NSS states that “A world [in which] half of the human race lives on less than \$2 a day, is neither just nor stable...This administration’s goal is to help unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations.”⁷⁵ Moreover, the NSS commits the US to an increase of 50 percent in its core development assistance to states that reform their national development policies, via a new Millennium Challenge Account. Additionally, the US advocates reforming the World Bank and other international financial institutions to make them more effective at alleviating poverty. On health aspects of security, the NSS touts the US’s commitment to the UN’s HIV/AIDS fund. Only in the Declaration’s allusion to environmental aspects of security is the NSS silent. In sum, the US NSS is quite congruent with the aspirations and new mindset previewed in the Declaration of Bridgetown.

3.5 THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST TERRORISM

The signing of this Convention was the culmination of a hemispheric project toward a regional convention that began with the Commitment of Mar del Plata in 1998, languished without progress for a number of years, and then regained new momentum in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Convention was signed on June 3, 2002 by 30 of the 34 member states of the OAS; by February 2005 all 34 members had signed the convention.

The Convention breaks new ground within the region in calling for multilateral cooperation to counter terrorist actions in the region, and breaks important ground in several respects as well. However, reflecting and building upon a perspective seen in earlier resolutions, the Convention sees terrorism exclusively as a law enforcement issue. As such, much, but far from all, of the Convention is congruent with the US NSS.

The Convention addresses several important themes in the regional counter-terrorist campaign. First, it mandates that states enact appropriate domestic legislation to prohibit and punish a range of terrorist-related or terrorist enabling actions, primarily in the financial realm. The Convention also requires that all states ensure terror cannot be financed via its domestic financial institutions, to include the movement of assets across borders, and mandates that states establish and maintain financial intelligence units to that end. The Convention also seeks to ensure states have the

⁷⁵ NSS, 21.

laws necessary to seize or confiscate assets “constituting the proceeds of, used to facilitate, or used or intended to finance the commissions of any of the [terrorist] offenses...”⁷⁶ The Convention also instructs states to cooperate on border issues, to include exchanging information to improve border and customs control measures, and, within certain cases and conditions, transport persons to other states to facilitate counter-terrorist investigations.

Most importantly, the Convention denies terrorists a number of legal safe-havens previously available. First, the Convention explicitly prevents states from considering terrorist actions as political offenses or offenses inspired by political motives.⁷⁷ Likewise, persons charged with terrorist offenses will not be given refugee status by Convention signatories, nor can they be given asylum.⁷⁸ In short, the Convention makes the case that terrorist acts committed within democratic states are criminal actions and thus their perpetrators are prevented from using legal and political avenues previously used by terrorist groups both within and outside the Western Hemisphere. In this light, the Convention breaks important new ground in combating terrorism.

All of the above actions are congruent with either the specific wording or the intent of the NSS. As demonstrated in the earlier analysis of the strategy, the NSS views bi- and multilateral cooperation as essential elements in combating terrorism. Early in the NSS, it states that the US will continue to work with its allies to disrupt the financing of terrorism, and later states that the US will disrupt or destroy terrorist organizations by “denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities.” (NSS, 6) The Convention clearly requires states of the region to close whatever loopholes that may exist in their domestic law to close in around terrorist organizations. And the Conventions actions preventing terrorists from claiming asylum or political status clearly falls within the NSS’s desire to prevent terrorism from exploiting the freedoms that exist in democratic states to perpetuate their actions. In short, there is much agreement between the Convention and the NSS.

But there are discontinuities, and they again, as in the September 21, 2001 resolution, relate to the nature of the threat. This Convention clearly and distinctly reflects a regional view that terrorism is a law enforcement problem, not a defense and security challenge. Article 8 explicitly requires states to work together to “enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the

⁷⁶ Article 4, “Measures to prevent, combat, and eradicate the financing of terrorism,” and Article 5, “Seizure and confiscation of funds or other assets,” *Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism*, June 3, 2002. In this regard, the consistent use of the phrase “each state shall” is, from the perspective of the US NSS, a welcome sign.

⁷⁷ Article 11, “Inapplicability of political offense exception,” *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Article 12, “Denial of refugee status,” and Article 13, “Denial of asylum,” *Ibid.*

offenses...”⁷⁹, and Article 9 requires states to provide each other mutual legal assistance “with respect to the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of the offenses...”⁸⁰ Nowhere in the Convention is military force, intraregional military cooperation, or intelligence cooperation mentioned.

The US NSS, as already described, sees terrorism as a threat sufficient to require more than just a law enforcement perspective. Indeed, terrorism had been viewed primarily as a law enforcement and a legal issue until the attacks of 9/11.⁸¹ In the aftermath of the US’s experience, the armed forces and other aspects of its security apparatus began to play a far larger role in combating terrorism. As such, from a perspective of the NSS, a purely law enforcement perspective would be seen as excessively self-limiting and preventive of full cooperation in addressing the terrorist threat in the region.

In sum, most of what is in the Convention is congruent with the NSS. The only true discontinuity would be that, from the NSS’s perspective, the scope of the Convention is excessively self-limiting. But that does not in any sense put the Bush NSS at odds with or in conflict with the region’s perspective toward security and the threat posed by terrorism.

3.6 DECLARATION ON SECURITY IN THE AMERICAS, ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON SECURITY⁸²

This Declaration is the culmination of a project laid out in the Declaration of Quebec City that called on the OAS and its Committee on Hemispheric Security to lay out a new regional perspective toward security. And indeed, some have touted it as the birth of a new perspective toward security in the region, finally putting an end to the system of hemispheric security created for the Cold War era. Some in the press lauded the Conference as “... write[ing] the obituary for the system of hemispheric security that emerged in the Cold War era.”⁸³ And while perhaps this quote is hyperbolic, it is no exaggeration to say that this Declaration makes a clear statement that thinking about security in the hemisphere is far different than in the years of the Cold War.

⁷⁹ Article 8, “Cooperation among law enforcement authorities,” Ibid.

⁸⁰ Article 9, “Mutual legal assistance,” Ibid.

⁸¹ See, for example, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2004) p. 73.

⁸² Organization of American States, Special Conference on Security, Mexico City, Mexico, (OEA/Ser. K/XXXVIII, CES/DEC.1/03) October 28, 2003.

⁸³ See, for instance, “Defence-Americas: Coup de Grace for Outdated Conception of Security, *Inter Press Service*, October 22, 2003.

The Declaration builds on previous Declarations on security in the region. The Heads of State Declaration of Quebec City in April 2001 was the first official statement of the multidimensional character of security in the region, while the Bridgetown Declaration was the first formal, official statement that this multidimensional perspective was becoming the accepted wisdom in the inter-American system. Neither Declaration, however, laid out exactly what multidimensionality consisted of, a shortfall that was rectified in the Mexico City Declaration.

The Declaration recognizes that each state is affected in different ways by traditional and new threats, concerns, and challenges. These include:

- Terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them;
- Extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect stability and democracy. Extreme poverty erodes social cohesion and undermines the security of states;
- Natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and environmental degradation;
- Trafficking in persons;
- Attacks to cyber security;
- The potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and
- The possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.⁸⁴

More than just an articulation of what constitutes “multidimensional” threats, the document is a statement that, while each state has a sovereign right to define its national security interests and attend to threats as it sees fit, the Declaration also reaffirms the shared values inherent in the hemisphere and that common approaches to security are encouraged within the region. These include:

- A sovereign right to establish one’s own national security priorities and actions for addressing threats;
- The belief that representative democracy is indispensable for stability, peace, and development in the region;
- Respect for human dignity, rights, fundamental freedoms, and good governance are essential;
- A number of social issues affect security, to include the need for social and economic development, social inclusion, and education and a the fight against poverty, disease, and hunger;
- The belief that security threats are of a diverse nature and multidimensional in scope the require an expansion of the traditional concepts and approaches to security;
- The commitment that new threats are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted responses that cross national organizations and also national governments, and indeed

⁸⁴ Declaration of Mexico City, p. 4.

frequently require partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society.⁸⁵

Moreover, the Declaration recognizes that not all security-related challenges lend themselves to resolution through formal and established multilateral organizations such as the OAS itself. Thus, the Declaration states that bilateral and subregional agreements are essential to strengthening security in the hemisphere. Even so, the documents asserts that solidarity among the hemispheric states, through economic, technical, political, legal, environmental, social, and security and defense cooperation contributes to the stability and security of the states and the hemisphere as a whole.⁸⁶

Importantly, the Declaration demonstrates a hemispheric recognition of the interdependence of the hemisphere with the rest of the world. It states that threats in distant lands affect the security and stability of the region, while the hemisphere's security and stability impact the rest of the world community as well.

While there is much more in this Declaration, it is quite congruent with the ideas and policies articulated in the US NSS. For example, the social aspects of the document, such as the relationship between poverty and underdevelopment to security that makes up the bulk of the nontraditional aspects to multidimensional security are completely in step with the NSS. For example, the Declaration states that “extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect stability and democracy. Extreme poverty erodes social cohesion and undermines the security of states.”⁸⁷ The NSS, on the other hand, states that “Including all the world's poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of US international policy.”⁸⁸ The NSS goes on to pledge a significant increase in US development assistance, stating that “Sustained growth and poverty reduction is impossible without the right national policies. Where governments have implemented real policy changes we will provide significant new levels of assistance” and later sets a goal of doubling the size of the world's poorest economies within a decade.⁸⁹

Moreover, the Declaration is fully supportive of the NSS's posture regarding weapons of mass destruction, recommitting the hemisphere to being both a nuclear weapons-free zone and

⁸⁵ Ibid., 3.4.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁸⁸ NSS, 21.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

declaring its objective to making the Americas a region free of biological and chemical weapons as well.

Finally, and most significantly, the Declaration is a clear statement of the region's belief in the multidimensional character of security, with traditional and nontraditional threats influencing security, as well as a host of social conditions. The NSS is in step with the region on this belief. In his introductory letter to the NSS, President Bush wrote that "Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." Likewise, the NSS itself devotes a whole chapter to the importance of championing human dignity, such as the rule of law, limits on the absolute power of the state, free speech and worship, equal justice, respect for women, education, religious and ethnic tolerance, and respect for private property.⁹⁰ Moreover, the NSS commits itself to the intolerance of corruption, a search for free trade, a 50 percent increase in US core development assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account program, the advancement of public health and HIV/AIDS programs. All of these themes are addressed either explicitly or implicitly in the Mexico City Declaration. Most importantly for a region seeking cooperation on security affairs, both documents commit to a multilateral approach to security issues.

The Documents are not in full agreement, though. Like other OAS Declarations analyzed earlier, the Mexico City Declaration includes passionate statements addressing the complex web of trafficking, be it in weapons, drugs, or persons, and their relationships to organized crime that threaten security and social cohesion. The NSS, while not contrary to the Declaration on these matters, does not address them. Likewise, the Declaration addresses the threat posed by cyberattacks, a matter on which the NSS is curiously silent. More seriously, the Mexico City Declaration (again) highlighted two security divergences between the US and the region. First, the Declaration advocated the establishment of the Americas as an anti-personnel landmine free zone, and also called for the recognition of the threat posed by global climate change. The US inserted footnotes on both accounts to highlight its dissent on this issue. However, this is far from reflecting a hemispheric breach on security matters. When these disputes were questioned, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega stated, "I think, as a matter of fact, that singling out two paragraphs from a 52-paragraph declaration and suggesting that somehow we're not part of the

⁹⁰ Ibid., 3.

consensus is what sends the wrong signal.”⁹¹ In sum the US NSS and the Mexico City Declaration are congruent on the vast majority of the security-related themes facing the hemisphere.

⁹¹ Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Amb. Roger Noriega, Scen setter for OAS Special Conference on Security, 27-28 October, 2003, Mexico City, Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC, October 24, 2003.

CHAPTER 4 – SO ... WHY IS THERE DISCORD WITHIN THE HEMISPHERE?

By analyzing the stated security strategies of the United States and the states of the western hemisphere, this paper has demonstrated conclusively that the overarching values and interests of the Americas as they relate to security concerns are overwhelmingly congruent. Indeed, the US's stated policy objectives for the hemisphere are also overwhelmingly congruent with the OAS's hemispheric vision. US policy in the region seeks to:

- Strengthen democratic institutions, especially by focusing attention on the countries most at risk;
- Promote a prosperous hemisphere, primarily through the negotiation of trade agreements;
- Investing in people through the Millennium Challenge Accounts that, among other things, invests in countries that have adopted structural reforms to increase transparency and reduce corruption;
- Bolsters security by addressing the myriad of traditional and transnational challenges that threaten the region.⁹²

Meanwhile, the OAS's "Shared Vision for the Americas works toward:

- Defend democracy through the recently adopted Inter-American Democratic Charter;
- Protect human rights through the OAS human rights system;
- Strengthen security through the workings of CICTE, the peaceful resolution of border disputes, and strengthened border controls. The OAS also works to enhance security through its de-mining operations;
- Fostering free trade via work on the Free Trade Area of the Americas;
- Combat illegal drugs via the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD);
- Fight corruption through the 1996 Inter-American Convention against Corruption.⁹³

Yet the reality of day-to-day intraregional security relations seems to reflect a very different reality. For example, at the Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994, every state in the region agreed to seek passage of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and this goal has been advocated consistently at the Ministerial level ever since. Yet Brazil, as the lead negotiator for the region, has slowed progress on the FTAA despite a general consensus that it would benefit tremendously under a hemispheric FTAA.⁹⁴ From a political perspective, Brazil has just hosted a first-ever Summit of South American-Arab Countries to promote economic and political ties between the two regions.

⁹² Dan Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, from a presentation to the Inter-American Defense College, April 11, 2005.

⁹³ Organization of American States, "A Shared Vision for the Americas," published by the OAS (undated).

⁹⁴ Jerry Haar, "Brazil Could Win Big from the FTAA," posted on the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, <http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spaccu2.htm>

The US was barred from even sending an observer.⁹⁵ These moves are widely seen as an attempt by Brasilia (and supported by others in the region) to counter US dominance. These are but two examples of many that could be cited from recent years.

According to scholars, such actions are taken to counter perceived or real instances of US unilateralism in the region.⁹⁶ They may also represent continuing resentment for what is viewed as interventionist policies in the region. As Diamond and Linz write,

After almost two centuries of conflict, tensions, intervention, and even in some cases invasion and occupation have left Latin Americans extremely wary of their giant neighbor to the north and inclined to see behind every political and economic debacle in their countries the hand of “Yankee imperialism. This suspicion is as exaggerated as it may be unavoidable. With the exception of direct, military interventions...the US has typically been able to do no more than influence events.”⁹⁷

Yet this discord also represents a classic case of balancing in international relations, whereby states seek to offset the potential threat posed by more powerful states.⁹⁸ Each state, seeing the US as the regional hegemon and global power in a unipolar world, offset by no other international or regional actor, seeks to protect itself.⁹⁹ This is not bad—it’s just the reality of how states operate in an anarchic international system, and it explains the behavior of regional actions that otherwise may seem irrational.¹⁰⁰ Keohane notes the overwhelming power asymmetry between the US and the rest of the region, then also points out that the relative lack of US interest in Latin America to make an interesting observation: “...lots of space exists for Latin American countries to maneuver in their relations with the US and other partners because either the US does not care or its policies are determined by domestic politics. In other words, in the structural sense the US has the potential to

⁹⁵ Alan Clendenning, “South American, Arab leaders unite,” *The Washington Examiner*, May 11, 2005, 15. See also the *Washington Post Express*, May 10, 2005.

⁹⁶ See for just one example, Gelson Fonseca, Jr., “The United States and Latin America: Multilateralism and International Legitimacy,” in David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong, eds., *Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Perspectives* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 321-346.

⁹⁷ Larry Diamond and Juan J. Linz, “Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America,” in Diamond, Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 49.

⁹⁸ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 3rd Edition (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 70-78. For new thinking on the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning, see Chon Ja Ian, “Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Going Beyond the Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy,” Working Paper No. 54, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, November 2003 at <http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/WorkingPapers/WP54.pdf>.

⁹⁹ Keohane, reflecting a theme common among international relations scholars, writes that “The period from 1989 to the present is one marked by the greatest degree of single-power hegemony in the world system since at least the 1860s and probably before. I am not sure there has ever been a country as powerful as the United States since the Westphalia Congress of 1648 when the nation-state-based world system was created.” Keohane, in Tulchin and Espach, eds., 210.

¹⁰⁰ At a minimum, the states of the Southern Cone use a balancing strategy as a “central facet” of their strategic relations with the US. Tulchin and Espach, 21.

dominate Latin America, but it does not because it does not have a sustained interest in doing so.”¹⁰¹ In other words, the US is not a constant, always-present hegemon, and typically gives the states of the region plenty of space in which to act on their own accord. The US only exerts its overt power infrequently, when conditions rise above its tolerance threshold; and at that point, US actions may seem overbearing when compared to the previous inattention.

Finally, such discord despite such apparent reasons for consensus on security issues can reflect real differences over specific actions taken to ensure security or other state interests. Most Latin American states, for example, opposed the US invasion of Iraq and similarly have disagreements with Washington over a wide range of policy issues. In short, while the states of the Americas are in widespread agreement on broad-based security goals and objectives, there remain tensions over the specific routes taken to achieve such objectives.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 209.

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION

This paper seeks to demonstrate that the security objectives of the states of the western hemisphere are broadly congruent; in reality, the analysis supports the paper's thesis even more than anticipated. First, the paper demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, the US National Security Strategy is far more multilateral than generally believed. Thus, having demonstrated that the US does seek to work with its allies and partners around the world, the paper focuses on how close the security interests of the US, as expressed in the NSS, are to those of the rest of the western hemisphere, as represented by a broad range of hemispheric statements on security issues. The comparison is rather clear: at least in the published resolutions and statements made by various senior officials representing the 34 countries of the Americas, the security interests of the region are remarkably congruent.

This is not, of course, to say entirely congruent. Most of the states of the hemisphere do not see the threat of terrorism nearly as great as it is seen in Washington.¹⁰² Likewise, the US's appreciation of the threat posed by organized crime, gangs, and traffickers in weapons and persons is not as keen as it is in the rest of the hemisphere. Still, nothing written in the hemispheric security documents about these transnational threats is contradictory to the positions taken in the NSS.

Perhaps only two true divergences exist within the hemisphere. The first is reflected in the Mexico City Declaration in the aftermath of the Special Conference on Security, in which the US objected to the threat posed by global climate change, a divergence that began with the US refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol. On a related matter, the region and the US tend to view natural disasters differently; while the US tends to view them as local emergencies, the rest of the hemisphere, probably given the greater limitations on resources and ability to respond, views them as security threats.¹⁰³ Secondly, and probably more importantly, is the region's staunch support of sovereignty that, as reflected in the analysis of the Rio Treaty, would prevent Latin American states from supporting preventive military actions by the US to prevent the formation of a terrorist threat or the formation of a WMD threat from a rogue state. This could become a serious divergence splitting the US from its hemispheric partners. But that split was avoided during the recent invasion of Iraq, and

¹⁰² While the region lauds the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and the OAS Convention Against Terrorism, CICTE only has six people on its staff, five of which are professional and full-time: two US personnel and one each from Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. El Salvador had previously provided someone to work on CICTE, but no longer. Moreover, CICTE's budget of \$2.2 million dollars comes exclusively from voluntary contributions; virtually nothing is provided directly from the OAS general fund. Information from Kevin Neumayer, program director, CICTE, presentation to the Inter-American Defense College, March 29, 2005.

¹⁰³ My thanks to Jay Cope, Center for Hemispheric and Defense Studies, for this observation.

current US reliance on diplomacy in dealing with WMD programs in Iran and North Korea also bode well for preventing any hemispheric rupture over preventive military action.

In sum, on the core security threats existing in the early 21st century, the hemisphere's values and interests are congruent, even if those congruencies do not always manifest themselves in the conduct of day-to-day international relations. But if states can move beyond the conduct of normal procedures and disputes over specific policies, they should realize that there is much to bind us together as the states of the Americas.

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