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**CANADIAN FORCES ENGAGEMENT  
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

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# CANADIAN FORCES ENGAGEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

## INTRODUCTION

Importance of the Study. Canada is a rich, liberal, western democracy, dependent upon trade for its economic health, protected from invasion by geography and a hegemonic neighbour, and lacking imperial ambitions of its own. Geographically, Canada is in the Western Hemisphere; historically and culturally, Canada has focused on relations with the U.S. primarily and Western Europe secondarily. Canada has the potential to play an important role in the inter-American system; however, Latin America and the Caribbean have not been high priorities for most Canadians, including the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

The Problem. The Canadian Forces has limited engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean now and it is unclear if, why and how the Canadian Forces should expand that engagement. Canadian values and the potential benefits that Canada could bring to the region would seem to support greater engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean, but values alone do not guarantee sustained political interest or investment in programs. Canada has enduring interests worldwide and the Canadian Forces must prioritise its efforts and resources. Should Canada play a major role in the inter-American system? What are Canada's national interests in Latin America and the Caribbean? What are the corresponding objectives for the Canadian Forces and how should they be achieved?

Hypothesis. Despite the Prime Minister of Canada's announcement on 17 July 2007, that reviving and expanding Canadian engagement in the Americas is a major foreign policy goal of Canada's Government, the Canadian Forces should maintain its current limited level of engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean; given Canada's interests, other regions demand greater priority.

Derived Hypotheses. To recommend an appropriate level of Canadian Forces engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is necessary to:

- a. define national interests and values, and determine their effect upon Canada's foreign policy;
- b. analyze Canada's worldwide interests and engagement, to understand the context in which to evaluate the relative priority of Canada's engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean;
- c. review Canadian interests, policy and objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean, and quantify the interdependence of Canada and both Latin America and the Caribbean;
- d. evaluate current Canadian Forces engagement in the region against Canada's national interests and foreign policy objectives; and
- e. suggest amendments to Canadian Forces objectives, plans and resources in Latin America and the Caribbean.

General Objectives. Determine Canada's national interests, identify the subset of interests and values that compel Canadian involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean; and recommend an appropriate level of Canadian Forces engagement.

Specific Objectives. Review Canadian policies and recent statements by Canadian leaders regarding engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean; quantify the interdependence between Canada and Latin America and between Canada and the Caribbean; detail recent and current Canadian Forces engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean and in relevant inter-American institutions and regimes; and identify security and defence issues that link Canada with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Methodology. Written reference material (books and articles both in print and on-line) was consulted, then deductive reasoning was used to test the derived hypotheses. Critical logic was applied to arrive at recommendations and conclusions.

Limitation. This academic analysis has been conducted using unclassified, open-source references. There may be important elements of information that are unknowable and that would affect the conclusion, if known.

Structure. Following this introduction to the analytical framework, the paper is divided in seven chapters: Chapter 1 delves into the theory of international relations; Chapter 2 links the theory to Canada's foreign policy; Chapter 3 enumerates Canada's worldwide interests; Chapter 4 analyzes Canada's engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean; Chapter 5 analyzes the Canadian Forces' engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean; Chapter 6 offers recommendations for the Canadian Forces; and Chapter 7 concludes.

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## CHAPTER 1: DETERMINATION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS – THEORY

1.1. Every state has enduring and overarching foreign policy interests. Logical and objective analysis of those interests should drive long-term international engagement policies and their subordinate programs and investments, and should inform decisions and actions in specific cases. In states that are responsive to their citizenry, societal values may also influence foreign policy. However, policies driven by interests will be more enduring than policies related to values.

“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”

Keynes, John Maynard, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*,  
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1936. (HB171.K45 1936) p.383.

1.2. World politics are complex; it is impossible to comprehend, never mind analyze, all of the facts potentially related to any significant event. In the study of international relations, a theory is a simplifying device that identifies the facts that matter.<sup>1</sup> Theories are required to filter and to organize the facts. Even those who do not subscribe to any formal theory are unconsciously using their own ideas about how the world works to decide what to do.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Baylis, John, and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. p.3.

<sup>2</sup> Walt, Stephen M., “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998. p.29.

“The function of international theory is to enable us to improve our knowledge concerning international reality, whether for the sake of “pure understanding” or for the more active purpose of changing that reality.”<sup>3</sup>

1.3. International relations theories are potentially valid if they convincingly explain the causes, interpret the meaning and evaluate the impact of past events. A valid theory may provide a framework to organize thinking about current events, although one must be aware of the limits of theories derived from the past when analyzing new situations. A useful theory would help to predict the future and guide the choices of statesmen. This section will survey the principal theories of international relations, searching for guidance to help determine Canada’s enduring interests in Latin America and the Caribbean.

1.4. The study of international relations as a distinct discipline began after the First World War, with the establishment of a Department of International Politics at the University College of Wales in 1919. Initially, the focus was on the causes of the Great War, with a view to preventing similar international catastrophes. Gradually, theorists expanded from the central issue of war and peace to study the economic interdependence of states, the role of international organizations and transnational actors, and the effect of social norms on inter-state behaviour.

1.5. Three of the principal theories of international relations will be used to examine Canada’s interests in Latin America and the Caribbean: realism, liberalism and constructivism.

### Realism

1.6. A key assumption of realist theorists is that the international environment is fundamentally an anarchic state system.

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<sup>3</sup> Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Theory*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1990. (JX1395.D67 1990) p.41.

- a. The central actors in the international system are the states. There are important non-state players, such as transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations, but they affect international politics through their influence upon national governments. The term has a legal flavour: State “implies a population occupying a definite territory, subject to a government which other states recognize as having some legal status.”<sup>4</sup>
- b. The international environment is anarchic, as there is no central body above states with the power to compel them to behave in a manner contrary to their perceived interest or to protect them from one another. It is therefore a self-help system, as states must rely on their own power to achieve their objectives. International law differs from domestic law because it is (purposefully) weak; in most cases, judgements can only be applied with the consent of the “losing” party. This weakness reflects the fragmented nature of international politics.

1.7. Realists believe that human nature is unchangeable; human beings are selfish and, without a sovereign to impose order, would exist, as Thomas Hobbes described in *Leviathan*, in a state of nature, of perpetual war of all against all, with “no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of a man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Expanding that philosophical outlook to the anarchic environment of international politics, self-interested states are in a constant struggle for power to guarantee their security. Order exists only when states achieve a balance of power, which prevents any one state from dominating.

1.8. A quote from Thucydides, the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War, illustrates the ancient historical roots of the realist theory of international relations. In the dialogue prior to the siege of Melos by Athenian forces in 415 B.C., the Athenians’ demanded that the Melians surrender or die, notwithstanding the Melians’ appeal to justice, explaining “The

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<sup>4</sup> Wright, Quincy, *The Study of International Relations*. New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1955. (JX1293.U6W7 1955) p.4.

standard of justice depends upon the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”<sup>5</sup>

1.9. The ends of policy are determined by interest; the capacity to achieve those ends is determined by available power. Therefore, political analysis depends upon the concept of interest defined in terms of power<sup>6</sup>: political, military or economic.

a. National Interest. The term “national interest” has been used and debated since the beginning of the study of international relations. According to an important early proponent of realism, Hans Morgenthau, the invariable minimum requirement for a state is survival, thus all nations must protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations.<sup>7</sup> There are also variable elements of the national interests, which are subject to influence by societal norms, values, and interest groups. Political morality can only be considered on the international scene once vital national interests are secure.<sup>8</sup> Felix Oppenheim, writing in 1997, stated that national survival is a matter of rationality. Hence, the national interest should be defined as improving the welfare of the state: preserving political independence or territorial integrity, increasing economic status or improving personal, social or national security. Values-based objectives, such as promoting human rights or democracy, that do not improve the welfare of the state are not in the national interest.<sup>9</sup>

b. Power. Keohane and Nye usefully describe power as “the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable

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<sup>5</sup> Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, ed. M.K. Finley. London: Penguin, 1972. p.402.

<sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J. and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Knopf, 1985. (JX1391 .M6 1985) p.5.

<sup>7</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the U.S.”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Dec 1952. p.972.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* p.985.

<sup>9</sup> Oppenheim, Felix E., “National Interest, Rationality, and Morality”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Aug 1997. pp.369-371.

cost to the actor)”.<sup>10</sup> Realist theorists have traditionally considered military force as the ultimate measure of state power; political or economic influence could also be used to modify others’ behaviour. The objective of international relations is to maximize the power of the state so as to prevent other states from threatening its national interests.

1.10. The seemingly hard-hearted restriction of national interest to exclude any consideration of humanitarian interests and values has stirred debate, especially amongst theorists in western liberal democracies. Morgenthau, in the spirit of Machiavelli long before him, emphasized that statesman must distinguish between their official duty: to protect the national interest; and their personal wish: to see universal moral values realized throughout the world.<sup>11</sup> The ethicist Reinhold Neibuhr argued that when choosing between courses of action in defence of the national interest, statesmen must refer to transcendent ethical norms: “All political justice ... is achieved by men and nations who have a margin of goodness or virtue beyond their self interest. But they must not deny the interested motives which partly prompt their action. Otherwise their marginal virtue will turn to vice.”<sup>12</sup> Morgenthau did not believe that the choices of statesmen should be completely value-free; morality imposes restraints upon the actions of states. International politics is not so inherently evil that there are no ethical restraints upon the conduct of statesmen in the furtherance of the power objectives of their states. “They refuse to consider certain ends and to use certain means ... not because in the light of expediency they appear impractical or unwise, but because certain moral rules interpose an absolute barrier.”<sup>13</sup>

1.11. Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, focus on the socio-economic interactions of states as rational actors with different degrees of power. The behaviour of states is explained by the effects and constraints of the international system, rather than

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<sup>10</sup> Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Glenview Ill: Scott, Foresman, 1989. (JX1395 .K428 1989) p.11.

<sup>11</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the U.S.”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Dec 1952. p.987.

<sup>12</sup> Neibuhr, Reinhold, as quoted in Good, Robert C., “The National Interest and Political Realism: Neibuhr’s “Debate” with Morgenthau and Kennan”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Nov 1960. p.601.

<sup>13</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the U.S.”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Dec 1952. p.984.

extrapolating a pessimistic view of human nature to the international arena.<sup>14</sup> The anarchical, self-help system of international relations fosters suspicion and insecurity, and compels states to maximize their relative power.

1.12. Summary. States are in constant competition, which will lead to war unless a balance of power is maintained. In classical realist theory, human nature is the root of the struggle for power; in neo-realist theory the anarchic, self-help nature of the international system causes the struggle for security. The vital interest of the state is preserving its own security; the state also has a critical interest in improving the welfare of its citizens. Policies and actions must above all satisfy those requirements; values and moral considerations are pertinent only when there is rational choice, such that the possible courses of action all meet the standards of rationality.<sup>15</sup>

1.13. Criticism. Realists consider the state to be the principal actor in international relations: the sovereign authority has organized power domestically and competes with other states internationally. The narrow focus on states as actors overlooks threats to the nation from non-state actors, such as terrorists<sup>16</sup> and environmental threats. Assuming that community exists within the state but outside is only competition precludes common culture and institutions; regimes and norms can facilitate cooperation, but realism does not support the concept of an international community.<sup>17</sup> Realism assumes that states are monolithic rational actors, but modern states lack a single “king” who evaluates state interests and directs state actions. Instead, the intelligence gathering and decision making processes are conducted by individuals and organizations that have their own interests and beliefs, which may lead to actions that are contrary to an objective analysis of the state’s interests.

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<sup>14</sup> Walt, Stephen M., “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998. pp.29-46.

<sup>15</sup> Oppenheim, Felix E., “National Interest, Rationality, and Morality”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Aug 1997. pp.385-387.

<sup>16</sup> Klarevas, Louis, “Political Realism”, *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 26, Iss. 3, Fall 2004. p.18.

<sup>17</sup> Dunne, Tim, and Brian C. Schmidt, “Chapter 7: Realism”, in Baylis, John, and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. pp.173-176.

## Liberalism

1.14. Liberals believe that humans, and hence their institutions and interactions, are perfectible. Individual selfishness can be overcome by increased interconnectedness between people, under a system of institutions for maintaining order; similarly, international interdependence will create norms of conduct which will change political behaviour, given a framework of international laws and institutions. All peoples share an interest in peace, so representative governments will necessarily embrace peace; national self-determination will lead to democracy and democracies will interact peacefully.<sup>18</sup>

1.15. Liberals are fundamentally optimists, who believe that progressive forces will lead to ever-higher levels of prosperity and peace. The most important of these forces are economic interdependence, international institutions and democratization. Economic exchange creates good relations between states, as the people and businesses that trade share interest in avoiding conflicts. International institutions help to improve communications between states, fostering trust, cooperation and norms of peaceful interaction. Democratic governments rely on the consent of the people and so are less likely to resort to war.<sup>19</sup>

1.16. Global society is a complex web of interdependence, which creates the context in which states interact. “Transnational relations increase the sensitivity of societies to one another and thereby alter relationships between governments.”<sup>20</sup> The movement of people, goods and ideas between states leads to greater understanding between individuals and the creation of international organizations and interest groups with normative values about peace, violence and freedom. The interdependence of states, especially in economics and trade, limits the freedom of governments to act without harming the economic security of their citizens, while also creating means of influencing the behaviour of other governments.

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<sup>18</sup> Dougherty, James E., and Robert Paltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Theory*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1990. p.5.

<sup>19</sup> Friedberg, Aaron L., “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?”, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005. pp.12-16.

<sup>20</sup> Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. p.xvi.

1.17. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies fight wars, but not with each other. Representative governments function by compromise and translate that tendency to the international arena.<sup>21</sup> This liberal sub-theory has been adopted by the leaders of many western states, at least in their public pronouncements, to justify interventions of all types in other states. Counterarguments<sup>22</sup> are that the supposed evidence depends upon the definition of democracy; that there are too few examples of potential conflict between democracies to be a significant sample; that the perception that another state is democratic is more important than the reality; and that states in transition to democracy are actually more dangerous to international peace.

1.18. Neo-liberalism focuses on the effect on states of durable cooperative regimes, which enhance the sharing of information, set standards of behaviour and establish coercive enforcement mechanisms. In contrast to realists who argue that states enter into cooperative regimes only when it is in their relative interest, neo-liberals believe that states will agree to cooperate if gains are evenly shared.<sup>23</sup>

1.19. Liberal democracy leads to peace and justice through trade, investment and commerce. There is a conflict between personal liberty and free trade on the one hand, which can cause inequality and internal conflict; and seeking a just society through democratic institutions and welfare-oriented economies on the other hand. This can lead to two different liberal approaches: minimal intervention and weak international institutions, trusting in economic growth to foster democracy and justice, versus intervention and strong international institutions to regulate growth and ensure the just distribution of benefits.<sup>24</sup>

1.20. Summary. Interdependent relationships force individuals to cooperate for their common good. International economic interdependence, especially within a system of

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<sup>21</sup> Walt, Stephen M., "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998. p.39

<sup>22</sup> Rosato, Sebastian, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 4, November 2003. pp.585-602.

<sup>23</sup> Dunne, Tim, and Brian C. Schmidt, "Chapter 7: Realism", in Baylis, John, and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. p.194

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* p.201.

supranational cooperative institutions, will force states to resolve their conflicts peacefully for the good of their peoples. Liberal democratic regimes, being responsive to their citizens, are even more likely to choose peaceful solutions to potential conflicts.

1.21. Criticism. The western world was highly interdependent and Liberalism therefore predicted the end of war, just before the beginning of the First World War. Liberalism may explain how states act when national survival is not threatened and there are no national security interests at stake, but the world is still fundamentally anarchic and competitive. Ultimately, states will do what they must to survive: cooperative international institutions and regimes notwithstanding.

### Constructivism

1.22. Constructionists emphasize the importance of ideas and culture in shaping how individuals think about international relations and therefore how governments interact. All political relations are socially constructed, meaning that they are shaped by the beliefs and ideas of the actors as much as by objective material factors. Collective identities, strategic cultures and norms are lenses through which events and data are interpreted. Identity is the self-perception of political actors and their perception of others; strategic cultures are the beliefs about the fundamental character of international relations; and norms are beliefs about what is right and appropriate. Identities, strategic cultures and norms evolve, especially through interaction with others.<sup>25</sup>

1.23. Constructivism is an analytical approach rather than a theory, as it lacks predictive power. Nevertheless, it is useful in understanding how preferences are formed and how the world is interpreted by the supposedly rational actors in international relations.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Friedberg, Aaron L., "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?", *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005. p.34

<sup>26</sup> Nye, Joseph S., Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. p.8.

## CHAPTER 2: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. A useful theory of international relations could help to guide the choices of statesmen; a good theory will at least provide a framework for analyzing those choices. The world political situation is ever-changing; a theoretical foundation is necessary to evaluate continuity in foreign policy objectives and consistency in the approach to challenges. Although international courses of action may have to be justified in terms that will satisfy domestic political audiences, the gap between words and actions cannot be so wide as to destroy credibility. This section will apply the general theories of international relations to Canada's specific situation.

### Realism

2.2. The survival of Canada is not threatened by any other state. The U.S. has the military capability, but not the intent to conquer Canada; if any other state made such an attempt, self-interest would compel the U.S. to intervene to maintain Canada's independence and prevent the rival power from obtaining a position on the U.S. border. Therefore, self-sufficient military power is not critical to Canada's survival. The realist interests that motivate Canada's foreign policy are primarily related to increasing the economic well-being of Canadians.

2.3. Canada is a trading nation; continued economic prosperity depends upon a stable international order.<sup>27</sup> In 2005, exports equalled 40.8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and imports equalled 40.6% of GDP.<sup>28</sup> However, trade was primarily with one country: the U.S. accounted for 84% of Canadian merchandise exports and provided 57% of imports. Japan absorbed 2.1% of Canadian exports; the U.K. 1.9%; China 1.6%; and

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<sup>27</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Ottawa: April 2005. p.5. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview3-en.aspx>)

<sup>28</sup> Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, *Canada: A Macroeconomic Study of the United States' Most Important Trade Partner*. Washington: September 2006. p.5. (<http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/WRS0602/wrs0602.pdf>)

Mexico 0.8%. Over 50% of Canadian exports came from just five categories: natural gas; crude oil; electricity; motor vehicles and parts; and wood, paper and furniture products.<sup>29</sup>

2.4. Clearly, maintaining good relations with the U.S. is the paramount foreign policy interest for Canada, from both the security and economic perspectives. The Canadian Government's International Policy Statement expresses the requirement in positive terms:

“As this new century begins, Canada finds itself part of an evolving yet mature continental partnership. The bedrock of that partnership is the Canada-U.S. relationship, built upon more than two centuries of close economic, security and personal ties. Over several generations, Canadians and Americans have intermingled through migration, cross-border work and travel, and the exchange of ideas. Our joint achievements - the world's largest bilateral trading relationship and the world's longest unmilitarized border - are the envy of the world. Canada-U.S. collaboration has produced these successes despite the obvious differences in power between the two countries, and without the abandonment of Canadian national identity, social policies or sovereign decision-making power. Each society is following a unique path, and we have demonstrated that closer economic ties are possible without losing our ability to determine our own course. Canada has also learned that our influence and cooperation with the U.S. can be a major asset in the pursuit of our own objectives. Investing in a durable framework for cooperation with the United States is therefore central to advancing Canada's regional and global interests.”<sup>30</sup>

2.5. Conflict in Canada – U.S. relations is inevitable, yet manageable within an extensive system of bilateral institutions and regimes. However, no rational Canadian Government would take actions or implement policies on the international stage that are contrary to vital U.S. interests and that would not be tolerated by Washington. Canada does not need to wholeheartedly back every U.S. policy choice; it could take a neutral position,

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. pp.9-10.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Ottawa: April 2005. p.6. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview4-en.aspx>)

as was the case with the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, but it must not be seen as opposing the vital interests of the U.S. An American perspective on the balance of power in the Canada – U.S. relationship is:

“Bush is by no means the first president to identify the elimination of tyranny as a vital U.S. interest. More than a few of his predecessors have seen the promotion of freedom as the best way to expand the roster of nations "friendly" to the United States. Yet friendship in this context connotes something more than cordiality. It implies subordination, other governments acceding to Washington's rules (especially with regards to political economy) and according to Washington's unique prerogatives (especially in relation to the use of force). For the United States, Canada epitomizes friendliness - not because Canadians themselves are friendly (although they are) but because Ottawa poses no hint of a threat and entertains no illusions about who wields the upper hand when it comes to Canadian-American relations. The United States will never feel fully secure until the world consists of nations like Canada, both genuinely free and reliably acquiescent.”<sup>31</sup>

## Liberalism

2.6. Canada’s foreign policy has been marked by tension between the necessity for U.S. – Canada bilateralism and the desire for global multilateralism. The Canadian public supports multilateralism and fears relying too heavily on the U.S.<sup>32</sup>

2.7. The current international environment is not complete anarchy. As a globally interconnected middle power, Canada invests great faith in international institutions and regimes as means to constrain and influence greater powers. More than simply relations

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<sup>31</sup> Bacevich, Andrew J., “Debating Democracy”. *The National Interest*. Iss. 90, July 2007. pp.8-13. (<http://proquest.umi.com.proxyau.wrlc.org/pqdweb?did=1308652111&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=31806&RQT=309&VName=PQD>)

<sup>32</sup> Stevenson, Brian J.R., “*Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis 1969-1990*”, Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 2000. p.102.

between more than two states, multilateralism as an organizing principle has the following general characteristics:

- a. institutions organized around general principles of conduct;
- b. participants consider themselves indivisible in relation to the application of the key principles; and
- c. participants behave in a way that generates “diffuse reciprocity” or long-run expected benefits over the short-run advantages of specific reciprocity or free-riding.<sup>33</sup>

2.8. Canada’s diplomacy has been focused on multilateral institutions from the very beginning of its independent foreign policy. Its involvement has been about making multilateral institutions work, perceiving that a multilateral world order is necessary to constrain the great powers, especially the U.S., and to amplify Canada’s international influence through alliances with like-minded countries. Multilateral engagement was initially based upon a realistic assessment of Canada’s national interest; over time it has developed into an “almost unconditional commitment to institutions and causes of little apparent strategic interest”<sup>34</sup>. The traditional realist emphasis on stability and the principle of non-intervention in sovereign states has been replaced by a liberal emphasis on using multilateral institutions to promote Canadian values, such as respect for the environment, tolerance and recognition of diversity and defence of human rights.<sup>35</sup> To some extent, Canadian national identity has become tied to support for multilateral initiatives and the promotion of Canadian values through multilateral institutions.

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<sup>33</sup> Ruggie, John Gerard, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution”, *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1992. pp. 571-572.

<sup>34</sup> Barreto, Edison Rodrigues Jr., and Paul Alexander Haslam, *Worlds Apart: Canadian and Brazilian Multilateralism in Comparative Perspective*, Paper presented at the International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Montreal, 8 September 2007.

<sup>35</sup> Lee, Steven, “Canadian Values in Canadian Foreign Policy”, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 10, Iss. 1, Fall 2002. p.104.

2.9. Soft Power. “Humans are neither purely moral nor totally cynical. It is a political fact that belief in right and wrong helps move people to act, and therefore legitimacy is a source of power.”<sup>36</sup> A state that acts as a model to which others aspire - a shining city on the hill - can influence other states without resorting to threats or the use of force. This legitimacy is known as soft power. Canada, as an economically successful and politically stable liberal democracy that champions international institutions, has accrued soft power that could be used to advance its interests in multilateral regimes.

### Constructivism

2.10. National foreign policy is not formed in a vacuum. The state is the dominant actor in international relations, but assuming that each state will act in a coldly logical manner discounts the effect of individual leaders, domestic and bureaucratic politics, and the values of the people.

2.11. The foreign policy process within a parliamentary democracy, with developed political parties and firm government control of the executive, could be purely rational. In theory, foreign policy bureaucrats need respond only to their Minister. However, from 1968 onwards the Canadian political structure changed, first permitting and then encouraging greater citizen participation in policy development. The resulting growth of sophisticated networks of institutional and issue-oriented pressure groups means that domestic political considerations now have a key influence on foreign policy.<sup>37</sup>

### Combining Values and Interests

2.12. A failed state is unable to control its territory and the people therein. The power vacuum left by ineffective or non-existent government is filled by illegitimate actors and the failed state becomes a “breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional

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<sup>36</sup> Nye, Joseph S., Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. p.177.

<sup>37</sup> Stevenson, Brian J.R., “*Canada, Latin America and the New Internationalism: A Foreign Policy Analysis 1969-1990*”, Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 2000. p.104.

conflict and terrorism”.<sup>38</sup> Canadian interests are threatened as failed and failing states import fewer goods than they potentially could; and are less able to cooperate on shared issues such as trafficking of humans, illegal arms and drugs, environmental contamination, and the prevention of terrorism. Canadian values are offended as failed and failing states do not protect human rights; and are unable to alleviate the suffering of their people.<sup>39</sup>

2.13. Preventing failing states from slipping over the edge into complete failure and restoring governance to failed states serves both Canadian interests and values. However, interests trump values: there are many failed and failing states, all of which should merit attention according to Canadian values; however, the gravity of the threat to Canadian interests determines whether the Government of Canada actually intervenes in a particular failed or failing state. As well, Canadians are only willing to expend limited resources to resolve crises in distant states.

2.14. Afghanistan is an illustrative example. The mostly Taliban-controlled state of Afghanistan severely restricted the rights of women and the population in general suffered greatly, yet Canada took little notice and no action until after the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the U.S. The Al-Qaeda terrorists had planned and trained in safe havens in Afghanistan and were threatening more attacks, so Canada joined the U.S. in overthrowing the Taliban regime and later joined the UN effort to establish security in Afghanistan and to help build a stable and peaceful, “developing country in which the rights of all citizens are respected and their security is protected by their own government”.<sup>40</sup> The international military presence ensures that Al-Qaeda is now unable to mount attacks on North America from Afghanistan, so the immediate threat to Canadian interests has been neutralized. The plight of the people has improved marginally, but Afghanistan is still a failed state and the population continues to suffer. Nevertheless, the Canadian Parliament has agreed to limit Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan to three more years, as the costs mount and the

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<sup>38</sup> Manwaring, Max G., *Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution – Impasse*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004. p.19.

(<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=372>)

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* p.19.

<sup>40</sup> Manley, John (Chair), *Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan*, January 2008. p.20  
([http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection\\_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf](http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf))

public's attention turns elsewhere.<sup>41</sup> Values are invoked in politicians' speeches, the report of the Independent Panel and even in military leaders' statements to justify Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, but interests determine the extent of that involvement.

### Official Policy

2.15. The Canadian International Policy Statement acknowledges the existence of fundamental, enduring interests – ensuring continued prosperity and security for Canadians – yet the bulk of its text oozes Liberalism: “process of globalization bringing people together”; “the joint pursuit of democracy, human rights and the rule of law”; “engaging with other societies around the globe”; “devising the innovative arrangements our world requires”; and “Effective multilateral governance is essential for Canadian security and prosperity. Multilateral action is in turn dependent on states accepting their responsibility to both their citizens and to other countries.”<sup>42</sup>

2.16. With Canada lacking the military or economic power to act unilaterally on the world stage, and without clear, existential threats to galvanize the nation to action, the International Policy Statement is reduced to a plaintive, values-based statement to justify Canada's international engagement and define its overarching objectives.

“Canada can make a difference, if it continues to invest in its international role and pulls its weight. We will know we have done so if there is demand for Canadian ideas and expertise, if Canadian priorities have pride of place on the international agenda, if the institutions we are part of deliver solutions efficiently and equitably, if our efforts to catalyze induce others to follow, and if the partners we support achieve their aspirations.”<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> CBC News, *House Votes in Favour of Extending Afghan Mission*, 13 March 2008. (<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/03/13/motion-confidence.html>)

<sup>42</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Ottawa: April 2005. pp.4-5. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview3-en.aspx>)

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* p.5

## Summary – Theory and Foreign Policy

2.17. Absent a direct national security threat and safe under the U.S. umbrella, Canada's foreign policy interests are primarily economic. Trade with the U.S. is critical to Canada; therefore, Canadian governments should maintain good relations with the U.S. and must avoid confrontation over issues that the U.S. regards as vital to its national interests.

2.18. Canada lacks the military and economic power to act unilaterally on the world stage and thus relies on multilateral institutions and regimes as means to constrain greater powers and to multiply its influence. As states claim to ascribe to norms of international behaviour, those norms become self-fulfilling constraints upon the states' freedom of action. By participating enthusiastically and acting honourably in international institutions, Canada increases its soft power. The Canadian public supports international engagement in theory to achieve liberal ideals, but its willingness to sacrifice for those ideals is suspect.

2.19. Domestic political considerations affect foreign policy formulation. Canadian engagement could be effective in many troubled parts of the world, but resources and energy are limited. Citizen pressure influences decisions on if and where to intervene.

2.20. Preventing failing states from becoming failed states and restoring governance in failed states serves Canada's interests and appeals to Canadians' values. However, interests determine the extent and sustainability of Canada's interventions in other states.

2.21. The Canadian International Policy Statement can be criticized for its appeal to warm and fuzzy values instead of hard interests, but the Government of the day did accurately judge Canadians' warmth and fuzziness. The magnanimous sentiment that Canadians are privileged and should share some of their advantages with the less fortunate does attract support as a concept, but ultimately what Canadians are willing to spend actual treasure and blood upon is more important than what they or their political leaders say they support.

## CHAPTER 3: CANADA AND THE WORLD

3.1. International Organizations. One of the founding members of the United Nations,<sup>44</sup> Canada is an active participant in numerous other international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the G8, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Organization of American States (OAS).<sup>45</sup> Formal relations exist with Canada's second-largest trading partner, the European Union (EU),<sup>46</sup> and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)<sup>47</sup>.

3.2. Trade. Canada is a trading nation. In 2006, exports and imports of goods totalled \$US 807,813,000,000. The U.S. is the principal market, accounting for almost 69% of trade, while Asia and Oceania accounted for 12.8%, Europe 11%, Latin America 4.7% and the rest of the world 2.8%. The value of goods traded with the U.S. decreased fractionally in 2006, while trade with the rest of the world increased nearly 10%.<sup>48</sup>

3.3. Aid. The International Policy review identified that Canadian aid was dispersed in small amounts amongst many countries; development assistance is more effective when concentrated in "high impact" countries. As a result, on 19 April 2005, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) announced that it would henceforth "concentrate the bulk of its country-to-country assistance in targeted sectors in 25 developing countries. This will lead to an increased impact in poverty reduction. By 2010, at least two-thirds of CIDA's direct country-to-country assistance will be focused on 25 developing countries — of which more than half are in Africa — that are among the poorest but have the capacity to use aid effectively." Four countries in Latin America and

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<sup>44</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada and the United Nations*, website, 1 October 2007. ([http://geo.international.gc.ca/canada\\_un/ottawa/canada\\_un/default-en.asp](http://geo.international.gc.ca/canada_un/ottawa/canada_un/default-en.asp))

<sup>45</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *International Organizations and Forums*, website, 30 November 2007. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/int-orgs-en.aspx>)

<sup>46</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada-EU Partnership Agenda*, website, 7 November 2007. ([http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-europa/eu/partnership\\_agenda-en.asp](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-europa/eu/partnership_agenda-en.asp))

<sup>47</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, website, 25 February 2008. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/asean-anase-en.aspx>)

<sup>48</sup> Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, *Canada's Trade with the World*, website. ([http://www.asiapacificbusiness.ca/data/trade/t3\\_waggregate.cfm](http://www.asiapacificbusiness.ca/data/trade/t3_waggregate.cfm))

the Caribbean are on the list of development partners: Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua. Criteria for selection include level of poverty, ability to use aid effectively and sufficient Canadian presence to add value. Aid will be targeted in the areas of governance, health (with a focus on HIV/AIDS), basic education, private-sector development, and environmental sustainability.<sup>49</sup> Since that announcement, Afghanistan, which was not on the original list of 25 development partners, has become the number one recipient of Canadian aid, at over \$100 million per year.<sup>50</sup>

3.4. Internal – Demographics. Statistics Canada analyzed the ethnic origins of Canada's population, based upon the 2006 census. Besides the vast majority who self-reported their ethnicity as "Canadian", the largest ethnic groups were English (6.6 million), French (4.9 million), Scottish (4.7 million), Irish (4.4 million), German (3.2 million), Italian (1.4 million), Chinese (1.3 million), North American Indian (1.3 million), Ukrainian (1.2 million) and Dutch (1.0 million).<sup>51</sup> In contrast, people of Latin American origin numbered only 304,245, less than 1% of the Canadian population.<sup>52</sup> [In 2001, Canadians of Latin-American origin numbered 244,400 or 0.8% of the population.<sup>53</sup>] Blacks numbered 783,795,<sup>54</sup> of which 52% or 407,573 reported Caribbean origins, mainly Jamaican (24.5%) and Haitian (12.3%).<sup>55</sup> Immigration is the main source of population growth: the 2006 census enumerated 6,186,950 foreign-born people in Canada, 19.8% of the population. 58.3% of first-generation immigrants came from Asia, including the Middle East; with fewer from Europe (16.1%), Central and South America and the Caribbean (10.8%), and Africa (10.6%). 20% of the population speaks a language other than English or French at

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<sup>49</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, *News Release 2005-17*, 19 April 2007.

(<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JER-324115437-MU7>)

<sup>50</sup> Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Final Report*, January 2008.

(<http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/reportViewer-eng.asp?selMenu=5#fig4>)

<sup>51</sup> Statistics Canada, *Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census*, Catalogue no. 97-562-X, 9 April 2008.

(<http://www.statcan.ca/bsolc/english/bsolc?catno=97-562-X2006001>)

<sup>52</sup> Statistics Canada, *Ethnocultural Portrait of Canada*, website, 4 January 2008.

(<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/highlights/ethnic/pages/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&Code=01&Table=1&Data=Count&StartRec=1&Sort=2&Display=Page>)

<sup>53</sup> Statistics Canada, *The Latin American Community in Canada*, website, 16 August 2007.

(<http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/89-621-XIE/89-621-XIE2007008.htm>)

<sup>54</sup> Statistics Canada, *Ethnocultural Portrait of Canada*, website, 4 January 2008.

(<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/highlights/ethnic/pages/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&Code=01&Table=1&Data=Count&StartRec=1&Sort=2&Display=Page>)

<sup>55</sup> Statistics Canada, *Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census*, Catalogue no. 97-562-X, 9 April 2008.

(<http://www.statcan.ca/bsolc/english/bsolc?catno=97-562-X2006001>)

home; Chinese is the mother tongue of 1,034,000 people in Canada.<sup>56</sup> Spanish is the seventh-most common language, with 362,120 people or 1.2% of the population claiming it as their mother tongue.<sup>57</sup>

3.5. Summary. Although obviously focused on the U.S., Canada has interests and is engaged worldwide. Priorities for engagement are shaped by external and internal factors.

- a. External Factors. Political involvement, through international organizations, is oriented towards the similarly rich and developed nations of Europe and the Commonwealth. Economic interdependence is much higher with Europe, Asia and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) than with the rest of the world, including Latin America and the Caribbean. Aid is targeted to the worst-off countries of the world, mostly in Africa.
  
- b. Internal Factors. Demographically and thus culturally, Canadians are still primarily Europeans; Asians are by far the most significant distinct sub-population. The Caribbean is a larger source of immigrants than is Latin America. There is more domestic political pressure to engage and intervene in the regions with which Canadians have the greatest ties.

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<sup>56</sup> Statistics Canada, *The Daily*, website, 4 December 2007. (<http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/071204/d071204a.htm>)

<sup>57</sup> Statistics Canada, *The Evolving Linguistic Portrait, 2006 Census: Data tables, figures and maps*, website, 11 December 2007. (<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/analysis/language/tables/table2.htm>)

## CHAPTER 4: CANADA, LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

### 4.1. Latin America and the Caribbean is the U.S.' backyard.

“The unchallenged supremacy of the United States within the Western Hemisphere has throughout been the backbone of the system of American states. As long as this supremacy is secure, there is, on the one hand, no need for the United States to assert it in the political and military sphere, and, taking it for granted, the United States can well afford to pursue a policy of the Good Neighbor; and there is, on the other hand, no opportunity for the other members of the system to challenge it effectively.”<sup>58</sup>

4.2. However, distracted by events in the Middle East, there is little prospect of new U.S. policy initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>59</sup> The U.S. will react to crises in the hemisphere, but is unlikely to be proactive. As a result, the U.S. is no longer the only influential actor in the hemisphere, as other external, globalized players such as the EU, Spain and China, as well as Latin American states with regional aspirations such as Venezuela and Brazil contend for economic and political influence. Increased Canadian engagement in Latin America could be a good thing for the Canada – U.S. agenda, as Canadian objectives and activities are generally compatible with U.S. interests and the clear disparity in relative power means that Canada is not considered a threat to the U.S. Consideration of Canadian interests in Latin America and capacity to act upon those interests will be limited by Canada’s commitments in other regions of the world.

4.3. At the March 2006 North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) summit in Mexico, U.S. President Bush pressured the Canadian Prime Minister to assist in counterbalancing

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<sup>58</sup> Morgenthau, Hans J., “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the United States”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Dec 1952. pp.967-968.

<sup>59</sup> Roett, Riordan, “United States – Latin American Relations: The Current State of Play”, *Nueva Sociedad*, No. 206, Nov-Dec 2006.

growing Chinese and Indian economic and political influence in the hemisphere.<sup>60</sup> On 17 July 2007, on a visit to Chile, Prime Minister Harper said, “We are a country of the Americas. Re-engagement in our hemisphere is a critical international priority for our Government. Canada is committed to playing a bigger role in the Americas and to doing so for the long term.”<sup>61</sup>

### Canada’s Engagement Strategy

4.4. Three key objectives form the basis of Canada’s engagement strategy in the Americas, including the Latin America and Caribbean region:

- a. To strengthen and promote our foundational values of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law.
- b. To build strong, sustainable economies through increased trade and investment linkages, as well as mutual commitment to expanding opportunity to all citizens.
- c. To meet new security challenges, as well as natural disasters and health pandemics.<sup>62</sup>

4.5. Besides the Prime Minister’s announcement and the publication of the three key objectives (above), not much concrete has happened. The problem seems to be an unwillingness to dedicate resources to support and give consistent political direction to the strategy. A new secretariat has been created within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), but progress has been slow due to shifting political directives, lack of budget and personnel, and demand for immediate, high-profile deliverables for

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<sup>60</sup> Oxford Analytica, *Latin America / Canada: Regional focus lacks resources*, OxResearch: 27 November 2007. (ProQuest document ID: 1393984061) (<http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/>)

<sup>61</sup> Office of the Prime Minister, *Prime Minister Harper Signals Canada’s Renewed Engagement in the Americas*, website, 17 July 2007. (<http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=1&id=1760>)

<sup>62</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Latin America and the Caribbean*, website, 5 March 2008. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/lac-alc-en.aspx>)

Ministers to unveil. Prior to the Summit of the Americas that Canada hosted in 2001, regional expectations were raised by the proactive and high-profile role that Canada was playing. Changing Canadian priorities after 11 September 2001 shifted the focus away from the Latin American and Caribbean states; renewed engagement is being viewed with scepticism there.<sup>63</sup>

4.6. Based upon their perception of Canada's influence, analysts outside the government have suggested that the new engagement strategy could sort the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean into three groups:<sup>64</sup>

- a. Major Influence. Canada has significant trade and investment linkages, as well as ties through migration and association in the Commonwealth or la Francophonie, with many Caribbean nations. The policy priority is security, particularly the interdiction of narcotics and related criminal gang activity; Canada's historic ties and overwhelming economic power should enable supporting development and trade policies to have significant effect.
- b. Demandeur of Note. Canada has sufficient trade and investment linkages, relative to the size of the Latin American economies, to have some influence over the Central American countries and the Andean Community. Policy is focused on strengthening the principles and institutions necessary for good governance, reflecting the importance of the rule of law for Canadian companies invested in the region.
- c. Little Influence. Canada has little leverage with Argentina, Brazil, Chile and, perhaps, Venezuela.

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<sup>63</sup> Oxford Analytica, *Latin America / Canada: Regional focus lacks resources*, OxResearch: 27 November 2007. (ProQuest document ID: 1393984061) (<http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/>)

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

4.7. It is unclear, even to those who study the region full-time, what specific role Canada should play in Latin America.

“Canada, of course, has a great deal of credibility in Latin America and the Caribbean. It’s seen both as being a country that has a very independent and principled foreign policy — most countries believe that — and at the same time, it’s seen as a country that has maintained a good working relationship with the United States without yielding on its fundamental principles. And that is all very sort of welcome in the region. I think Canada is not going to be able to reshape directions in the region. It has one of the largest economies in the region, but still, the U.S. is so huge in this proposition. And Canada is not a Latin American country either. Canada has to pick a few critical issues where it can really focus its attention, its resources, and produce results.”<sup>65</sup>

### The Inter-American System

4.8. The U.S. and friendly Latin American states established the International Union of American Republics in 1890, which became the Pan American Union in 1910. In 1948, twenty-one members formed the Organization of American States (OAS). For years, the OAS was seen largely as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in the hemisphere. Canada had been a permanent observer since 1972, but was reluctant to join the organization.<sup>66</sup>

4.9. One of Canada’s objectives in international organizations is to amplify its voice and influence by finding common ground with other middle powers, in order to counterbalance the great powers. There were significant concerns that joining the OAS would compromise Canada’s independence, as the organization was perceived to be dominated by the U.S., and that joining the club would legitimize a number of unsavoury military governments.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Hakim, Peter, (President of the Inter-American Dialogue). Videotaped interview, 15 June 2007. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/peterhakim-en.aspx>)

<sup>66</sup> Kilgore, Secretary of State (Latin America) David, “Canada and the OAS: Engaging Our Neighbours”, *One World*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1999. (<http://www.david-kilgour.com/secstate/oas2.htm>)

<sup>67</sup> Foreign Affairs Canada, “Canada and the OAS”, *Canada World View*, Iss. 28, Winter 2006. pp.8-9.

The end of the Cold War and a shift to democratically-elected governments led to a new political climate in the Americas. Internal conflict gave way to peace processes and Canada decided to play a greater role in Latin America.<sup>68</sup> Canada joined the OAS in 1990.

#### 4.10. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

- a. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), also known as the Rio Treaty, entered into force in 1948 and is one of the pillars of collective security in the Inter-American system. TIAR calls for the adoption of collective measures in the face of acts of aggression, including armed attacks, extra-continental or inter-continental conflicts, or any other contingency that might endanger peace, for the common defence and maintenance of peace and security in the hemisphere. In addition, TIAR sets the legal foundation for applying procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the obligatory nature of the measures adopted, with the exception of the use of armed force, which requires the express consent of each state.<sup>69</sup>
  
- b. Canada has not ratified the treaty. Not all other OAS member states are parties to TIAR either. Many Caribbean states who gained independence after 1947 are not signatories. Venezuela has also not ratified the treaty. In September 2002, Mexico withdrew from the Rio Treaty, arguing that:

“The treaty is no longer useful as it grew out of factors and situations which have disappeared. The challenges to regional and international security have radically changed... We do not confront an extra-continental enemy that obliges us to defend ourselves through a military alliance.”<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Kilgore, Secretary of State (Latin America) David, “Canada and the OAS: Engaging Our Neighbours”, *One World*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, 1999. (<http://www.david-kilgour.com/secstate/oas2.htm>)

<sup>69</sup> Inter-American Defense College, online course notes, *The Inter-American System*, Unit 4, pp. 87-88. <http://pfp.ethz.ch>

<sup>70</sup> Fox, Mexican President Vicente, cited by: Peoples Daily, *Mexico Calls for Replacement of Inter-American Defense Treaty*, September 8, 2001. [http://english.people.com.cn/english/200109/08/eng20010908\\_79657.html](http://english.people.com.cn/english/200109/08/eng20010908_79657.html)

- c. Participation in the OAS does not obligate Canada to intervene militarily in Latin America or the Caribbean.

### Hemispheric Security Challenges

4.11. The Declaration on Security in the Americas of October 2003 broadened the range of issues that the OAS considers threats to the security of the Hemisphere. New threats, concerns, and other challenges of a diverse nature mean that security can no longer be framed in conventional military terms but must be multidimensional in scope. The list of new threats includes:

- a. Terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, and the connections among them;
- b. Extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect stability and democracy. Extreme poverty erodes social cohesion and undermines the security of states;
- c. Natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and environmental degradation;
- d. Trafficking in persons;
- e. Attacks to cyber security;
- f. The potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and

- g. The possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.<sup>71</sup>

4.12. Defining threats in the hemispheric context to include “political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects”<sup>72</sup> means that almost any problem could be considered a security threat. Military defence of the continent is but a small part of the spectrum of responses to the multidimensional security threats and the use of national military forces is unlikely to be appropriate against the new threats. In some weak states, the military is the only reliable organ of government that has the ability to defeat the new threats and maintain internal order, but the encroachment of the military into civilian national security issues is potentially very dangerous for democracy (and for the combat capability of the military).

4.13. Drug trafficking, migration of undocumented persons and organized crime originating from Latin America and the Caribbean are challenges to Canada’s security forces and judicial system, but they are not existential threats to the state. Geography favours Canada: distance and the fact that the intervening space is filled by the U.S., which acts as both barrier and more attractive market, dilutes the effect of the problems exported from Latin America and the Caribbean. Canada is engaged in the OAS’ Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission; to aid the developing nations of the Caribbean and Latin America more than to assure Canada’s security.

### Trade

4.14. In the 1990s, Canada’s trade and investment with the Caribbean and Latin America (including Mexico, which joined the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the U.S. in 1994) more than doubled. In 2001, total two-way trade with the Caribbean was valued at \$US 0.921 billion and total two-way trade with Latin America, less Mexico,

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<sup>71</sup> Organization of American States, *Declaration on Security in the Americas*, Mexico City, Mexico, 28 October 2003. [http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/DeclaracionSecurity\\_102803.asp](http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/DeclaracionSecurity_102803.asp)

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

was valued at \$US 9.602 billion. Canadian foreign direct investment was \$US 28.659 billion in the Caribbean and \$US 13.740 billion in Latin America, less Mexico.<sup>73</sup>

4.15. Canada's trade with Latin America has tripled over the last 10 years,<sup>74</sup> but it is still negligible in comparison to trade with the U.S. Bilateral trade with MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) was only \$5 billion in 2005, and \$4.2 billion of that was with Brazil. Bilateral trade with the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) was only \$5.5 billion in 2005, and \$2.5 billion of that was with Venezuela. Bilateral trade with the countries of Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) was only \$1.3 billion in 2005, about the equivalent of one day's trade with the U.S.<sup>75</sup> Canadian foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America was only \$23 billion in 2005, concentrated in 4 countries: Brazil, \$8 billion; Chile, \$5.6 billion; Argentina, \$4.6 billion; and Mexico, \$3.1 billion.<sup>76</sup>

Although Latin America is a populous potential market, individual poverty and low levels of economic development make it difficult to foresee huge growth in demand for Canadian goods and services in the near future. There is no economic imperative for Canada to engage in Latin America, although there are opportunities that could benefit both Canadian businesses and Latin American society.

4.16. Much of Latin America is physically closer to Canada than is Asia; Canadian businesses that outsource labour-intensive work to Latin America may benefit from more efficient movement of semi-finished goods between countries and faster delivery of finished products to the U.S. and Europe. Canadian firms have competitive advantages in business areas with growth potential in Latin America: extractive industries, such as oil, gas and mining; information technology; and infrastructure, especially power generation

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<sup>73</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Canada's Trade and Investment with Latin America and the Caribbean*, Washington: 29 January 2003. (<http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/11960/lclwas161.pdf>)

<sup>74</sup> Oxford Analytica, *Canada / Latin America: Expanding trade faces challenges*, OxResearch: 15 June 2007. (ProQuest document ID: 1292889601) (<http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/>)

<sup>75</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Opening Doors to Latin America and the Caribbean*, website, 31 October 2007. ([http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/cimar-rcami/2007\\_7\\_07.aspx?lang=en](http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/cimar-rcami/2007_7_07.aspx?lang=en))

<sup>76</sup> Daudelin, Jean, "Canada and the Americas: A Time for Modesty", *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 64, no. 3, May 2007. p.18. ([http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Library/ciialibr/behindth/behin%7E16/bth\\_vo%7E2](http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Library/ciialibr/behindth/behin%7E16/bth_vo%7E2))

and transmission. However, political resistance to trade liberalization, due to the social and environmental costs of previous structural adjustment policies imposed upon Latin America (the Washington Consensus), and extremely high levels of violent crime<sup>77</sup> increase the risk of doing business in much of Latin America.<sup>78</sup>

4.17. Free Trade Agreements. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), for which Canada advocated throughout the last 15 years, is dead. Canada has bilateral free trade agreements with Costa Rica and Chile, and is negotiating or discussing free trade agreements with Peru, Colombia, CARICOM (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago), the Dominican Republic, and the “Central American Four” (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua).<sup>79</sup>

## Cuba

4.18. Cuba was the first nation in the Caribbean with which Canada established diplomatic relations, in 1945; Canada remains engaged in Cuba.<sup>80</sup> In contrast, the U.S. relationship with Cuba has been confrontational since the U.S. imposed an embargo on Cuba in October 1960 and broke off diplomatic relations in January 1961.<sup>81</sup> The U.S. had Cuba suspended from the OAS in 1962.

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<sup>77</sup> There were 605 homicides in Canada in 2006, for a rate of 1.85 per 100,000 population, while Guatemala and El Salvador suffered 37 and 38 homicides per 100,000 population.

- Statistics Canada, “Crime Statistics”, *The Daily*, website, 18 July 2007.

(<http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/070718/d070718b.htm>)

- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Crime and Development in Central America*, May 2007, p.52

- (<http://www.scribd.com/doc/341527/United-Nations-Crime-and-Development-in-Central-America>)).

<sup>78</sup> Oxford Analytica, *Canada / Latin America: Expanding trade faces challenges*, OxResearch: 15 June 2007.

(ProQuest document ID: 1292889601) (<http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/>)

<sup>79</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Negotiations and Agreements*, website, 2 April 2008.

(<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx>)

<sup>80</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada – Cuba Relations*, website, 29 January 2008.

(<http://geo.international.gc.ca/latin-america/cuba/geo/cuba-bb-en.aspx>)

<sup>81</sup> U.S. Department of State, *U.S. – Cuba Relations*, website, 1 May 2001.

(<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/2558.htm>)

4.19. The U.S. policy objective for Cuba is to promote a peaceful transition to a stable, democratic form of government and respect for human rights. Given that the U.S. refuses to engage Cuba economically or politically, the U.S. relies on its friends and allies to promote its objective in Cuba.<sup>82</sup>

4.20. Canada has open trade and investment relations with Cuba. Cuba is the fifth most popular overseas destination for Canadians, after the United States, Mexico, United Kingdom and France. In 2005, approximately 600,000 Canadian tourists visited Cuba, with approximately 125 flights from Canada to Cuba per week during high season.<sup>83</sup> Two-way trade between Canada and Cuba was \$1.625 billion (Cdn) in 2006.<sup>84</sup> Canada is second only to the Netherlands as an export market for Cuba and is the fifth-largest source of imports by Cuba.<sup>85</sup> Canada provides 39% of Cuba's foreign direct investment, making Canada the second-largest investor in Cuba, after Spain.<sup>86</sup>

4.21. Canada is well positioned to promote its own interests while simultaneously assisting the U.S. The stated U.S. political and humanitarian objectives for Cuba are congruent with Canadian values; the U.S. inability to engage Cuba directly gives Canada the opportunity to act as a diplomatic intermediary between the U.S. and the new government of Cuba, while maintaining the head-start that Canadian companies have in seeking business opportunities in Cuba.

## Summary

4.22. For the past 15 years, Canada has tried to be an important hemispheric player. "Canadian politicians, diplomats, activists and academics have invented for themselves an

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Canada – Cuba Relations*, website, 29 January 2008. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/latin-america/cuba/geo/cuba-bb-en.aspx>)

<sup>84</sup> Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Fact Sheet - Cuba*, website, 15 June 2007. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo/cuba-fs-en.aspx>)

<sup>85</sup> CBC News, *Facts on Canada – Cuba Trade*, website, 3 August 2006. (<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cuba/canada-cuba-trade.html>)

<sup>86</sup> Embassy of Cuba in Canada, *Economic Office*, website, accessed 10 May 2008. (<http://embacu.cubaminrex.cu/Portals/7/Investment072007.doc>)

hemispheric identity and tried to turn the region into a practice field for their big ideas. Democracy was to be promoted, free trade implemented, and old understandings of security ditched in favour of a brand new human security paradigm. The OAS' old geo-political straightjacket was to be torn apart and the Organization turned into an effective instrument of ethical collective action. The whole hemisphere was to be transformed into a kind of big beautiful Canada: democratic, liberal, multicultural, peaceful, efficient and profoundly moral.” But it didn’t work.<sup>87</sup>

4.23. “No one would remember the Good Samaritan if he’d only had good intentions. He had money as well.”<sup>88</sup> If Canada is to be significantly engaged in Latin America and the Caribbean, then significant resources are necessary. However, Canada’s security is not directly threatened and economic interests are not at stake; the U.S. is not proactively engaged in the region so Canada’s lack of involvement there does not harm the Canada - U.S. relationship (although Canada may be able to inter-mediate if U.S. - Cuba relations change); and Canada has no unilateral ability to resolve the massive poverty and social problems disrupting Latin American and Caribbean society.

“There is no reason for the Canadian government to play a prominent role in the Americas, for the simple reason that what it does there has little bearing on Canadians. The game is for Latin Americans to play and Canada should, modestly, let them take charge of it.”<sup>89</sup>

4.24. Conclusion. Canada has no vital security or economic interest at stake in Latin America and the Caribbean. Canada’s national interests in the region are real but the effects are second-order (fostering higher standards of living through trade, investment and aid will create demand for Canadian goods and services; and will reduce the spill-over

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<sup>87</sup> Daudelin, Jean, “Canada and the Americas: A Time for Modesty”, *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 64, no. 3, May 2007. p.20. ([http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Library/ciialibr/behindth/behin%7E16/bth\\_vo%7E2](http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Library/ciialibr/behindth/behin%7E16/bth_vo%7E2))

<sup>88</sup> Thatcher, Margaret (British Prime Minister), Television interview, 6 January 1986. Quoted in Jay, Antony (ed.), *Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. (PN6084.P6 094 2005)

<sup>89</sup> Daudelin, Jean, “Canada and the Americas: A Time for Modesty”, *Behind the Headlines*, vol. 64, no. 3, May 2007. p.2. ([http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Library/ciialibr/behindth/behin%7E16/bth\\_vo%7E2](http://www.igloo.org/ciia/download/Library/ciialibr/behindth/behin%7E16/bth_vo%7E2))

effects of uncontrolled migration by people seeking economic opportunity) and are not substantially different from Canada's interests in other under-developed regions. Liberal Canadian values will drive the government to stay engaged in the region, principally through multilateral institutions such as the Organization of American States, but the effort will always be secondary, especially as there is no sizeable Canadian domestic constituency demanding action in Latin America. The claim that the countries of Latin America merit special attention because they are Canada's "neighbours" is incorrect: geographically, historically, demographically and politically, Toronto and Montreal are closer to London and Paris than they are to Buenos Aires or Brasilia.<sup>90</sup> The 17 July 2007 announcement by the Prime Minister of Canada notwithstanding, any surge in engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is not likely to outlast the current government.

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<sup>90</sup> Kinsman, Jeremy, "Intereses y valores en la política exterior de Canadá", *Política Exterior*, Vol. XXI, Núm. 120, Noviembre/Diciembre 2007. pp.109-110.

## CHAPTER 5: THE CANADIAN FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

5.1. The roles of the Canadian Forces are:<sup>91</sup>

- a. protect Canada and Canadians, at home and abroad;
- b. defend North America in partnership with the United States; and
- c. contribute to international peace and security.

5.2. The Canadian Forces has, and has had in the past, only limited engagement in the Caribbean and even less in Latin America, all under the rubric of contributing to international peace and security. The region is generally peaceful: there are no inter-state military conflicts, although security issues such as drug trafficking and related organized crime and narco-terrorism occasionally heighten tensions between states. The region is subject to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, which occasionally demand relief aid. With the exception of Haiti there are no on-going situations that require large-scale external military intervention.

5.3. Recent Operations. The Canadian Forces have conducted operations in only two countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in the past 10 years. In contrast, the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command website<sup>92</sup> lists 17 current operations and 39 past operations in other regions during the same period.

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<sup>91</sup> Government of Canada, Defence Policy Statement, *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence*, April 2005. ([http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/pdf/dps\\_e.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/pdf/dps_e.pdf))

<sup>92</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, *Past Operations*, website, 29 February 2008. ([http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/pastops\\_e.asp](http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/pastops_e.asp))

- a. Honduras, November 1998 - December 1998.<sup>93</sup> In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, the Canadian Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), deployed to La Cieba, Honduras, with 180 personnel organized in medical, engineering, logistics and security sections. The mission priorities were: sanitation and water treatment to stop the spread of disease; delivery of emergency health care to the injured and sick; provision of emergency electrical power; and rebuilding bridges and clearing landmines.
  
- b. Haiti, March 2004 – Present
  - (1) OP HALO, March 2004 – July 2004. The Canadian Forces deployed about 500 personnel and six helicopters to Haiti as part of a United Nations-sanctioned force. The initial Multinational Interim Force (MIF) had a 90-day mandate to contribute to a secure and stable environment in Haiti, to facilitate the delivery of relief aid to those in need, and to help the Haitian Police and Coast Guard maintain law and order and protect human rights. The Canadian Forces contingent stayed on to assist with the transition to the follow-on United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).<sup>94</sup>
  - (2) OP HAMLET, May 2004 - Present. The Canadian Forces continues to provide four staff officers in senior positions at MINUSTAH headquarters.<sup>95</sup>

5.4. Past Operations. The Canadian Forces participated in six United Nations peacekeeping operations in Central America (3) and Haiti (3 consecutive) during the 1990s:

- a. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, November 1989 - January 1992. The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was established “to verify compliance by the Central American

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<sup>93</sup> Canadian Forces, *Operation Central*, website, 16 April 2007.  
[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/central\\_e.asp](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/central_e.asp)

<sup>94</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, *Operation HALO*, website, 26 February 2008  
[http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/halo/index\\_e.asp](http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/halo/index_e.asp)

<sup>95</sup> Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, *Operation HAMLET*, website, 26 February 2008.  
[http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/hamlet/index\\_e.asp](http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/site/ops/hamlet/index_e.asp)

Governments with their undertakings to cease aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements in the region and not to allow their territory to be used for attacks on other States. In addition, ONUCA played a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance and monitored a ceasefire and the separation of forces agreed by the Nicaraguan parties as part of the demobilization process.”<sup>96</sup> The Canadian Forces provided a rotary-wing aviation unit of 8 helicopters, as well as Military Observers.<sup>97</sup> From December 1990 to May 1991, the United Nations Chief Military Observer was a Canadian Brigadier-General.<sup>98</sup> 350 Canadian Forces personnel participated in the mission, with up to 174 personnel deployed at one time: the majority with the helicopter unit and no more than 30 as Military Observers.<sup>99</sup>

- b. El Salvador, July 1991 - April 1995. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established “to verify implementation of all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional.”<sup>100</sup> The Canadian Forces provided Military Observers: 25 personnel participated in the mission<sup>101</sup>, with up to 11 deployed at one time.<sup>102</sup>
- c. Haiti, October 1994 – June 1996. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established in September 1993 “to assist the democratic

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<sup>96</sup> United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America*, website. (<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuca.htm>)

<sup>97</sup> Department of National Defence, Policy Group, *Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations*, website, 18 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7D>)

<sup>98</sup> United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America - ONUCA*, website. (<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuca.htm>)

<sup>99</sup> Veterans Affairs Canada, *ONUCA – OP SULTAN*, website, 26 March 2003.

(<http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/cmdp/mainmenu/group07/onuca>)

<sup>100</sup> United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America - ONUSAL*, website. ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/onusal.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/onusal.htm))

<sup>101</sup> Veterans Affairs Canada, *ONUSAL*, website, 26 March 2003.

(<http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/cmdp/mainmenu/group07/onusal>)

<sup>102</sup> Department of National Defence, Policy Group, *Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations*, website, 18 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7D>)

Government to sustain a stable environment, professionalize the armed forces and create a separate police force, and establish an environment conducive to free and fair elections.”<sup>103</sup> Canada provided up to 500 military personnel, including a rotary-wing aviation unit, and approximately 100 civilian police at any given time to UNMIH.<sup>104</sup>

- d. Haiti, July 1996 – July 1997. The United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established “to assist the Government in the professionalization of the police, maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive to the success of efforts to establish and train an effective national police force, and to coordinate activities of the United Nations system in promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation.”<sup>105</sup> Canada provided civilian police and up to 750 military personnel to UNSMIH, including an infantry battalion, an aviation unit, an engineering company and security personnel.<sup>106</sup>
- e. Guatemala, January 1997 – May 1997. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) was established “to verify the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca”.<sup>107</sup> The Canadian Forces provided 15 Spanish-speaking Military Observers to the mission.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America - UNMIH*, website. ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmih.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmih.htm))

<sup>104</sup> Department of National Defence, Policy Group, *Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations*, website, 18 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7D>)

<sup>105</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America - UNSMIH*, website. ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unsmih.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unsmih.htm))

<sup>106</sup> Department of National Defence, Policy Group, *Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations*, website, 18 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7D>)

<sup>107</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America - MINUGUA*, website. ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/minugua.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/minugua.htm))

<sup>108</sup> Department of National Defence, Policy Group, *Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations*, website, 18 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7D>)

- f. Haiti, July 1997 - November 1997. The mandate of the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) was to assist the government of Haiti by supporting and contributing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police. The Canadian Forces contingent of up to 650 personnel included a reconnaissance battalion to conduct patrols and other operations in Port-au-Prince and throughout Haiti; a helicopter squadron to provide casualty evacuation services, a 24-hour mission capability, and a medium airlift capability; a military police platoon to provide criminal investigation services; a Military Information Support Team to provide the civilian population with timely, accurate information about UN activities; and a Logistics Group.<sup>109</sup>
- g. Haiti, December 1997 – February 2000. The task of the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH), which succeeded UNTMIH, was to assist in the professionalization of the Haitian national police.<sup>110</sup> The Canadian Forces provided armoured vehicles, with technicians and driving instructors, until February 2000.<sup>111</sup>

#### 5.5. Canadian Defence Attachés

- a. The Canadian Forces has five Defence Attachés covering Latin America<sup>112</sup> and the Caribbean:

(1) Canadian Defence Attaché Mexico City, Mexico (cross-accredited to Belize, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama);

<sup>109</sup> Canadian Forces, *Operation Constable*, website, 16 April 2007.

([http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/constable\\_e.asp](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Operations/constable_e.asp))

<sup>110</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Completed Peacekeeping Operations – Central America - MIPONUH*, website. ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/miponuh.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/miponuh.htm))

<sup>111</sup> Department of National Defence, Policy Group, *Past Canadian Commitments to United Nations and other Peace Support Operations*, website, 18 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id=%7B4433D831-9230-4572-B297-CEA4F4C1DA3D%7D>)

<sup>112</sup> Canadian Forces, Director of Protocol and Foreign Liaison 2-3, *Canadian Defence Attaché Locator List 2007-2008*, 22 October 2007.

- (2) Canadian Defence Attaché Bogotá, Colombia (cross-accredited to Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela);
- (3) Canadian Defence Attaché Buenos Aires, Argentina (cross-accredited to Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay); and
- (4) Canadian Defence Attaché Brasilia, Brazil (cross-accredited to Guyana and Suriname).
- (5) In addition, a Canadian officer stationed at the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff in Washington is accredited to the Dominican Republic as Defence Attaché and to Jamaica as Defence Advisor.

b. The Defence Attaché offices in Latin America consist of two people: the Defence Attaché, a Colonel or Captain (Navy); and an Administrative Assistant, Sergeant or Petty Officer 2<sup>nd</sup> Class. The functions of the Defence Attaché are:<sup>113</sup>

- (1) Management of the bilateral defence relations program;
- (2) Information collection, initial analysis and reporting;
- (3) Assistance with Canadian Forces international operations;
- (4) Assistance with bilateral defence materiel cooperation; and
- (5) Management of the Defence Program in the mission.

5.6. Military Training Assistance Programme. The Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) is a key instrument of Canada's foreign policy and defence diplomacy, promoting Canadian interests and values abroad and contributing to international peace and security. The three major training areas under the MTAP are language training to facilitate communication among international forces; staff and technical training to improve the interoperability capacity of foreign armed forces; and peace operations education to improve military and civilian participants' understanding of multi-lateral stability operations.

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<sup>113</sup> Canadian Forces, Director of Protocol and Foreign Liaison Briefing Note, *Canadian Defence Attaché Program*, June 2005. ([www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/units/dpfl2/docs/CDAAA-Synopsis\\_e.pdf](http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/units/dpfl2/docs/CDAAA-Synopsis_e.pdf))

- a. The objectives of the MTAP are to promote Canadian foreign and defence policy interests; target assistance to achieve influence in areas of strategic interest to Canada; promote Canadian bilateral defence relations; raise Canada's independent national profile as a valuable player in the international arena; build peace support operations capacity among Canada's peacekeeping partners; contribute to the international campaign against terrorism through select assistance; and promote democratic principles, the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and international stability.<sup>114</sup>
  
- b. There are 70 active members of the programme, of which 20 are from Latin America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.<sup>115, 116</sup>
  
- c. “The Caribbean Junior Command and Staff College, based in Jamaica, is a cooperative venture between Canada and Jamaica, with support from the UK and other Caribbean states. Members of the Canadian Forces deploy annually to Jamaica to help administer and run the yearly staff course, while some Canadian officers participate as students. The CJCSC provides the only source of in-theatre Staff College training for the Caribbean states, and forms a key element in the ability of officers from this region to participate effectively in international peacekeeping operations.”<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Department of National Defence, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), *Military Training Assistance Program Background and Strategic Relevance*, website, 21 June 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id={75991DE6-7D4D-4C4B-988C-0EFE4AB4EE47}>)

<sup>115</sup> Department of National Defence, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), *Military Training Assistance Program Membership*, website, 11 July 2007.

(<http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id={5C707E11-40AB-48A1-8613-BF3DE0712F63}>)

<sup>116</sup> “Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras became MTAP members on 1 April 2008.”

(Note from Patrick Henrichon, 6 May 2008)

<sup>117</sup> Rasiulis, Andrew P., “The Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP): An Instrument Of Military Diplomacy”, *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Autumn 2001. pp.63-64.

([www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no3/pdf/63-64\\_e.pdf](http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol2/no3/pdf/63-64_e.pdf))

- d. MTAP sponsors peacekeeping operations seminars in Latin America, at the Chilean, Argentinean and Uruguayan peacekeeping training centres, and at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington.
  
- e. Funding for individual training and education at Canadian military institutions is based upon the number of available vacancies at the institutions. The regionally-oriented Directorates within the Department of National Defence Policy Group, such as the Directorate of Western Hemisphere Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean, make recommendations as to which countries should be offered positions on specific courses. Normally, but not exclusively, the selected countries are members of the MTAP.

5.7. Inter-American Defense Board. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was established in 1942 to “provide a means of systematic communication and coordination between the militaries of the Hemisphere, and to serve as a powerful symbol of hemispheric unity.”<sup>118</sup> However, the IADB was never granted any real power by its member states. There was no formal hemispheric military alliance, no operational command and control structure, and no troops assigned to the IADB.<sup>119</sup> Membership in the IADB gave the Latin American and Caribbean nations the sense that they were participating in hemispheric defence planning, while the U.S. continued to act unilaterally or to make bilateral arrangements instead of pinning its hopes on effective hemisphere-wide military cooperation. When the Organization of American States was formed in 1948, the idea of absorbing the IADB was rejected. For years, Canada was reluctant to join the IADB because of its restricted hemispheric participation, outdated mandate and lack of civilian oversight. Canada only joined the IADB in 2003, after the membership had expanded to include many Caribbean states and after a greater proportion of the member states had become democracies rather than military dictatorships. It also appeared that the organization would establish a formal link with the Organization of American States

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<sup>118</sup> Weidner, Glenn R., *Overcoming the Power Gap: Reorienting the Inter-American System for Hemispheric Security*, Harvard, June 1998.

<sup>119</sup> Battaglia, Diane, *Institutional Leadership of the Inter-American Defense Board*, Monograph, Inter-American Defense College, May 2005. p.1.

(completed on 16 March 2006: “Under the new institutional framework, the IADB will provide technical and educational advice and consultancy services to the OAS and its member states on military and defense matters.”<sup>120</sup>) and that the IADB would transform into an effective organization delivering concrete results (still to be achieved). The Canadian Defence Attaché (Major-General) in Washington is appointed the Chief of Delegation to the IADB as a secondary duty; a Lieutenant-Colonel, also in Washington, has the primary responsibility for the IADB file.

5.8. Other Inter-American Defence Institutions. Canadian representatives participate in the biennial Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas and the meetings of the service-specific organizations: the Conference of American Armies (CAA); the Inter-American Naval Conference (IANC); and Sistema de Cooperación entre las Fuerzas Aéreas Americanas (SICOFAA).

5.9. Summary. Canadian Forces permanent engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is minimal: four full-time and one part-time Defence Attachés to cover the region; one Lieutenant-Colonel dedicated to Inter-American Defense Board issues; and a few staff officers who deal with specific meetings on an as-required basis; in addition to the normal complement of strategic-level policy, operations contingency planning and intelligence staff dedicated to every geographical region. The Military Training Assistance Program applies to some Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is always the possibility of humanitarian relief operations and small-scale (individuals rather than units) participation in peacekeeping in the region, but little likelihood of Canadian participation in warfighting or large-scale peace operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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<sup>120</sup> Organization of American States, *Key OAS Issues: Multidimensional Security*, website, July 2007. ([http://www.oas.org/key%5Fissues/eng/KeyIssue\\_Detail.asp?kis\\_sec=9](http://www.oas.org/key%5Fissues/eng/KeyIssue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=9))

## CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. In the Caribbean, Haiti will require ongoing external support for many years. U.S. interest in the political transition in Cuba, the largest of the Caribbean islands, coupled with U.S. inability to directly engage Cuba opens an opportunity for Canada to act as the principal intermediary between the two governments. A representative of the Canadian Forces could play the same role between the two militaries.

Recommendation. A new Canadian Defence Attaché should be located in Cuba and cross-accredited to the Dominican Republic and to Jamaica, as well as more generally responsible for the Caribbean (especially Haiti).

6.2. Canadians have more historic, cultural, linguistic and family ties to the Caribbean than to Latin America. The small Caribbean states have small economic links with Canada, but the economic interdependence of Canada with Latin America is still small relative to the other regions of the world. There is no potential military threat to Canada emanating from Latin America and little prospect of large-scale Canadian military operations in the region. The present, minimal level of defence liaison and aid is appropriate.

Recommendation. No change to the current level of Canadian Forces engagement in Latin America.

## CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

7.1. Canadian foreign policy is motivated by values and constrained by interests. While the introduction to Canada's International Policy Statement correctly asserts that, "there is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada doing good",<sup>121</sup> Canada cannot solve every problem in the world. External and internal influences determine in which regions and situations Canada will intervene.

7.2. Latin America and the Caribbean are low priority, relative to other parts of the world that are more troubled or more interdependent with Canada. Problems in Latin America and the Caribbean that could affect Canadian interests are no worse than similar problems in Africa, South East Asia and the Middle East. Crushing poverty and insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean are painful to observe, but few Canadians actually notice and the problems of the region have few immediate consequences in Canada.

7.3. Economic interdependence between Canada and Latin America, and Canada and the Caribbean, is growing but is still relatively small. Canadian historic and cultural ties are greater with the Caribbean than with Latin America; immigrants from the Caribbean are more numerous and more politically influential in Canada.

7.4. There is little likelihood of significant Canadian Forces operations in Latin America or the Caribbean, except for humanitarian disaster relief missions, in the short to medium term. The current minimal level of Canadian Forces liaison and aid to Latin America is appropriate; engagement should be expanded slightly in the Caribbean, with the addition of a Defence Attaché in Cuba.

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<sup>121</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World*. Ottawa: April 2005. Foreward. (<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-overview3-en.aspx>)

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